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9Voorwoord (Preface in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift zal openen met het verhaal van Khadija, de vrouw die volgens de overlevering 
cruciaal was voor Mohammed om te bereiken wat hem ten doel was gesteld. Zij was een 
leermeester voor hem. Zij was een schouder. Zij geloofde in hem. Ook dit proefschrift had ik 
zonder de hulp, de steun en het vertrouwen van de mensen om mij heen nooit kunnen voltooien
 Het gedrukte proefschrift zoals het er nu ligt, daarvoor ben ik dank verschuldigd aan  twee 
mensen die hun (creativi)tijd met mij hebben willen delen. Sjors, wat ben ik blij dat jij zei een 
bibliografie maken ‘leuk’ te vinden. Er staat altijd een kop thee klaar voor een gezellig of 
goed gesprek. Bas, jouw passie voor lettertypes en het kunnen doorstaan van mijn kritiek op 
kommaniveau is roemenswaardig. Ik hoop dat je net zo blij bent met het eindresultaat als ik. Laat 
je me nu de komende zondagen gewoon weer rustig lezen?
 Binnen de opleiding Politicologie aan de RU kreeg ik de kans en de ruimte om les te geven 
en ook de ruimte om daarin mijn eigen weg te vinden. Voor het creëren van die ruimtes dank 
ik in het bijzonder Bob, Anna, Mieke, Jeroen, Karen en Monique. Door ‘mijn’ studenten ben 
ik gedwongen zaken scherp te stellen en ze zorgden voor de (on)nodige afleiding. Ik ben 
ontzettend trots op jullie groeiende kritische geesten en de openheid die we samen creëren in 
deze opleiding. Van deze ervaring en sfeer is mijn proefschrift zeker beter geworden.
 Dit brengt me ook meteen bij mijn collegae (en soms oud-docenten). Binnen Politicologie 
alsook binnen de ‘groep Jeroen’ bij Economie heb ik kunnen wortelen. Ik waag me hier niet aan 
het noemen van namen, maar jullie weten hoe goed ik mij voel in Nijmegen en ik heb veel van 
jullie geleerd. De RU is voor mij een plek waar analytisch denken centraal staat, waar we ons 
scherpen aan elkaar, waar ik ondanks enig groen achter de oren serieus genomen ben, en waar we 
ook simpelweg plezier hebben.
 Specifiek rond het schrijven van dit proefschrift dank ik de collegae die me in een 
proefpromotie hebben voorbereid op de openbare verdediging met hun helse vragen, en de aio’s 
van grofweg ‘onze generatie’ met wie ik lief, leed en borrels heb gedeeld tijdens, of beter na, 
het schrijven. Ellen, Gerry, Janine, Kristof, Marco, Sandrino, Saskia, Stijn, Yvette, jullie zijn toffe 
mensen.
 Het borrelen heeft zich echter niet beperkt tot collegae. En waar ik zeker af en toe wat 
meer tijd aan mijn vrienden had willen besteden, prijs ik me vooral gelukkig aan de sterke band 
die we hebben en de afleiding en steun die jullie me geven. Meike, mijn ethische kompas, het 
vertrouwen dat jij en Annemarie me hebben gegeven is onmenselijk menselijk. Hopelijk blijf je je 
ongezouten meningen en waarnemingen met me delen. Wilma, er moet toch ergens een aardlijn 
lopen die ons in één huis bracht. Ik bewonder je kracht, vrijheid en positiviteit, en hoop daar van 
te blijven leren. Oh ja, en voor elke afwasbeurt, mag je gewoon een whiskey pakken. Monique, 
behalve mijn ‘oudste’, ben je ook mijn meest directe vriendin. Menig kapsel, schoeisel en 
kledingstuk heb je afgekeurd en juist daarom ben ik zo op je gesteld. Nog lang zul je mijn reality 
check zijn, ook al luister ik zo slecht. Karen, de enige persoon waarmee ik steeds in de slappe lach 
schiet en met wie het tegelijkertijd zo vanzelfsprekend is om onzekerheden te delen. Wat ben 
ik blij dat je me toen bij de inschrijving uit de rij plukte. Bart, Ralf, Rick en Rogier, al langer dan 
ons halve leven zijn we ook een geoliede groep met allemaal een eigen rol, eigenaardigheden 
en onderlinge banden. Onze verschillen en gedeelde geschiedenis zijn me erg waardevol. Nog 
menig weekeinde hoop ik lekker een boek te lezen terwijl jullie voorbij komen mountainbiken.
 Waar ik wellicht her en der iemand te weinig aandacht heb gegeven, stonden mijn (co)
promotoren altijd voor mij klaar en gaven ze richting waar nodig. De hoeveelheid vertrouwen 
en  de vrijheid die jullie me hebben geschonken vind ik bijzonder. Bob, het ontvangen van de 
hoofdstukken met jouw commentaar was altijd spannend en je kritiek haarscherp. Dat moet  
je menig rode pen gekost hebben. Ook was je een strenge procesbewaker, maar met een zeer 
menselijke kant als het nodig was en dat waardeer ik enorm. Heb ik je weten te verleiden om 
ooit nog eens statistisch onderzoek te doen? Jeroen, het is niet overdreven om te zeggen dat jij 
mijn grootste leermeester bent geweest in statistiek en databewerking, en je hebt me geleerd 
de o zo belangrijke artikelen te schrijven. Aan het begin van het proces kende je me niet en je 
kon toen niet weten hoe eigenwijs ik zijn kan; later wel. Toch heb je me gaandeweg veel ruimte 
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gegeven om mijn weg te gaan en hebben we regelmatig samen zitten discussiëren over hoe iets 
aan te pakken. Voor mij is dat een heel belangrijke ‘vote of confidence’ geweest. Dank voor alles! 
Mieke, jij hebt voor mij een deur geopend waarvan ik het bestaan niet kende. Gezien het plezier 
dat ik aan de universiteit beleef, hoop ik dat ik ooit een vergelijkbare rol voor een of meerdere 
studenten mag vervullen. Als promotor viel je vinger altijd op de zere plek als ik even vast zat 
met een paper of hoofdstuk, en ook in onze gesprekken over ‘het leven’ wist je mij als geen 
ander te analyseren. Ik maak graag met respect en bewondering een diepe buiging voor je, als 
wetenschapper en mens.
 Dan mijn paranimfen en zo veel meer. Kristof, je bent de laatste collega hier in het rijtje, maar 
je bent bovenal een hele goede vriend. In wetenschap, spel en discussie een ware uitdager; op 
andere fronten een steun en toeverlaat. Je hebt zo’n beetje elke persoonlijke en professionele 
crisis van me meegemaakt en er was altijd tijd voor koffie of zelfs een verplicht tripje naar de 
stad. Dat de muntthee nog rijkelijk mag vloeien.
Het belang van mijn evenknie, mijn zusje krijg ik hier simpelweg niet uitgedrukt. Voor 
Mohammed was er eigenlijk maar één Khadija; ik kan en wil me geen leven voorstellen zonder 
Rieke. Als twee deviant cases hebben we onze eigen weg weten te vinden. Dat is niet altijd 
makkelijk, maar met z’n tweeën een stuk leuker en ook wat beter te doen. Ik kan je niet noemen 
om een specifieke reden, maar enkel om je zijn.
 En dan rest mij enkel nog te eindigen met de mensen waar het allemaal begon: ons pap en 
mam. Ondanks onze rare nukken, komen jullie op voor je kinderen en staan achter ons. Jullie 
hebben ons de ruimte en middelen gegeven om te zijn wie we zijn en ons te ontwikkelen, ook 
al is het soms – tenminste dat stel ik me zo voor – moeilijk om te begrijpen wat ons drijft en hoe 
ons leven er uit ziet. Van jullie heb ik ook meegekregen dat het niet moeilijk is om voor andere 
mensen klaar te staan. En wat blijkt, die anderen staan ook klaar voor jou als het nodig is, soms 
zelfs vrij onverwachts. Meer dan ooit hebben we dat begin dit jaar gemerkt. Het laatste rondje 
wijzingen aan dit proefschrift heb ik – ter afleiding – doorgevoerd in de familiekamers van de 
intensive care van het UMC St. Radboud, een aantal extreem zware dagen. Al met al bleek het 
geluk toch aan onze kant, en nu maken we gevieren mijn promotie mee alsook de start van Auke 
zijn leven. Ik ben ontzettend trots op jullie en ik weet dat jullie dat ook op ons zijn. 
Tegeltjeswijsheid of niet, zo’n proefschrift is echt maar relatief. Wat ik van de laatste jaren vooral 
zal onthouden zijn de warmte, steun en liefde van alle mooie mensen die me zo dierbaar zijn.
Niels 
september/oktober 2012
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1 This account of Khadija’s life and role in Muhammad’s was 
derived from several sources: Abdolah (2008: 40), Ahmed 
(1992: 42–3), Andersen, Seibert & Wagner (2012: 165), 
Geaves (2006: 58), Jansen (2009: 24–26), Mernissi (1993: 
152–3), and Moghadam (1988: 223).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Disconnected knowledge
1.1 KHadIja: tHe fIrSt – eConoMIC Independent – MuSLIM
She was born in the year 555 CE and was said to be both beautiful and wealthy, coming from 
a successful business family, and being the widow of a rich merchant. She was Khadija bint 
Khuwaylid, Muhammad’s first wife. After having lost her second husband, she led her own trade 
business. Laws did not prohibit public activities for women and as a widow, Khadija had the 
authority to make her own decisions. The young orphan Muhammad was one of the agents this 
economically independent woman hired. He, Muhammad, turned out to be gifted. At the age of 
forty, Khadija decided to ask Muhammad (25) to marry her. This is how she became his first wife. 
 Khadija also became the first Muslim. When Muhammad received his first revelations, Khadija 
is said to have been of great moral support and encouraged him in his endeavour, besides learning 
him to read and write. Her wealth (housing, network, resources) gave Muhammad the opportunity 
to perform the task he believed was assigned to him. Till her death (619 CE), Muhammad did not 
marry another woman.1
Khadija’s story seems contradictory to our common belief as well as the scientific knowledge 
about the (economic) position and role of women in Muslim cultures. Inglehart & Norris (2003a: 
68–9, 73) conclude that “the real fault line between the West and Islam … concerns gender 
equality and sexual liberalisation. … Today, these divergent values constitute the real clash 
between Islamic societies and the West.” Hirsi Ali (2006: xi) substantiates this by saying that 
“Islam is … a culture in which women were the property of their fathers, brothers, uncles, 
grandfathers, or guardians. The essence of a woman is reduced to her hymen. Her veil functions 
as a constant reminder to the outside world of this stifling morality that makes Muslim men the 
owners of women”. On the specific topic of economic participation, scholars have drawn similar 
conclusions: “Islam, with its strong emphasis on separate spheres for men and women … ha[s] 
blocked women from acknowledged entry into the paid work force” (Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991: 
59–60); and “obstacles to female participation include religion … Religious norms … discourage 
female labor force participation most strongly in Islamic countries” (Lincove, 2008: 50, 57).
 When Islam is part of the public and scientific debate – and the last decades it often has 
been – prominent politicians, opinion leaders, and social scientists do not shy away from making 
strong and wide-ranging claims, and often the (‘dreadful’) position of women in Islam and Muslim 
countries is involved. The simplistic (scientific) rhetoric deludes us into believing that we should 
focus on Islam as the single explanatory factor, whereas on many of the issues regarding the 
position of women in Islam or in Muslim countries our knowledge is still limited and patchy. I 
argue that truly to understand the position of women in Muslim countries, a comprehensive 
framework is necessary. A framework that starts from the complexity and interrelatedness of 
the many different influences, and I will develop such a framework for women’s employment. 
Economic independence is one of the dimensions vital to the position and empowerment of 
women and, derived from this, paid employment (see Farah, 2006; Fergany, Jad, Abdellatif, 
Al-Kitbi, Farahat, Manna & Silini, 2006; Metcalfe, 2011; Moghadam, 2003). Thus, this study shall 
try to understand and explain women’s paid employment status in Muslim countries, and in 
particular the differences among and within these countries.
 Broadly defined, the ‘Islamic civilisation’ or the group of Muslim countries includes countries 
such as Indonesia and Iran, Somalia and Syria, Bangladesh and Burkina Faso, Tajikistan and 
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia and Senegal.
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 There are great differences between the positions of women in these countries. For instance, 
women’s participation in the non-agricultural labour market is said to range from around 5% in 
Algeria and Yemen, to about 50% in Brunei and Uzbekistan (Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). 
Within the borders of each individual country, economic positions differ too: of the women living 
in Ouagadougou, to take Burkina Faso for instance, 65% is non-agriculturally employed, while 
this level is about 26% in the Hauts-Bassins region and 3% in the Eastern province (see Chapter 
5). This diversity among and within Muslim countries seems to contest the claim that Islam is 
the most important aspect determining (limiting) women’s employment positions in Muslim 
countries. Generalisations at the level of a ‘civilisation’ (e.g. Anker, 1998; Clark, 1992; Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b) clearly tend to 
ignore “‘the internal dynamics and plurality’ of Muslim nations” (Davis & Robinson, 2006: 167).
 This diversity should not lead us to believe that the low levels of employment in some Muslim 
countries should be denied or ignored. Despite the fact that Muhammad’s first wife Khadija – 
the first Muslim – was economic independent, an active entrepreneur and even Muhammad’s 
employer (Ahmed, 1992), I realise that women’s employment is relatively low in some Muslim 
and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries (see also Fergany et.al., 2006; 
Moghadam, 2004; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). Also the average employment level is rather 
low. However, such an average obscures differences, and focussing too much on a low average 
draws attention away from important explanatory factors. Thus, the finding that employment 
levels are low can hardly be called a useful conclusion that helps to understand the position of 
women in Muslim countries. The diversity among and within Muslim countries does tell us that a 
more fitting explanation is needed. The academic and societal relevance of understanding why 
women’s employment is low in some (parts of) countries and higher in others creates an ideal 
starting point for academic research.
1.2 tHe aBSent fIeLd of woMen’S eMpLoyMent In MuSLIM CountrIeS
the Arab Middle East … has not figured prominently in the literature on women’s employment and 
yet is fertile ground for … investigation (Miles, 2002: 413)
Over the last decades, several scholars have articulated that research on the incentives and 
restrictions affecting women’s employment in Muslim countries or in the Middle East, though 
badly needed, is lacking (e.g. Abu Nasr, Khoury & Azzam, 1985; Fergany et.al., 2006; Hijab, 1988; 
Kapteijns, 1998; Moghadam, 2003; Syed, 2008: 136). Parallel to these scientific cries for more 
attention – and parallel to the growing prominence of Islam and of Muslim countries in popular 
media after 9/11 –, the number of studies on women’s employment has risen during the last ten 
to fifteen years. In that sense, the literature and our knowledge of this topic have been growing. 
However, the results of this growth have been limited due to the fragmented nature of this body 
of work.
 The current literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries is highly fragmented 
in terms of their levels of analysis (e.g. individuals, households, and countries), method (case 
studies, participatory observation, and statistical analysis), theoretical specificity (general or 
meta-theory to single variable-focussed theories), as well as their explanatory focus (economics, 
politics, religion, …). Although there are solid scientific studies on women’s employment in 
Muslim countries, there is no comprehensive vision that helps us relate different parts of the 
literature to each other, that tells us how to proceed and identify the most pressing scientific 
problems.
 The importance of such a vision is crucial to scientific progress, as is for instance shown in 
Kuhn’s discussion of normal science. Kuhn (1996: 24) described normal science as “increasing the 
extent of the match between those facts [that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing] 
and the paradigm’s prediction, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.” When there 
is a disagreement between the applied theory and observations, a problem is born (ibid: 32, 
34). The work of ‘normal scientists’, then, is focussed on solving these problems. This process 
resembles the solving of puzzles, because the normal scientist is convinced that there is a 
22
3 This problem of fragmentation does not seem to be 
unique to women’s employment (either in the Muslim 
countries, Middle East, or overall). Rosenberg & Howard 
(2008) in their review of feminist sociology see it in the 
4 These issues are not only discussed when women’s 
employment in Muslim countries is studied, but they are 
also often found in the broader literature on women’s 
economic position in developing economies.
2 The journal Feminist Economics has planned a special issue 
on ‘Gender and Economics in Muslim communities’ in 
2014.
whole field of sociology, due to the broad scope and many 
different explanatory foci when it comes to people in 
social structures (see also Stacey &Thorne, 1996).
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solution to the problem that would eliminate any ambiguity and ultimately proves the existing 
theory to be valid (ibid: 36–43). Only by the identification of problems, an understanding of the 
world will be further advanced. In other words, a paradigm is needed as a guide and overarching 
set of rules that helps scientists to focus in the scientific enterprise: which facts to investigate, 
which theories to articulate and how to match facts and theory. In the case of a fragmented 
literature in which there is no common understanding of the studied phenomenon, we can speak 
of a ‘pre-paradigm’ period without reciprocal constructive communication.
 The lack of conferences on the topic of this dissertation, the nonexistence of specialised 
institutes, and the absence of major journals’ special issues all contribute to, and are indicators 
of, the absence of such communication.2 For instance, Pettit & Hook observe that: “The 
polarisation of research on women’s employment into traditions emphasising either micro 
or macro determinants of women’s employment ignores the relationship between individual 
employment decisions and institutional conditions” (2005: 780). Pettit & Hook are talking 
about Western women’s employment – a far richer literature in terms of publications – but this 
statement certainly holds for Muslim countries as well. In the same vein, Moghadam argues 
for a more comparative approach, which “is rarely applied to the Middle East, and even less 
so to women in Muslim societies in general” (2003: 2). Drawing on Kuhn, I argue that we need 
a comprehensive framework to connect the existing knowledge on women’s employment in 
Muslim countries, and to identify scientific problems and puzzles in this area.3
 Before I briefly introduce the basic principles of such a theoretical framework, I will illustrate 
the consequences of fragmentation for some of the most prominent issues in the literature on 
women’s employment in Muslim countries: (1) the role of Islam; (2) the modernisation thesis; (3) 
the influence of education; (4) globalisation and shifts over time; and (5) the patriarchal gender 
contract.4
1.2.1 WHAT’S ISL AM GOT TO DO WITH IT?
One major strand in the literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries focuses on 
the role of Islam from a global, comparative perspective: these studies – mostly quantitative 
research – compare the group of Muslim countries as a whole with other groups of countries 
in the world. The difference in averages between these ‘civilisations’ is then attributed to the 
negative influence of Islam. This is what I will call the ‘civilisationist’ school (this school includes 
works such as Anker, 1998; Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Clark, 1992; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 
2003b; Lincove, 2008; Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007). This civilisationist view is problematic on 
at least three counts.
 Firstly, the reasoning or mechanism underlying this approach focuses on Islam as a religion of 
a very traditional nature with an ideology opposed to women entering employment, but rarely 
specifies how the traditionalism of Islam is translated from a worldview or ideology into the 
practice of women’s employment. Is it by policy, by the personal views of the women themselves, 
by peer pressure, by laws? Distinguishing between the message and the way the message 
is transmitted can help us to understand the possible influence of Islam and may reveal that 
different Islams at different levels can simultaneously influence women, that Islam is multivocal 
(Badran, 2001; Spierings, 2007; 2009b). Part of answering the question how Islam might 
influence women’s employment is finding the level at which it is (most) effective: that of society 
(through norms, religious laws, or state policies) or that of the individual (through religious 
beliefs and household decisions)?
 Secondly, we may question whether there actually is a relationship between Islam and 
women’s employment. According to some scholars, it seems that the differences between 
religions are overestimated because other important factors are not taken into account. For 
instance, the most traditional of the Muslim countries are the oil-rich and Arab countries (e.g. Ross, 
2001; Stepan & Robertson, 2003), and women’s employment is also said to be influenced by the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the region (e.g. Khattab, 2002). At the individual level, differences between 
Muslim and non-Muslim women within a country might overlap with class and educational 
segregation differences (e.g. Droeber, 2003; Moghadam, 2003). Not taking these aspects into 
account might bias research results in favour of Islam as the single negative explanation.
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 Thirdly, we can question – in line with the two previous points – whether the existing 
empirical research (almost solely statistical country-level comparative analyses in which the 
percentage of Muslim is an explanatory factor) truly assesses the possible influence of Islam. 
Analyses limited to the aggregate level and to religious denomination as the single explanation 
are insufficient to support the conclusion that Islam has an unequivocally negative influence on 
women’s employment.
1.2.2 MUSLIMS’ MODERN WAY
In the last decades, modernisation has been regarded as an important driving force behind 
change in Muslim countries, and the position of women is often expected to have improved from 
this development, at least to some extent (e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1998; Jaquette, 1982; Lenski & 
Nolan, 1984; Lerner, 1958; Mernissi, 1987; Moghadam, 2003; Rukhsana, 2004; see also Jaquette, 
1982; Walby, 2009: 24–35). However, there are different ideas about the specific role of 
modernisation and about its exact influence.
 In their general theories on modernisation both Lerner (1958) and Inglehart (1997) suppose 
it to be fuelled by increased interaction between people, in particular with people from other 
social backgrounds. This increase is mainly due to technological advancement, industrialisation, 
urbanisation, mass media, and education. As a result, expectations and ambitions change, 
people become more critical (Lerner, 1958), and their values shift from traditional to secular-
rational (Lerner, 1958; Inglehart, 1997). In this process, women are expected to enter the paid 
labour force (Inglehart, 1997). According to Lerner (1958: 89) the “secular trend [is] unilateral 
in direction – from traditional to participant lifeways”. In Lerner’s model, each country takes 
the same route to modernisation, only starting at different points in time. Inglehart agrees 
that modernisation is a global process, but he does draw attention to the existence of a 
cultural imprint: because cultural heritage has a lasting effect, countries at the same stage of 
industrialisation may not modernise to the same degree. The process of modernisation thus 
leads to parallel trajectories, not necessarily to converging values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
In connection with this, Islamic culture is said to have the strongest negative imprint on the 
modernisation process (Norris & Inglehart, 2002).
 Other scholars argue against the idea of one universal trajectory that leads to higher 
participation rates, either because some cultures or civilisations have characteristics that are 
completely incompatible with modernisation (e.g. Huntington, 1996; see also Walby, 2009), 
or because they believe there are different paths toward a modern society (e.g. Moghadam, 
2003). Also, several important studies question whether industrialisation is always conducive 
to modernisation and whether modernisation is always conducive to women’s employment. A 
first example is the classic article by Lenski & Nolan (1984), which shows that industrialisation 
has remarkably weaker effects in terms of fertility, education, and media in horticultural than 
in agricultural societies. Secondly, industrialisation can also harm the labour market position 
of women. The introduction of cash-crop agriculture has pushed many women out of the 
agricultural labour market, particularly in African countries (Bullock, 1994; Jaquette, 1982; 
Pampel & Tanaka, 1986). Thirdly, economic development and industrialisation based on oil 
revenues is said not to be conducive to female employment because of the type of industry it 
creates (male, labour extensive) (Moghadam, 1998; 2003; Ross, 2008).
1.2.3 SCHOOLGIRL
In many studies on employment in Muslim countries, or in developing countries for that matter, 
education is regarded as a very important factor in shaping people’s employment opportunities 
(for Muslim countries see: Aromolaran, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Glick & Sahn, 2005; 
Gunduz-Hosgor & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980; Khattab, 2002; Kuepie, Nordman 
& Roubaud, 2009; Moghadam, 2003). However, ideas about how, when, and what education is 
influential differ across the field.
 Human capital theory is possibly the framework for understanding why education is 
important and for whom, which is articulated in most detail. Based on the work of Becker 
(1965; 1981) and Mincer (1962; 1974), both Aromolaran (2004) and Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud 
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(2009) argue that people perform a cost-benefit analysis in deciding to work, weighing the 
opportunity costs of leaving the household against the wage benefits of a job. With education, 
people’s productivity rises and they will find better-paying jobs, which can then outweigh the 
additional opportunity costs of leaving the household. For instance, the increase in wage due 
to a higher educational level can cover the costs of letting someone else take care of household 
tasks.
 However, other parts of the literature suggest that education does more than just raise one’s 
income. It also means having more opportunities in terms of suitable jobs (Lincove, 2008), it is 
said to decrease fertility (Olmsted, 2003), and it may shift peoples’ ambitions and value patterns 
towards personal development (Azam, Abu Nasr & Lorfing, 1985; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980; 
Lincove, 2008).
 Regarding the level of education, there seems to be a general agreement about the strong 
and positive influence of tertiary education, whereby some studies also mention the strong 
potential of secondary or non-academic education (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Khattab, 2002). The 
latter types of education’s effects are less obvious in the literature, however. Furthermore, 
several studies argue that primary education actually leads to decreased employment: what is 
learned in primary school is more beneficial to the role of housewife and mother, and has less 
value on the labour market. The opportunity costs of employment here become greater than the 
benefits of the job (Aromolaran, 2004; Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud, 2009; Lincove, 2008).
 Studies also suggest that education is not always conducive to all forms of women’s 
employment. Thirty years ago Benería & Sen (1981: 298) already observed that: “Unless 
the systemic causes of unemployment are removed, women’s education by itself is purely 
an individualist solution.” According to Hirschman & Aghajanian (1980), education mainly 
encourages employment in the modern non-agricultural sectors. Calvès & Schoumaker (2004) 
find that it is paid employment in the traditional food and care sector instead, and Kuepie, 
Nordman & Roubaud (2009) speak of the encouraging of employment in the entire formal 
labour market. The presence of certain sectors and jobs might then also affect the added 
value of education, leading to different pay-offs of the same type of education in different 
areas (see also Miles, 2002; Pampel & Tanaka, 1986; Rani & Schmid, 2008; Tansel, 2002), but 
explanations of how labour market structures affect this added value are still underdeveloped. 
The same argument could be made for other contextual characteristics that are often ignored 
in understanding the effect of education, such as cultural norms (see Abu Lughod, 1998; Acar, 
2006; Jansen, 2006).
1.2.4 THE TIMES THE Y ARE A-CHANGING
A popular belief is that over time things will almost automatically change for the better: full 
employment of women will only be a matter of time, because modernisation is a linear process 
(see above), because globalisation will create more and more economic opportunities for women, 
and/or because the diffusion of equality norms is irreversible (e.g. Black & Rainerd, 2004; Gray, 
Kittilson & Sandholtz, 2006; Meyer, 2003; Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007). This 
almost devout belief heavily rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is that processes 
such as modernisation and globalisation take place in each part of the world and that these 
processes are largely unitary, which means that their effects all point in the same direction: 
towards increasing employment. The second assumption concerns the stability of effect through 
time: the effects of explanatory factors remain as strong in the future as they are now. Both 
assumptions are dubious, and doubting them in earnest raises new questions regarding the 
development of women’s employment in the long run.
 Regarding the first assumption, a closer look at globalisation may be insightful. Though the 
common denominator of globalisation definitions seems to be a focus on being less restricted 
by physical distances, it has become a container concept that includes phenomena as diverse 
as American cultural imperialism, economic liberalisation, and communicational closeness 
(television, internet) (cf. Moghadam, 2007; Scholte, 2001; Walby, 2009). These diverse aspects 
of globalisation can each have their own and different effect on women’s employment. In this 
light, we should understand Moghadam’s observation that ‘globalization has given rise to 
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contradictory tendencies and trends’ (2007: 2; see also Bergeron, 2001; Pyle & Ward, 2003). By 
doubting the first assumption, questions about the differential effect of various globalisation 
aspects can become part of our research agenda.
 A tangible example comes from the IMF’s and WorldBank’s Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), which are expected to benefit women. It is expected that the increased economic 
competition and trade caused by the SAPs will lead to new labour market opportunities 
for women, who are generally low-skilled and a cheap labour resource (e.g. Meyer, 2003; 
Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007). However, this reasoning mainly focuses on 
the economic liberalisation side of the SAPs, while these programmes often also include 
privatisation measures. Studies – in particular on Egypt – have shown that women’s employment 
opportunities declined due to privatisation because of cuts in the public sector (Moghadam, 
1998; Nassar, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; Posusney & Doumato, 2003).
 Based on the second assumption – the idea that micro-level effects remain stable in direction 
and size through time – we might also expect strong increases in women’s employment as long 
as we keep focusing on the driving forces behind women entering the labour market, such as 
increasing education levels and a decline in fertility. However, higher educational levels and 
lower fertility rates might be no guarantee for a future rise in employment figures. Will a further 
decline in the fertility rate lead to a similar increase in women’s labour market participation as 
it has in the last decades? Hardly any attention is given to questions such as this and results are 
discussed under the assumption of temporal stability: the literature’s implicit message is that 
effects do not change over time. On the topic of fertility we for instance see that empirically 
shown differences are ignored (e.g. Başlevent & Onaran, 2004), or that results are phrased in 
such a static way that they are easily understood as being valid for the future as well (e.g Khattab 
2002: 103).
1.2.5 IF YOU WERE A WOMAN AND I WAS A MAN
One of the often-mentioned social institutions of Muslim and/or Arab culture that is considered 
to shape women’s employment is the traditional family structure with extended patrilineal 
households (e.g. Fergany et.al., 2006: 173–4; Moghadam, 2003: 1; Read, 2002; 2004). Inspired by 
Pateman (1988) and the literature on Nordic countries, Moghadam (1998: 9) speaks of this issue in 
terms of a patriarchal gender contract, because that concept makes visible the taken-for-granted 
gendered structures in which multiple parties are involved (such as men, women, and the state). 
At the core of that patriarchal gender contract is the male breadwinner/female homemaker 
model (Moghadam, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1988). The importance of these roles is reflected in the 
effects of getting married and having children on women’s employment. Women without male 
relatives who provide a certain income can much easier step out of the role of homemaker and 
enter the labour market. In families with children, women are generally supposed to take on the 
care-provider role, more so than when no children are present in a household. Therefore, having 
children lowers women’s employment chances (e.g. Al-Qudsi, 1998; Aromolaran, 2004; Başlevent 
& Onaran, 2004; Glick & Sahn, 2005; Gunduz-Hosgor & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 
1980; Khattab, 2002).
 However, for societies in which the nuclear family is not the rule, as is the case in many of the 
countries studied in this thesis, the concept of a classic patriarchal gender contract with strict 
gender roles in the household division of labour suggests that other aspects of the household 
configuration can also be important in influencing women’s employment. Thinking through the 
concepts of the patrilineal household and the male breadwinner/female homemaker model (see 
Moghadam, 2003), we can expect that women’s employment is also influenced by whether the 
head of the household is a man (cf. Fergany et.al., 2006), the presence and number of other care 
consumers, care providers and income providers (cf. Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2010; Spitze, 
1988), the number of sons or brothers (cf. Miles, 2002), and the presence of adopted children 
(cf. Glick & Sahn, 1997). Some studies do include a variable related to one of these aspects, but 
despite the emphasis often put on the effects of patriarchy in Muslim countries, no systematic 
assessment exists that identifies the household structures through which patriarchy might 
influence women’s employment.
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1.3 CreatIng a CoMpreHenSIve fraMeworK
If we take a closer look at the themes discussed above, we can derive at least five underlying 
issues that stem from the field’s fragmentation: (a) causal mechanisms are underspecified 
and not related to other factors, in particularly when it comes to macro-level explanations 
(Islam, modernisation); (b) we know little about how the effects at the micro level differ 
among different geographical or temporal contexts (e.g. education, household structures); (c) 
general meta-level theories are barely translated to explanatory variables (e.g. modernisation, 
globalisation, patriarchy); (d) studies tend to be restricted to classic sociological and economic 
factors and variables. Other conceivably important explanatory factors are overlooked, because 
it is unclear where to look (e.g. household structures, Islamic institutions); and (e) there are no 
comprehensive systematic empirical analyses that test the general validity of results (household 
structures, education, Islam).
 Progress regarding these five issues can be made, and further problems distinguished, by 
using the new comprehensive theoretical framework that will be presented, applied, and tested 
in this dissertation. This framework is expected to offer a better understanding of women’s 
employment by identifying problems in the literature, providing solutions for contradictions 
found therein, and filling in its blank spots. The core elements of this framework are the 
following:
1) The world is conceptualised as a complex social reality in which different spheres of life are 
interconnected. For instance, economical circumstances are shaped by political decisions, 
cultural patterns create the boundaries of effective policy-making, economic developments 
influences cultural systems, and so forth and so on. These spheres are connected and shape 
each other, in Walby’s terms, they co-evolve (2009: 90).
2) To understand women’s employment it is crucial to understand who the acting agents are. 
The primary agent in my framework is the individual woman; she decides whether or not 
to enter the labour market and whether to accept a job or not. The secondary agent is the 
employer who decides to hire these individual women. Many other actors might influence 
the women’s decisions or that of the employers, but they are not the decision makers who 
determine women’s employment status.
3) To understand why decisions are made we must take into consideration the environment 
or structure surrounding the acting agent. For women’s decisions there are four important 
levels in this structure: (a) the household level, which is the closest and most prominent 
contextual level. Household characteristics such as the family structure, partner’s opinion, 
and household wealth all influence women’s possibilities and (felt) responsibilities; (b) the 
community level, which becomes the dominant level the moment women set foot outside 
the door. Behavioural norms and the availability of jobs in the vicinity are for instance found 
at this level; (c) the country level, because it is the locus of policy-making, in particular 
regarding economic and gender policies; and (d) the global level, which accommodates 
economic, cultural, and political cross-border transactions such as foreign direct investments 
and (neo)colonisation.
4) Each higher level forms the context of the characteristics found at a lower level and of the 
relationship between those characteristics and women’s employment. This means that 
characteristics at a certain level (a) can influence women’s employment, (b) can influence 
another characteristic at a lower level that influences women’s employment, and (c) 
can influence the extent to which a characteristic at a lower level influences women’s 
employment.
5) At the heart of each causal mechanism explaining women’s employment is a combination of 
three conditions: needs, opportunities, and values. By shifting the focus in understanding 
causal mechanisms from spheres or domains (economic, political, cultural, religious, and so 
on) to conditions, it is easier to see the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, I will be able to 
identify relevant factors, even if they seem not to fit neatly in one of these domains. Needs 
refer to the necessity felt by a woman (or employer) to do one thing over another, such as 
staying home to manage the household or entering the labour market because additional 
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income is needed. Opportunities capture the fit between the labour market and women’s 
characteristics: are there suitable jobs/employees in the vicinity? Values focus on the norms 
in society and on the roles considered acceptable for a certain individual. Together these 
three conditions inform each and every decision. How they take shape can differ by context 
(see Chapter 3).
1.4 put tIng tHe pIeCeS togetHer: reSearCH queStIonS and MetHodS
This framework will be presented in more detail in Chapter 2. The five core elements will help 
to gain insight into, and to answer important questions about, women’s employment in Muslim 
countries. Three general questions are central to this thesis. The first is at the fundament of this 
study’s goal to understand the differences between and within Muslim countries, therefore I will 
firstly have to chart this diversity in more detail:
1) What is the degree of women’s employment in Muslim countries and how does it differ 
among and within these countries and over time?
The framework identifies the main levels where factors explaining the differences can be found 
and it provides a way of theorising the influences in terms of conditions and interrelatedness 
between levels. This corresponds with the second research question:
2) Which micro-, meso- and macro-level factors are the (major) determinants of women’s 
employment in Muslim countries, and how do they influence women’s employment?
In addition, the framework recognises that influences on women’s employment should be seen 
as being embedded in a larger context that shapes these relationships, and it provides a way of 
conceptualising this context. This is what is at stake in the third research question:
3) Do the effects of explanatory factors of women’s employment in Muslim countries differ 
in strength and presence according to time and space, and if they do, how and why do they 
differ?
The new theoretical framework, however, constitutes only part of my dissertation project. 
The empirical research to test the theory constitutes the other part. For this study, data sets 
for 28 Muslim countries have been crunched, synchronised, and combined, and subsequently 
used in multilevel regression analyses. In several chapters, these analyses are supplemented 
with accompanied by qualitative assessments of particular countries, histories or phenomena. 
The newly formed database contains information about women’s employment, as well as the 
socio-economic characteristics of the women and their households, living environment, family 
structures, and their partners. The data will be used to measure the needs, opportunities, and 
values at the micro level. Some surveys also include information on religious denominations. 
In addition, the data indicate in which (sub-national) region women live, so also geographical 
differences within countries can be studied. Moreover, I will use the geographic information to 
aggregate information from the individual and household to the sub-national level. Data from 
the national level – and sometimes the district level – from other sources may complement the 
survey data. Based on a selection of the data (sets), each of the empirical chapters tackles a 
different substantial question related to the three main questions.
 The overall theoretical framework – presented above in a nutshell – is applicable to different 
forms of employment, and translating the framework for different forms of employment might 
thus lead to different factors at the variable level. Yet, the empirical chapters all focus on 
one specific type of women’s employment: paid non-agricultural employment. Agricultural 
employment and non-agricultural employment should be distinguished, because a single 
explanatory factor can create non-agricultural opportunities and at the same time decrease 
agricultural opportunities for women (e.g. Bullock, 1994; Hoodfar, 1997; Norris & Inglehart, 2002; 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). I have chosen to restrict the explanandum to non-agricultural 
employment. Its opposites, being non-employed and being active in agriculture, are considered 
to be a ‘default’ option for women (cf. Fergany et.al., 2006; Nabli & Chamlou, 2004). Agricultural 
participation is mostly tied to living in a rural area and coming from a farming family. Entering 
the non-agricultural labour market is seen as an important and conscious decision, a step away 
from agricultural employment or being a housewife. Another reason for a focus on paid non-
agricultural employment relates to empowerment issues. In general, employment tends to lead 
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to empowerment (e.g. Dworkin, Kambou, Sutherland, Moalla & Kapoor, 2009; Kritz & Makinwa-
Adebusoye, 1999; Yount & Li, 2009), but not all forms to the same amount. Non-agricultural 
and paid employment is believed to lead to more empowerment than agricultural and unpaid 
employment (cf. Fergany et.al., 2006; Nabli & Chamlou, 2004). Furthermore, the agricultural 
sector is shrinking in terms of labour, whereas the combined labour demand of the industrial 
and the service sectors are growing or stabilising worldwide. For these reasons, I will focus on 
understanding and explaining women’s paid non-agricultural employment in this study (a more 
detailed discussion of this is found in Chapter 4). As of here, when I use the terms women’s 
employment, I mean women’s paid non-agricultural employment, unless stated otherwise.
1.5 ten More StepS towardS woMen’S eMpLoyMent
Above, I have touched on the multitude of explanations for women’s (non)employment available 
in the literature on Muslim countries. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the core building blocks of 
the new theoretical framework that should help overcome the diagnosed fragmentation and 
understand how different influences on women’s employment are interrelated. The framework 
will be related to other useful and inspiring approaches – such as Walby’s complexity theory 
(2009), the Gender and Development approach (see Rathgeber, 1990), Moghadam’s studies of 
gender and social change in the Middle East (Moghadam, 1998; 2003), and Hijab’s condition frame 
regarding women and work in Arab countries (1988; 2001). Their useful aspects are combined and 
enriched, leading to a coherent and guiding framework to which the five elements mentioned in 
Section 1.3 are central. The theoretical and conceptual specification of the dependent variable 
is also discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the general hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 will 
be translated to the context of Muslim countries to show how the framework, on the one hand, 
covers the existing knowledge on women’s employment in Muslim countries and, on the other 
hand, identifies new factors that might influence women’s employment, and how it relates to 
existing debates. Later on, in the thematic, empirical chapters (7 through 10), I will digress on 
theoretical issues, using this general framework in order to fill in blank spots.
 Chapter 4 will focus on methods and data. Firstly, I shall briefly discuss the methodological 
premises that guide the choice and application of methods: diversity and complexity. Special 
attention will be paid to the role of generalisation and diversity in regression analyses, not only 
because mainstream gender and feminist research often regards quantitative research as overly 
generalising (cf. Harding, 1986; Lorber, 2006; McCall, 2005; Spierings, 2010, 2012a), but also 
because generalisation is an important issue in the debates about Islam. Subsequently, I will 
discuss the case selection and the characteristics of the specific method used in this study – 
multilevel regression analysis – and how this agrees with the methodological premises. In the 
next parts of Chapter 4, I will go into the surveys used and the additional data sources, as well as 
the specific measurements for the factors shaping the three theoretical conditions, including an 
extensive discussion on measuring women’s (non-agricultural, paid) employment. This chapter 
will focus on the core data; variables specific to one of the thematic chapters will be discussed in 
that particular chapter.
 The next six chapters will contain empirical analyses regarding women’s employment in 
Muslim countries. The first two, 5 and 6, discuss general analyses that give an overall view and 
use data from 28 countries. Chapters 7 and 8 focus on a particular explanatory factor or cluster of 
factors (education and household configurations), also using data from all these countries. The 
last two empirical chapters (9 and 10) also focus on particular issues (religion and globalisation) 
but will focus empirically on a selection of countries.
 Chapter 5 starts the empirical part of this thesis by describing the employment levels in 28 
countries, rates ranging from less than 4% (Yemen 2003) to well over 45% (Kazakhstan 1999, 
Nigeria 2008). These figures shall be put into broader perspective by also giving an overview 
of women’s employment figures for the over 380 total districts within the countries. Besides 
this, employment levels are discussed in terms of major differences between the almost 
300,000 women, such as age, education, children, marital status, and the urban/rural divide. 
This descriptive information helps to chart the differences and similarities among and within 
the countries.
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 Chapter 6 builds on this and focuses on explaining women’s employment differences among 
women, households, districts and countries. Using data for all the sampled women in the over 
380 districts of 28 countries and applying four-level models, I test which factors affect women’s 
employment probabilities, distinguishing more and less important factors, as well as direct 
and indirect effects. It will be shown how needs, opportunities, and values all play their part in 
shaping women’s choices and position.
 Chapter 7 is the first thematic chapter. Here I shall derive hypotheses from the theoretical 
framework about how the effects of education – one of the most important determinants 
identified in Chapter 6 – may differ according to characteristics of the context. For the full set of 
countries, interaction terms shall be added to the models presented in Chapter 6, showing how 
the effects of education differ, especially for the higher education levels.
 The issue central to Chapter 8 is which aspects of the household configuration are embedded 
in the values of patriarchal gender contract and how they shape the women’s and households’ 
needs and opportunities. This chapter illustrates how the comprehensive framework lays bare 
gaps in our knowledge as it links more general concepts and theories on patriarchy, gender, and 
development to variable-level constructs. Newly formulated expectations are tested by taking the 
models from Chapter 6 and adding new household-configuration variables that go beyond marital 
status and having children. It also tests whether effects differ by region in order to explore the 
possible different gender contracts that exist in different geographic and cultural-historic regions.
 Whether and how religion (Islam) influences women’s employment is the issue addressed 
in Chapter 9. There, I discuss the current line of thinking that mainly focuses on whether Islam 
has an influence, and subsequently shift the question to how Islam’s influence might work. By 
applying the framework, I hypothesise that Islam can have different and contradictory effects at 
different levels. Empirical analyses on data for Indonesia and Nigeria test the newly formulated 
hypotheses and these analyses underscore the usefulness of a more nuanced approach. While 
the choice for Indonesia and Nigeria favours the ‘civilisation’ approach, I show that institutional 
variables are more helpful in understanding the influence of Islam than denomination-related 
variables as focussed on by civilisationists. The generalisability of some of these results is 
reflected upon by exploring the employment differences between Muslim and Christian women 
and regions in some other countries for which religion data are present in the surveys.
 Chapter 10 examines the dynamics of women’s employment from a longitudinal perspective, 
focusing on the common notion that over time everything will change towards greater gender 
equality. Specifically, two aspects of this are highlighted and reunderstood from the perspective 
of this thesis: the conceptualisation of globalisation as one positive driving force behind women’s 
employment and the idea that micro-level factors’ influences are stable over time. Empirically, 
I will firstly show that employment is not singularly rising. Then I zoom in on one country at the 
heart of the Middle East – Egypt – using data from surveys for four different years and a more in-
depth analysis of women’s employment in the country. Combining these sources will help to test 
the expectations derived from this thesis’ framework that might explain the found discrepancy: 
globalisation’s multifaceted impact and the temporally instable micro-level effects.
 Chapter 11 concludes this study. The conclusions from the different empirical chapters 
are summarised in three notions: empirical diversity, structured multiplicity and generalised 
context-dependency. These general conclusions are discussed in more detail, and in doing so the 
three main questions as formulated in Section 1.4 will be answered. Subsequently, I assess the 
underlying theoretical framework of this thesis, and based on the results, I also discuss the more 
general theoretical, methodological, and policy implications of the research – including the five 
issues mentioned in this chapter (Section 1.2). Throughout the chapter suggestions for further 
research are given. Lastly, two more normative notes will close this thesis.
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5 In this thesis, I will use the terms ‘gainful’ and ‘paid’ 
interchangeable. With both I indicate pecuniary 
remuneration.
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Chapter 2
theoretical framework
A holistic view on women’s employment
2.1 preSentIng and poSItIonIng a new enCoMpaSSIng fraMeworK
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are scholars in different disciplines who study women’s 
employment in Muslim countries or overarching issues. Although debates run and positions are 
taken in each of these disciplines, there is little communication between the various studies 
from these different traditions. To gain more knowledge about women’s employment in Muslim 
countries, I have argued, it is necessary to formulate a more inclusive theoretical framework that 
outlines the fundamental mechanisms determining a woman’s paid employment status,5 and 
that makes it possible to understand the empirical reality of women’s employment. Although 
this argument for a broader, less discipline-focussed approach is not new – and in this thesis 
I for example draw from multidisciplinary theories focussing on Arab women’s employment 
(Hijab, 1988) as well as very broad social theories (Walby, 2009) – no satisfactory theoretical 
framework has so far been presented to address the issue at hand. Important as they are, 
none of the previously formulated theories is truly holistic in terms of how different levels are 
related, how general ideas relate to the factors determining participation, and how to establish 
whether important explanations might have been left out. In this chapter I will therefore present 
a new holistic view on the issue, taking into account the multilayered structure of society and 
conceptualising existing influences in terms of needs, opportunities and values.
 In discussing this framework I take positions in several debates in the literature on women’s 
employment or situation in Arab, Muslim or developing countries, and the framework relates to 
more debates about more general social theories. Where relevant, I will relate my position to 
these debates in order to demonstrate how my theoretical framework originates from existing 
knowledge, circumvents current deadlocks and facilitates further communication between 
different disciplines.
 The general framework as presented in this chapter might be translatable to other forms 
of participation or individual behaviours, but for now this thesis’ focus is on women’s labour 
market participation and specifically women’s paid non-agricultural employment. Because the 
framework will be discussed in the light of that phenomenon or dependent variable, I will firstly 
define what I consider women’s gainful non-agricultural employment to be, and discuss why I 
have chosen to focus on non-agricultural labour and gainful employment only (Section 2.2). After 
that, I will discus the main characteristics of the explanatory framework. Firstly, I discuss how 
the individual woman is the central to my model, who as an agent is embedded in a structure 
in which other agents participate (Section 2.3). The number and type of levels in this structure 
are subsequently discussed in Section 2.4, after which I will elaborate how the different levels 
relate to each other (Section 2.5). In the last section, I will return to the actors in the model – 
mainly focussing on the individual woman – and discuss the three conditions at the core of the 
actors’ decisions: needs, opportunities and values. That section will conclude with seven general 
hypotheses. In Chapter 3, the theoretical position and general hypotheses presented in this 
chapter will then be translated into more specific hypotheses.
2.2 tHe dependent varIaBLe: woMen’S gaInfuL non-agrICuLturaL 
eMpLoyMent
To take the bull by the horns: by no means does this study claim or want to suggest that women’s 
domestic, agricultural, unpaid, or informal activities are not part of women’s productive life or 
do not (economically) contribute to the community. However, for reasons explained below, the 
focus in this study is on women’s gainful (self-)employment in the non-agricultural sector.
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6 As many Western-dominated institutions do, according to 
Adeley (2009: 112).
Economic activities
Work 
Gainful
employment
Non-
agricultural
Women’s gainful non-
agricultural employment
figure 2.1 From Economic activities to Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment
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2.2.1 L ABOUR, ECONOMIC AC TIVITIES, WORK AND EMPLOYMENT
In the debates about women’s economic activities, many distinctions are made, discussed, 
ignored and mixed up: domestic labour vs. labour outside the domestic sphere, employment 
vs. self-employment, paid vs. unpaid labour, payment in cash vs. payment in kind, 
reproductive vs. productive work, subsistence vs. market labour, agricultural vs. non-
agricultural work, and informal vs. formal labour. Uncovering an underlying structure among 
these distinctions will make clear what the scope of this study is. To do so, I will distinguish 
between ‘economic activities’, ‘work’ and ‘employment’, with each subsequent category 
more narrowly defined (see Figure 2.1), an approach in line with the major critiques from a 
gender approach to the classification of economic activities (see Anker, 1983; Benería, 1981, 
1982; Chen, Sebstad & O’Connell, 1999; Donahoe, 1999; Jansen, 2004; Langsten & Salem, 
2008).
 ‘Economic activities’ designates all the reproductive and productive activities of women. 
This thus includes household or domestic work (reproductive labour), because these tasks need 
to be taken care of in order to make productive labour possible. Reproductive activities therefore 
contribute to the production process and have an economic value, albeit not considered an 
exchange value in many concepts of labour (cf. Benería, 1982; Donahoe, 1999; Langsten & Salem, 
2008: 283).
 ‘Work’ is the subset of ‘economic activities’ that lead to income or subsistence production: 
activities directly leading to covering the economic needs of a household. This definition 
comes close to what is generally considered to being active on the labour market and not being 
unemployed. The ILO conceptualises work in terms of being involved in the production of goods 
or services that contribute to national wealth and economic growth (Donahoe, 1999: 544). They 
further clarify this by stating that it
includes all production and processing of primary products whether for the market, for barter or 
for own consumption, the production of all other goods and services for the market and, in the 
case of households which produce such goods and services for the market, the corresponding 
production for own consumption. (ILO cited in Langsten & Salem, 2008: 284–5)
While we should be critical of devaluing ‘noneconomic’ contributions, such as household 
care, and economic contributions that do not fit into preferred categories of wage-earning 
labour,6 this thesis will focus on (subcategories of) work as dependent variable and not on other 
economic activities. The main reason to demarcate the type of activities focussing on is causal 
homogeneity, as will be elaborated in the next section.
 Within the category of ‘work’, activities can be grouped along two dimensions. The first 
concerns the gains produced from the activities, with three possible options: being paid 
in cash or kind, production for one’s own usage or performing unremunerated labour. The 
last has to do with different employment positions: being employed in a regular position, 
in occasional work, being self-employed, or working in a family business. Within the larger 
category of work, I will now define ‘employment’ as all ‘work’ that is both gainful in terms of 
cash paid for labour or products, thus leading to a more or less regular income; meaning that 
the woman regularly works and has an income. This excludes unpaid and occasional jobs, but 
not self-employment. Employment defined in this manner will be used as the explanandum of 
this thesis.
2.2.2 THE CAUSAL CONCEPT OF WOMEN’S GAINFUL NON-AGRICULTUR AL EMPLOYMENT
The reason to define employment using a rather restricted concept centres around the notion 
of causal concepts: the definition and demarcation of a concept is partly determined by the 
context in which it is studied, because the latter determines which characteristics are crucial to 
its causal effects and determinants (see Goertz, 2006). The defining aspects of my definition of 
employment (‘gainful’ and ‘non-agricultural’) have certain specific qualities that are important in 
understanding (a) the effects it has on the position of women and (b) the mechanisms explaining 
labour participation.
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 8 This is a summary of the story of Zineb Kadmiri, mother of 
Nour–eddine Saoudi – a political prisoner – , discussed in 
Mernissi’s Sherehazade’s weblog (2004: 115–8).
 9 Jaquette (1982: 276–7) paraphrases Peggy Sanday, who 
also claims that that economic participation is a necessary 
condition to a high female status, but to come full circle 
in this logic, Sanday includes that it is not a sufficient 
condition (Sanday, 1974). By no means, do I want to claim 
it is.
 10 This could be reason to make a distinction between paid 
and unpaid agricultural labour, but the second argument 
– about the social network – and the different causal 
mechanisms expected to influence women's entrance into 
the labour market for non-agricultural and agricultural 
labour have led me to make this conceptual distinction.
7 Several positive societal effects of increased women’s 
employment are registered as well: if relatively more 
women are active in productive employment, child 
mortality seems lower (Kishor, 1993) and economic 
growth increases (Klasen & Lamanna, 2009). The last 
authors show that especially the Middle East, North 
Africa and South Asia lost economic growth compared 
to for instance East Asia, due to more inequality in the 
labour market (on average a growth 1.1 percentage points 
less).
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 Regarding the effect on the position of women of employment, the central focus in this 
research is empowerment.7 In this respect, the empowering effect of employment is aptly 
captured by the story of Zineb Kadmiri:
Like many women in Casablanca, Zineb Kadmiri weaved carpets. With her husband and children 
she formed a typical working-class family. She learned something about language in her education 
to become an upholsterer. Gradually her zest for work and ambition brought her economic 
independence: firstly through sewing, later by becoming a carpet weaver. Works of art is what she 
made and she sold more and more of her carpets. Her income was much higher than the salary she 
earned as a seamstress.8
Through her labour, Zineb Kadmire became a successful artist (Mernissi, 2004) and gained 
economic independence (see also Dworkin, Kambou, Sutherland, Moalla & Kapoor, 2009; Kritz 
& Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1999; Yount & Li, 2009). More generally, Farah (2006) and Metcalfe 
(2011) see employment as a dimension of empowerment, and Moghadam (1990: 6) even says that 
remunerative work in the modern sector is a necessary condition for empowerment.9
 When employment is considered in this light, it should however be noted that this 
relationship between employment and empowerment does not hold for all forms of employment, 
though it is said to be particularly strong for gainful (self-)employment. This is the case because, 
firstly, these kinds of jobs are believed to be more profitable and less vulnerable than unpaid 
and occasional jobs (e.g. Calvès & Schoumaker, 2004: 1351; Moghadam, 1998: 15–6, 69). Several 
studies have shown that women’s autonomy goes up due to paid employment (Anderson & 
Eswaran, 2009; Kibria, 1990; Wolf, 1990). Spitze (1988) also finds that employment fosters both 
physical and psychological health. An independent regular income can enable women to make 
decisions about purchasing items without asking their husband for money and it generally 
increases women’s bargaining power (see Adely, 2009: 114; Afshar, 1998; Gray, Kittilson & 
Sandholtz, 2006: 297; Olmsted, 2005). Contrary to this, agricultural labour almost exclusively 
entails working at the family farm without payment (Moghadam, 1998: 69, 78).10 Secondly, 
when women enter the (labour) market as part of the public sphere they are able to build a larger 
social network, learn from their job or colleagues and exchange experiences. For instance, Adely 
recollects from her fieldwork in Jordan that: “many of the teachers with whom I spoke found that 
working outside the home gave them the opportunity to socialise with peers and colleagues. 
Asked if she would like to retire, Mariam, a science teacher, said no because ‘I would become too 
isolated if I stayed at home.’ “(2009: 114). Moghadam adds that through “employment women 
become active participants in society, organise and mobilise themselves” (1998: 3).
 Thus the type of employment is a characteristic that divides work in groups according to 
its empowering potential. In this study I have selected the category of non-agricultural and 
gainful employment, because this is said to have the greatest empowering potential. I do not 
claim that employment always leads to empowerment. Some positions might harm women’s 
empowerment, because, for instance, women get trapped at the bottom of the labour market 
hierarchy (Elson, 2009: 44). However, the overall trend that non-agricultural paid employment 
does empower women, is enough reason to try to increase our understanding of what influences 
employment.
 In terms of developing an explanatory theory, however, not only the causal effects discussed 
above, but also the causal mechanisms explaining it are important. Different forms of work 
are influenced by different factors, or influenced differently by one and the same factor (e.g. 
Bullock, 1994; Donahoe, 1999; Norris & Inglehart, 2002; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). In this 
respect, the difference between agricultural and non-agricultural work seems most important. 
Women living in a rural area are almost by definition active in some form of agricultural work. Not 
that they made a very conscious decision to enter the agricultural labour market, but because 
helping on the family farm is the ‘default’ option for these women; just as it is the ‘default’ 
option for women in urban areas to stay at home or get involved in home-based work and not to 
seek employment (Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2010). As agricultural work is often considered an 
extension of a woman’s domestic responsibilities, it does not go against the dominant norm in 
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figure 2.2 A holistic meta-level framework for explaining women’s employment in Muslim countries
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rural areas, while other forms of work do (Azzam, Abu Nasr & Lorfing, 1985: 18; Jansen, 2004). In 
other words, for both women working on a family farm and for housewives not being employed 
the step to being non-agriculturally employed is rather similar (Azzam, Abu Nasr & Lorfing, 1985: 
30–1; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2010).
 In this study, I set out to understand the forces influencing women’s gainful non-agricultural 
employment, and the framework discussed below is developed with that purpose in mind. 
However, this framework’s development is grounded in broader debates. Thus, while this study 
focuses on only one form of women’s economic activity, it might still be used as a springboard 
to understanding influences on other types of economic activities – the presented meta-level 
framework can be translated to all kinds of (economic) activities.
2.3 froM defauLt to eMpLoyMent: tHe agent-StruCture deBate
Conceptually, I do not see the change from not being employed (the state in which we are all 
born) to being employed as a singular switch, but rather as a process that involves two crucial 
steps (1 and 2) and three decisions (A, B and C). Firstly, if a woman wants to find a job, she needs 
to enter the labour market. That is step 1 and decision A, made by the woman herself. In the 
decision-making process, the woman is surrounded by structures and other agents (see section 
2.4), but she is the primary actor. What others deem acceptable – other household members, 
social norms, governmental policies or laws – can be very important in this respect, but even in 
the hypothetical case that death is the punishment for being employed, seeking a job or not is 
a decision that can only be made by the woman, unless she is an automaton without any form of 
agency.
 Secondly, once on the labour market, the woman needs to find someone to pay her for her 
labour. This is step 2 and involves decisions by two main actors: one by the woman to accept a 
certain job or start a business (B) and one by the employer or customer to pay for the woman’s 
(fruits of) labour (C). The first is again decided by the woman (B); she may have little choice 
because she is the only one in the household who can provide an income, but she can still 
decide not to accept a certain job. In this decision, she might be influenced by which jobs are 
considered acceptable. Whether she is considered suitable for the job or whether customers buy 
her products is ultimately decided by the employer/customer (C), who is also subject to external 
influences. These two steps are not unrelated – for instance, a woman can decide to take a job 
and enter the labour market at the moment she is invited to start working for a company – but to 
understand the theoretical mechanisms it is important to disentangle the two conceptually.
 From the two steps it takes from being outside the labour market to being employed, it 
can be derived that both structure and agency play important roles in understanding women’s 
employment. It also becomes clear that the principal agent is the woman, who lives in specific 
structures (in Figure 2.2 the individual woman is literally place in the centre). Before the Gender 
and Development (GAD) approach was introduced, women were often portrayed as “passive 
recipients” in the development literature and discourse (Rathgeber, 1990: 494, see also Hakim, 
1991; Walby, 2009: 72). In the literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries, this 
tendency still exists. One leading scholar, Moghadam, for instance, builds on the GAD approach 
(2003: 33–4), but hardly pays attention to a woman’s agency:
The theoretical framework that informs this study rests on the premise that stability and change in 
the status of women are shaped by the following structural determinants: the sex/gender systems, 
class, and economic development and state policies that operate within the capitalist world system. 
(2003: 14, emphasis added)
Another common practice, as others such as Archer (1988) and Walby (2009: 71–5) also observed, 
is to conflate structure and agent, which leads to a poor understanding of the causal mechanism 
explaining women’s employment status. In this respect I would like to stress that whereas it 
seems logical to separate agent and structure, this is often mistakenly equated to the individual 
woman (agent) and the context (structure). I argue for a better understanding in which women 
are not the only agents, and in which both structures and agents make up the context. These 
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11 These are the theoretical levels which should be 
considered in pinpointing the influences on women’s 
employment, they are not by definition similar to the 
levels of measurement or the levels at which variables 
have to be analysed. For instance, the global level will 
often be analysed by assessing differences between 
countries with regard to their position in the global 
systems.
 • A woman makes the choice [to enter the labour market // to accept a job] based on her assessment of the desirability of 
doing so. If the overall desirability is higher than the desirability of not [entering the labour market // accepting a job], 
she will choose to do so.1 
 • In determining the desirability, the woman’s decision is influenced by (her perception of) whether other agents in her 
surroundings regard [entering the labour market // accepting a job] as desirable.
 • A woman’s potential [customer // employer] will pay for the product that that woman offers, based on that person’s 
assessment of the desirability of doing so. If the overall desirability to pay for the woman’s product is higher than the 
desirability of not doing so, the potential [customer // employer] will choose to do so. 
 
1 By using the word assessment I do not imply that this is always a rational and explicit cost-benefit analysis. The 
assessment can also be based purely on a feeling or a divine calling an individual has (had), which tells that person that 
she or he should do this. This goes for the third bullet as well.
Box 2.1
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agents, such as partners, employers and politicians, are not the primary focus of my framework 
but can play an important role in shaping a woman’s employment status because they are 
part of the context. Each of these actors makes decisions that might shape a woman’s needs, 
opportunities or values and thereby her choices (see Section 2.3 and Section 2.5).
 In this thesis, the relationship between the woman as agent, and the context consisting of 
structures and other agents can be summarised in the three decision rules notions given in Box 
2.1.
2.4 fIve ConCeptuaL LeveLS: tHe MICro-MaCro deBate
To understand what influences agents’ decisions, it is necessary to conceptualise how the 
context is shaped. I distinguish five contextual levels where agents and/or structures and 
important explanatory factors influencing women’s employment can be found. These levels are 
the individual, household, community, country and global levels – the five concentric circles 
in Figure 2.2.11 In line with my framework, this graphical depiction emphasises the growing 
geographical distance as one moves from the individual to the global level. This is important in 
light of the idea of proximity, as will be discussed below, for instance with regard to the inclusion 
of the sub-national community level.
 THE INDIVIDUAL WOMAN
As discussed above, the individual woman is the primary agent who decides to enter the labour 
market and to accept a job. The woman’s individual characteristics are important in this decision-
making process because she will consider her chances on the labour market, because she holds 
certain ideas about what her role in society is, and because she might feel the need for self-
development or for an income to provide for food and other basic needs.
 THE HOUSEHOLD
The first and closest important contextual level for a woman is her household. Daily life takes 
place in this context and this is where generally her decisions are discussed with the people 
closest to the woman: partners, parents, her nearest and dearest. This is also the setting in 
which the reproductive and productive roles of women most often collide: should women 
primarily run the household, should they go out and work, or can and should the two roles be 
somehow combined? Given the gendered division of labour and the way the household is often 
treated as the smallest economic unit in society (see also Kabeer, 1992; Razavi & Miller, 1995), 
characteristics of the household (e.g. family structures, ideas of other household members, and 
its economic situation) are expected to shape the incentives and limitations to seek employment.
 THE COMMUNIT Y 
A woman’s opportunities are also influenced by the norms of society at large and the actual job 
opportunities in her living environment. This means that the community level – a sub-national 
level that is smaller and closer to the woman than the country level – is very important. As soon 
as people cross their doorstep, they face this context. Norms differ throughout a country, 
and a norm upheld at the other end of a country is expected to be less important than the one 
dominant in one’s own area. This proximity is also important for the opportunities women have, 
since travelling is costly (in terms of time, money and gendered mobility norms [cf. Assaad & 
Arntz, 2005]). It is thus crucial that the necessary facilities and opportunities are located nearby.
 THE COUNTRY
In this framework, countries are mainly considered to be political units. Countries can also 
be seen as cultural units, but – certainly in Muslim countries – country borders often do not 
overlap with ethnic, religious or cultural groups. These cleavages are more prominently found 
at the sub-national level or, if one wants to think in terms of an Umma or an Arab culture, at 
the global level (cf. Owen, 2004: 1–12). More important, however, is that the state has the 
capability of policymaking, which demands that the country level is included as a contextual 
level in this framework. Political structures and gender and/or economic policies differ widely 
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12 In other parts of the world, the international context 
can be separated in two levels: the global level and the 
regional level, which falls in-between the country and 
global level. The best example with respect to women’s 
employment is the EU. At that level, many policies that 
13 Assaad & Artnz (2005) is a notable exception.
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A  Immediate influence B  Top-down influence
C  Upward relation D  Embedded relatedness
figure 2.3 How factors at different levels can influence women’s employment
 • The context influencing women (the individual level) and their employment has four major levels – the household, the 
community, the country and the global level – and factors at each of these levels shape women’s employment. 
 • Contextual characteristics at the level closest to the individual woman have the strongest influence on the chance women 
are employed.
Box 2.2
affect women’s employment opportunities are made. 
I would argue that so far no such intermediate level of 
importance exists for the Muslim countries studies here. 
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across countries and can have a substantial impact on the position of women. Depending on the 
country, policies can also be made or influenced at the local level, but the primacy of (gender and 
economic) state policies is often situated at the national level.
 THE GLOBE
The last important contextual level shaping women’s employment in Muslim countries is the 
international one.12 In a world in which geographical distances have become easier to bridge, 
both international and transnational transactions cannot be ignored. This draws attention to 
economic, cultural, and political relations and forces such as international trade and investments, 
monetary world politics, and (neo)colonisation. Processes found at the global level can directly 
and indirectly influence women’s employment through these processes.
Existing studies mostly focus on two of these levels: the macro level, which often equals the 
country level,13 and the micro level, which includes but often does not distinguish between 
individual and household levels. Even studies that claim to be more comprehensive are limited 
and focus on only (one of) these two levels. For instance, Hijab (1988: 74; 2001) explicitly speaks 
of the ‘popular’ and ‘state’ levels in her work on Arab women and work, but ignores the other 
levels (household, community and globe). Moghadam (e.g. 1998, 2003) focuses heavily on 
developments at the country level, and only sometimes includes micro-level supply side factors 
(Moghadam, 1996), and the GAD approach pays attention to political systems and national 
structures in particular (Rathgeber, 1990). While Moghadam and GAD draw some attention 
to the global level as well, mentioning the importance of the (developing) countries’ position 
in the international economic system, the lower levels are disregarded. Of course, each of 
these approaches was a reaction to time-specific dominant perspectives and added important 
spheres that had been absent before that time, such as the international dimension or the 
importance of the state. However, none of the previous approaches were truly comprehensive: 
the focus was placed on the level that was ‘new’, levels were conflated and/or levels were left 
out. Consequently, each of these approaches only covers a selection of the potentially relevant 
factors. This is clearly illustrated by the neglect of the community or sub-national level, and 
consequently of the importance of proximity.
 The theoretical claims I have put forward in this section are summarised in Box 2.2.
2.5 ConneCtIng tHe LeveLS: tHe CoMpLexIt y deBate
To theorise the relationship between the individual woman and her context, and to distinguish 
the important levels of analysis is only the first step. The second, taken in this section, is 
conceptualising how these levels are connected. I argue that there are four different ways factors 
at different levels can be related to women’s employment or to each other (see Figure 2.3), and 
each of these is important to understand women’s employment.
 As visualised in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, the woman is embedded in the household, the 
household in the community, the community is embedded in the country, and the country in 
the international system. At each of these levels, explanatory factors can be placed from which 
an arrow can be drawn to the woman’s employment status. These arrows represent the causal 
relationship between explanatory factor and outcome. The lower-level relationships are then 
also embedded in the higher-level contexts. From this multilevel approach, I can then deduce 
the four ways they relate to each other: the direct top-down influence, the indirect top-down 
influence, multilevel spuriousness, and the embedding effect (see Figure 2.3).
 Firstly, a factor at a higher contextual level is relevant if it influences women’s employment 
at the individual level. This effect can take place without interference of variables found at 
the levels in between the influencing context factor and a woman’s employment. For example, 
national laws that prohibit women working in certain (e.g. heavy manual labour) sectors decrease 
women’s opportunities. This is what I call a direct top-down influence, which is illustrated in 
Figure 2.3’s Panel A.
 Secondly, changes at the higher level might affect lower-level characteristics that influence 
employment not directly, but indirectly. For instance, more economic transactions at the global 
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16 E.g. The Middle East (Azzam, Abu Nasr & Lorfing, 1985; 
Hijab, 1988; Moghadam, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2004; Olmsted, 
2003; Pfeiffer & Posusney, 2003; Tzannatos & Kaur, 
2003); Algeria (Moghadam, 1998); Bahrain (Metcalfe, 
2007), Egypt (Assaad, 2003; Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 
2003), Indonesia (Bahramitash, 2002), Iran (Bahramitash, 
2003; Moghadam, 1996, 1998), Jordan (Malt, 2007; Miles, 
2002; Moghadam, 1998; WorldBank, 2005), Lebanon 
(Chamie, 1985), Malaysia (Standing, 1996), Morocco 
(Cairoli, 2007; Moghadam, 1998), Nigeria (Callaway & 
Creevey, 1994); Saudi-Arabia (Doumato, 2003), Senegal 
(Callaway & Creevey, 1994), Sudan (Hale, 2003), Syria 
(Moghadam, 1998), Tunisia (Moghadam, 1996, 1998; 
Murphy, 2003), Turkey (Moghadam, 1996, 1998), 
Yemen (Carapico, 1996; Myntti, 1985), and Central Asia 
(Moghadam, 1996), or more cross-sectional comparative 
(Clark, 1992; Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Fish, 2002; 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009).
14 Studies focussing on differences on civilisations often 
compare countries and include other explanations as 
well. In this sense civilisationist studies and macro-level 
studies are not excluding groups. Studies that present 
civilisation-logic are: Clark, 1992; Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 
1991; Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003a; Lincove, 2005, Norris & Inglehart, 2002, 
2004; Yuchtman–Yaar & Alkalay, 2007.
15 E.g. Burkina Faso (Calvès & Schoumaker, 2004), 
Egypt (Donahoe, 1999), Guinea (Glick & Sahn, 1997; 
2005), Jordan (Jansen, 2004; Al–Qudsi, 1998), Kuwait 
(Al–Qudsi, 1998), Malaysia (Hirschman & Aghajanian, 
1980), Mali (Wooten, 2003), Nigeria (Aromolaran, 2004; 
Togunde, 1999), Oman (Al–Qudsi, 1998) the Palestian 
Territories (Khattab, 2002; Al–Qudsi, 1998), Saudi Arabia 
(Vidyasagar & Rea, 2004), Turkey (Gündüz–Hoşgör & 
Smits, 2008), and urban West Africa (Kuepie, Nordman & 
Roubaud, 2009).
 • Context-level factor CFA influences women’s employment directly – immediate influence.
 • Context-level factor CFA, found at a context level L A, influences women’s employment indirectly by influencing context-
level factor CFB, found at a context level lower then L A, and CFB influences (context-level factor CFX, found at context 
level L X, which is located closer to the individual woman than LB, where CFX directly influences) women’s employment 
– top-down influence.
 • The relationship between women’s employment and context-level factor CFA, found at level L A, is caused by a factor at 
a lower level than L A, whereby the lower-level factor influences both women’s employment and the context-level factor 
CFA – upward relatedness.
 • Context-level factor CFA, found at a context level L A, influences the effect that another factor, found at a level lower 
than L A, has on women’s employment – embedding effect.
Box 2.3
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level in the form of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) can increase manufacturing facilities at 
the sub-national level. This new, additional local industry leads to a higher demand for labour, 
for female employees especially if it involves labour-intensive manufacturing industries. 
Consequently, women’s employment opportunities rise. This is shown in Figure 2.3’s panel B, 
and I will label this as an indirect top-down influence.
 Thirdly, as is the case with one-level relationships, multilevel relationships can be spurious. 
In particular, macro-level influences might be spurious and not detected due to missing micro-
level variables. This has hardly been theorised upon because it is rather unique to multilevel 
frameworks. When characteristics of units at a lower level are related to characteristics at 
higher contextual levels, it might seem that the higher-level context factor influences women’s 
employment, but in fact they do not. It are lower-level characteristics that influence women’s 
employment and might also be responsible for the higher-level context factor. In Figure 2.3, this 
is illustrated by panel C under the description of multilevel spuriousness; the dotted arrow is 
non-causal. An example might be the effect of living in an urban area and of living in a city. There 
might be a positive effect of living in a more urbanised region, but this effect might disappear 
after inclusion of living in a city. In that case it are for instance the job opportunities in the closer 
proximity of women that count, not in the larger area. In a region, with more women living in 
cities, the degree of urbanisation is higher and women’s employment is higher, but that is not 
because of the job opportunities outside the city influencing women’s employment. The lower 
level variable – living in a city – causes both employment and the degree of urbanisation.
 Fourth, because relationships at lower levels are embedded in higher-level contexts, 
influences at the lower level are not by definition universal, but they can be context specific: 
through a so-called embedding effect (see panel D in Figure 2.3). The influence of a household 
characteristic – e.g. having a partner – on women’s employment is for instance placed in the 
community context and might have a different influence in more traditional or wealthy areas 
than in less traditional or wealthy areas.
 Due to the fragmentation of the current literature in terms of levels, these different forms of 
interrelatedness are hardly discussed or theorised. Most studies focus either on civilisations,14 
countries,15 or individuals16 (see also Pettit & Hook, 2005; Walby, 2009). This approach has led 
to a disconnect, with several negative theoretical and empirical consequences. Where theory is 
concerned this means that macro-level mechanisms can be underspecified because little thought 
is given to the question how macro factors might have indirect top-down influences or whether 
it is multilevel spuriousness. Similarly little attention is paid to how micro-level influences might 
differ by their context (cf. Walby, 2009: 71). A schematic overview of the three types of studies 
(at the civilisation, country and individual level) and their weaknesses and strengths is provided 
in Appendix 2.1. By bringing together the different levels (as Hijab [1988] did for the country and 
individual level) and also theorising how they relate, the different effects of influencing factors 
at the various levels can be better understood.
 In sum, my general expectations about the interrelationship between levels can be captured 
as is done in Box 2.3. Different types of interrelatedness can exist simultaneously; economic 
development, for instance, can have a direct top-down influence as economic need, an indirect 
top-down influence through human capital investments, and an embedding effect whereby 
having children is less restricting.
2.6 needS, opportunItIeS and vaLueS: tHe doMaInS deBate
Now that I have distinguished the different levels and discussed the various ways how the factors 
at the multiple levels are related, the question arises which factors at these levels particularly 
influence women’s employment. To identify these factors, it is necessary to understand the basic 
mechanisms behind the decisions crucial to women becoming employed. I conceptualise these 
mechanisms in terms of circumstances that can be present in different degrees and the more 
they are present for a certain woman, the higher the probability that woman will work. If they are 
fully present, a woman should have a job according to this logic. These circumstances are what I 
have called conditions (cf. Hijab, 1988). I argue that for women’s employment three (combined) 
conditions should be distinguished: Needs, Opportunities and Values (NOV ).
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17 Of course, needs and opportunities also have an influence 
in changing the values in society, but here I do not mean 
that values determine needs and opportunities in such a 
causal way, but that the values in society change the way 
society is perceived.
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 In Figure 2.2, these three conditions are depicted by the different parts and shades of the 
circles and background. As will be elaborated below, these conditions partly overlap: Values 
can constitute an effect on their own (the light gray top segment of the circle), but they also 
shape what is considered a Need or an Opportunity (all concentric circles are placed on top of 
the background light gray of Values; in a sense, Values form a prime coat);17 both Needs and 
Opportunities influence women’s employment, with Values as an underlying condition (the 
segments in medium gray at the left and right of the concentric circles); and societal Needs and 
micro-level Opportunities are different sides of the same coin (the dark grey segment of the 
circles where all three conditions come together).
2.6.1 THREE CONDITIONS
 NEEDS
At the core of this condition is the question: What must be done? ‘Needs’ refer to the things 
or actions that are considered necessary in order to reach the goals people or groups of people 
have set for themselves. These needs can either stimulate employment or prevent women from 
seeking employment.
 At the micro level (individual and household), the two core needs in understanding women’s 
employment are material needs and care needs, both related to the goal of survival and reaching 
a certain level of well-being. Material needs include money, food and clothing, all of which 
require some sort of income that most of the time will be acquired through labour. Care needs 
refer to the reproductive and social aspects of household life: taking care, physically and 
emotionally, of other household members. Considering the usual time constraints, care needs 
interfere with other activities, and increasing care needs therefore hinder the entrance to the 
labour market. Especially in contexts where care roles are heavily gendered and considered to be 
exclusively feminine, care needs limit women’s employment.
 At the macro level, the goals of growing prosperity and state or group survival are most 
relevant in understanding employment-related needs. To reach these goals it can be necessary 
that more people enter the labour market, or that people (mostly men) join the armed forces and 
are to be replaced by others (women) in the labour force, for example. At this level, the core need 
is the need for additional labour, which especially influences women’s employment decisions if 
this societal need is internalised by women; if they consider it their duty to help their country or 
group, the need for labour will stimulate a woman to enter the labour market.
 OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities are captured in the question: What can be done? Needs might drive women 
to enter the labour market, but this does not necessarily mean that they will get employed. 
A woman’s employment status ultimately depends on whether her characteristics match the 
available jobs.
 At the societal level, this has to do with the presence of accessible and suitable jobs. In this 
respect it is important that there are vacancies. Moreover, these jobs need to be open to women. 
Employers have to be allowed and be prepared to hire women, or customers have to be prepared 
to buy from a woman. Here, norms about what jobs are considered suitable for women as well 
as the perceived comparative advantages of hiring women are both important. In addition, the 
accessibility of jobs depends on the jobs’ location, the place where the women live, and women’s 
mobility. The presence of suitable and accessible jobs as an opportunity overlaps with the societal 
need for female labour (the darkest segment in Figure 2.1): a perceived need for women as 
employees can result in opportunities for women to find jobs (once they are on the labour market).
 At the micro level, women’s skills and the household’s resources to find and secure a job 
shape the opportunities of women to become employed. The job requirements need to match 
the skills of the potential employee. In addition, a woman must have access to the jobs that suit 
her. If there are jobs in the vicinity and a woman’s skills match their requirements, it is necessary 
that the woman and the job ‘find each other’. Opportunities therefore also depend on the 
resources that women and their households have that can be applied in finding a job.
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VALUES
The values condition is reflected by the question: What should be done? Value patterns, for 
instance on gendered household roles, are first translated to norms that influence which needs 
are considered most important for women, which jobs are suitable to women, and which can 
be institutionalised in policies creating opportunities for women. It is in this sense that values 
underlie needs and opportunities.
 Secondly, not every woman who is in need of an income, has no care duties, and can easily 
find a job will actually seek employment. She can always decide not to. Certain values she or 
her social environment holds or that are dominant in society can prevent her from seeking 
or finding employment because it would be considered inappropriate and undesirable. The 
opposite also holds true: values can stimulate her to find a job. At the individual level, women 
can have internalised such values and act accordingly. However, a woman might also consciously 
anticipate how others will judge her behaviour, what values other people hold and which societal 
norms are dominant. The costs of going against family or societal norms may outweigh the 
perceived personal benefits of employment. These direct influences of values are reflected by 
the light gray top segment in Figure 2.2.
 On the issue of women’s employment in Muslim countries, at least two broad sets of 
values should be considered. The first concerns ideas about the general role of women in 
the public sphere: are women and men supposed to live separate from each other or not? A 
norm of seclusion restricts the employment of women to working environments in which only 
women are active. The second includes more specific values about the existence and extent of 
complementary roles of women and men: are women primarily seen as care providers? If so, they 
will be less likely considered as potential employees, but ‘feminine jobs’ may still be acceptable 
and open to them.
 These two types of values do not automatically influence women’s employment, as they are 
only the normative content. Only if this normative content is embodied can it influence women’s 
behaviour (see also Badran, 2001; Spierings, 2007). Such an embodiment can be found in the 
above-mentioned societal norms, institutionalised in policies and politics and in internalisations.
2.6.2 NOV – A CONDITIONS APPROACH
The choice to make conditions the underlying frame for identifying factors that influence 
women’s employment contradicts the common practice in the literature. Most studies start 
by identifying dimensions, spheres or domains such as economics, politics or culture. For 
instance, the GAD perspective and Moghadam’s framework have drawn attention to (groups of) 
factors that are often neglected in mainstream theories. Both stress the importance of political 
structures and policies, class differences and gender systems (Moghadam, 1996, 1998; 2003; 
Rathgeber, 1990). Doing so, they complemented existing ideas on the influence of religion (Islam) 
and economic characteristics. Walby’s more general theory also emphasises the importance 
of different groups of factors. In Walby’s terms, employment is part of the economic domain 
(including domestic labour) that coevolves with the other domains, such as the polity and civil 
society (a label Walby prefers over culture), and different inequalities (class, gender, and so on) 
shape social relations in each of these domains (2009: Chapter 2). GAD, Moghadam, and Walby 
justifiably argue for a comprehensive approach that takes into account the cultural, political, and 
economic domains, and that considers both the productive and reproductive roles of women. 
However, adding dimensions or domains to a theoretical framework is insufficient for creating a 
truly holistic framework.
 To be able to identify all the important factors influencing women’s employment it is 
necessary to understand what general causal mechanisms are at work. From these mechanisms 
the more specific factors can then be derived, but the mechanisms are not domain specific and 
thus the collection of influencing factors cannot be fully understood when the focus remains on 
domains. Frameworks that start their reasoning in terms of domains do not go to the core of the 
phenomenon, which are the theoretical mechanisms, even thought they might pinpoint a large 
part of all important factors. In sum, starting with domains might lead to possibly neglecting 
important influences. This is not to say that the different domains are not important; as can be 
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 • A woman’s decision to enter the labour market and whether she will be employed is fully based on a combination of the 
needs, opportunities and values of the woman and her surroundings.
Box 2.4
i To the extent that the material needs of a woman and her household increase, the greater the probability that a woman is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
ii To the extent that the care needs of a woman and her household increase, the smaller the probability that a woman is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
iii To the extent that the labour demand at the societal level increases, the greater the probability that a woman is gainfully 
non-agriculturally employed.
iv To the extent that a woman’s skills increase, the greater her probability to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
v To the extent that the resources at the disposal of a woman increase, the greater the probability that she is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed.
vi To the extent that the number of suitable jobs in the vicinity of a woman’s residence increases, the greater the probability 
that the woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
vii To the extent that the strength of gender seclusion and segregation values increase, the smaller the probability that a 
woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 2.5
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derived from the conditions discussed above, the different domains mentioned by Moghadam, 
Walby and the GAD approach are included in my framework, but this framework in itself is quite 
different from their approaches.
 My approach is inspired by Hijab’s (1988, 2001). She argues that Arab women’s employment 
is shaped by many factors, such as education, wealth, cultural and social views, legislation and 
labour market structures. These factors are conceptualised as aspects of three conditions – 
needs, opportunities, and abilities – “which must be met before women (or men) can be fully 
integrated into the wage labor force” (1988, p. 73). Besides widening the scope of the framework 
from Arab women to women in Muslim countries and adding (the interrelatedness of) levels, my 
conceptualisation of conditions is also substantially different.
 Hijab refers to needs as requirements or manpower at what she calls the state level and as 
income at the popular (micro; in my terms household and individual) level. She sees opportunities 
as encompassing the proper environment in terms of legislation at the state level as well as the 
cultural and social obstacles at the popular level. Abilities in her view include training facilities 
and skills. This classification has several weaknesses. Firstly, her concept of needs includes 
only economic needs and does not pay attention to broader needs such as care. Secondly, the 
difference between abilities and opportunities is unclear and both seem to tap into the fit 
between the labour market situation and women’s characteristics. Thirdly, Hijab includes values 
and societal norms as part of the concept of opportunities. She thereby conflates different 
influences and at the same time seems to neglect culture as a force on its own, a system of 
descriptive and injunctive norms (see Smith & Louis, 2009). Fourthly, she formulates the 
conditions as if they cannot have a combined effect, that they are mutually exclusive, while I have 
argued that only values might have an effect by themselves.
 In this section, I have argued that each and every causal mechanism is based on (a mixture of) 
three conditions, which is summarised in Box 2.4. Subsequently – and within the framework of 
the other theoretical starting points discussed in this chapter – these three conditions have been 
translated to seven general hypotheses as given in Box 2.5. In the next chapter, these general 
hypotheses are further specified to factors influencing the likelihood that a woman is to be 
employed.
2.7 ConCLuSIonS: a HoLIStIC vIew of woMen’S eMpLoyMent deCISIonS and 
poSItIonS
In this chapter, I have presented the basic premises on which my theoretical expectations 
are based and that will be used to formulate specific hypotheses or expectations in the next 
chapter and the thematic chapters (respectively Chapters 3 and 7, 8, 9 & 10). I have argued that 
the individual woman is the primary agent who is placed in a four-level context (household, 
community, country, globe), with different structures and other agents at each of these levels 
shaping her decision to enter the labour market and influencing whether she will succeed 
in finding a job. The probability that the woman in the end succeeds in becoming employed 
depends on the needs, opportunities, and values of herself and her environment. These 
conditions underlie factors that influence women’s employment at the different levels, whereby 
contextual factors are expected to manifest a stronger influence the closer they are to the 
individual woman. Moreover, some of these (contextual) factors will have direct effects, some 
will influence other explanatory factors at a lower level and thus influence women’s employment 
indirectly, some will shape the strength of relationships at the lower level, and some contextual 
effects might turn out to be caused by lower-level differences.
 This framework combines insights from different approaches, such as the Gender & 
Development (GAD) approach (Rathgeber, 1990), Moghadam’s work on women’s economic 
position in the Middle East (Moghadam, 1998; 2003), Hijab’s approach to work and Arab women 
(1988, 2001), and Walby’s complexity theory for the social sciences (Walby, 2009). At the same 
time my framework transcends these approaches by explicitly theorising the multiplicity of the 
important levels and their interconnections, and by clarifying the relationship between structure 
and agent as well as the underlying causal factors. Applying this framework, I will formulate 
specific expectations in the following chapters that encompass the existing literature, point 
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towards unexplored influences on women’s employment, take position in existing debates, 
disentangle existing conflated explanations and contextualise explanations of women’s 
employment.
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18 This pattern is not exclusive to Muslim countries; on the 
contrary, this division of labour is found in many if not 
most societies.
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Chapter 3
formulating expectations
Micro- and macro-level determinants of women’s 
employment
3.1 generatIng a new underStandIng and forMuL atIng HypotHeSeS
In the previous chapter, I have discussed what I think are the crucial aspects that determine 
women’s employment, in the process formulating seven general hypotheses. In this chapter, I 
will derive more specific hypotheses about what factors influence women’s employment using 
the previously established framework. These hypotheses are more concrete specifications of the 
seven general hypotheses regarding needs, opportunities and values as formulated in Chapter 
2. In other words, the general concepts that can be applied to women’s employment in each 
context are here reformulated into factors that I expect to influence women’s employment in 
Muslim countries. This chapter will be organised in five sections, the first four corresponding 
with the segments indicating the four combinations of conditions found in Figure 2.1 and Figure 
3.1. Section 3.2 focuses on care and economic needs; Section 3.3 on societal economic needs 
that translate to opportunities for individual women; Section 3.4 on opportunities in terms of 
matching labour supply and demand; and Section 3.5 on the direct influence of values. Section 
3.6 pays special attention to the role of the state and government, relating it to both the needs/
value combination of conditions and the opportunities/values combination.
 In this second theoretical chapter, the theoretical expectations formulated in the 
fragmented literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries are brought together and 
reinterpreted in light of the framework presented in the previous chapter. While the main 
focus in this chapter is on re-understanding the possible effects of familiar factors, I will at 
the end of each section also briefly address ways the framework sheds light on new issues or 
running debates on the (group of) factor(s) discussed in that section. There, I will also refer to 
the thematic Chapters 7 through 10 in which the general framework will be applied to how the 
employment opportunities created by education differ by context (Chapter 7), how household 
configurations shape women’s perceived economic and care burden and thus employment 
because of a certain patriarchal value system (Chapter 8), how religion might influence women’s 
employment once it is translated to (institutionalised) norms (Chapter 9), and how global-level 
factors influence women’s employment and effects change over the years (Chapter 10). On each 
of these issues specific expectations will be formulated in those chapters.
3.2 CoMpetIng needS: InCoMe and Care
In this section the two general hypotheses (see Chapter 2 and Box 3.1) on micro-level needs will 
be translated into more specific ones.
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (1)
To understand how material and care needs influence women’s employment, the theoretical 
framework directs our attention to the household level. The dominant value pattern in Muslim 
countries with respect to the gendered division of labour dictates that men are considered the 
prime income providers and women the caregivers (e.g., Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Fergany et.al., 
2006).18 The consequence is that the collective input of the household members in terms of care 
and income determines whether there is a need for women to seek employment or stay home to 
provide care (Hoodfar, 1997). 
 Only if the income of the male household members is insufficient are women expected to 
seek employment. In other words, the economic need for women to enter the labour market 
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3.1 If a male breadwinner is present, the probability that a woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if 
no male breadwinner is present.
3.2 To the extent that the number of (young) children of a woman in the household increases, the smaller the probability that 
she is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.2
i To the extent that the material needs of a woman and her household increase, the greater the probability that a woman is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
ii To the extent that the care needs of a woman and her household increase, the smaller the probability that a woman is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.1
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increases when the family income or wealth decreases, as this constitutes an incentive for a 
woman to enter the labour market to earn an extra income (see also Glick & Sahn, 1997; Gündüz-
Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980). While men are primarily responsible for 
the household income, women are primarily responsible for the household management. Since 
time is limited in quantity and roles are rather strict, more care consumers and thus more care 
tasks for women might prevent them from entering the labour market. The main difference 
between households in this respect is the number of present (young) children (cf. Al-Qudsi, 1998; 
Donahoe, 1999; Glick & Sahn, 2005; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Khattab, 2002; Maume, 
2006; Moghadam, 2004; Waite, 1980). More women alleviate the care burden and can thus be 
expected to increases women’s employment likelihood, while the presence of more children 
increases the care burden and thus decreases women’s employment likelihood according to this 
reasoning. These considerations lead to the more specific hypotheses in Box 3.2.
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
While the existing literature almost exclusively focuses on children when discussing care and 
family structures, other foci may also be deduced from the framework used in this study. For 
instance, by drawing attention to the male-breadwinner-female-caregiver norm and care needs 
at the household level, it becomes clear that the extent to which care needs limit women in 
entering the labour market not only depends on the number of care consumers but also the 
number of people that can provide care: the household’s number of adult women. When more 
female adults are present in a household, the relative care burden of each individual woman 
will be less, increasing her possibilities for entering the labour market (see also Assaad & Arntz, 
2005; Pettit & Hook, 2005). This and other expectations with regard to patriarchal values and 
household configurations, needs and opportunities will be formulated and tested in Chapter 8.
3.3 L aBour deMand: CreatIng opportunItIeS
The societal need for labour, which can spur women to enter the labour market, overlaps with 
the general concept of opportunities; in other words, the demand for labour might create 
opportunities for women. In this section, I will further specify this general hypothesis (Box 3.3).
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (2)
In the case of gainful non-agricultural employment, a society’s demand for female labour is 
shaped by a combination of, on the one hand, the generating of non-agricultural jobs (which 
leads to a societal need or demand) and, on the other hand, opportunities for individuals due 
to newly created jobs. The demand of non-agricultural labour is mainly tied up with processes 
of modernisation and industrialisation. In those processes, economies shift from an agricultural 
base to an industrial one, with the service sector developing later on (cf. Bahramitash, 
2002, 2003; Kerr, Harbison, Dunlop & Myers, 1960; Moghadam, 1998, 2003; Standing, 1996; 
WorldBank, 2005). However, not all newly created jobs might be beneficial to women’s 
employment. Because of the labour division in societies where women are considered secondary 
workers – as is believed to be the case for Muslim countries (see Jansen, 2004; Moghadam, 2004; 
Nassar, 2003; Olmsted, 2003) – there is only a need for female labour when the male labour 
supply is depleted; only then do women get the opportunity to find a job. Simultaneously, 
women might in some cases be preferred over men. If it is true that employers often hold the 
view that women are more docile, less unionised, and equipped with ‘nimble fingers’ (see Clark, 
1992; Cairoli, 2007; Moghadam, 2003; Pfeifer & Posusney, 2003; Standing, 1996), it can be 
expected that the demand for female labour is particularly strong when light manufacturing 
– such as sewing or the assemblage of electronic devices – is at the basis of the overall labour 
demand increase.
 With regard to the impact of labour demand, the sub-national or community level seems 
most important. Given the restricted mobility of women in (many) Muslim countries (see Assaad 
& Arntz, 2005; Haddad, Brown, Richter & Smith, 1995), it is economic development at the 
community level that creates a demand for labour, not just the economic development of the 
country as a whole. National-level labour needs should not be ignored, however, as national 
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3.3 To the extent the economic development of a community/country increases, the greater the probability that a woman is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community/country.
3.4 To the extent that the male labour supply in a community is more depleted, the greater the probability that a woman in 
that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.5 To the extent that the relative number of light manufacturing jobs in a community increases, the greater the probability 
that a woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.6 To the extent that the urbanisation of place a woman lives increases, the greater the probability that she is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed.
Box 3.4
3.7 To the extent the foreign direct investments in a country increase, the greater the probability that a woman in that 
country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.5
iii To the extent that the labour demand at the societal level increases, the greater the probability that a woman is gainfully 
non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.3
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processes such as employment policies and within country migration are certainly influential. 
A focus on proximity not only draws attention to the level at which these effects manifest 
themselves, but also to women’s direct environment. Since non-agricultural labour is mainly 
found in urban areas, the demand for labour will be stronger in urban environments. This type 
of location will improve women’s opportunities, especially when they are strongly restricted in 
their mobility (i.e. travelling is only allowed in the presence of a mahram – a male relative), and 
it is therefore the degree of urbanisation in women’s direct environment that counts the most 
(cf. Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Donahoe, 1999; Glick & Sahn, 1997; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; 
Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980). Based on this discussion four more specific hypotheses are 
formulated and given in Box 3.4.
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
The influence of economic development as described above is derived from the framework 
discussed in the previous chapter. In the existing literature, economic development is discussed 
in a much broader sense; lower fertility rates, increased educational levels, and changing value 
patterns are all part of one process – often labelled “modernisation” – that is often said to 
lead to women’s entry into the labour market (cf. Inglehart, 1997; Kerr, Harbison, Dunlop & 
Myers, 1960; Moghadam, 2003; Olmsted, 2003). In line with suggestions by others, I believe it 
is important to explicitly formulate that economic development is an important phenomenon 
linked to women’s employment through different causal mechanisms, not one causal process. 
Using the idea of multiple conditions and levels helps to understand better which aspects 
influence women’s employment and how the overall effect is accomplished. In my framework, 
at least five consequences of economic development from the literature can be linked to 
women’s employment: (A) – as described above – the demand for labour creates opportunities 
for women; (B) the development of a welfare state indirectly influences women’s employment 
through increased opportunities since women become better educated; (C) economic welfare 
leads indirectly to lower care needs because of lower fertility rates; (D) economic security leads 
to changing values towards self-development and equality; and (E) more wealthier households 
means that fewer households need additional income to the male contribution to the household 
income and there is less need for women to find employment. In other words, economic 
development can be expected to have an direct top-down influence (A) and a fourfold indirect 
top-down influence (B, C, D, E) that includes an indirect negative effect (E). Single-level studies 
at the macro-level conflate all these different mechanisms.
 The framework’s multiple levels also help better to understand how labour demand might 
be related to international processes. This link with the global level is particularly present when 
discussing the creation of jobs. Often international companies are the drivers of investments 
in manufacturing facilities in low-wage countries, and creating light manufacturing industries 
increases the demand for female labour. Foreign direct investments (FDI) at the global level 
might therefore create a demand for female labour at the community level (an indirect top-
down influence), which increases women’s employment opportunities (see also Chapter 10) (Box 
3.5).
3.4 MatCHIng deMand and SuppLy: SuItaBLe and aCCeSSIBLe joBS
The previous section has discussed how economic demand for labour might create opportunities 
for women to find a job. Zooming further in on the idea of opportunities draws attention to 
the notion that jobs also have to be suitable and accessible. This means that the wishes and 
possibilities of the employer and the woman have to match. From that perspective, the three 
general hypotheses on opportunities (Box 3.6) will be further specified in this section.
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (3)
Combining the concept of suitable jobs with the underlying condition of values leads to the 
expectation that perceptions and norms regarding women’s roles and capabilities shape the 
extent to which an industry or job type is seen as suitable for women. In other words: the local 
labour market structures are important to women’s job opportunities.
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3.8 To the extent that the number of jobs in the service sector in a community increases, the greater the probability that a 
woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.9 To the extent that a country’s public sector size increases, the greater the probability that a woman in that country is 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.7
iv To the extent that a woman’s skills increase, the greater the probability that she is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
v To the extent that the resources at the disposal of a woman increase, the greater the probability that she is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed.
vi To the extent that the number of suitable jobs in the vicinity of a woman’s residence increases, the greater the probability 
that the woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.6
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 Firstly, a value pattern that includes strongly gendered roles means that sectors or types 
of jobs that are feminised – that fit these roles – are most conducive to women’s employment 
opportunities. The service sector especially harbours jobs that are related to feminised tasks, 
such as teaching, nursing and cleaning (cf. Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; 
Bahramitash, 2002; Hijab, 2001; Moghadam, 1998; 2003). Secondly, not only more lenient 
norms but also the practical provisions in sectors can make it easier for women to accept a job. 
If discrimination in a sector is lower, child care facilities are better, and there are relatively 
good social benefits, then important barriers for women to find and accept employment are 
levelled, although, in the private sector these provisions might be considered too costly, which 
leads to a comparative disadvantage for women since only they bear children and are the main 
care providers. For public companies and the government sector more often other motivations 
play a role and therefore the presence of a larger public sector is expected to be beneficial to 
women’s employment (see Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Assaad, 2003; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Miles, 
2002; Moghadam, 1996, 1998, 2004; Nassar, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; WorldBank, 2005). 
Consequently, I have formulated the two hypotheses in Box 3.7.
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
Each of the effects described above is presented as a direct top-down effect from the 
community/country level. Connecting these effects to factors found at other levels can also 
shed further light on some (supposedly) important influences on women’s employment. 
Firstly, a fierce debate has been going on in the literature about the influence of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that are enforced by IMF or the WorldBank in exchange for 
economic and financial support. Some argue that SAPs foster women’s employment, while 
others insist that they disadvantage women. Disentangling the levels and mechanisms might 
shed light on this issue, making clear that and how SAPs might have contradictory effects. On 
the one hand, international economic-political instruments might lead to economic development 
and increased trade through economic liberalisation, positively influencing women’s 
opportunities (see Harrison, 2005; Jaquette, 1982; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Serra, Spiegel 
& Stiglitz, 2008), on the other hand SAPs also entail economic privatisation measures, cuts in 
government expenditures and shrinkage of the public sector, decreasing women’s options and 
thus negatively influencing women’s employment from the top down (Assaad, 2003; Fergany 
et.al., 2006; Miles, 2002; Nassar, 2003; Yousef, 2004). Chapter 10 pays more attention to this 
issue.
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (4)
So far, the match between the job market and the women on that job market has been discussed 
from the perspective of the labour market, but the second crucial part of the equation are 
the women’s characteristics: jobs can be present and available, but this does not mean that 
they are accessible. Women need to find the job and have to be judged to (best) fulfil the job 
requirements. This process depends on individual and household characteristics such as human 
capital and resources such as a social network. Firstly, with regard to women’s paid employment 
outside agriculture, most crucial basic skills seem to be obtained through education. Especially 
higher up in the occupational hierarchy, higher education is expected to be a nearly necessary 
condition for obtaining the human capital needed for such jobs (see Aromolaran, 2004; Assaad 
& Arntz, 2005; Boserup, 1970; Calvès & Schoumaker, 2004; Glick & Sahn, 1997, 2005; Gündüz-
Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980; Khattab, 2002; Kuepie, Nordman & 
Roubaud, 2009; Pettit & Hook, 2005). The more human capital, the more labour market options a 
woman has, as the number of jobs for which she fulfils the requirements increases.
 Secondly, a woman’s resources can foster the process of becoming employed, because they 
are the tools with which one can find a job. Social networks seem to be an important example 
of these resources or tools: having a larger social network that comprises more connections 
(wasta – ‘who you know’) (and thus also more possible employers) makes it easier to find a 
job. These resources are often not a characteristic of the woman, but of the household. For 
instance, the literature on women in Muslim countries often focuses on the husband’s (or head 
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3.10 To the extent a woman has more human capital, the greater the probability that she is gainfully non-agriculturally 
employed.
3.11 To the extent the household belongs to a social network at a higher socio-economic class, the greater the probability that 
a woman in that household is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.8
vii To the extent that the strength of gender seclusion and segregation values increase, the smaller the probability that a 
woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.9
3.12 To the extent that the presence of women in the public sphere in a community increases, the greater the probability that 
a woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.13 To the extent that the dominance of traditional care roles in a community increases, the smaller the probability that a 
woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.14 To the extent that other household members hold more traditional values, the smaller the probability that a woman in 
that household is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.15 To the extent a woman internalised more traditional values, the smaller the probability that she is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed.
Box 3.10
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of the household’s) socio-economic status (Donahoe, 1999; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; 
Mernissi, 1987; Moghadam, 2003). This all results in two more micro-level hypotheses, given in 
Box 3.8.
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
The importance of human capital is not something that is only dealt with in this framework, and 
higher education is generally considered and shown to be conducive to women’s employment, 
however, the current literature is less clear about how the human capital obtained through 
primary education influences women’s employment. For instance, Aromalaran (2004) and 
Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud (2009) argue from an opportunity cost (‘Mincerian’) perspective 
that primary education is not conducive to wage work, because the skills learned there in terms 
of better household management increase the benefits of staying at home more than that the 
fictitious cost of not entering the labour market and staying at home (lost wages) rise. From a 
needs, opportunities and values perspective, such an explicit cost-benefit analysis is not made 
by definition, and primary education simply increases a woman’s opportunities on the labour 
market because a woman with education has generally speaking more skills – literacy for instance 
– than a woman without education (regardless of whether this also might increase her usefulness 
when staying at home). With regard to the effect of education or human capital, the way levels 
are connected in this study also draws attention to embedded effects. For instance, the effect 
of human capital can be expected to be weaker in areas where more suitable job opportunities 
exist: employers will prefer higher-educated women, so that these women will find a job even 
if there are relatively few jobs. The lower-educated women will then only become employed if 
there are enough suitable jobs. So, more suitable jobs in the vicinity mean a smaller gap between 
higher- and lower-educated women and thus a smaller effect of education. How the framework 
predicts this and other embedded effects is discussed more extensively in Chapter 7.
3.5 tHe added vaLue of worK: SoCIetaL and InternaLISed norMS
In shaping women’s opportunities and needs, value patterns play an important role, as has been 
shown in the previous sections. As explained in Chapter 2, values can have direct effects as well. 
In this section on the values at work at the different levels, the hypothesis in Box 3.9 will be 
further specified.
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (5)
To understand the influence of values, we have to distinguish different ideas and the different 
forms these ideas take (see Chapter 2). With regard to the normalisation of gendered behaviour, 
two different practices are often thought of in the context of Muslim countries: seclusion and 
segregation. While these can overlap, I will treat them separately and the extent to which 
they are present in society as dominant behavioural patterns can be seen as the strength of a 
(descriptive [Smith & Louis, 2009]) norm because the situation serves as examples of what is 
considered appropriate. In other words, if a woman lives in a community in which hardly any 
women are present in the public sphere (i.e. labour market, education, politics), it will be more 
difficult for that woman to enter the public sphere; not because she does not want to, but 
because she will have the idea that other people (including employers) do not think she should. 
Similarly, in a community in which traditional family roles and structures are more dominant, a 
woman will think others will find it inappropriate is she became employed. Norms ‘imposed’ by 
others within the household are also expected to be relevant to women’s employment decisions; 
probably there will be discussions about the decision to look for a job, at least with the partner 
or household head, and otherwise I assume that a woman will at least weigh what she believes 
the other household members’ opinions to be. This is different from internalised values, because 
when segregation and seclusion values are internalised the woman herself finds it inappropriate 
to enter the labour market. Based on this discussion, four additional hypotheses can now be 
formulated (Box 3.10).
 Besides social pressure and internalisation, norms can become influential through 
institutionalisation in policy and state structures (see Bahramitash, 2002; Doumato, 2003; 
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3.16 To the extent the institutionalisation of conservative Islam into the state increases, the smaller the probability that a 
woman in that country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.11
3.17 To the extent that traditional gendered family roles are more institutionalised in government policies, the smaller the 
probability that a woman in that country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.18 To the extent that the size of the social safety net in a country increases, the smaller the probability that a woman in that 
country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.12
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Murphy, 2003; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Walby, 2009). This can lead to policies that 
shape women’s needs and values (as will be discussed in the next section), and it can have a 
so-called injunctive effect: because certain values are institutionalised, women might perceive 
that others (such as the state) disapprove of certain behaviour (see Smith & Louis, 2009). Because 
many traditional values with regard to women’s position in society are related to conservative 
strands of religion, Islam in particular (see Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Donahoe, 1999; Hale, 
2003; Jansen, 2004; Moghadam, 2004; Syed, 2008; Wooten, 2003), it can be expected that the 
institutionalisation of a conservative version of this religion into the state structure and policies 
such as family law prevents women from being employed, also in an injunctive way (see also 
Bahramitash, 2002; Doumato, 2003; Murphy, 2003; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Walby, 
2009) (Box 3.11).
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the influence of Islam is often discussed 
simplistically and without much specification of the causal mechanism(s) at work (e.g. Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Inglehart & Norris, 2003b; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Ross, 2008; 
Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007). The literature often refers to some overall Islamic culture 
that is misogynist or in which women are subordinate to men. My holistic approach may help 
to understand how religion as a message can be influential, but also how it differs within 
and among Muslim countries. Furthermore, it shows that religion is only one of the sources 
from which values spring. Since each set of value message needs a messenger as a means of 
communication to have that influence, the framework also implies that Islam can have multiple 
influences because values can manifest themselves in many different ways and at different 
levels. Further discussion – including empirical tests – can be found in the thematic chapter on 
religion: Chapter 9.
3.6 tHe roLe of tHe governMent: SHapIng opportunItIeS and needS
As discussed in the previous section, governments can institutionalise values through policies, 
but governments can also impact women’s employment by influencing the factors that shape 
the opportunities and needs restricting or stimulating women’s employment. In this sense, the 
role of governments might be related to all seven main hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 and 
further specified above.
 NOV-FR AMEWORK EXPEC TATIONS (6)
Governments’ influence is heavily dependent on the type of policies they support. Governments 
can implement legal impediments to job opportunities, but they can also reduce the conflict 
between productive and reproductive needs (e.g. Bahramitash, 2003; Carapico, 1996; Doumato, 
2003; Miles, 2002; Moghadam, 2003; Murphy, 2003). With regard to job opportunities, 
government policies can limit or increase access to jobs. For instance, legal restrictions on 
travelling or on access to certain sectors and ownership all decrease women’s opportunities 
because it limits the pool of jobs women can choose from and restricts their resources to find 
employment. These legal restrictions can be religiously motivated – Shari’a-based law for 
example – but they do not have to be. Policies that facilitate childcare and support family 
planning can help to meet a household’s care needs. If women can outsource some care duties, 
it is easier for them to find employment. Lastly, with regard to economic needs, welfare policies 
can decrease women’s economic needs to enter the labour market, because the household has 
less need for an additional income and can sustain itself based on the household head’s income 
and the added state provisions. This is summarised in two hypotheses (Box 3.12).
 Thinking in terms of top-down influences, indirect effects, and the country level as the 
main political arena draws attention to the form of government as being a possibly important 
influence as well. Given the characteristics of a democratic regime, it can be expected that 
in such a system there are more incentives to implement gender-equal policies (see Huber, 
Rueschemeyer & Stephens, 1997; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). Principles such as freedom 
of organisation, freedom of speech and freedom of protest make it possible for interest groups 
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3.19 To the extent that the level of democracy in a country is higher, the greater the probability that a woman in that country 
is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 3.13
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figure 3.1 A holistic meta-level framework explaining women’s employment in Muslim countries, including factor-level inflences
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to influence policies, and the system as a whole then will give all citizens the possibility to 
influence policies. Because the citizens are about 50% women, a democratic system and certain 
freedoms creates possibilities for them. Parts of the female electorate might force or compel the 
government to change its policies in the direction of gender-equality. Additionally, politicians 
do often show vote-seeking behaviour, and – again – half of the electorate is female (cf. Fergany 
et.al., 2003; Posusney & Doumato 2003; Yousef, 2004). In Box 3.13, this is formulated in a 
hypothesis. However, the developments in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia also show that people 
fear democratisation because it might bring Islamists to power (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 
2007; Spierings, 2011).
 REFLEC TING ON THE EXISTING LITER ATURE
Comparative work on the role of the government in shaping women’s employment is very scarce 
and focuses almost exclusively on economic policies, as can be derived from the discussion on 
SAPs or FDI above. On social and gender equality the research is striking. One reason for this, 
besides data scarcity, might be the (biased) thought that governments in Muslim countries 
will not take much action to improve women’s situation. This thesis tries to contribute to the 
literature by theorising different ways government can influence (the factors determining) 
women’s employment, and in each of the empirical chapters I reflect on the state and the role 
of governments. For instance, in Chapter 9 the local political situation is taken into account, and 
in Chapter 10 social policies are taken into account to explain the effects of global processes. 
From these analyses and the framework, it should be possible to envision a path for further 
development of the study of state and policy effects on women’s employment in Muslim 
countries.
3.7 ConCLuSIonS: furtHer deveLopIng a HoLIStIC approaCH
In Chapter 2, I presented the theoretical backbone of this thesis. In this chapter, that holistic 
framework has been translated into specific hypotheses at the individual, household, community 
and country level. The hypotheses formulated in this chapter encompass the existing explanatory 
factors, pinpointed in other works on women’s employment as well. It has brought those into 
connection with each other and has helped to reunderstand those influences in terms of the 
NOV-conditions. It are thus also the causal mechanisms that count in testing the framework. 
They shed light on whether the theoretical expectations are correct. Especially, regarding the 
indirect top-down influences this seems possible in this study.
 While the focus in this chapter lay on the more well-know factors, other novelties of this 
framework have been highlighted as well. In the Chapters 7 through 10, other aspects of the 
framework will be translated to specific hypotheses. One of the most notable contributions by 
doing so is the framework’s capacity to generate new – in the literature hardly or not studied 
– hypotheses. In Chapter 8, I will formulate and test hypotheses on the presences of different 
household members. In Chapter 9, many different manifestations of religious ideology at the 
micro and macro level are related to women’s employment. A second notable contribution of 
the framework is that it tries to understand and theorise how (micro-level) relationships differ 
by context (the embedding effect – Section 2.5). A brief remark on this in the current chapter 
is found in Section 3.4. In Chapter 7 this will be discussed for education, in Chapter 8 I theorise 
how household configurations have different effects in different regions, and in Chapter 
10 time is used as the context for different individual and household-level characteristics in 
Egypt. Throughout this thesis, a third important contribution is the translation of macro-level 
hypotheses to the district level, as is done for labour market structure in this chapter.
 In Figure 3.1, all factors discussed in this chapter are placed in the visualisation of the overall 
framework presented in Chapter 2. Some sections in this figure are empty, which may give rise 
to the conclusion that this chapter neglects one or more conditions at one of the levels. Three of 
such areas can be distinguished from the figure. (A) At the global level, the processes expected 
to influence women’s employment are often underspecified (e.g. ‘globalisation’) or the literature 
collapses different effects into one singular effect. Structural Adjustment Programmes, for 
instance, include different processes such as economic liberalisation and economic privatisation. 
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These might be relevant to women’s employment because of their influence on FDI, economic 
development, and the size of the public sector, three variables that are included in Figure 3.1. In 
other words, to formulate specific expectations, global influences often need to be translated 
to country- or district-level factors, and only specific factors such as these are included in Figure 
3.1. In Chapter 10, more attention will be given to the discussion of globalisation, SAPs and thus 
the global level. (B) At the community level, no economic factors are found in the needs segment 
because factors that create a demand for female labour, by definition also create an opportunity 
for women. Thus these factors are found in the lower quadrant. However, it is possible that 
factors at the community level shape women’s care needs. Childcare facilities are a example of 
this. Since such a hypothesis cannot be tested within the limits of this study, I have not included 
this factor. Sub-national data on policies and facilities that are comparable across countries is 
needed for these kinds of tests, and regrettably such data are not available yet. (C) Where needs 
are concerned, no individual-level factors are included in Figure 3.1 simply because this condition 
is translated in terms of the collective needs of the household, and the factors can thus be found 
at that level.
 In Chapter 6, I will test the hypotheses formulated above on data for 28 countries, 383 
districts, over 225 thousand households and about 300 thousand women. This will show how 
the translation of the overall framework holds empirically. In Chapters 7 through 10 further 
translations are made and tested.
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Chapter 4
Method & data
Quantifying diversity
4.1 IntroduCtIon
This study aims to identify the general influences on women’s employment in Muslim countries, 
and how these might differ or change according to their spatial or temporal contexts. To find 
and test for these relationships, I primarily make use of large data sets and regression-based 
techniques (multilevel models) that on the one hand enable the identification of general 
relationships and on the other hand allow me to test the complex dynamics and differences as 
discussed in the previous and upcoming chapters.
 This chapter will, firstly, explicate the two ontological premises underlying my 
methodological choices (diversity and complexity) (Section 4.2). Then, I will discuss the selection 
of countries and of the women in these countries (Section 4.3), the methods and techniques 
I used (logistic multilevel models) (Section 4.4), and the data that underlie all empirical 
analyses (Section 4.5). In Section 4.6, I will elaborate on the demarcating and measuring of the 
dependent variable, women’s gainful non-agricultural employment, and Section 4.7 discusses 
the operationalisation of the explanatory factors. The subsequent thematic chapters will provide 
more detailed and specific information about the methods, models and data specific to the 
topics treated in those chapters. Section 4.8 closes this chapter with a short summary.
4.2 BaSIC prInCIpLeS
Before turning to the case selection, the nature of the data, and the operationalisation of the 
theoretical factors, I think it is useful to emphasise two basic ontological premises, which were 
implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, present in the theoretical chapter. They have profoundly 
influenced my methodological choices, and might be summarised best by the words ‘diversity’ 
and ‘complexity’.
4.2.1 DIVERSIT Y
In the 1970s and 80s, feminist scholars heavily criticised the androcentric nature of 
generalisation in many studies, especially statistical ones (e.g. Bernard, 1975; Harding, 1986; 
Jayaratna, 1983; Millman & Moss Kanter, 1975/1987; Oakley & Oakley, 1979). These feminists 
found that those studies either overemphasised the differences between men and women over 
the differences between people of one sex, or that they generalised results based on the study 
of males to apply to non-males as well (Millman & Moss Kanter, 1987: 33–5). Similar critiques 
are found later with regard to differences between black and white women (e.g. Hancock, 
2007; Wekker & Lutz, 2001). Currently it seems that history is repeating itself, with Muslim 
people and countries being the subject of overgeneralisation (see also Davis & Robinson, 
2006). The issue of diversity is at the core of feminist critiques on mainstream methodologies, 
including statistics. Here, I will discuss how I think statistics and diversity can be reconciled, 
once neither generalisation nor diversity is treated dogmatically, and how this is reflected in 
my research.
 Following their own critiques on quantitative research, many feminist scholars have reacted 
by looking for new and different methods, which were thought to be less androcentric, such 
as ethnography, focus groups, and case studies (see Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 
2008; Harding, 1997; Reinharz, 1992). In this line, new epistemological positions such as 
standpoint feminism and feminist postmodernism came into existence that (to a large extent) 
rejected generalisations (see Harding, 1997; Spierings, 2010; 2012a). Specificity and multiple, 
fluid identities became more important. As McCall (2005) and Harding (e.g. 1986, 1997) argue, 
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19 Similarly a researcher might formulate the expectation 
that there is no substantial difference, while the existing 
literature suggests otherwise, but no empirical test are 
performed yet. This kind of research can be valuable 
too, because it can help to chart the shifting locus of 
identity politics. Still, it should of course be argued why a 
difference is not considered to be substantial.
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questioning categorisations or identities, and deconstructing stereotypes are both legitimate 
scientific endeavours and do contribute to a better understanding of our society; however, 
researching how power relations are linked to (perceived) identities and studying the general 
patterns of power in society can be worthwhile as well. That kind of research, if it meets the 
right conditions, does contribute to ‘feminist-proof’ knowledge, not withstanding its use of 
categorisation and generalisation. This is also my point of view.
 From a feminist perspective, the core of the problem with statistical research is that it 
neglects diversity in the search for generalisations. I claim that diversity can be honoured 
without having to renounce generalisations (see Spierings, 2010, 2012a). However, diversity 
should not be a dogma, an a priori truth. Similarly, homogeneity should not be assumed either. 
I argue that we can focus on the degree of diversity, where ‘diversity’ comprises the relevant 
differences between people based on their identities. Core to this rather loose definition are 
the words “relevant”, “differences” and “identities”. Differences can be empirically measured, 
but in the end it is the individual researcher (or policy-maker, or -generally speaking- reader) 
who has to decide whether a difference is considered to be relevant (cf. Warner, 2008), and 
statistical significance then becomes just one of the applicable criteria (see McCloskey & Ziliak, 
1996). The person performing the study and the study’s readers each have to make this decision 
for themselves, taking into account which identities are used to distinguish (groups of) people 
and which power relations are studied. Whether these are considered relevant might depend 
on the goal of the research (see Harding, 1997; McCall, 2005), the position or ‘standpoint’ of 
the researcher (see Young, 2003), or the (societal) attention for or the (perceived) relevance of 
a specific inequality (see Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006; Verloo, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Crucial, 
however, is that that choice for a focus on certain identities is a conscious decision, taking into 
consideration what is neglected and why.
 Thinking in terms of the degree of diversity – in stead of assumed homogeneity or diversity 
– is a starting point in performing scientific studies that enables researchers to look for general 
relationships while recognising diversity. The researcher can first try to define to what extent 
general conclusions are drawn or diversity is emphasised in the existing research on the topic the 
researcher is interested in. After critically assessing that literature, the researcher can formulate 
expectations about the empirical relevance of a distinction or power relation not yet studied in 
the field.19 These expectations can then be tested, and the study can in this manner contribute 
to a better understanding of differences without drawing the conclusion that generalisations 
are impossible to make. The measuring stick would then be that a study is particularly valuable 
if it theorises and tests the influence of at least one aspect related to people’s identities that is 
relatively new to the field of study. If this practice were followed, each new study would add to 
our knowledge on (causal) relationships in the (current) world, as well as on the differences and 
similarities among people(s).
 This point of view has not only resulted in theoretical attention for the gendered structures 
in society or a focus on differences through religion (Chapter 9), it also informs several 
methodological choices. As will be discussed below, the focus on general patterns and internal 
plurality has firstly led to a selection of cases including as many Muslim countries as possible. 
Secondly, the models used in this thesis are particularly well suited to including many different 
influences, and they thus test for the existence of empirical differences in the positions of 
women with different characteristics and identities. Thirdly, in several chapters I will employ 
techniques that help to differentiate between effects on different groups of women (Chapter 7 
on education; Chapter 8 on household configurations; Chapter 10 on time).
4.2.2 COMPLEXIT Y
As discussed in the introduction, many studies of women’s employment focus on one level 
or explanatory factor. In this thesis I have presented a more holistic approach to this topic. 
This choice is based on the underlying view that our social world is a collection of complex 
interrelationships. In one of the latest and most promising ways of grasping complexity, Walby 
(2007, 2009) understands this world in terms of different systems, including domains (e.g. polity, 
economy) and sets of social relations (e.g. gender, class) that are each other’s environment and 
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20 It might seem that the position taken in this thesis 
is in contradiction with Popper’s notion that it is the 
scientists’ job to simplify the universe to that what is 
deemed relevant (for instance in explaining certain 
phenomena) (Popper, 1982: 44, see also Lieshout, 1993: 
24). It is not (in contradiction). However, I do start from 
the idea that for most phenomena (including women’s 
employment in Muslim countries) there is no single or 
small group of primary explanatory factors. My theory 
dictates that there are many factors, but still many 
things are excluded as being irrelevant. Since I do not 
argue that ‘everything influences everything’, this more 
encompassing theory can be proven to be wrong. But 
any empirical test of the theory can only be performed if 
an ontological complexity position is taken in designing 
a study. To put it simply: one can only empirically 
find many factors to be related to the phenomenon 
of interest, if one starts from a perspective in which 
these factors are included. If one starts from a focus on 
one factor, one will not find other important factors. 
Additional factors will then only come into the picture to 
explain residuals.    
 This also raises the question about the importance of 
explanatory factors. Given the assumption that no single 
factor (as part of a theory) can explain all variation and, 
consequently, that there are always multiple explanatory 
factors; it is human judgement that determines which 
factor is most important. I do not think that this can be 
done theoretically, a priori, without empirical tests. 
Theoretically grounded empirical test can resolve how 
much a factor explains, but is explained variance – not 
solely meant in quantitative terms – the only valid 
criterion? For instance, if age or distance to the planet’s 
equator are the strongest explanatory factors and second 
in row are educational attainment and the amount of 
vegetation, I would argue that that latter two can be more 
important. Policy-wise these two are changeable; moving 
a country more towards the equator seems somewhat 
more difficult than planting trees. The relevance of 
a factor is in the eye of the beholder. But before the 
beholder can make a judgement, one needs to have a 
good overview of all factors. A complexity perspective on 
social reality informs theories and empirical studies that 
can lead to such knowledge. 
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thus co-evolve. To explain phenomena in this world, Walby also draws our attention to concepts 
such as emergence, path dependency, non-linearity and critical turning points (2007, 2009: 
58–99).
 Without going into a detailed discussion here, I would argue that two major basic points can 
be distilled from Walby’s theory that are highly relevant for social science research, particularly 
for research on women’s employment in Muslim countries. Firstly, Walby’s different systems 
(‘domains’ and ‘sets of relations’) are linked to each other in such a way that you can hardly study 
the influence of a certain part of a system without taking into account other parts of that system 
(e.g the polity or class), as well as the other systems (e.g. the economy or gender). Secondly, 
the development of, and relationships between, aspects of a system can take different shapes 
besides linearity, and the shape of a relationship also depends on the environment. The question 
is not only whether factors are interrelated, but also how they are interrelated. Therefore, a 
study should start by taking into account the environment of the system under study, meaning 
the other systems.
 Taking multiple systems into account in empirical studies does not necessarily mean losing 
focus. As empirical Chapters 7, 8, and 9 on education, household configurations, and religion will 
show, you can still focus on specific explanations, as long as the analyses’ starting point is that of 
complex systems. This broadened view sheds much more light on possible relationships and their 
shape. While this does not equal a loss of theoretical focus, the methodological consequence is 
that data on many more factors should be included and assessed, this compared to a relatively 
limited focus on the variable(s) of interest in ‘classic’ studies. Related to this, I agree with King, 
Keohane & Verba (1994: 20) that simplicity or parsimony should never be a criterion or goal, but 
seen as an assumption, a theoretical notion.20
 Incorporating this take on complexity has several consequences for statistical research. 
Firstly, for quantitative analyses, the inclusion of many explanations places greater emphasis 
on the trade off between the validity and reliability of the variable(s) of interest on the one 
hand, and the overall set of included variables on the other. Compared to traditional accounts, 
this perspective relatively values the second part to a greater extent. A second point regarding 
quantitative studies concerns the linearity assumption of many regression techniques (e.g. 
Allison, 1999). According to Walby it is “troublesome” to think in terms of linearity, and she 
consequently notes that conventional regression techniques can be problematic (2007: 465). 
On this point, I disagree with Walby, because (in line with the argument made in Section 
4.2.1) by using regression techniques much progress can be made in (1) discovering how the 
interrelatedness of factors takes place (interaction effects); (2) how different levels relate to 
each other without reducing one level to the other (multilevel analysis) (cf. Walby’s concept of 
‘emergence’ [2007: 462–3]); (3) understanding how historical differences – path dependency 
– shapes current choices (cross-level and temporal interaction effects); (4) knowledge about 
critical turning points or sudden changes (dummy variables); and (5) adding other forms of non-
linearity in models (dummies, quadratic terms). These techniques will all be employed in this 
thesis.
4.3 popuL atIon and CaSeS
Up till now, I have written about women in Muslim countries as being the subjects of this study. 
In this section, I will further discuss to whom exactly this refers, and why I have chosen these 
demarcation criteria.
4.3.1 THE POPUL ATION: WOMEN IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES
In determining which cases to study, I had to deal with several important questions: (1) At what 
level(s) do I find the units of analysis (and units of measurement) in this study?; (2) To which 
substantial (e.g. geographical) units of analysis is this study limited?; and (3) Are there so-called 
irrelevant negative cases (women that ‘cannot’ be employed, such as disabled women) within 
that group that should be excluded from the analyses (see Goertz & Hewitt, 2006; Goertz & 
Mahoney, 2006)? These three questions collapse into one basic question: What is the population 
in this study?
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21 Only up to 5 out of 45 to 50 countries do not come up in 
both selection processes. Examples are Cote d’Ivoire, 
Eritrea and Kazakhstan.
25 They could however be translated to that: the economic 
development of a region this woman lives in. This is how 
rectangular data files are created in multilevel data sets. 
However, the level of economic development is shared 
by many women living in one and the same unit, such as a 
country. 
22 Clark, Ramsbey & Adler (1991) and Clark (1992) use a 
majority not plurality. I have decided to use a plurality, 
because a plurality, when large enough – hence the 
40% criterion – is still a predominant group and Islam is 
then the major religion in a country with a plurality of 
Muslims. Norris & Inglehart (2003b) and Fish (2002) also 
use pluralities, but are not explicit in terms of percentage, 
only that the ‘predominant religion’ determines the 
classification of countries (e.g. Norris & Inglehart, 2003: 
63–6). I have chosen the 40% criterion, because otherwise 
it is possible that highly pluralistic societies with 20% 
of the people being Muslim are coded as being a Muslim 
country, while Islam can hardly be called dominant in 
those cases.
23 Different ways of classifying countries, such as the 
majority of population approach (Clark, 1991; Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler, 1992; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a), the 
24 Definitions of UoA’s do not seem to take into account the 
existence of multilevel research designs. For instance, 
Gerring (2007: 217, emphasis in original) defines units 
of analysis as “The species of observation that will be 
analyzed in a particular research design.” This is a nice 
illustration of how measurement/observation and analysis 
are conflated.
figure 4.1 Muslim countries in 2009
plurality of population approach (Fish, 2002; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003b) or the loose hand drawing historical lines 
approach (Huntington 1993, 1996) can lead to discussion 
on some countries or societies (Eritrea, Ivory Coast), 
but for almost all Muslim countries it leads to the same 
classification. 
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MUSLIM COUNTRIES
Studies of women’s employment focussing on Muslim countries or their inhabitants tend either 
to draw generalising conclusions about Muslim countries vis-à-vis other groups of countries 
(Western countries in particular) or stress the specificity of a certain country or area. The middle-
ground perspective described above (Section 4.2.1 ) enables me to focus on Muslim countries 
in general, but without comparing them to other countries. This means that this study will seek 
knowledge about the ‘internal plurality’ (Davis & Robinson, 2006) of this ‘region’, simultaneously 
enabling me to find general relationships within and among these countries. In short, being a 
Muslim country is the first demarcation criterion of this study’s population.
 The question that arises now is what constitutes a ‘Muslim country’. Since this study is 
partly a reaction to the existing ‘civilisationist’ trend in the literature and it would otherwise 
be difficult to relate the results of this study to that trend, I will follow their practice in 
determining which countries are Muslim countries. The core idea of the civilisationists’ selection 
is the predominance of a religion: if Islam is predominant, the country is a Muslim country. 
Predominance, however, can be formulated in different terms, such as groups of people, culture, 
and historical rule (e.g. see Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Inglehart 
& Norris, 2003a, 2003b). Which operationalisation is chosen does have consequences for the 
in- or exclusion of a few countries, but overall just about the same countries are included in all 
civilisationist studies.21 I have chosen to base my selection on the predominance of a Muslim 
population, because – while still copying the civilisationist selection criterion – it is a clearer 
criterion than ‘having a Muslim culture’ and I find it hard to defend to refer to a Muslim country 
when most inhabitants are not Muslims.
 I intentionally use ‘Muslim country’ instead of ‘Islamic country’. The former refers to 
individuals (‘Muslims’), making a Muslim country a country populated by Muslims – the label 
closest to the actual measurement. The term “Islamic country”, on the other hand does not refer 
to the religion of individual inhabitants, but to the country or state being Islamic itself. This 
implies a state that is ruled (solely) by Islamic codes and is religious itself. Which countries would 
belong to this group is open to discussion, but it would be a very limited number, including Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen (see e.g. Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009: 509, 519). I use ‘countries’ 
and not ‘civilisation’, because the latter would a priori stress that Muslim countries are a coherent 
group that is culturally different from other civilisations (cf. Huntington, 1993; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003a, 2003b). The focus on culture as primary source of this ‘ultimate divide’ should be 
open to discussion instead of assumed or implicitly stated.
 In determining which countries are predominantly inhabited by Muslims, I have chosen a 
plurality of at least 40% of the inhabitants22 being Muslim according to the CIA world factbook 
as the demarcation criterion. Based on data for 2009, this means that the study’s population 
contains 52 countries (including the Gaza Strip, West Bank and Western Sahara) ranging from 
the northern half of Africa, West-Asia, Central Asia, South/South-East Asia to (South-)Eastern 
Europe (see Figure 4.1).23
 WOMEN IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES
Contrary to what the above discussion might suggest, this study in the first place focuses on 
women, not on countries. Women in Muslim countries are the primary units of analysis here. It 
is useful to distinguish between the units of analysis (UoA) and the units of observation (UoO). 
Although these terms are often used interchangeably (see Brady & Collier, 2004; Gerring 
2007; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994),24 they are not. The goal of this study is explaining why a 
woman is employed or not, which means that the unit I am interested in is the individual, the 
woman, because being employed is a characteristic of hers. In explaining this individual-level 
phenomenon, I include contextual characteristics, which means that not all relevant explanatory 
factors are characteristics of the woman herself.25 I am interested in those other characteristics 
because they might be part of a causal mechanism that I am studying, which has an individual 
characteristic as dependent variable. The household, community and country are all secondary 
units of analysis: they are only relevant because they are part of a woman’s context. The units 
of observation are the units on which I collect information in order to say something about the 
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26 By explicitly discussing the two parts of how I define 
the population, it also becomes more evident why the 
focus is not on Muslim women, but women in Muslim 
countries. Muslim women in non-Muslim countries are 
often not mentioned as part of the Muslim civilisation 
according to ‘civilisationists’. It is the collective culture 
that is most important. For instance Inglehart & Baker 
(2000: 36–8) argue that differences within a country are 
less important than the ‘cultural zone’ to which a country 
as a whole belongs. Nonetheless, they find differences 
within countries that confirm their ideas about cultural 
differences at the individual level as well. This indicates 
that studying women with different religions in Muslim 
countries is interesting as well to shed light on the 
cultural/civilisationist thesis (see Chapter 9).
27 It is arguable that (large parts of) the meta-theoretical 
framework is also applicable to individual men.
 28 One of these 28 is Zanzibar. Up till 1964 – when it united 
with Tanganyika to form Tanzania – it was a separate 
country and it still has a very high degree of autonomy, 
with an own government that sees Zanzibar as a fully 
autonomous state within the union of Tanzania. Of its 
population about 95% of the people adheres to Islam. For 
the country-level variables most of the information that is 
used however applies to Tanzania as a whole, because few 
data sources provide information for Zanzibar alone. Gaza 
Strip and West Bank were not included purely because 
there is no DHS, PAPFam or IPUMS survey available for 
them.
figure 4.2 Included countries
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unit of analysis. There are four different UoO’s in this study: the woman, her household, the 
administrative district (province/region/wilaya/governate/…) she lives in, and the corresponding 
country. In order to measure district-level characteristics, I use individual or household level 
observations (see Section 4.7); and household characteristics are sometimes based on individual-
level observations (Section 4.7).
 Despite the focus on women, the previous section used the country level to demarcate the 
population of this study. As discussed above, the focus on only Muslim countries allows for a 
focus on the similarities and differences among and within Muslim countries that otherwise 
would not have been possible. However, the mechanisms as discussed in the theoretical chapter 
are not per definition restricted to Muslim countries, and might apply to women in other 
countries as well.26 27
 WORKING-AGE WOMEN IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES WHO ARE NEITHER DISABLED NOR 
IN SCHOOL
So far I have identified women in Muslim countries as the Unit of Analysis. For this population, I 
will try to find explanatory factors of their employment likelihood. For theoretical reasons three 
groups of women are deselected from the scope of this study. Firstly, I will apply what Goertz 
calls the ‘Possibility Principle’ (Goertz & Hewitt, 2006; Goertz & Mahoney, 2006). This assumes 
that there are some fundamental variables that make it almost impossible for women to work, 
regardless of their characteristics in terms of the independent variables. These cases are negative 
but also ‘irrelevant’ cases and should be excluded. For this study, disabled women fall in this 
category: because if they have a severe disability, they are unable to work. Any other influencing 
factor becomes irrelevant, as they will nearly always score a zero on the dependent variable. 
Secondly, the specific hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 are in first instance applicable to 
women of working age (15–64) only. In this thesis, the scope of these specific hypotheses does 
not go beyond those ages, because I expect that needs, opportunities and values are translated 
differently to specific factors for non-working-age women. Thirdly, women who are still in 
school are also excluded from the population. Schooling and labour participation are partly 
interchangeable, and it is therefore impossible to determine whether the position of not working 
but being in school is more similar to the status of being employed or not (e.g. if one sees school 
as a first step on the labour market). In sum, the population of relevant cases for this thesis only 
includes women of working age, living in Muslim countries, who are neither disabled nor in 
school.
 4.3.2 FROM POPUL ATION TO CASES
Given the goals of this research, I want to include as many cases from the population as 
possible. Including many cases makes it possible to draw more general conclusions, and more 
cases provide more leverage for complex regression models. Besides the number of cases, the 
representativeness of the cases is also important.
 At the country level, this makes it preferable to include the whole group (population) of 
about 45 to 50 countries. Given the relative infancy of research on women’s employment in 
Muslim countries, there are no comparable datasets for all Muslim countries available (see also 
Section 4.4). Nonetheless, this thesis will make major steps forward by making use of a unique 
data infrastructure enabling the inclusion of 28 countries, representing all geographical regions 
in which Muslim countries can be found.28 Among these, the ‘classic’ Middle East, especially the 
Gulf’s oil countries, is underrepresented and West Africa overrepresented. Still Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen are all included. A full overview is given in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. 
This sample might not be entirely representative for all Muslim countries, but it does enable me 
to focus on differences and similarities among (women in) a substantial number of countries from 
all regions of ‘the Muslim world’.
 The selection strategy within these countries is that of random (multistage cluster) sampling. 
In each country, clusters (small geographical areas) are randomly sampled from a list of all the 
country’s clusters. Within each of these clusters, households are randomly sampled and all these 
households’ women between the ages of 15 and 49 are included in the sample. Women aged 50 
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29 Ever-married women are women who are married, 
divorced or widowed.
30 Theoretically, I also discussed the global level and 
explanatory factors at that level. This level is not included 
in technical terms, because the factors distinguished 
theoretically at the global level do vary at the country 
level. For instance, the amount of FDI is a global-level 
Country a
original sample size 
(women aged 15–49)
B
‘a’ excluding 
respondents with 
missing data on 
dependent variable
C
number of women 
from ‘B’, not in 
school
d
number of women 
from ‘B’, not in 
school and physically 
able to work 1
e
women paid 
employed in non-
agricultural sectors 
(of women in ‘d’)
Algeria 33,796 33,662 28,478 28,478 2,554
Azerbaijan 8,444 8,421 7,195 7,195 1,366
Bangladesh2,3 10,996 10,988 10,849 10,849 1,499
Burkina Faso 12,477 12,464 11,950 11,950 2,595
Chad 6,085 6,058 5,543 5,543 1,315
Djibouti2 6,689 6,626 5,896 5,896 450
Egypt2,3 19,474 19,470 19,392 19,392 3,028
Eritrea 8,754 8,736 7,896 7,896 1,046
Guinea 7,954 7,946 7,336 7,336 2,232
Indonesia2 32,895 32,847 32,752 32,752 9,833
Jordan2 10,876 10,876 10,746 10,746 1,429
Kazakhstan 4,800 4,759 4,038 4,038 1,919
Kyrgyz Republic 3,848 3,848 3,344 3,344 1,536
Lebanon 6,556 6,514 4,996 4,952 1,219
Malaysia 10,500 10,186 8,600 8,556 3,637
Mali 14,583 14,320 13,423 13,423 3,925
Mauritania 7,728 7,618 6,641 6,641 1,630
Morocco 16,798 16,765 15,195 15,195 2,280
Niger 9,223 9,204 8,816 8,816 2,466
Nigeria 33,385 33,233 28,749 28,749 12,694
Pakistan2,3 10,023 10,019 10,002 10,002 1,547
Senegal 14,602 14,578 13,344 13,344 4,032
Sierra Leone 7,374 7,331 6,483 6,483 1,118
Syria 12,455 12,455 10,969 10,969 1,459
Tunisia 8,829 8,812 7,109 7,109 1,667
Turkey2 8,075 8,075 8,054 8,054 1,464
Yemen 20,180 20,148 18,119 18,065 765
Zanzibar3 1,365 1,365 1,185 1,185 458
total 348,764 347,324 317,010 316,958 71,163
Notes: (1) Data on ability to work was only present for Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia and Yemen; (2) Only ever-married women; (3) 
information on being still in school was only available for a very limited group of women and based on age, years of schooling and 
age of entry a proxy was created to exclude women from the sample; (3) all these figures are unweighted, the percentages of women 
being employed can thus deviate from the rates calculated based on this figures in this table.
table 4.1 Number of selected women and coding of the dependent variable
factor, but Morocco has more FDI inflow than Kazakhstan 
and technically speaking this is considered as country-
level variation. Factors that belong to the global level 
technically would be something such as distance to the 
nearest star or the number of years that sentient live has 
been present on a world, a ‘globe’.  
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through 64 are not included in the survey process, despite their being part of the theoretical 
population. For each country at least several thousands of women are included in the sample. 
Women from all parts of the countries are included and the datasets list in which district they 
live – throughout this study, I will use the term ‘district’ to designate the provinces, governates, 
wilaya, oblasts, or what these administrative divisions are called in the different countries. 
Because all districts are generally included in the surveys, this enables me to use ‘provincial data’ 
to represent the sub-national contextual level of the community. 383 districts in total are included 
in the analyses. In total 246,461 households and 348,764 individuals have been randomly sampled. 
In combination with the large numbers this ensures representativeness within the countries.
 Besides case selection in terms of geography, a longitudinal selection has been made. The 
moment when a sample is taken can influence descriptive statistics and also the outcomes of 
analyses of causal relationships. It is often assumed that influences are temporally stable (King, 
Keohane & Verba, 1994; Spierings & Smits, forthcoming), but this has hardly ever been tested. In 
this study, I want to test my theory about women’s employment for ‘today’s’ reality and identify 
influences that are still at work. To do so, I will generally include the most recent survey for 
each of the countries selected – with the exceptions of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz republic, all 
surveys date from between 2000 and 2008 (see Appendix 4.1). In Chapter 10, special attention is 
given to the extent and way in which the effects of explanatory factors can differ over time (their 
temporal stability).
 Overall, the relatively large number of countries, the unique selection of over 350 districts, 
and the large random samples of households and women make it possible to perform analyses 
that answer the main questions of this thesis with a fair degree of generalisability. At the same 
time, the selection strategy makes it possible to look at variations in the characteristics of 
the households, districts and countries, and how these might explain differences in women’s 
likelihood of employment. The three major limitations in drawing conclusions for the population 
as a whole are that it does not include all Muslim countries (and no ‘oil economies’ [Moghadam, 
2003: 10] at all), that women are only sampled up to the age of 49, and that for seven countries 
no never-married women are sampled (Appendix 4.1).29 Despite the unique richness of the 
database used, these limitations have to be taken into account when drawing conclusions.
 For the empirical analyses in the chapters that zoom in on more specific topics (Chapters 9 
and 10) a sub-selection of cases has been made. This selection will be discussed in more detail in 
those chapters.
4.4 MetHodS
The backbone of the empirical analyses in this thesis is made up of multilevel regression 
models. This enables me to include explanatory variables at the country, district, household and 
individual level simultaneously without deflating standard errors and it addresses the problem of 
correlated errors due to the clustering of women within higher level units (see Hox, 2002; Jones 
& Duncan, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Different forms of diversity and complexity will be 
incorporated in these models. By including possible explanatory factors at the different levels, 
the model can reveal how much diversity exists and along what lines (see all empirical chapters). 
By comparing multilevel model results with the results of ‘one-level variables only’-models, I 
will get more insight in causal processes and interrelatedness as described in Chapter 2 (and in 
Chapters 6 and 10 in greater detail). By using dummies, non-linear relationships can be included, 
and by adding interaction terms (regular, cross-level or temporal) the context-specific effects of 
influences can be tested (Chapters 7, 9, and 10 in particular).
 Technically, I distinguish four levels in the model: the individual, the household, the district, 
and the national level.30 The response variable in my models is dichotomous (whether a woman 
is employed or not) which violates the assumptions of a normal distribution of errors and of 
homoscedasticity for OLS regression (Allison, 1999; Pampel, 2000). Hence, I will use logistic 
(multilevel) modelling. For logistic multilevel models, the basis is the standard logistic regression 
model:
 Ln (pyi=1/(1–pyi=1)) = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + … + βnXni + εi    (1)
The X’s in this model represent the independent variables, and these are measured at the 
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31 Malaysia is the only Muslim country in which an IPUMS 
survey was held. 
32 In light of the comparative goal of this study, the 
discussed characteristics of this collection of surveys 
makes them preferable over for instance labour force 
surveys of the individual countries, which are harder to 
compare, not available for this many countries, do not 
include the same broad range of variables, and not always 
include district codings.
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individual level (level i, for ‘individual’), the level of the dependent variable. The latter in this 
model is the natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of being (gainfully and agriculturally) employed, 
and the odds are calculated by taking the chance of being employed for a certain group of 
women (pyi=1) and dividing it by the chance of not being employed (1–pyi=1). In the models below 
the dependent variable will be designated by logit (π).
 To add variables at higher levels, the model will be adjusted. For instance, to add explanatory 
factors at the household level, β0 is varied at level h (for ‘household’) – a random intercepts 
model – and is subsequently modelled at that level. First, β0 is written as a function of household 
level factors and in the formula for Y the subscript h is added to denote that the explanatory 
factors vary at level i and h:
 β0h = β0 + μ0h        (2)
 logit (πih) = β0h + β1X1ih + β2X2ih + … + βnXnih + εih      (3)
Model (2) allows me to add explanatory variables at this level (the γ’s represent the coefficient of 
household-level variables, while the W’s stand for the value of a unit on a context-level variable). 
μ0h stands for the residuals at the household level.
 β0h = β0 + γ1W1h + γ2W2h + … + γnWnh + μ0h      (4)
Integrating models (3) and (4) gives us a basic two-level model:
 logit (πih) = β0 + β1X1ih + β2X2ih + … + βnXnih + γ1W1h + γ2W2h + … + γnWnh + εih + μ0h (5)
In this model β0 can be modelled at the district level d. This will result in another ‘error’ term at 
level d, which will be modelled including country-level factors, denoted by subscript c. Taking 
this all together results in the following formula:
 logit (πihdc) = β0 +
 β1X1ihdc + β2X2ihdc + … + βnXnihdc+ 
 γ1W1hdc + γ2W2hdc + … + γnWnhdc +
 δ1V1dc + δ2V2dc + … + δnVndc +
 α1U1c + α2U2c + … + αnUnc +
 + εihdc + μ0hdc + φ0dc + ω0c        (6)
Whereby β, γ, δ, and α denote the coefficients for the explanatory factors of respectively the 
individual, household, district and country level; X, W, V, and U denote the explanatory variables 
at respectively the individual, household, district and country level; β0 is the intercept; and ε, 
μ, φ, and ω denote the residuals at respectively the individual, household, district and country 
level.
 All presented models are estimated using the MLwiN 2.20 MCMC procedure, unless stated 
otherwise (see Section 4.5.3 for a further discussion of this). The MCMC procedure was chosen 
because it gives the most accurate estimates when logistic models (or, generally speaking, 
discrete response models) are used (CMM, 2011a; Rodriguez & Goldman, 2001). For each model 
a DIC (Deviation Information Criterion) statistic is produced and reported, which indicate the 
models’ fit. A lower DIC suggests a better fit. Descriptive statistics and bivariate models will of 
course accompany the use and comparison of logistic multilevel models. In the thematic Chapters 
9 and 10, the models are embedded in an in-depth, descriptive analysis of a country or time 
period, based on a secondary analysis of existing empirical studies.
4.5 data
The analyses in this thesis are mainly based on large datasets from the Pan Arab Project for 
Family Health (PAPFam) of the League of Arab States, and from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). I also include an Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) survey (for data 
on Malaysia).31 All three types of data sets were obtained from the Database Developing World 
(DDW ), where these surveys are brought together and made comparable (DDW, 2009) and they 
are highly comparable with respect to the goal of this study. At the district and country levels, I 
have enriched the database data with external data sources.
4.5.1 DATA SURVE YS
Although there are limitations to these surveys, they are well suited for the purposes of this 
study.32 Firstly, this database has a unique cross-national scope of comparable datasets and the 
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33 The age range 15–64 is generally seen as the working age 
population and country-level databases (such as the ILO 
or World Factbook) present information on this group 
(see Appendix 4.1), the survey data used in this study, 
however, are restricted to the ages 15–49. The data are in 
that sense not representative for all working aged women 
and descriptives are somewhat overestimated since older 
34 MCMC start from a previously estimated model. I have 
used weighed IGLS models for that.
women tend to be less often employed (see Chapter 5); 
however this bias will probably not lead to very large 
discrepancies, because of the young populations in these 
countries. 
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different types of surveys included are also highly comparable. In the case of Morocco (2004), 
PAPFam and DHS even cooperated in conducting the survey. Secondly, because these surveys 
all include data on which administrative unit (district) the surveyed women live in, I can include 
a sub-national contextual level for all countries. Thirdly, the broadness of the surveys makes it 
possible to have reliable data on the question whether a woman is gainfully employed outside 
agriculture, as well as on the most important demographic and socio-economic explanatory 
factors at the micro level, including partner information, household structures and proxies for 
values. Fourthly, the range of variables and the number of cases within each district enable me to 
aggregate micro-level data to the district level and thus create contextual variables at that level.
4.5.2 ADDITIONAL DATA SOURCES
The data at the individual and household levels come solely from the surveys, while for 
Chapter 8 district-level data from additional data sources were also linked to the data from the 
DDW. Adding these external district-level data was however not possible for the very broad 
comparative analyses. While research would greatly benefit from these kinds of data, there are 
no external data sources with comparative data at the sub-national level for all these countries. 
By building a data collection at this level, I hope to make a first step towards offering the 
research community more opportunities for testing macro- and sub-national-level theories.
 In some surveys, two district coding schemes were present (for larger and smaller districts). 
In those cases, the leading principle was that the sub-national units represent an administrative 
level within the specific country. If both levels represented administrative units, the lowest level 
was chosen unless too few (<100) cases were sampled in each district. On average, each of the 
383 districts represents about one million working-age women (see Appendix 4.1).33
 At the country level, data were obtained from existing and well-known sources (e.g. United 
Nations, CIA World Factbook, OECD, Freedom House) and linked to the DDW. Data were always 
selected for the year closest to the moment the survey was carried out. For some variables, no 
data were available but I was able to construct an index myself (see Section 4.6).
4.5.3 DATA ISSUES AND REPRESENTATIVENESS: WEIGHTS AND MISSINGS
As in any survey-based research, several choices have to be made in data management. Besides 
the specific operationalisation of variables (see Sections 4.6 and 4.7), this also includes the 
weighing of data and the treatment of missing data.
 WEIGHTS
To obtain representative results, data are often weighed in regression models. The MCMC 
procedure in MLwiN, however, does not take assigned weights into account (CMM, 2011b).34 
Consequently, the weights are mainly used in the descriptive analyses. I use ‘mainly’ here 
because some robustness test are performed. Some studies conclude that the usage of weights 
can have a substantial influence on the results (e.g. Chantala, Blanchette & Suchindran, 2006; 
Zaccarin & Donati, 2008). Therefore, I will perform robustness tests by estimating the final 
models using the IGLS estimating procedure with and without weights. Any notable differences, 
when found, will be discussed in the respective empirical chapters. For example, the comparison 
of the weighted and unweighted IGLS models in Chapter 6 shows that the exclusion of weights 
does not have very substantial consequences (Appendix 6.1); only in some cases do the macro-
level variables show differences in strength and statistical significance. Nonetheless after 
performing several robustness tests (weighted IGLS, fixed effects models, and MCMC models 
with more iterations), the overall conclusions drawn in this study are rather robust.
 Having said this, the question of how to weigh should (still) be answered, and in the case 
of multilevel data this becomes somewhat more complicated than in that of single-level data 
sets, mainly because the probability of being selected might differ for individuals coming from 
different higher-level units, because the higher-level units have their own probability of being 
selected from a larger population (Chantala, Blanchette & Suchindran, 2006; Pfeffermann et. 
al., 1998; Zaccarin & Donati, 2008). The probability of being selected from the higher-level 
population is irrelevant for this study, because we cannot speak of a probability sample: all 
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districts in the chosen countries are included and the countries are selected from one population 
based on the availability of data. Consequently, the countries and districts are equally weighted 
(=1) at the respective levels.
 At the individual level, the surveys themselves provide weights to ensure the national 
representativeness of the samples. These weights correct for unequal representation within 
each country. For the pooled analyses, on women aged 15–49 in the 28 countries, not all women 
have the same probability of being sampled, as it depends on the ratio of the number of sampled 
women and the population size of the countries. I will adjust the weight provided by the surveys 
for countries’ populations of working-aged women. The final case weight (FCWic) is the provided 
case weight (PCWic) adjusted on the basis of the respondents per country (Rc), the number of 
working aged women per country (Wc), total number of respondents in all the datasets (RTot), 
and the combined number of working aged women in the countries (WTot), using the following 
formula:
 FCWic = PCWic * [ (RTot/WTot) * (Wc/Rc) ]
 This formula ensures that the overall number of cases does not differ from the number of 
surveyed women we use in our analyses. For Rc, I have used the number of respondents per 
country after cleaning the data set and handling the missing cases (see below). Wc is based 
on the number of working-aged women (15–64) according to the CIA World Factbook of the 
corresponding year (see Appendix 4.1). The number of women in each country aged 15–49 would 
be better to use for the calculation of the percentage of women that was sampled per country, 
but no such (comparable) data were available for all included countries. The use of the age group 
15–64 might lead to slight distortions in the adjusted weight FCWic.
 MISSING DATA
I distinguish between two forms of missing data: inexistent data (the question in the survey 
is inapplicable) and unknown data (the question is applicable, but not answered) (see Allison, 
2001).
 Missing data due to ‘inexistent data’ occurs for instance in the case of women who have no 
partner or have never given birth, but of whom we want to include their partner’s education, 
occupation or age, or their child(ren)’s gender or age. As the reason for this missing information 
is known, I will include control variables for the group with such missing data (in the form of 
dummies for having a partner and having children). Consequently, the effects of these missing 
data may be treated as statistically irrelevant (Allison, 2001: 9–11; Little & Rubin, 2002), and 
the respondents with such missing data are all given a value equal to the average of the other 
respondents on that variable.
 Information that is missing for unknown reasons (the questioner has not put down an answer, 
the respondent has not answered the question, or a woman from the DHS women’s survey 
is missing in the DHS household survey) can lead to biased estimates if there are too many 
respondents with missing data. In these cases listwise deletion is used: a woman with missing 
data on one of the micro-level variables is removed from the model. With logistic regression, 
listwise deletion works under broader conditions than when applying linear regression (the latter 
builds on more restrictive assumptions), and this treatment of missing data produces more robust 
results than more complicated techniques (Allison, 2001).
 In addition, it should be remembered that for seven countries only ever-married women 
are included in the surveys, this obviously affects the descriptive analyses. But the group of 
never-married women is relatively small (see Section 5.3.1) and all surveys include women that 
were once married. If effects for married and unmarried women differ it might also affect the 
explanatory analyses. However, the excluded group is relatively small and can thus be expected 
to have a limited effect on the general coefficients.
 Overall, it should also be noted that the samples are large and show a wide range on all 
variables, so that relatively precise estimations can still be made. Of the total sample I have 
deleted 20,498 cases (6.5%) for the main analyses (and a few more for the analyses in which 
other independent variables are added [see Chapters 8 and 9, and Table 4.2]). For the dependent 
variable, the missing cases will be discussed in more detail below.
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4.6 MeaSurIng woMen’S paId non-agrICuLturaL eMpLoyMent
A wide and fierce debate about measuring women’s economic activities is going on (e.g. Anker, 
1983; Benería, 1981; Chen, Sebstad & O’Connell, 1999; Donahoe, 1999; Langsten & Salem, 
2008; Moghadam & Senftova, 2005). From this debate we can distil two important questions 
that should be answered: (1) What do I want to measure? and (2) How can that be measured? 
(cf. Assaad, 1997; Langstem & Salem, 2008). The answer to the first question is that I want to 
measure women’s gainful non-agricultural employment (see Section 2.2). The second question 
will be discussed below.
4.6.1 MEASURING WOMEN’S GAINFUL NON-AGRICULTUR AL EMPLOYMENT
As Jansen (2004) nicely shows for (groups of) women in Algeria, some women do not regard 
specific activities as work, nor their remuneration as wages; this work is reclassified as a religious 
or cultural practice. In this case, the term for it is ajr – activities that are rewarded with religious 
merit, not payment (an important social convention of which is that the receiver of the gift is 
obliged to reciprocate with another gift) – which is socially acceptable, but something classified 
as remunerated work is not. When translated in terms of measuring ‘work’, this would mean that 
the number of women actively engaged in ‘work’ (see Section 2.2) is underestimated (see also 
Donahoe, 1999; Langsten & Salem, 2008). Taking a closer look at survey practices also shows 
that it is difficult to measure work using ‘single keyword questions’ (questions in which only one 
word is used to describe economic activities, in the case of DHS the word was ‘work’) as DHS and 
PAPFam do; however, these problems turn out to be mainly present in cases of agricultural and 
informal work, while surveys do a far better job in measuring women’s gainful non-agricultural 
employment.
 Langsten & Salem (2008) compare DHS’ Egypt 2003 ‘single keyword question’ survey 
results with the SFT Egypt 2004 results (the SFT is a follow up to the 2003 DHS using a 
subsample of the DHS) and show that surveys based on a ‘single keyword question’ or on an 
‘activities list’ (a number of questions including a number of possible economic activities) 
leads to answers that are highly consistent for women working in professional/technical/
clerical occupations. For other occupations (sales, agriculture/animal husbandry, services/
manual), there is considerably less of an overlap and the ‘activities list’ questions lead to 
higher numbers of women active in these occupations. Almost half (1,168 out of 2,490) of 
this second group of surveyed women is active in agriculture. The other half, however, is 
active in non-agricultural work, but is inactive according to the DHS (Langsten & Salem, 
2008: 290–3). Langsten & Salem conclude that DHS’ use of a single keyword question leads 
to a measurement bias, because the coverage of economic activities is far greater in the SFT 
than in the (2008: 293). When the focus is on ‘economic activities’ or ‘work’ – as defined in 
Section 2.2 – Langsten & Salem are right. However, if one wants to measure women’s gainful 
non-agricultural employment ‘the SFT’s greater coverage’ becomes a clear disadvantage 
(with its own measurement bias). As the authors themselves show, the women active in sales, 
agriculture/animal husbandry, and services/manual labour who are only identified as active 
according to the SFT, are more likely to work without payment and in irregular jobs (Langsten 
& Salem, 2008: 294). With regard to agriculture, the SFT clearly does a better job, but that 
type of work is not the focus of this study. It seems that a single keyword question method 
satisfyingly captures women’s gainful employment (and additional questions can help to filter 
out agricultural activities).
 Donahoe’s study of Egyptian time-use data (1999) confirms the appropriateness of single 
keyword data for measuring women’s gainful non-agricultural employment. She distinguished 
different groups of economic activities, including ‘nonfamilial employment’ (paid nondomestic 
activities – production, trade or service – for a nonfamily member), which largely overlaps 
with women’s gainful non-agricultural employment. Donahoe finds that 16.0% of the sampled 
Egyptian women fall in this category in 1993 (1999: 551), while the DHS survey of 1995 gives 
15.9% of the women being active in the non-agricultural sector and paid, amongst the same 
group of women (aged 15–49 and presently married). Taking into account the small decline in 
women’s work rates found in different surveys for Egypt in the early nineties (e.g. Langsten & 
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all six countries
variable values variable values
Occupation -9 DK Work status1 -9 DK
-8 Missing -8 Missing
1 Directors 1 Salaried employee
2 Professional 2 Self employed
3 Administrators 3 Employer
4 Clericals 4 Unpaid family worker
5 Salesmen, services 5 Unpaid apprentice
6 Agriculture, fishing
7 Workers
8 Simple labour
algeria, Lebanon, tunisia, yemen2 djibouti, Syria2
variable values variable values
Economic -9 DK Member still -9 DK
activities3 1 Working in school 1 Currently attending
2 Unemployed 2 Attended in past
3 Seeking work 1st time 3 Never attended
4 In school
5 Housewife at home
6 Wealthy enough
7 Retired
8 Handicapped
9 Other
Notes: (1) There is some variation in the answer labels for the different countries; in all surveys a distinction is made between 
employees, (self-)employers and unpaid workers; (2) For Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen the data included a variable indicating 
the economic activities of a women, for Djibouti and Syria the data only included a variable indicating whether the woman was 
still in school; (3) The categories differ somewhat by country: only Lebanon and Yemen included respectively ‘cannot work’ and 
‘handicapped’; all countries include the category ‘In school’.
Box 4.2 PAPFam economic activities variables
PAPFam economic activities questions
Q112 Besides housework, do you do any work?
Q113 As you know, some women do some work for some payment, and others own a business or help the family in cultivation or 
trading. Do you do any work of these or of others?
Q116 What main work did (do) you do? 
Write in detail the work as mentioned.
Source: League of Arab States, Pan Arab Project for Family Health (PAPFam) & Syrian Arab Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, 
Central Bureau of Statistics. (2001) The Family Health Survey in the Syrian Arab Republic. Principal Report, Annex 2: Survey 
Questionnaires
Box 4.1 
35 For Bangladesh the question was only asked to women 
aged 24 and younger; for Egypt the variable had missing 
for 84% of the women; in the Pakistani and Zanzibari 
surveys an answer was missing for several hundreds of 
women.
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Salem, 2008: Figure 1), the DHS survey does not seem to underestimate ‘paid non-agricultural 
employment‘ compared to Donahoe’s figures based on time-use information.
4.6.2 THE QUESTIONS AND OPER ATIONALISATION
This last section on the dependent variable will be devoted to how the different answers to 
the survey questions are combined to select the population (women in Muslim countries that 
are neither in school, nor disabled) of this study and construct its dependent variable. For an 
overview of the sample sizes, the selected number of women, and the number of gainfully 
employed women by country, see Table 4.1.
 PAPFAM
Several questions in the PAPFam surveys help to select the population of this study and 
determine whether a woman is gainfully employed in the non-agricultural sector. Box 4.1 
presents the three main questions (cf. section 4.5.2). Based on these survey questions, the 
datasets report three important characteristics used in the coding: a woman’s occupation, 
a woman’s work status, and a woman’s form of economic activities. Box 4.2 presents these 
variables.
 All women that had valid answers recorded for work status and/or occupation were included. 
Consequently, 288 women were excluded. Subsequently, all women ‘in school’/ ’currently 
attending school’ (12,650) were deselected. For Lebanon and Yemen (see Box 4.2) it was also 
known whether a woman was physically unable to work. These women (98) are not part of the 
population and excluded as well. This leaves 75,469 women who are part of the population 
and on which sufficient data are available to determine whether they are gainfully and non-
agriculturally employed.
 The women with a non-agricultural occupation according to their scores on ‘occupation’ 
(scores 1–5, 7, 8) and being (self) employed or employer according to ‘work status’ (1–3) were 
considered to be gainfully employed outside agriculture. The women whose occupation was 
unknown (-8) were not working according to the ‘economic activities’ variable (scores 2 and up) 
and consequently not considered to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed. 213 women were 
known to be active on the labour market, though their occupation was missing (-9). Of these 
213, the women who were (self-)employed or employee were considered to be gainfully non-
agriculturally employed. The other part of the 213 are not seen as gainfully non-agriculturally 
employed. They are likely to be active in agriculture: the sector that registers the most unpaid 
working women in these surveys.
 DHS
The three main questions I used from the DHS survey – very similar to the PAPFam questions 
– are given in Box 4.3. Based on these questions the surveys report two important variables: a 
woman’s occupation and the form of payment. Together with her educational status, these are 
used to select the cases and construct the dependent variable (see Box 4.4).
 All women without a valid code on occupation were excluded (838). The DHS household 
surveys ask whether a woman is still in school, the answer to which was used to exclude women 
who where still in school from the sample. For four countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Zanzibar) these data were not available for a considerable number of women.35 In these cases, an 
alternative measurement was used: women were considered to still be in school if their highest 
educational level (another survey question) had an answer including ‘incomplete’ and they were 
not older than the number of years they had been in school plus the age of school entry for that 
country’s schooling system. For women with an educational degree coded as being ‘higher than 
secondary’, it is unclear whether they had completed tertiary education or not. These women 
were assumed to be still in school if they were not older than the number of years they had been 
in school plus the age of school entry, and if the number of years that they were enrolled in this 
higher education was below the number of years that most people need to complete tertiary 
education – in most countries this is four years. As some non-working Azerbaijani, Bangladeshi 
and Burkinabe women were coded as students in a more refined occupations variable present in 
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36 However, I do not rely heavily on this variable, because 
with the absence of formal contracts and social benefits, 
men that have no job often become active in some family 
business or informal job. Consequently, very few men 
indicate to be unemployed. Real unemployment can be 
considered much higher than what is derived from these 
surveys. This would bias the results against finding an 
effect, because men who are classified as employed are 
actually not really employed or decently paid.
807 Aside from your own housework, have you done any work in the last seven days?
808 As you know, some women take up jobs for which they are paid in cash or kind. Others sell things, have a small business 
or work on the family farm or in the family business. In the last seven days, have you done any of these things or any other 
work? 
811 What is your occupation, that is, what kind of work do you mainly do?
Source: Measure DHS. (2006) Model Questionnaire. With Commentary. Basic Documentation Number 2. Section 8.
Box 4.3 DHS economic activities questions
variable values variable values
Occupation1 0 Not working2 Type of earnings3 0 Not paid
1 Prof., Tech., Manag. 1 Cash only
2 Clerical 2 Cash and kind
3 Sales 3 In kind only
4 Agricultural self-employed School attendance4 0 Not attended during current school year
5 Agricultural employee 1 Attended at some time during current school year
6 Household & domestic
7 Services
8 Skilled manual
9 Unskilled manual
Notes: (1) There is some variation in the answer labels for the different countries. But the distinction between not working, 
agricultural work and other work is always clearly made; (2) For Azerbaijan, Bangladesh and Burkina Faso a more refined coding was 
present for ‘Not working’ women, including being a student and being disabled; (3) In three countries the data is conflated and this 
variables only tells if at least some cash is earned by the women, since that is basically the same as the selection of category 1 and 2 I 
use, this is no problem whatsoever; (4) For Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan and Zanzibar, this variable includes a considerable number of 
missings; based on age of entry, age of the women, and their educational attainment a proxy for being still in school was created and 
used (see text). 
Box 4.4 DHS economic activities variables
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the surveys for these countries, they were excluded as well. In total, I coded 15,078 women from 
the DHS surveys to be still in school. For Kazakhstan it was furthermore known if women did not 
work because of a disability. Taking this into account led not to the exclusion of more women.
 Of the over 200,000 selected women, all women that had no agricultural job, were not ‘not 
working’, and were paid at least partly in cash are considered to be gainfully employed outside 
agriculture. For Jordan no information on payment was available. However, other variables 
showed that of the non-agriculturally employed women, all except four were self-employed or 
employees, and that in this country almost 90% of the non-agriculturally employed women had 
a professional or clerical occupation. Consequently, I decided to treat all women with a non-
agricultural occupation as being gainfully employed. For Pakistan, the ‘type of earnings’ variable 
shows a considerable number of missing data. In cases where the data were present, however, 
the women with a non-agricultural job were almost all paid at least some cash. Based on this I 
decided to code the women without an entry on earnings but with a non-agricultural job as being 
gainfully employed.
 IPUMS
The data in the IPUMS for Malaysia was highly similar to those in PAPFam and the same 
procedure was followed.
4.7 Independent varIaBLeS
In this section I will discuss how the factors mentioned in the hypotheses in Chapter 3 are 
measured (see also Figure 3.1). This will first be done for the micro-level hypotheses (individual 
and household levels), then the district level and finally the country level. Statistically, some of 
the micro-level variables are included at the individual level of the model (e.g. education) and 
others at the household level (e.g. living in an urban area). If women in the same household can 
have different values on it, it is an individual-level variable. This statistical distinction, however, 
should not be confused with the theoretical distinction made in Chapters 2 and 3. Theoretically 
it is important to understand the embeddedness of individuals in a household, because it draws 
attention, for instance, to the importance of the partner and household structure (see Chapter 8). 
Some of the household characteristics (e.g. having a partner and having children), however, may 
vary statistically at the individual level. Of two women living in the same household, one might be 
married and the other might be single. However, in an attempt to prevent too much confusion, I 
will discuss the micro-level variables at once. Nevertheless, Figure 3.1 shows the theoretical levels 
of each factor, while in Table 4.2 the statistical levels are leading. Table 4.2 provides an overview 
of the variables, including descriptives and information on the missing data.
4.7.1 INDIVIDUAL & HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Related to the ‘needs hypotheses’ (the left quadrant of Figure 3.1), three variables are 
operationalised. To measure whether a male breadwinner is present, I include two variables. 
Firstly, a dummy is used to indicates whether (1) or not (0) the household head is male and 
between the ages of 18 and 65. Secondly, I include a dummy for the presence of a male partner 
based on the marital status of the women: (0) no partner is present; (1) a partner is present. Both 
dummies focus on the presence/absence of a male person in the household position of being 
responsible for fulfilling the economic needs of the household. Another possible indicator comes 
from a variable used to measure socio-economic status (see below): the partner’s employment 
status. If a partner is indicated having no job, this signals that the chance is higher someone 
else needs to provide the household with an income.36 The presence of children is measured for 
each individual woman. The number of children (aged 14 and under) is taken and divided in four 
groups: no children, 1 or 2, 3 or 4, and more than 4. Because young children are expected to have 
higher care needs, I distinguish women that have at least one child below the age of 6 and women 
without children below that age. This means that the presence of children is measured in seven 
categories: (1) no children, (2) 1–2 children, all older than 5, (3) 3–4 children, all older than 5, (4) 5 
or more children, all older than 5, (5) 1–2 children, at least one younger than 6, (6) 3–4 children, at 
least one younger than 6, (7) 5 or more children, at least one younger than 6.
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factor (Hypo) variable values1 average (s.e.)2 Missings3
Individual level (n=316,958)
male breadwinner partner present4 (1) yes 0.768 49
presence of children children (0) no children 0.343 0
(1) 1or 2, older than 5 0.137
(2) 1or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 0.239
(3) 3 or 4, older than 5 0.041
(4) 3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 0.173
(5) 5 or more, older than 5 0.003
(6) 5 or more, at least 1 younger 
than 6
0.064
human capital education (1) No primary completed 0.538 445
(2) primary completed, secondary 
not
0.276
(3) secondary completed, no 
tertiary
0.127
(4) at least some tertiary 0.060 
socio-economic network partner’s occupation3 (1) agriculture 0.312 8,184
(2) blue collar 0.277
(3) lower white collar 0.188
(4) upper white collar 0.179
(5) unemployed 0.044
traditional values partner’s education3 (1) No primary completed 0.468 11,315
(2) primary completed, secondary 
not
0.283
(3) secondary completed, no 
tertiary
0.153
(4) at least some tertiary 0.095
age at birth first child min: 6
max: 49
20.30 (4.35) 207
age difference with partner 
(partner-women)
min: -35
max: 67
8.07 (7.29) 4,536
control variable age min: 7
max: 49
30.97 (9.27) 0
Household level (n=242,410)
male breadwinner Household head is male aged 
18–65 
(1) yes 0.802 251
urban area living in a city (1) yes 0.453 0
traditional values Traditional family structure min: 0
max: 2
0.33 (0.50) 923
table 4.2 Overview main variables by statistical level
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factor (Hypo) variable values1 average (s.e.)2 Missings3
district level (n=383)
economic development Wealth level min: 0.01
max: 0.87
0.47 (0.27) 66
male labour supply Male non-employment min: 0.00
max: 0.71
0.06 (0.10) 0
service sector jobs Proportion white collar jobs min: 0.03
max: 0.81
0.44 (0.15) 0
Light manufacturing Proportion skilled labour min: 0.01
max: 0.48
0.21 (0.10) 0
Service + light manufacturing5 Degree of urbanisation min: 0.00
max: 1.00
0.44 (0.28) 0
Women in public sphere Proportion of women in higher 
education and the labour market
min: 0.00
max: 0.79
0.21 (0.16) 0
Traditional care roles Prevalence of traditional 
household
min: 0.08
max: 0.76
0.33 (0.15) 0
Country level (n=28)
Economic development GDP per capita in thousands min: 0.49
max: 8.16
2.84 (2.29) 0
Foreign direct investment Ln (FDI three years average (% 
GDP))
min: -1.11 
max: 3.50
0.92 (1.10) 0
Democracy Freedom House civil liberties 
and political rights
min: 1
max: 5
2.41 (1.24) 0
State institutionalisation of 
conservative Islam
Codification of Islam in constitu-
tion
min: 0
max: 6
1.64 (1.83) 0
Traditional family policies Gender unequal policies and 
laws (based on OECD GID)
min: 0.06
max: 0.71
0.41 (0.17) 0
Public sector size Government expenditures (% 
GDP)
min: 5
max: 41
14.68 (7.67) 0
Social safety net Family Allowance policies 
(dummy)
(1) yes 0.51 0
Notes: (1) the presented minimums and maximums are the extremes as they are present in the data, not the conceptual/possible 
extremes; (2) these figures are based on the unweighted data; in the case of nominal/categorical variables no standard deviation is 
reported and the average represents the proportion of cases falling in the designated category; (3) ‘impossible missings’ (see Section 
4.4.3) are not included as missing here; (4) these variables are theoretically part of the household level, but measured at the individual 
level, the missing should therefore be interpreted related to the n at the individual level; (5) the degree of urbanisation is expected 
to measure both the presence of light manufacturing and service sector jobs, as explained in the text; (6) all these cases were given 
scores as described in the text, only cases with missing on the individual and household level were deleted.
table 4.2 Continued
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37 Qu’ranic school in Mauritania is considered to be pre-
primary education.
38 The spouses’ age was obtained from the women. This 
might be not always accurate. In some cases it led to very 
extreme or even impossible values on this variable. In 
those cases the value was topped to the nearest high or 
low value in that country. All recoded values were at least 
lower than – 19 or higher than 42.
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 One micro-level variable is used to measure the factor of the ‘societal needs, women’s 
opportunities’ or the lower quadrant of Figure 3.1. Whether or not a woman lives in an urban area 
is answered by the household’s location. If a household is settled in a city it is coded (1) on the 
dummy ‘living in a city’; if not, it is coded (0).
 The quadrant at the right side in the figure concerns ‘opportunities’, and those are 
determined with two variables. The degree of human capital of women is measured by the 
women’s educational level. I distinguish four categories here: (1) no completed education, (2) 
primary completed, (3) secondary education completed, (4) at least some tertiary education.37 
The extent to which a household has a higher-level socio-economic network is more difficult 
to measure. However, one of the important aspects of it is the household’s socio-economic 
status, which a partner’s occupation points to. This can indicate the socioeconomic network to 
which a woman has access (through her partner). The variable is coded in five possible values: 
(1) agriculture, (2) blue collar, (3) lower white collar, (4) upper white collar, (5) unemployed. 
Blue-collar includes ‘Skilled manual’ and ‘Unskilled manual’ from the DHS Surveys and 
‘Workers’ and ‘Simple labour’ from the PAPFam surveys. Lower white-collar encompasses 
‘Services’, ‘Sales’ and ‘Household & domestic’ and ‘Salesmen, services’; upper white-collar 
encompasses ‘Professional, technical, Managerial’ and ‘Clerical’ and ‘Directors’, ‘Professional’, 
‘Administrators’ & ‘Clericals’; Agricultural encompasses ‘Agriculture self-employed’, 
‘Agriculture employee’ and ‘Agriculture’ & ‘Fishing’. The surveys also provide information 
based on which the occupation of the household head could be deduced. However, this 
information is not used, because it not only would include a woman’s occupation if she is the 
household head, but also because there are too many missing data on this subject (78,428 
cases of unknown data, see Section 4.4.3).
 The last group of variables aims to measure traditional values (the upper quadrant in 
Figure 3.1). For the internalised values or the values held by household members no direct 
questions are present in the surveys. Therefore, a set of four variables based on behaviour 
that taps into these values will be used as proxies. The first is the age difference between 
partners in a relationship: a larger age difference (the male’s age minus the female’s) indicates 
more traditional attitudes (see Wheeler & Gunter, 1987);38 the second is the age of the woman 
when she gave birth to her first child, as a younger age indicates more traditional attitudes 
(see Civettini & Glass, 2008; Varea, 1993). Both are measured on an interval scale in years. Age 
at first marriage was also considered, but for a very substantial number of women data were 
missing on this variable. The third variable is a construct based on the ‘traditionality’ of the 
family structure. Households that were extended and in which the household head was in a 
polygynous relationship get a score of (2), if the household is either extended or has a head 
in a polygynous household it get a score of (1), and if it was a nuclear household without a 
polygynous relationship the score is (0). The fourth variable focusses exclusively on the values 
held by the partner. Here, the educational level of the partner of a woman is used as a proxy, 
the assumption being that higher-educated partners are less traditional. Because a woman’s 
own educational level and her partner’s occupational status are also in the model, I expect 
that the partner’s educational attainment will mostly tap into the values held by the partner 
of the woman and not the socio-economic position. The partner’s educational attainment was 
measured in the same four categories as for women themselves: (1) no completed education, 
(2) primary completed, (3) secondary education completed, (4) at least some tertiary 
education.
 Besides these variables directly related to the factors mentioned in the theoretical chapter, 
I will include age as a control variable. Indicating the stage of life a woman is in, it might capture 
needs, opportunities and values simultaneously. This is not very useful in distinguishing the 
different influences of the three conditions, because the effects might work simultaneously 
through age. Nonetheless, age accounts for variation in women’s employment related to stages 
of life that are not captured by the other factors and thus it is an important control (e.g. Glick & 
Sahn, 1997, 2005; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980). To grasp the expected hyperbolic function of 
age – lower employment at young and older ages, higher in between – age is included both in 
years as well as in its quadratic term.
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39 This EFA was based on the district level data (n=383) 
and I used principal axis factoring (which gives the best 
results with non-normal distributed data [Costello & 
Osborne, 2005]) with oblique rotation (which is best to 
use if factors might be correlated, as is almost always the 
case in the social sciences [Costello & Osborne, 2005] – it 
should be noted that this is quite irrelevant if only one 
factor is extracted).
40 On each of the assets there were at least some missing 
data: Television, Refrigerator, Car, Telephone (18); 
Running water (24); Electricity (36). For each district 
at least one of the assets was present and for 342 
information on all assets was available. The only 
exception are the six Djiboutian districts for which 
all information was missing. For Djibouti the scores 
are calculated using multiple imputation based on a 
regression model whereby the independent variables 
are the districtal percentage of people aged 25 to 49 
that have at least some tertiary education, the districtal 
percentage of people aged 15 to 49 that have not enjoyed 
any education, and the districtal sex ratio. All effects 
were highly statistically significant (p<0.001) and the 
adjusted R-square was 0.604.
41 In the PAPFam surveys the equivalents are ‘workers’ and 
‘simple labour’.
42 This is based on a closer look at the makeup of the skilled 
manual labour for the women in the datasets that provide 
43 This claim is only made for the datasets used in this thesis. 
I have taken a look at other data sources such as the ILO 
Laborsta employment data. The classification in these 
data mainly differs on the blue-collar labour, making a 
comparison difficult and close to useless. The categories 
used there are ‘craft and related trade workers’, ‘plant 
and machine operators and assemblers’, and elementary 
occupations’. While the latter two seem to almost 
exclusively include heavy manufacturing, the first mixes 
light- and heavy-manufacturing jobs. 
44 This variable includes the non-agricultural employment of 
women, but not in absolute terms. It is a measure that is 
relative to men’s non-agricultural employment. Therefore 
it can be included in the models in which women’s paid 
non-agricultural employment is the dependent variable.
more detailed information about occupation (only a few 
do). In Azerbaijan, for example, the larger part of women 
coded as being active in light-manufacturing are active in 
‘food processing and related trades workers’ and ‘textile 
& garment & related trades workers’. In Burkina Faso it 
are mostly ‘crafts & production of goods’ workers. For 
Nigeria almost all women in this category are active in one 
of the following three trades: ‘spinners, weavers, knitters, 
dyers and related workers’, ‘food & beverage processors’, 
and ‘tailors, dress makers, sewers, upholsterers & related 
workers’. 
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4.7.2 DISTRIC T LEVEL
At the district and country levels, the models include economic development. At the district 
level, I include a variable that measures the district’s level of wealth. By aggregation I derived the 
number of people in a district with a TV, a telephone, a refrigerator, a car, and access to running 
water and to electricity. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with these six factors clearly showed 
that they load on one factor (see Appendix 4.2).39 The factor loadings are applied as weights in 
averaging the scores on household assets. This takes into account the relative extent to which an 
item is related to the underlying concept (factor). The districts with missing data on one or more 
assets are included by calculating the same weighted average, leaving out the missing asset.40 
The average of these weighted variables is taken as an indicator of the economic development 
level in the district. Conceptually the scale runs from 0 to 1. The depletion of the male labour 
supply is measured by taking the proportion of men that were not employed. To measure the 
level of non-employment, I aggregated the information on the partners’ – who are all men in 
the data sets – employment. All partners who were not involved in a job were considered not-
employed. If more men are not-employed, the supply of male labour is larger. This is measured on 
a scale ranging from 0 to 1.
 Next, both service-sector jobs and light-manufacturing jobs focus on the labour market 
structures and the types of jobs available. The labour market structure in a district can be charted 
by aggregating the proportion of people active in a certain occupation compared to all people 
active on the labour market. The occupation variables provided in the survey do not fully overlap 
with the two theoretical variables, but I can create two variables that approximate these labour 
market structures. For service sector jobs, I take the proportion of all women and their partners 
if they are aged 25 and over and had a white collar job, and divide this by the total number of 
working women and partners. This age limitation was chosen since many service-sector jobs 
require secondary or tertiary education. For ‘light-manufacturing jobs’, I focus on the blue-collar 
jobs, but not all. All datasets make a distinction between skilled and unskilled manual labour.41 
The latter includes rougher labour such as ‘mining’, ‘construction’ and ‘production workers’; jobs 
that are general considered to be part of the heavy industries. ‘Skilled manual labour’ on the 
other hand includes jobs like ‘assemblers’, ‘paper/plastic workers’ ‘drivers’ and ‘confectioners’, 
and for women mainly jobs in the food and textile industry.42 In other words, there is 
considerable overlap between ‘skilled-manual labour’ and ‘light-manufacturing jobs’,43 which 
is generally considered to include the manufacture of small electronics and home appliances; 
textiles, cloths and shoes; food; and small furniture. Clearly not all light-manufacturing jobs are 
captured by the category ‘skilled-manual labour’ and not all harder manufacturing by ‘unskilled-
manual labour’, but a decent indication of the labour market structure can be derived from these 
data. I therefore take the proportion of all women and partners that had a skilled manual-labour 
job against the total number of working women and partners. In addition to these labour market 
structure variables, I include a more general measurement of job opportunities: the degree of 
urbanisation in the district (in addition to ‘living in a city’ at the household level). The assumption 
underlying this variable is that in more urban areas the number of service-sector and light 
manufacturing jobs is higher than those of other manufacturing and agricultural jobs. Therefore 
the degree of urbanisation captures these two aspects as well. The degree of urbanisation is 
measured by the proportion of people living in an urban area of the district. All three discussed 
variables range from 0 to 1.
 Finally, two values variables will be included at the district level. The women in public 
sphere variable is based on the extent to which the number of women present in the non-
agricultural labour market compares to men and the same for higher education.44 Per district, 
the total number of women who were non-agriculturally employed or had finished a secondary 
or tertiary education is divided by the total number of women and men (i.e. partners) that were 
non-agriculturally employed or had finished a secondary or tertiary education. For education, 
I only used ages 25 through 49, when higher education has definitely been concluded and in 
order to focus on people who have finished education in the last decades and not long ago. 
For labour market participation the focus is on the current situation at the labour market, and 
all women (15 through 49) and their partners are included. The average of the figures for the 
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45 In the factor analysis including the extended-family item, 
the factor loading of household size was higher and above 
0.4. That has been one of the considerations to include in 
the factor even though the factor loading is between 0.35 
and 0.4 in Appendix 4.3.
46 There is some – valid – criticism on the database, for 
instance its bias towards giving Muslim countries 
lower scores due to the inclusion of some indicators 
(dress codes) and the measurements without including 
equivalent indicators on which non-Muslim countries 
would score higher (Verloo & Van der Vleuten, 2009). This 
critique, however, is not applicable here, because the 
sample of countries only includes Muslim countries.
47 Turkey has progressive parental authority (0) and 
polygamy (0) family codes and a somewhat less 
progressive inheritance code (0.5), which makes a score 
of 0.17 on Family Code. On both Civil Liberties and 
Ownership Rights it scores 0, and the Physical Integrity 
variables score somewhat above the minimum (0.25). 
The overall score of Turkey is then 0.10. For Djibouti, the 
Family Code score is 0.83, because it has a Muslim Family 
Code (for Muslim women only). The Civil Liberties are 
among the lowest (0.5) and Physical Integrity is limited 
with for example the regular occurrence of FGM (0.75). 
Together with an Ownership score of 0.67, this leads to an 
overall score of 0.69.
Indicators
-Islam is mentioned as part of the history of the country
-Islam is the state religion
-Freedom of religion is not guaranteed
-The country is called an ‘Islamic state’
-Only a Muslim can become head of state
-The Shari’a is foundational to other laws
Source: Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2009)
Box 4.5 State institutionalisation of conservative Islam
variable values
Family Code Parental authority
Inheritance
Polygamy acceptance / legality
Civil Liberties Freedom of movement
Dress code in public
Physical Integrity Violence against women/ Legal indicator
Ownership Rights Women’s access to land
Women’s access to bank loans
Women’s access to property other than land
Source: OECD GID 
Box 4.6 Traditional family policies indicators
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labour market and education is used as the indicator for presence in the public sphere. A higher 
score indicates a relatively stronger presence of women in the public sphere, and conceptually 
the variable runs from 0 to 1. The second values variable measures the prevalence of traditional 
care roles with a traditionalism index. The index is based on aggregated information about the 
average household size in a district, the proportion of polygynous households in a district, the 
average age difference between a woman and her partner in a district, and the district’s average 
age of women at the birth of their first child. A factor analysis has shown that these four items 
all load on one factor (see Appendix 4.3). The proportion of households that was extended was 
also included but does not seem to belong to the same underlying factor.45 All four items were 
recoded to scales from 0 to 1 (1 being more traditional). Using the factor loadings of an EFA with 
the four rescaled items as weights, the weighted average of the four items is determined. A 
higher score thus indicates a higher degree of traditionalism in the district.
4.7.3 COUNTRY LEVEL
Statistically speaking, seven variables are to be operationalised at the country level: the 
six country-level factors in Figure 3.1 and FDI as a theoretically global factor. Economic 
development is also included – just as it was at the district level – and measured in the 
conventional way: the GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars per thousand) (Maddison, 
2008). As Maddison gave one and the same GDP/c for Eritrea and Ethiopia, that figure is used for 
Eritrea. Foreign direct investments are measured by the average net inflow as a percentage of 
GDP per year, over the course of the three years before the micro-level survey took place (WDI). 
I used the natural logarithm of this figure because three countries – Azerbaijan (33%), Chad 
(33%), and Jordan (16%) – had FDI rates far higher than the other countries (the maximum among 
the other countries is 5⅔%). To determine the level of democracy, I fall back on the Freedom 
House Political Rights and Freedom House Civil Liberties scores (Freedom House, 2010). The 
average of the two is recoded so that a high score corresponds with a high level of democracy. 
The scale runs from 0 to 6.
 The factor of state institutionalisation of conservative Islam is based on the measurement 
introduced in Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2009). Based on the constitutions of the countries, 
this variable indicates to what extent conservative Islam is codified in the political structure of 
the state and the measurement provides a comparable indicator of institutionalisation. Each 
constitution was analysed and given a score running from 0 to 6 based on the presence of six 
indicators of the incorporation of Islam in the constitution (see Box 4.5). Spierings, Smits & Verloo 
(2009) provide no scores for Eritrea and Zanzibar. I used the same coding scheme in this study.
 There are hardly any comparative data available on traditional family policies in Muslim 
countries. However, the OECD has recently constructed a new database – the Gender, 
Development and Institutions database (Jütting, Morrison, Dayton-Johnson & Drechsler, 2008; 
OECD, 2010) – that includes some cross-country data on gender policies. This database provides 
“12 innovative indicators on social institutions, which are grouped into 5 categories/subindices: 
Family Code, Physical Integrity, Son Preference, Civil Liberties and Ownership Rights” (OECD, 
2010).46 Based on these data, the OECD created an overall index. In line with this, I have 
constructed a new overall index based only on the items that focus on policies and laws (see Box 
4.6). Within each of the four subindices used here, the average score of the indicators is taken, 
the average of the four subindices is subsequently used to calculate the country’s overall score. 
A higher score indicates more inequality in policies and laws, and a policy regime geared towards 
more traditional family life. These data are based on 2009, the only year available in the online 
OECD GID database. Djibouti and Turkey are missing in the database. Based on qualitative 
comparisons of Turkey and Djibouti with the other countries, they were given scores relative to 
the countries on which data were available.47 This led to scores of 0.10 for Turkey and 0.69 for 
Djibouti, ranking them respectively second from the bottom and second from the top.
 For the measurement of the public sector size there also were few data available. The 
World Development Indicators of the WorldBank Group, however, do include an indicator of 
the general size of government in terms of public expenditures. In the absence of more precise 
data, I used this as a proxy for public sector size (WDI). The public expenditures are measured 
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48 The total recurrent expenditures of the government 
divided by the GPD at current market prices (both in 
million Nairas): 1,589,270.00 / 20,657,317.70.
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as a proportion of the GDP and range conceptually from 0 to 1. As for Nigeria this information 
is missing (also for adjacent years), I have calculated a figure for Nigeria based on 2007 data 
presented in Nurudeen & Usman (2010).48
 Lastly, I have included the presence of a social safety net. For this variable, a dummy 
is created based on the country summaries of the Social Security Online database (Social 
Security Online, 2011). I have taken the presence and extent of family allowances as bases for 
the operationalisation, because the theoretical focus is on the decrease in women’s economic 
needs. The more generous family allowance policies are (in terms of scope and size), the lower 
the (number of households with) economic needs (see Section 3.6). Countries without family 
allowance policies according to this source were coded (0), while countries with some sort of 
family allowance benefits were coded (1). The policies, of course, differed somewhat by the 
amount of the allowance, but are largely comparable in coverage (unemployed people and 
widows with children below the age of 14, and sometimes a poverty threshold is used), which 
made it difficult to make a further distinction among the countries with family allowance 
policies. On Djibouti and Eritrea no information was present on social security policies. 
Alternative sources, such as the International Social Security Association (ISSA, 2011), do not 
provide information on these countries. From this it is concluded that the social security policies 
(including family allowance) in Djibouti and Eritrea are minimal and thus they were coded to be 
(0).
4.8 ConCLuSIonS
This chapter has discussed the methodological backbone of this thesis. I have argued that a 
focus on women in Muslim countries provides the means to test for general relationships without 
veiling the differences among and within countries. Based on the idea of the concept’s causal 
characteristics, I have further refined the population to working-aged women who are neither 
in school nor disabled. Subsequently, the cases within this population have been selected 
based on availability of information, which led to the selection of 28 Muslim countries, 383 
districts, and 296,460 women (after deleting respondents with missing data) from about 227 
thousand households. These data will be analysed using multilevel regression models with four 
levels (countries, districts, households and individual women), by which all theoretical levels 
are covered. In these models, women’s gainful non-agricultural (self-)employment will be the 
dependent variable. In making these choices, I have discussed the commonly heard critique on 
the use of surveys in measuring women’s economic position. The surveys (here: DHS, PAPFam, 
IPUMS) are indeed not suitable for measuring all kinds of women’s economic activities, but it is 
incorrect generally to discredit them. I have shown that they are well suited for measuring some 
aspects of women’s economic activities, amongst which the dependent variable of interest in this 
thesis. Subsequently, I have discussed how the main explanatory factors were operationalised, 
what additional data sources were used, and which new constructs were created for testing the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3.
 In the next two chapters, I will describe the employment situation in the 28 countries and 
analyse the relationship between women’s employment and the explanatory variables discussed 
in this chapter. The models presented in Chapter 6 will function as the background of the four 
subsequent thematic chapters. Chapters 8 and 9 use additional data sources or variables; 
Chapter 8 includes more household structures; and Chapter 9 uses micro- and district-level data 
on religion. Moreover, in Chapter 10 on Egypt I will also use DHS surveys from other years to 
enable a longitudinal perspective. More information regarding those data and measurements will 
be provided in the relevant chapters.
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49 This number is based on the total number of working-
aged women (Appendix 4.1), from which I subtracted the 
percentage of women in the surveys that was disabled 
or still in school (Table 4.1). This left 91% of 327 million, 
making about 298 million. The mentioned 72 million is 
24.2% of that number.
24, 2%
75,8%
not gainful non-agriculturally employed
gainful non-agriculturally employed
figure 5.1 Women’s overall gainful non-agricultural employment in 28 Muslim countries
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Chapter 5
descriptive analysis
Women’s employment in 28 Muslim countries
5.1 deSCrIBIng woMen’S eMpLoyMent In MuSLIM CountrIeS
The empirical literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries is not abundant and as has 
been argued in the previous chapters, the overall picture is patchy at best. The two archetypical 
conclusions that are derived from the existing empirical studies are either that women’s 
employment in Muslim countries is low or that employment rates differ considerably within 
countries. Presented as a juxtaposition in the debate on women’s employment, these conclusions 
do not necessarily contradict each other empirically: there can be both major differences among 
and within countries, as well as an overall relatively low level of employment. The extent to 
which both claims hold true can only be assessed if data allow both comparisons across many 
countries and comparisons within them. In this chapter, both types of descriptive statistics will 
be presented for 28 countries.
 This chapter is organised in two major sections. In Section 5.2, women’s gainful non-
agricultural employment rates and variations are presented for various geographical units (‘the 
Muslim world’, regions, countries, districts). In Section 5.3, women’s employment is presented 
in relation to ‘non-geographic’ characteristics of women or their context, such as educational 
level and economic development. Though much information can be derived from these figures, 
in the text I will only highlight some of the most notable results regarding the debates touched 
upon in this thesis. Unless stated otherwise the ‘data’ refer to the whole sample as discussed 
in Chapter 4. Where in this chapter the term ‘women’s employment’ is used, it refers to 
women’s gainful non-agricultural employment as described in Chapters 2 and 4, unless stated 
otherwise.
 The figures presented here contribute in at least three ways to the overall goals of this 
thesis. Firstly, the proportion of women who are employed in the different areas partly provide 
an answer to the first general research question as formulated in Chapter 1: What is the degree 
of women’s employment in Muslim countries and how does it differ among and within countries 
and over time? Secondly, to explain women’s employment, knowing the (variation in the) level 
of women’s employment is a necessary condition. This chapter reports on that matter. Thirdly, 
discussing the additional characteristics of the women who are employed and of those who are 
not expands our knowledge from knowing where women are employed to who these employed 
women are.
5.2 a geograpHy of woMen’S eMpLoyMent
Below is a presentation of women’s employment, and the variation therein, for all countries 
together, for the 28 countries separately and for the 383 districts. The figures are based on the 
weighted data as discussed in Chapter 4. Still, comparisons between countries and districts 
warrant some caution, as the surveys date from different years. Except two (Kyrgyz Republic: 
1997; Kazakhstan: 1999), all surveys are held in 2000 or later.
5.2.1 ‘THE MUSLIM WORLD’
Overall, about 1 in 4 women living in the 28 Muslim countries studied here is gainfully employed 
outside the world of agriculture (see Figure 5.1). This indicates that a substantial majority of the 
women in these countries has no individually earned income, with all the consequences that 
implies for both the position and empowerment of women, as well as the economic potential of 
these countries. At the same time, this – based on extrapolation – means that roughly speaking 
72 million working aged women are gainfully employed in these countries.49
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figure 5.2a Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment per country
 Women's employment (%)
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B Spread based on districts’ 
women’s employment levels
figure 5.3 The variation in women’s gainful non-agricultural employment
 Womens's employment (%)
figure 5.2b Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment per country
 Women's employment (%)
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5.2.2 28 MUSLIM COUNTRIES
Dissecting the overall figure of 24.2% by country shows that women’s employment varies from 
3.6% in Yemen to 47.4% in Nigeria (see Figure 5.2a), and those two countries are no outliers (see 
Figure 5.2a and Figure 5.3a). Of 28 countries, the MENA countries are clearly overrepresented 
among the ones with the lowest women’s employment levels: six of the seven countries with an 
employment level below 16% are from the MENA (or Greater Middle East). Of these, Yemen – 
one of the poorest countries in this study – stands out.
 At the other end of the distribution spectrum, five countries seem to form a distinct group 
in terms of high women’s employment levels: in Kazakhstan (1999), the Kyrgyz Republic (1997), 
Malaysia (2000), Nigeria (2008) and Zanzibar (2004) between 40% and 50% of women is gainfully 
employment outside agriculture. Regarding these five countries, four things should be noted. 
Firstly, they represent four different geographical regions, which makes the ‘top of the list’ more 
geographical diverse than the bottom. Secondly, among these five countries, the three with 
the oldest surveys are included. From external figures of the developments of the size of the 
female labour force over time (ILO Laborsta)50 and the population growth/decline (CIA World 
Factbook), it can be derived that women’s employment in Kazakhstan has increased considerably 
since 1999, while that of Kyrgyzstan has levelled or even declined after 1997.51 Consequently the 
ranking amongst these five should be treated with caution.
 Thirdly, these countries not only stand out in terms of women’s employment, but for each 
the ‘extreme’ position among the total population of countries (see Gerring [2007] on extreme 
cases) is accompanied by another extreme position: Nigeria is the only country with a large 
petrol-economy; Malaysia is the only country that is designated as a newly industrialising 
country or economy in the economic literature (e.g. Assaad, 2003; Muscatelli, Stevenson & 
Montagna, 1995; Prajogo, Laosirihongthong, Sohal & Boon-itt, 2007); Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic are the only two countries included here in which the Soviet Union’s projects and 
campaigns were prominent; and of the Sub-Saharan and East African countries, Zanzibar has by 
far the largest tourism inflow in terms of tourists per inhabitant (WDI). Fourthly, since these five 
have the highest women’s employment of the countries studied, this means that in none of the 
28 countries half or more of the women is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
 Zooming in on the geographical clustering in Figure 5.2 shows that the average women’s 
employment is highest in Sub-Saharan African (for a large part due to Nigeria’s level of women’s 
employment and its large population) and Central Asia, and lowest in the MENA. However, the 
variation within the regions is substantial as well. Within each country, the difference in women’s 
employment between the district with the highest and lowest employment is at least 23.7 
percentage points or a factor of 2.3.
5.2.3 383 DISTRIC TS
Comparing the variation between districts to the variation among countries (Figure 5.3), we 
see – not surprisingly – that the variation among the 383 districts is considerably higher. Most 
of this ‘additional’ variation is found in the ‘whiskers’ of the boxplot: the quartiles containing 
the districts with the highest and lowest levels of women’s employment. The two middle 
quartiles still occupy about the same area: between 10% and 30% of the women being employed. 
Moreover, when studying the districts the ten districts with an employment rate above 60% can 
be considered to be outliers. Figure 5.4 further illustrates the district-level variation: one third 
of the districts is found in the two largest 5% groups: between 5% and 15%. In comparison, the 
highest third is found from 25% (to 100%), indicating that the spread is clearly skewed right or 
positive (the mean of women’s employment is higher than the median). Women’s employment is 
lowest in the Yemeni Al Maharah governorate where no women are gainfully employed outside 
agriculture, and it is highest in Nigeria’s Osun in which women’s employment level is over 85% 
(see Appendix 5.1). Osun is one of the ten outliers (see Figure 5.3b), seven of which are Nigerian 
districts, one is Kyrgyz, one Kazakh and one Burkinabe.
 As can be derived from the list of women’s employment levels in each district (Appendix 
5.1), the districts show clustering by country, as well as variation within countries. For instance, 
we find over half of the Nigerian districts and 40% of the Malaysian districts among the top 
122
52 In these kinds of models it cannot be tested whether the 
individual-level variation is significant.
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figure 5.4 The distribution of women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in 383 districts
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figure 5.5 The highest and lowest women’s employment levels dor districts in each of the 28 Muslim countries
 Women's employment (%)
51 For Kazakhstan, 2001 and 2008 are compared, showing an 
increase in women’s paid employment outside agriculture 
table 5.1 Variation in women’s employment by level
Level variation s.e. Share total variation
Country 1.05 *** 0.32 14%
District 0.66 *** 0.05 9%
Household 2.62 *** 0.06 34%
Individual1 3.29 43%
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; All cases with a value on the dependent variable are included: Ni=316,885; Nh=242,410; Nd=383; 
Nc=28; Notes: (1) In logistic models, the variation at the lowest level is not estimated; 3.29 (π2/3) can be taken to partition the varia-
tion across levels (CMM, 2011).
of about 14 percentage points. Over the same years, 
the increase is between 1 and 2 percentage points for 
Malaysia. For the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999 and 2007 are 
compared, women’s paid employment outside agriculture 
there decreased by 4 percentage points.
50 [“Employment” >> “Main statistics (annual): employment 
general level, by economic activity, by occupation, by 
status in employment – paid employment by economic 
activity, in manufacturing” >> “Paid employment, by 
economic activity”]
23%
77%
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10% of districts. At the same time, this top 10% also hosts districts from countries that ‘rank’ 
lower on the country list (see Figure 5.2a), such as Senegal (rank 6), Guinea (7), Indonesia (8), 
Mali (9), Tunisia (10), Burkina Faso (14) and Chad (17). At the bottom of the district list, we find 
almost one third of the Algerian districts among the 10% of districts with the lowest women’s 
employment. 80% of the Yemeni districts are also part of this 10%. Surprisingly, we can also find 
districts from Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali among the lowest 10%. The spread within these three 
countries turns out to be quite high. A more systematic assessment of this spread can be found 
in Figure 5.5, which depicts the difference between the lowest and highest district per country. 
Most countries show a considerable difference of around 25 to 30 percentage points. But others, 
such as Bangladesh, Jordan and Pakistan have considerably lower variations. For Bangladesh 
and Pakistan this might partly be due to there being fewer districts in these countries. It should 
also be noted that the districts with the highest women’s employment in a country are often the 
capitals of these countries.
5.2.4 GEOGR APHIC PAT TERNS AND EXPL AINING WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT
The above-discussed figures have shown that several geographical patterns can be discerned 
regarding women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in these 28 Muslim countries.
1. All countries have regions with relatively low employment figures (the ‘highest low’ is found 
in Kazakhstan: 39.4%).
2. The 28 countries to some extent cluster in geographical subregions (for Central Asia, the 
MENA and Southeast Asia this is most clear).
3. Districts from one and the same country cluster together, indicating country-level effects.
4. In each geographical region there is considerable variation between countries, and in each 
country there is also considerable variation between districts.
5. The variation of women’s employment among district differs considerably between 
countries.
Summarising, I would say that similarities and differences are both present, and one does not 
overshadow the other.
 Consequently, it can be concluded that explanations for the level of women’s employment 
in regions, countries and districts are to be sought both in factors that are tied to women’s 
geographical location (e.g. economic development and the presence of a certain religion) 
and in factors that are more related to the individual and household (e.g. such as household 
configuration and education). Moreover, explanations seem to be needed at each of the 
different levels: country, district and intra-districts. A four-level null model (see Table 5.1 – a 
null model is a model without explanatory factors but that includes the dependent variable 
and the level identifiers) also shows that the variation at each context level is (statistically) 
significant.52 Furthermore, it shows how much variation is found at each level (uncontrolled for 
any explanation). About three quarters is found at the micro-level and a quarter can be explained 
by differences between countries and districts. In the next section, several substantial factors 
at these levels are related to the variations found. In the explanatory chapters, the multilevel 
models will help explain some of the variation discussed here.
5.3 LooK wHo’S worKIng
Below, women’s employment will be presented in relation to several other characteristics 
of women and their households, and of the district or country context. These statistics give 
an impression who are employed, and in what kind of environment these women live. The 
highlighted characteristics are a selection of the ones discussed in Chapter 3, the most prominent 
ones in the literature.
5.3.1 EMPLOYMENT WITHIN AND AMONG HOUSEHOLDS
At the individual and household levels, there is a great deal of variation, with clear patterns, 
when women’s employment is calculated by age, marital status, having children, education and 
living in a city. The figures presented here are raw figures, not taking into account differences 
between countries and districts. They simply show the general patterns in the sample as a whole.
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53 Or between the ages of 45 and 49, which can only be 
detected if figures for the age over 49 are included.
54 As discussed in Section 4.2.1, women who are still in 
school are excluded from this study.
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figure 5.6 Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in 28 Muslim countries by age
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figure 5.7 Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in 28 Muslim countries by age
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figure 5.8 Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in 28 Muslim countries by number and age of children
 Women's employment (%)
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 As Figure 5.6 shows, women’s employment is related to age in the shape of an inverted 
U-curve. The likelihood to be employed starts around 11% and rises from the age of 15 up till 
about the age of 30, when women’s employment likelihood is between 25–30%. Then it is rather 
constant or rises only slightly for another 10 to 15 years. Beyond that age, women’s employment 
likelihood clearly declines again. Of course, this trajectory is not the same in all 28 countries, 
but for 22 countries a similar polynom is found with a peak between the ages of 30 and 45 in 19 
of these countries. In three countries (Azerbaijan, Mali and Nigeria) the slope seems constantly 
positive. This does not exclude the possibility of a peak, but in those cases it occurs after the 
age of 49.53 In only three countries (Eritrea, Guinea and Sierra Leone) the pattern might suggest 
an M-curve. Empirical research on Western countries also suggests one peak just after finishing 
education and then a drop after marriage and childbirth, sometimes with a second peak at the 
age the children have grown older (e.g. Waite, 1980). Overall, for the 28 Muslim countries, the 
overall course of employment over life does not resemble this M-curve. An earlier age of (first) 
marriage (18 years and 2 months in this sample) and first childbirth (20 years and 1 months) might 
explain the general absence of a decline between two peaks.
 The relationship between women’s employment on the one hand, and marriage and having 
children on the other, is illustrated in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 respectively. Women who are 
widowed or divorced are almost twice as often employed than women with a partner; however, 
the former group only accounts for less than 6% of all women. Women who have never been 
married (about 7%) fall in between the two, which is not surprising since these figures are not 
controlled for age; this group contains many of the younger women, who have lower employment 
likelihoods than the older (widowed and divorced women). These numbers indicate that women 
without partner are more often employed, especially widowed and divorced women.
 Looking at women’s employment from the perspective of having children also lays bare 
interesting patterns (Figure 5.8). First of all, women without children and women who have only 
one or two children, over 5, have the highest likelihood to of employment. Notable is that the 
average age among that first group is 31.6 and for the second group 38.4. Secondly, for both 
women without younger children and women with young children, we see a trend that women’s 
employment declines the higher the number of children present. Thirdly, the declining trend 
is much steeper for women with only children over 5. Surprisingly, of the women with five or 
more children, the women with older children are less likely to be employed than the women 
with younger children. The absence of controls for age and traditional values can be crucial in 
understanding this: only 0.3% of the women has five or more children all above the age of 5, 
and the average age of these women is 38.8. These women might be the most traditional of all 
groups: they are from an older generation and have many children.
 A focus on education reveals the strong association of women’s employment with education 
as well as the importance of educational levels in these countries for understanding the level of 
women’s employment.54 In Figure 5.9, we see that the likelihood of being employed is higher 
if the educational level is higher. At the same time, the number of women declines at an even 
steeper rate as the education level increases. Consequently, as the shortest bars in the figure 
reveal, women’s employment chances might be higher for those higher educated, but still most 
gainfully non-agriculturally employed women have completed no education.
 Lastly, I have distinguished between women living in rural and urban areas (see Figure 5.10). 
For every three women living in a rural area, about two live in a city. Of the latter, about one in 
three is gainfully employed outside agriculture. In rural areas, this number is about half that: one 
in six.
 Overall, it seems that tertiary-educated women without children who are widowed or 
divorced, around the age of 30–45 and living in a city have the highest likelihood to be employed. 
Indeed, more than 75% of the women of this group is gainfully employed outside agriculture. 
At the other extreme, the ‘low potentials’ – women aged 15–25, living in rural areas, without 
education, with more than four children and having a partner – only have an employment 
likelihood of 12.6%. However, both groups are extremes, they each just account for 0.1% of the 
women in the sample. Only focussing on extremes is not the only misleading strategy: paying 
the most attention to the groups of women with the highest employment rates tends to ignore 
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56 This does not mean that the same holds for the entire 
population of Muslim countries, as some of the most 
Islamised countries are not part of the sample (e.g. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia). Still, it can be said that of the whole 
population of 52 countries, at least 13 countries (25%) are 
not Islamised (at least measured on their constitutions).
55 This is done by running a standard OLS regression 
model in SPSS on the sample of districts with women’s 
employment as the dependent variable and district 
wealth as the independent variable, including dummies 
for 27 (of the 28) countries. The partial plot of the 
wealth-employment relationship shows how these two 
are related after controlling for country-level differences. 
That graph is used here.
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figure 5.9 Women’s gainful non-agricultural employment and education in 28 Muslim countries
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figure 5.10 Women’s employment by living in a city
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figure 5.11 Women’s employment and country-level economic development
 Women's employment (%)
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that these groups are often relatively small, as was shown for tertiary-educated women (7%), 
widowed and divorced women (6%) and women without children (25%). A focus on these women 
might well mean that in absolute terms most employed women are actually ignored, as was 
shown above in the case of education.
5.3.2 EMPLOYMENT AND THE DISTRIC T AND COUNTRY CONTEX T
The variation in women’s employment level among the 383 districts and the 28 countries is 
probably related to specific characteristics of these areas. In this section, I relate a selection of 
variables to women’s employment levels: economic development and cultural or value-based 
factors. These were chosen because they figure most prominently in the literature. Relating 
the employment rates of women to these factors gives a first indication of how they relate to 
women’s employment.
 Economic development at first glance shows hardly any relationship. The country-level 
scatter plot of GDP per capita with women’s employment does not show any relationship 
(Figure 5.11), and a bar chart of women’s employment for each wealth decile at the district level 
(Figure 5.12) does not present a clear relationship either. Does this mean there is no relationship 
between economic development and women’s employment, while it is one of the most robust 
ones in the literature? To draw such conclusions other factors have to be taken into account, as I 
will do in the next chapter. However, only for economic development, I will make one first step 
in that direction here, in order to understand the role of economic development a bit better. 
Since the districts can be expected to be clustered by country, it is interesting to focus on the 
differences within countries, by filtering out the country differences. That is why I have graphed 
the relationship of district-level wealth with women’s employment controlling for country-level 
differences.55 Figure 5.13 shows this ‘corrected’ relationship between economic development 
and women’s employment at the district level. Whereas the coefficients along the axis are not 
the most insightful given the procedure followed, the distribution of districts indicates that 
in the richer districts women’s employment is generally speaking considerably higher than in 
the poorer districts. The graph, however, collapses the possible different effects of economic 
development (see Section 3.3). A multiple regression model (see next chapter) is needed to 
distinguish those. The use of multilevel regression seems legitimised by the results presented 
here as well: a possible effect at the district level only turns up once country-level clustering is 
taken into account.
 With regard to cultural values and women’s employment, the focus in existing literature is 
most often on Islam. Here, I graphed the relationship between state Islamisation and women’s 
employment, as well as norms on the public presence of women and women’s employment. The 
first represents the institutionalisation of Islam, also focused upon in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. 
The second graphs the underlying norms often discussed as part of the causal mechanism when 
Islam is brought to the fore.
 In Figure 5.14 the country-level variation in women’s employment (see also Figure 5.2) 
is related to state Islamisation. The association between state Islamisation and women’s 
employment is negative. Besides a seemingly declining trend, two other things can be derived 
from these data on the 28 countries. Firstly, most Muslim countries studied here are not 
(strongly) Islamised in terms of their state structure: 13 of 28 score 0 points on the scale and only 
5 score 4 points or higher (out of 6).56 Secondly, the spread in women’s employment seems to 
be higher among the countries with lower scores on state Islamisation. If I was discussing this 
in terms of causality, this might indicate that state Islamisation in itself is sufficient for a low 
employment of women, but certainly not necessary; there are other explanations for having low 
employment levels (on sufficient and necessary conditions, see for instance Goertz, 2006; Ragin, 
2008).57
 Also at the district level, value patterns taking shape in societal norms seem to be related 
to women’s employment. In districts where the norm on the presence of women in the public 
sphere is less restrictive, women’s gainful non-agricultural employment is on average higher (see 
Figure 5.15). However, with an R-square of 0.143 and a rather flat line, the relationship seems 
not to be that strong. Inspecting the plot, though, shows that a cluster of districts in the lower 
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figure 5.14 Womens’ gainful non-agricultural employment and State Islamisation
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57 This relationship is not necessarily only present for Islam. 
However, in none of the countries another religion than 
Islam is institutionalised in the state (see Spierings, 
Smits & Verloo, 2009). This makes it impossible to check 
whether the (causal) effect is only found for Islam or also 
for the institutionalisation of conservative strands of 
other religions.
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right corner heavily influences this relationship (see the rectangles and squares in Panel A). These 
fifteen districts are all nine Azerbaijani (squares) and six Bangladeshi provinces (diamonds). It 
seems that in Azerbaijan and Bangladesh the norm is in favour of women’s public presence, but 
women’s employment is relatively low. This could be due to a heretofore-unaccounted factor. 
When these districts are temporarily excluded from the sample, the R-square of the relationship 
increases to 0.245 and the slope is much steeper (Panel B).
 Overall, women’s gainful non-agricultural employment levels in the Muslim countries and 
their districts do seem to be associated with other characteristics of these areas. This is not 
surprising, but showing some of these patterns does contextualise the analyses in the upcoming 
chapters. Furthermore, the characteristics to which women’s employment is related overlap 
with each other as well. It might be that the districts with more women friendly norms are 
mostly found in the non-Islamised states. Economic development might show a much stronger 
pattern when individual-level economic needs are filtered out, and controlling for other 
district characteristics such as labour market structures is expected to decrease the association 
between women’s employment and public presence norms. For now, it seems that in regions 
with a moderate level of economic development that have little institutionalised religion and in 
which gender parity in the public sphere is higher, more women are gainfully employed outside 
agriculture than other in areas.
5.3.3 NEEDS, OPPORTUNITIES, VALUES AND EXPL AINING WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT
The substantial characteristics of women, their households, districts and countries, which were 
linked in Section 5.3 to women’s employment, are all derived from the theoretical framework 
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The bivariate associations presented here have provided 
some information about which women are (mostly) employed. The first important conclusion 
to be drawn from this is that in terms of focus, a distinction can made between ‘the category in 
which women’s employment is highest’ and ‘the category that supplies the most female labour 
for employment’. The former is a relative measure drawing attention to chances for individual 
women given their characteristics and those of their environment. The latter is an absolute 
measure that tells us something about the make up of the labour market. This distinction is 
best illustrated by education: though clearly many more women of the women with tertiary 
education are employed than of the women without any education, more employed women had 
no education than tertiary education.
 The second conclusion is that on several occasions the figures showed ‘surprising’ results 
(e.g. for having children or district-level economic development). In each of these cases it 
seems that other, unaccounted-for characteristics at least partly explain the ‘surprise’. In these 
two cases, there was an obvious solution, but it generally means that neglecting to control for 
confounding factors can seriously distort the results. In this chapter, I have portrayed what is 
seen at the surface; in the next chapters the focus will shift to understanding and disentangling 
causal mechanisms lying beneath the surface.
5.4 ConCLuSIon: pat ternS of dIverSIt y
“What is the degree of women’s employment in Muslim countries?” 24.2% is the answer for 
the 28 selected countries, sampled between the end of the 1990s into 2008. As simple as 
this answer sounds, the figure can be highly misleading. It should at least be accompanied 
by the answer to the second part of the question: “How does it differ among and within 
countries?” In some countries it is twice as high, in others many times lower and for individual 
districts the extremes are even further apart. This supports a general common place: “There 
is much diversity in the 28 Muslim countries.” However, it is questionable whether these 
kinds of remarks are much help in understanding women’s employment in Muslim countries. 
Yes – assuming that the women considered to be employed here are the most economically 
independent women in these countries – it is also true that in each country the economic 
independence of at least half of the women can be much improved, the half not being gainfully 
employed. Yes, it is true that there is a great degree of diversity. But what does this mean in 
terms of explanations?
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 This chapter has shown that the variation and similarities in women’s gainful non-agricultural 
employment can be understood in patterns of diversity instead of erratic variation. Both in 
geographic and substantial terms, it is clear that the variation in women’s employment is 
linked to other phenomena. While that is unsurprising, it might be surprising that the variation 
geographically clusters around subregions – such as the MENA – and also varies greatly 
within these regions. Also the sub-national district cluster by country, and show considerable 
variation within the district too. Together with the association of women’s employment with 
the substantial characteristics, this highlights that many different factors correlate with 
employment. Some of these are linked to the geographical area a woman lives in, but many are 
not. Furthermore, these descriptive results seem to underscore the statement that women’s 
employment is part of a complex reality, in which many influential factors at different levels 
are interrelated. Understanding the units of analysis (women, districts, countries and so on) in 
terms of their being part of a larger population helps to understand the phenomena which might 
influence women’s employment, and can suggest new explanations for women’s employment, as 
was shown when discussing the five countries with the highest level of women’s employment in 
Section 5.2.2.
 Understanding women’s gainful non-agricultural employment means we have to go beyond 
treating ‘the Muslim world’ as one homogeneous unit, as well as to try to understand the 
similarities between women, household, districts and countries. By focussing on 28 Muslim 
countries – without comparing them to for instance ‘the West’ – and on the patterns of diversity 
within and between these countries, this chapter has provided a view on the economic position 
of women in this part of the world. Many different types of graphs and statistics are presented 
here, and depending on our position we are liable to choose an interpretation in line with our 
own mindset. Are ‘most highly-educated women employed’ or ‘most employed women hardly 
educated’? It only seems a matter of words, and both statements are true, but their impact is 
easily politicised and has an influence beyond the simple descriptive function they have in a 
chapter like this one. To make more accurate claims about what influences women’s employment, 
the next five chapters will use multivariate analyses to asses the associations shown in this 
chapter as well as others. In Chapters 8, 9 and 10, also additional descriptives will be presented 
regarding patriarchy, religion and longitudinal variation.
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58 The smaller the Deviation Information Criterion 
diagnostic, the better the model fit (it takes the degrees 
of freedom used into account).
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Chapter 6
explanatory analysis
General influences on women’s employment in 28 
countries
6.1 IntroduCIng an expL anatory anaLySIS
Chapter 5 has shown how different characteristics of women and their environment relate to the 
likelihood that a woman is gainfully and non-agriculturally employed. While these descriptives 
give a good view of just who is employed, they ignore to what extent the different characteristics 
are interrelated and hence they do not show which factor is more and which is less important. 
That is where this chapter comes in.
 Starting from multilevel models using one explanatory factor at a time (Table 6.1) and then 
advancing towards a model including all relevant micro-, district- and country-level factors (Table 
6.2), this chapter tests if and to what extent these factors may have an independent effect on 
women’s employment. In the cases of the district- and country-level factors, I will also assess 
in what way. I will stick to Chapter 3’s clustering of hypotheses under five headings: (1) income 
and care needs; (2) labour demand creating opportunities; (3) demand and supply: suitable 
and accessible jobs; (4) societal and institutionalised norms; and (5) the government shaping 
opportunities and needs. First though, Section 6.2 starts with a few general remarks about my 
analyses and interpretation of the models. In the last two sections of this chapter (Sections 
6.8 and 6.9), I will pay attention to the most notable results, and reflect on their overarching 
implications. Those sections also discuss the way this chapter is like the heart of a flower to 
which the following thematic chapters are attached like petals. Those chapters will focus on 
the contextual dependence of effects (Chapter 7), the inclusion of new variables (Chapter 8), 
the assessment of controversial variables (Chapter 9), and the temporal dependence of effects 
(Chapter 10).
6.2 InterpretIng tHe reSuLtS
6.2.1 INTERPRETING THE MODELS
Before turning to the substantial results, some general and technical remarks are helpful to 
understand the guidelines I have used in interpreting the results. The discussion of the results 
in this chapter is mainly based on the estimations in the full multivariate model (Model 4, Table 
6.2). However, when the coefficients in the other models are substantially different, they are 
given more attention because this sheds more light on the mechanisms at work. To understand 
which variables could be responsible for the changes in coefficients, additional models were run. 
The results of those additional tests are discussed in the text, and the most relevant coefficients 
are presented in accompanying illustrations.
 As discussed in Chapter 4, MCMC estimation gives the most accurate results for logistic 
multilevel models in MLwiN. The models presented here start from weighted IGLS models, but 
the weighing procedure in MCMC is not optimal. To test the sensitivity of the results, Appendix 
6.1 also presents the weighted IGLS model and a weighted fixed effects model. I will refer 
to these in the text below if the results of these estimation techniques lead to considerably 
different conclusions (see also Section 6.8).
 Lastly, though this thesis is mostly interested in the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and women’s employment, I will also report – but hardly discuss – the models’ DIC 
diagnostics, which is an indicator of the variance not explained. A decline indicates thus a better 
model.58 These figures, for instance, show that the model with all variables (Model 4 in Table 6.2) 
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61 It should be noted, however, that the exact impact of 
having children might be overestimated, because women 
who want to work can also be expected to choose to 
have fewer children. On the other hand, if women have 
fewer children because they want to work, that implicitly 
supports the theoretical reasoning here. If we understand 
the counterfactual dimension of causality (e.g. Brady, 
59 When I do not go into detail about the level of statistical 
significance, this means that the coefficient differs 
significantly from 0 at the conventional level. For the N 
of the individual and household level that is 0.1%, for 
the lower N at the district and country level, a less strict 
criterion will be used.
60 It seems surprising that women with 5 or more older 
children are less often employed than women with the 
same number including young children. As Figure 6.1 – in 
which the 95% confidence intervals are drawn – shows 
there is no statistically significant difference.
2008, 220–1), then the absence of the cause must lead 
to the absence of the effect. If these women would have 
had children, they would not have worked, because they 
have had children. That is why they decided not to have 
children. Two alternative futures exist for these women 
and it depends on having children which one will become 
reality. It is not working as such that changes their 
decision on the number of children; it is the expected 
effect of having children on employment that determines 
how many children they want. This issue of endogeneity is 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis as well.
62 In a MCMC model with 5,000 iterations and explanatory 
factors at all four levels, deleting country-level variables 
backwardly, GDP/c turns out to have a negative 
significant effect. However, the estimation trajectory 
history shows large differences and after running MCMC 
models with more iterations, the variable does not show a 
significant effect (see also in Table 6.2). 
3.1 If a male breadwinner is present, the probability a woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if no 
male
✓  breadwinner is present.
3.2 To the extent that the number of (young) children increases, the smaller the probability of being gainfully non-
agriculturally 
✓  employed of a woman.
 Legend
 This holds for all further use of these symbols
✓ Expectation holds
x Expectation doens not hold
? The results are inconclusive
? ✓ The results are inconclusive, but tend to support the expectation
? x The results are inconclusive, but tend not to support the expectation
Box 6.1
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
-�.�
�
� or more children� or � children� or � children
only children age >�
including children age <�
figure 6.1 95% confidence intervals of effect of number of children (compared to having no children) on women’s employment
 Logged oddds
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explains most of the variation in women’s employment in these 28 countries, has the best model 
fit.
6.2.2 INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS
Some literature strongly criticises an unclear use of the word ‘significance’ (e.g. McCall, 2005; 
McCloskey & Zilliak, 1996; McCloskey, 1983; Miller & van der Meulen Rodgers, 2008). I think 
here it suffices to say that when I use the term ‘significant’ or any conjugation thereof, I mean 
statistical significance.59 The size of the coefficients (and thus their ‘substantial significance’) 
is discussed separately, and Section 6.8 will pay special attention to the different influences’ 
relative degree of influence.
6.3 CoMpetIng needS: InCoMe and Care
This section focuses on the effect of income and of care needs in the household. An increase in 
the first is expected to lead to higher employment propensities among women, whereas rising 
care needs are thought to restrict women from entering the labour market. Two hypotheses on 
the presence of children and male breadwinners were tested in this regard (see Box 6.1 for the 
hypotheses and outcomes).
 Regarding the presence of male breadwinners, both variables show a clear and significantly 
negative effect (p<0.001). The odds that women with a spouse are employed are 56% lower than 
those of unmarried women (Model 4). Women living in a household in which the head of the 
household is a man of working age have 18% lower odds of employment (Model 4). This effect is 
considerably smaller than in the bivariate analyses, because in there the effect is not controlled 
for being married.
 The dummies for the number and age of children showed some surprising results in the 
bivariate analyses: (a) women with one or two children, including young ones, work more 
often than any other group of women; and (b) women with a more than three children, all over 
five years old, work less than women with the same number of children, but at least one of 
them under five years old. However, these figures do not take into account, for example, the 
correspondence between the age of the respondent and having children and the respondent’s 
age and her lower employment likelihood. After controlling for other factors, particularly 
age, the results (Model 4) show that, as the number of children rises, women’s likelihood of 
employment decreases. The effect of the number of children seems to matter most if no young 
children are present. If young children are present, women are clearly held back more to enter 
the labour market and the number of children matters less (see Figure 6.1).60 That there is no 
significant difference between having one or two older children and none at all might indicate 
that the influence of children’s presence should be understood in terms of both care and 
economic needs, the former being dominant. If the care needs are not too high, however, the rise 
in economic needs may push women to enter the labour market.
 In conclusion, both hypotheses with regard to economic and care needs in the household are 
corroborated.61 Furthermore, the significant findings for both variables related to Hypothesis 3.1 
support the idea that, while different people can be responsible for providing a household with 
an income, men are the first to fulfil economic needs. With respect to Hypothesis 3.2, having 
more children restricts women’s employment, particularly the presence of young children.
6.4 L aBour deMand: CreatIng opportunItIeS
The second group of variables revolves around the expectation that an increasing demand 
for labour creates opportunities for women to become gainfully employed. Particularly, the 
processes related to economic development and industrialisation (as an important phase of 
a modernisation trajectory) are highlighted as potential causes of an increased demand for 
female labour. Empirical analyses show a somewhat more complex picture. The hypotheses and 
outcomes are summarised in Box 6.2.
 Firstly, the general economic development level of the area women live in was measured 
at both the country and the district level. At the country level multivariate analyses found no 
effect,62 and the effect in the bivariate model was small. At the district level, however, a much 
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table 6.1 Coefficients of bivariate four-level logistic regression analyses with the logged odds of being non-agriculturally employed as dependent 
variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Country variance district variance Household variance dIC
Null model 1.397 (0.436) 0.667 (0.052) 2.667 (0.072) 259,321.12
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5
3 or 4. older than 5
5 or more. older than 5
1 or 2. at least 1 younger than 6
3 or 4. at least 1 younger than 6
5 or more. at least 1 younger than 6
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.182
-0.118
-0.581
-0.351
-0.302
-0.424
***
**
***
***
***
***
0.021
0.036
0.150
0.018
0.021
0.031
1.20
0.89
0.56
0.70
0.74
0.65
1.373 (0.417) 0.649 (0.053) 2.592 (0.067) 258,839.14
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.599 *** 0.016 0.55 1.168 (0.353) 0.654 (0.053) 2.539 (0.079) 258.748.14
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.549 *** 0.018 0.58 1.422 (0.448) 0.665 (0.055) 2.605 (0.070) 258,912.28
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not
Secondary completed, no tertiary
at least some tertiary
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.600
1.505
3.204
***
***
***
0.020
0.024
0.031
1.82
4.50
24.63
1.267 (0.385) 0.516 (0.041) 2.366 (0.052) 247.425.79
.
.
.
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 1.417 *** 0.017 4.12 1.554 (0.474) 0.440 (0.037) 2.259 (0.059) 254,126.30
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture
Lower white collar
Upper white collar
Unemployed
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
-1.070
0.198
0.767
-0.055
***
***
***
0.023
0.022
0.024
0.043
0.34
1.22
2.15
0.95
1.392 (0.415) 0.542 (0.044) 2.251 (0.060) 255,416.50
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 0.071 *** 0.002 1.07 1.583 (0.488) 0.627 (0.050) 2.519 (0.077) 258,792.10
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69 -0.022 *** 0.001 0.98 1.349 (0.408) 0.662 (0.053) 2.670 (0.084) 258,955.40
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not
secondary completed, no tertiary
at least some tertiary
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.405
0.963
1.854
***
***
***
0.020
0.025
0.029
1.50
2.62
6.39
1.437 (0.431) 0.594 (0.047) 2.488 (0.050) 255,334.55
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.186 *** 0.014 0.83 1.364 (0.417) 0.652 (0.052) 2.587 (0.085) 259,664.13
Age
Age2
15 - 49
225 - 2401
0.196
-0.003
***
***
0.005
0.000
1.22
1.00
1.473 (0.456) 0.644 (0.051) 2.563 (0.057) 256,834.43
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 3.253 *** 0.125 25.87 2.143 (0.625) 0.448 (0.036) 2.616 (0.058) 259,605.18
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -3.848 *** 0.638 0.02 1.219 (0.368) 0.664 (0.055) 2.625 (0.053) 259,584.75
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 3.622 *** 0.133 37.41 1.467 (0.431) 0.419 (0.035) 2.616 (0.061) 259,584.75
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 2.607 *** 0.411 13.56 1.400 (0.425) 0.607 (0.051) 2.605 (0.090) 259,671.41
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 1.930 *** 0.118 6.89 1.553 (0.477) 0.435 (0.036) 2.662 (0.051) 259,348.86
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 5.847 *** 0.540 346.19 1.799 (0.551) 0.513 (0.042) 2.688 (0.073) 259,201.52
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -4.369 *** 0.385 0.01 1.605 (0.491) 0.564 (0.046) 2.623 (0.058) 259,552.21
Country level  
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 - 8.16 -0.040 * 0.017 0.96 1.355 (0.405) 0.661 (0.053) 2.583 (0.072) 259,726.56
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50 0.129 *** 0.037 1.14 1.391 (0.413) 0.668 (0.055) 2.617 (0.059) 259,574.67
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5 0.078 *** 0.023 1.08 1.269 (0.393) 0.660 (0.052) 2.607 (0.062) 259,589.42
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.226 *** 0.032 0.80 1.010 (0.309) 0.663 (0.052) 2.644 (0.057) 259,455.94
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71 -0.633 *** 0.173 0.53 1.482 (0.458) 0.670 (0.055) 2.658 (0.080) 259,369.44
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41 -0.065 *** 0.008 0.94 1.064 (0.324) 0.664 (0.053) 2.632 (0.057) 259,506.07
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy -0.180 * 0.076 0.84 1.314 (0.403) 0.660 (0.052) 2.597 (0.069) 259,679.40
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting from 
IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness. Sources: see Chapter 4.
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variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Country variance district variance Household variance dIC
Null model 1.397 (0.436) 0.667 (0.052) 2.667 (0.072) 259,321.12
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5
3 or 4. older than 5
5 or more. older than 5
1 or 2. at least 1 younger than 6
3 or 4. at least 1 younger than 6
5 or more. at least 1 younger than 6
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.182
-0.118
-0.581
-0.351
-0.302
-0.424
***
**
***
***
***
***
0.021
0.036
0.150
0.018
0.021
0.031
1.20
0.89
0.56
0.70
0.74
0.65
1.373 (0.417) 0.649 (0.053) 2.592 (0.067) 258,839.14
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.599 *** 0.016 0.55 1.168 (0.353) 0.654 (0.053) 2.539 (0.079) 258.748.14
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.549 *** 0.018 0.58 1.422 (0.448) 0.665 (0.055) 2.605 (0.070) 258,912.28
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not
Secondary completed, no tertiary
at least some tertiary
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.600
1.505
3.204
***
***
***
0.020
0.024
0.031
1.82
4.50
24.63
1.267 (0.385) 0.516 (0.041) 2.366 (0.052) 247.425.79
.
.
.
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 1.417 *** 0.017 4.12 1.554 (0.474) 0.440 (0.037) 2.259 (0.059) 254,126.30
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture
Lower white collar
Upper white collar
Unemployed
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
-1.070
0.198
0.767
-0.055
***
***
***
0.023
0.022
0.024
0.043
0.34
1.22
2.15
0.95
1.392 (0.415) 0.542 (0.044) 2.251 (0.060) 255,416.50
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 0.071 *** 0.002 1.07 1.583 (0.488) 0.627 (0.050) 2.519 (0.077) 258,792.10
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69 -0.022 *** 0.001 0.98 1.349 (0.408) 0.662 (0.053) 2.670 (0.084) 258,955.40
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not
secondary completed, no tertiary
at least some tertiary
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
0.405
0.963
1.854
***
***
***
0.020
0.025
0.029
1.50
2.62
6.39
1.437 (0.431) 0.594 (0.047) 2.488 (0.050) 255,334.55
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.186 *** 0.014 0.83 1.364 (0.417) 0.652 (0.052) 2.587 (0.085) 259,664.13
Age
Age2
15 - 49
225 - 2401
0.196
-0.003
***
***
0.005
0.000
1.22
1.00
1.473 (0.456) 0.644 (0.051) 2.563 (0.057) 256,834.43
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 3.253 *** 0.125 25.87 2.143 (0.625) 0.448 (0.036) 2.616 (0.058) 259,605.18
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -3.848 *** 0.638 0.02 1.219 (0.368) 0.664 (0.055) 2.625 (0.053) 259,584.75
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 3.622 *** 0.133 37.41 1.467 (0.431) 0.419 (0.035) 2.616 (0.061) 259,584.75
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 2.607 *** 0.411 13.56 1.400 (0.425) 0.607 (0.051) 2.605 (0.090) 259,671.41
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 1.930 *** 0.118 6.89 1.553 (0.477) 0.435 (0.036) 2.662 (0.051) 259,348.86
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 5.847 *** 0.540 346.19 1.799 (0.551) 0.513 (0.042) 2.688 (0.073) 259,201.52
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -4.369 *** 0.385 0.01 1.605 (0.491) 0.564 (0.046) 2.623 (0.058) 259,552.21
Country level  
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 - 8.16 -0.040 * 0.017 0.96 1.355 (0.405) 0.661 (0.053) 2.583 (0.072) 259,726.56
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50 0.129 *** 0.037 1.14 1.391 (0.413) 0.668 (0.055) 2.617 (0.059) 259,574.67
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5 0.078 *** 0.023 1.08 1.269 (0.393) 0.660 (0.052) 2.607 (0.062) 259,589.42
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.226 *** 0.032 0.80 1.010 (0.309) 0.663 (0.052) 2.644 (0.057) 259,455.94
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71 -0.633 *** 0.173 0.53 1.482 (0.458) 0.670 (0.055) 2.658 (0.080) 259,369.44
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41 -0.065 *** 0.008 0.94 1.064 (0.324) 0.664 (0.053) 2.632 (0.057) 259,506.07
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy -0.180 * 0.076 0.84 1.314 (0.403) 0.660 (0.052) 2.597 (0.069) 259,679.40
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting from 
IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness. Sources: see Chapter 4.
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Model 1 – null model Model 2 – Context levels1 Model 3 – Micro level Model 4 – Country, district and
 Micro level2
variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r.
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.029 0.024 0.97 -0.026 0.024 0.97
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.220 *** 0.038 0.80 -0.214 *** 0.039 0.81
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.542 *** 0.153 0.58 -0.542 *** 0.148 0.58
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.182 *** 0.023 0.83 -0.180 *** 0.021 0.84
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.285 *** 0.029 0.75 -0.281 *** 0.027 0.76
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.379 *** 0.039 0.68 -0.375 *** 0.037 0.69
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.827 *** 0.021 0.44 -0.833 *** 0.024 0.43
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.203 *** 0.018 0.82 -0.203 *** 0.018 0.82
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.425 *** 0.021 1.53 0.426 *** 0.020 1.53
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 1.106 *** 0.029 3.02 1.108 *** 0.027 3.03
at least some tertiary Dummy 2.575 *** 0.036 13.13 2.574 *** 0.036 13.12
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 0.818 *** 0.018 2.27 0.813 *** 0.019 2.25
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture Dummy -0.860 *** 0.024 0.42 -0.861 *** 0.025 0.42
Lower white collar Dummy 0.047 * 0.022 1.05 0.047 0.024 1.05
Upper white collar Dummy 0.170 *** 0.027 1.19 0.173 *** 0.026 1.19
Unemployed Dummy 0.045 0.044 1.05 0.045 0.046 1.05
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 -0.005 ** 0.002 1.00 -0.005 ** 0.002 1.00
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.99 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.99
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.043 0.024 1.04 0.042 0.024 1.04
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 0.096 ** 0.029 1.10 0.093 ** 0.028 1.10
at least some tertiary Dummy 0.114 *** 0.034 1.12 0.110 *** 0.034 1.12
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.126 *** 0.014 0.88 -0.125 *** 0.014 0.88
Age 15 - 49 0.235 *** 0.013 1.26 0.235 *** 0.011 1.26
Age2 225 - 2401 -0.003 *** 0.000 1.00 -0.003 *** 0.000 1.00
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -0.665 ** 0.230 0.51 -1.308 ** 0.409 0.27
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -2.715 *** 0.542 0.07 -2.063 ** 0.716 0.13
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 2.161 *** 0.186 8.68 1.312 *** 0.209 3.71
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.910 * 0.459 2.48 0.628 0.358 1.87
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 0.674 *** 0.153 1.96 0.050 0.182 1.05
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 3.801 *** 0.378 44.75 2.971 *** 0.308 19.51
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -2.410 *** 0.430 0.09 0.214 0.327 1.24
Country level
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 - 8.16
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.329 *** 0.035 0.72 -0.428 *** 0.052 0.65
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy
table 6.2 Coefficients of multivariate four-level logistic regression analyses with the logged odds of being non-agriculturally employed as 
Continues on pages 142–143
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Model 1 – null model Model 2 – Context levels1 Model 3 – Micro level Model 4 – Country, district and
 Micro level2
variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r.
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.029 0.024 0.97 -0.026 0.024 0.97
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.220 *** 0.038 0.80 -0.214 *** 0.039 0.81
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.542 *** 0.153 0.58 -0.542 *** 0.148 0.58
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.182 *** 0.023 0.83 -0.180 *** 0.021 0.84
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.285 *** 0.029 0.75 -0.281 *** 0.027 0.76
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.379 *** 0.039 0.68 -0.375 *** 0.037 0.69
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.827 *** 0.021 0.44 -0.833 *** 0.024 0.43
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.203 *** 0.018 0.82 -0.203 *** 0.018 0.82
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.425 *** 0.021 1.53 0.426 *** 0.020 1.53
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 1.106 *** 0.029 3.02 1.108 *** 0.027 3.03
at least some tertiary Dummy 2.575 *** 0.036 13.13 2.574 *** 0.036 13.12
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 0.818 *** 0.018 2.27 0.813 *** 0.019 2.25
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture Dummy -0.860 *** 0.024 0.42 -0.861 *** 0.025 0.42
Lower white collar Dummy 0.047 * 0.022 1.05 0.047 0.024 1.05
Upper white collar Dummy 0.170 *** 0.027 1.19 0.173 *** 0.026 1.19
Unemployed Dummy 0.045 0.044 1.05 0.045 0.046 1.05
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 -0.005 ** 0.002 1.00 -0.005 ** 0.002 1.00
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.99 -0.006 *** 0.001 0.99
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.043 0.024 1.04 0.042 0.024 1.04
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 0.096 ** 0.029 1.10 0.093 ** 0.028 1.10
at least some tertiary Dummy 0.114 *** 0.034 1.12 0.110 *** 0.034 1.12
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.126 *** 0.014 0.88 -0.125 *** 0.014 0.88
Age 15 - 49 0.235 *** 0.013 1.26 0.235 *** 0.011 1.26
Age2 225 - 2401 -0.003 *** 0.000 1.00 -0.003 *** 0.000 1.00
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -0.665 ** 0.230 0.51 -1.308 ** 0.409 0.27
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -2.715 *** 0.542 0.07 -2.063 ** 0.716 0.13
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 2.161 *** 0.186 8.68 1.312 *** 0.209 3.71
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.910 * 0.459 2.48 0.628 0.358 1.87
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 0.674 *** 0.153 1.96 0.050 0.182 1.05
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 3.801 *** 0.378 44.75 2.971 *** 0.308 19.51
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -2.410 *** 0.430 0.09 0.214 0.327 1.24
Country level
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 - 8.16
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.329 *** 0.035 0.72 -0.428 *** 0.052 0.65
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy
dependent variable
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Model 1 – null model Model 2 – Context levels1 Model 3 – Micro level Model 4 – Country, district and
 Micro level2
variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r.
Model statistics
Household-level variance 2.667 *** 0.072 2.617 *** 0.088 2.126 *** 0.072 2.126 *** 0.067
District-level variance 0.667 *** 0.052 0.324 *** 0.028 0.430 *** 0.035 0.375 *** 0.032
Country-level variance 1.397 ** 0.436 1.358 ** 0.426 2.126 ** 0.667 1.062 *** 0.323
Intercept -1.639 *** 0.104 -1.689 *** 0.166 -5.102 *** 0.346 -5.571 *** 0.115
DIC Diagnostic 259,321.12 259,579.61 236,041.50 236,027.50
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; Models are based on MCMC estimation (5,000 
iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: 
see Chapter 4; Notes: (1) Given the low number of country level observations, only the significant country-level variables are included 
in the model, this was determined using backward deletion; (2) The same procedure was followed as for Model 2, several country-
level variables showed ‘unhealthy’ trajectory histories (see Browne, 2005: 25) and the number of iterations in the MCMC procedure 
was increased. After several increases (up to 70,000) it was decided to exclude the two ‘unhealthy’ variables (public sector and 
economic development), because they showed no clear significant effect. In notes to the text, I will refer to these results.
table 6.2 Continued
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Model 1 – null model Model 2 – Context levels1 Model 3 – Micro level Model 4 – Country, district and
 Micro level2
variable range Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r. Log odds s.e. o.r.
Model statistics
Household-level variance 2.667 *** 0.072 2.617 *** 0.088 2.126 *** 0.072 2.126 *** 0.067
District-level variance 0.667 *** 0.052 0.324 *** 0.028 0.430 *** 0.035 0.375 *** 0.032
Country-level variance 1.397 ** 0.436 1.358 ** 0.426 2.126 ** 0.667 1.062 *** 0.323
Intercept -1.639 *** 0.104 -1.689 *** 0.166 -5.102 *** 0.346 -5.571 *** 0.115
DIC Diagnostic 259,321.12 259,579.61 236,041.50 236,027.50
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; Models are based on MCMC estimation (5,000 
iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: 
see Chapter 4; Notes: (1) Given the low number of country level observations, only the significant country-level variables are included 
in the model, this was determined using backward deletion; (2) The same procedure was followed as for Model 2, several country-
level variables showed ‘unhealthy’ trajectory histories (see Browne, 2005: 25) and the number of iterations in the MCMC procedure 
was increased. After several increases (up to 70,000) it was decided to exclude the two ‘unhealthy’ variables (public sector and 
economic development), because they showed no clear significant effect. In notes to the text, I will refer to these results.
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65 The rerun of the models with different estimation 
techniques supports the possible existence of this effect. 
In the weighted IGLS estimated model the effect is 
considerably stronger and statistically significant at 0.1%. 
Moreover, a MCMC model with 15,000 iterations, in 
stead of the standard 5,000, shows only one difference 
with the 5,000 model: the effect of light manufacturing is 
somewhat larger and statistically significant at the 5.3% 
level. The coefficient in that model is 1.046.
63 Running additional models with economic development 
as explanatory variable for women’s employment, adding 
the other district-level variables one by one shows that it 
is not one variable in particular that takes away the effect 
of economic development, but that they all contribute to 
this in combination. 
64 That the found difference in size of the negative 
coefficient comparing Model 4 and Model 3 is not due to 
coincidence can only be said with 70% certainty. We also 
see that using the IGLS estimation (Appendix 6.1), the 
effect of economic development is still negative but only 
with a certainty of 85 or 80% (using 5 percentage points 
intervals) which is generally not considered acceptable. 
66 In Model 4, without the living-in-a-city variable, the 
logged odds of the district-level urbanisation variable are 
0.756, the s.e. 0.168. 
3.3 To the extent the economic development of a community/country increases, the greater the probability of a woman
✓/x  being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community/country.
3.4 To the extent that the male labour supply in a community is more depleted, the greater a woman’s probability of being 
✓  gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
3.5 To the extent that the relative number of light manufacturing jobs in a community increases, the greater the probability
?✓  of a woman being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
3.6 To the extent that the urbanisation of place a woman lives increases, the greater the probability of a woman being
✓  gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.7 To the extent the foreign direct investments in a country increase, the greater the woman’s probability of being gainfully 
? x non-agriculturally employed in that country.
Box 6.2
Demand
for labour
Gender
equality norms
Educational
attainment
Wealth:
Economic need
Women’s
Employment
Economic
Development
figure 6.2 The difference pathways from economic development to women’s employment
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larger effect was found. In the bivariate analysis the increase in logged odds on employment per 
standard deviation increase in district wealth is 1.53. This positive effect, however, completely 
disappears after control for the district-level norms and the labour market structure variables.63 
Considering the multiple impacts economic development can have helps to understand this 
disappearing act (see Figure 6.2). Economic development has an effect on women’s employment 
because of the creation of more jobs in industry and services, as well as a concurrent shift 
in values away from traditionalism, towards the acceptance of women in the public sphere. 
However, the positive effect not only disappears taking into account district-level norms and 
the labour market structure variables, in Model 2 and Model 4 economic development even 
has a negative effect, which in particularly grows after the inclusion of education.64 Thus after 
controlling for effect through the factors mentioned above, economic development tends to 
decrease the need for women to enter the labour market: the (male) breadwinners seem to then 
be able to provide a sufficient income for the household without women earning additional 
income.
 The three variables discussed next focus on the structure of the labour market. The male 
labour supply was measured by the degree of men’s non-employment and it was expected that 
the more men are non-employed, the lower employment likelihoods of women. In all models 
a strong and highly significant negative effect is found for this variable. After control (Model 
4), the effect is smallest, but still the odds on employment for women living in the district with 
the highest non-employment are less than a quarter of those of a woman in the district with the 
lowest non-employment. The results show that the demand for female labour, and thus women’s 
employment likelihood, is clearly lower if more men are not employed.
 The size of the light-manufacturing sector might be mediating between economic 
development and women’s employment, but the most important sector seems to be the service 
sector (see Section, 6.5). In Model 4, the variable’s effect is not significant (Table 6.2). Additional 
models, however, tend to support the expected effect of the presence of light manufacturing 
jobs.65 Furthermore, the distinction I made theoretically between heavy and light manufacturing 
labour seems justified. The former clearly has no effect on women’s (non-agricultural) 
employment, whereas the latter seems to do have effect (Table 6.3).
 The demand for labour and the availability of jobs is also measured by urbanisation. Based 
on the bivariate models, I conclude that there is a large difference between women living in more 
rural areas and women living in more urban areas. At the micro-level, women living in a city have 
employment odds that are 312% higher than those of women not living in a city. After control 
for other micro-level differences, the effect at the household level decreases, but is still present 
and rather strong: women living in a city have employment odds that are 125% higher than those 
of women not living in a city. The effects of higher education and of having a partner employed 
outside agriculture have been filtered from that figure. Part of the decline in the coefficient can 
be indirect. Girls living in cities probably have more educational opportunities (see Huisman & 
Smits, 2009; Kazeem, Jensen & Stokes, 2010; Smits, 2007), and consequently higher likelihoods 
of employment.
 In the final model, living in a more urbanised district was found to have no effect. Though 
economic development and the size of the service sector take away the influence of urbanisation 
at the district level, a reasonable effect still remains. However, when living in a city is included, 
the district-level urbanisation becomes irrelevant.66 The results for the two urbanisation 
variables strongly support the argument about the importance of proximity of women to 
opportunities. To a large extent the effect of urbanisation at the district level is compositional: it 
is not the number of cities in the vicinity, but living in the city itself that counts.
 The influence of foreign direct investment is often linked to labour market structures, but 
it does not seem to work through them. After controlling for other factors the effect of FDI 
disappears, while in the bivariate analysis it makes a maximum difference of an 81% increase in 
women’s employment odds. Additional test show that it is not economic development or the 
labour market structure, as might be expected, are responsible for the decline in FDI effect. 
In these data, the institutionalisation of conservative Islam rather is the variable that has led 
to this result. It seems that the overlap between low FDI and a higher level of institutionalised 
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67 While the analyses here cannot fully support the idea of 
a secondary labour force, it could have been refuted if no 
effect for the non-employment for men had been found.
69 In a 5,000 iterations MCMC model with explanatory 
factors at all four levels, deleting country-level variables 
68 To test this further, the inclusion of wealth at the 
household level could be considered; however, this 
would not be insightful because of strong problems with 
reversed causality. The presence of working women 
increases the wealth level of the household.
backwardly, the public sector size shows a significant 
negative effect. However, the trajectory histories 
suggested that more iterations were needed for a 
better estimation. Models with more iterations show an 
insignificant or negligible effect (e.g. the coefficient in 
a 70,000 iterations model is just significant at 5%, and 
has a maximum influence of a 1.8% decrease in odds. 
Including it in the model would lead to no different 
overall conclusion, since Hypotheses 3.9 is not supported 
by these results either. 
variable (1)
Model 4, table 6.2
(2)
(1) + non-light manufacturing
Economic development: Wealth level -1.308 ** -0.533
Male labour supply: Male non-employment -2.063 ** -2.060 ***
Labour market structure: Share white collar 1.312 *** 1.322 *
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.628 1.501 *
Labour market structure: Share unskilled labour - -0.162
Degree of urbanisation 0.050 0.025
Norms: Women in public sphere 2.971 *** 2.162 ***
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.214 1.385
Note: These coefficients are based on a model of which all specifications are the same as Model 4 in Table 6.2. The only difference 
is that one variable is added to the model: non-light manufacturing manual jobs. This variable is measured similarly to the light 
manufacturing variable (Section 4.6.3), but now unskilled manual jobs are used in the numerator. 
table 6.3 District-level coefficients including non-light manufacturing manual jobs 
3.8 To the extent that the number of jobs in the service sector in a community increases, the greater the probability a woman
✓  in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.9 To the extent that a country’s public sector size increases, the greater the probability a woman in that country is gainfully 
? x non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.3
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conservative Islam (such as in Mauritania, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen, or the other way around 
in Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, and Turkey) might have distorted the bivariate results. This 
strongly suggests that the bivariate correlation are not causal, because companies are more 
likely to invest in countries where more women are already active on the labour market (given the 
strong relationship between employment and state Islamisation) (see also Busse & Nunnenkamp, 
2009). The results found here might also explain why Clark, Ramsby & Adler (1991) and Gray, 
Kittilson & Sandholtz (2006) found no link between FDI and women’s employment, while Pyle 
& Ward (2003) and Richards & Gelleny (2007) found a positive relationship between FDI and the 
general socio-economic position of women, because FDI does not create extra jobs but might 
‘import’ gender equality norms.
The conclusion here should clearly be that the demand for labour is an important reason for 
women’s employment to increase. It has also been shown that combining different variables 
and studying them in models including micro-level factors can provide interesting information 
about the causal mechanisms at work, for instance with respect to proximity (e.g. urbanisation), 
multiple effects (e.g. economic development), and pathways (e.g. the combination of economic 
development, FDI, and light manufacturing). The results most clearly support Hypotheses 3.4 
and 3.6 (see Box 6.2). With regard to Hypothesis 3.4 that states that a further depletion of the 
male labour force increases women’s chances, it must be added that the results here are no 
conclusive proof of the hypothesis’ underlying idea of women as a secondary labour force, which 
informed the inclusion of this variable.67 Whether the effect of non-employment is stronger 
for women than men can only be tested through separate models with men’s employment as 
dependent variable. Furthermore, the hypothesis on the presence of light manufacturing jobs 
(Hypothesis 3.5) can be cautiously accepted, but this type of jobs does not seem to be a channel 
through which Foreign Direct Investments (Hypothesis 3.7) influences employment. Economic 
development (Hypothesis 3.3), on the other hand, does seem to increase labour demand. At 
the same time economic development harbours a multitude of other effects (see Figure 6.2). 
Economic development seems to change societal norms and labour market demands (more 
service sector jobs), both benefiting women. Moreover, it is related to higher educational levels, 
fostering women’s chances (also compared with men). Simultaneously, the results here suggest 
that economic development can also decrease women’s employment because of lower economic 
needs.68
6.5 MatCHIng deMand and SuppLy: SuItaBLe and aCCeSSIBLe joBS
Above, the availability of jobs has been discussed from the perspective of demand, of the 
employer’s perspective. In this section, the focus shifts to the characteristics of women and what 
is deemed acceptable for them, given the gendered segregation of economic activities. I have 
argued that additional demand for labour has the strongest positive effect if it fits women’s role 
in society. As is to be expected, this is mostly the case for the service and public sectors (see Box 
6.3 for the hypotheses).
 Regarding the service economy, the relative number of white-collar jobs in a district has a 
strong, consistently positive effect in all analyses. The creation of white-collar jobs benefits 
women’s gainful non-agricultural employment considerably (Hypothesis 3.8). The results, 
however, also suggest that the effect will be overstated if micro-level differences are not 
taken into account. The difference between Models 2 and 4 (Table 6.2) is interesting because 
it is largely due to the inclusion of education. It can be that the same processes of economic 
modernisation or government policies lead to both higher education levels and a larger service 
sector in an area. The effects of labour market structures found in exclusively macro-level studies 
can thus partially be an example of multilevel spuriousness.
 For the size of the public sector variable no substantial and significant effect was found. 
The effect was only statistically significant in the bivariate analysis, but its size is negligible.69 
The odds on employment only decrease by 2% over the full range of the variable. Rejecting 
Hypotheses 3.9 outright may nonetheless be a bit too rigorous. In the operationalisation of the 
explanatory factor I was obliged to determine the size of government in terms of expenditures 
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70 To calculate these predicted probabilities, an equation 
based on the coefficients from Model 4 (Table 6.2) is 
formulated. Using the averages (as reported in Table 
4.2) for each of the variables and the different values 
for education, the logged odds are calculated which are 
transformed to the probabilities presented here (see e.g. 
Pollock, 2009).
3.10 To the extent a woman has more human capital, the greater the probability a woman is gainfully non agriculturally 
✓  employed.
3.11 To the extent the household belongs to a social network at a higher socio-economic class, the greater the probability a 
✓  woman in that household is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.4
3.12 To the extent that the presence of women in the public sphere in a community increases, the greater the probability that
✓  a woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.13 To the extent that the dominance of traditional care roles in a community increases, the smaller the probability that a 
?✓ woman in that community is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.5
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figure 6.3 Predicted probability on employment (%) for an average woman in an average context
 Women's employment (%)
variable (1)
Model 2, table 6.2
(2)
(1) + education
Economic development: Wealth level -0.665 ** -0.753 ***
Male labour supply: Male non-employment -2.715 *** -2.465 ***
Labour market structure: Share white collar 2.161 *** 1.927 ***
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.910 * 1.256 ***
Degree of urbanisation 0.674 *** 0.629 ***
Norms: Women in public sphere 3.801 *** 2.975 ***
Norms: Traditional care roles -2.410 *** -0.251
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not - 0.585 ***
secondary completed, no tertiary - 1.481 ***
at least some tertiary - 3.169 ***
Note: These coefficients are based on a model of which all specifications are the same as Model 2 in Table 6.2. The only difference is 
that the dummies measuring women’s educational attainment at the micro level are included. 
table 6.4 Coefficients of a country, district model including education at the micro level 
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instead of employees, as there were no useable data available on government employee 
numbers, which might have shown a clearer relationship.
Matching demand and supply also drew attention to the resources of women and their 
households. If the resources were greater, it was expected that women would more easily find a 
suitable job (Box 6.4).
 Education as the operationalisation of human capital is very strongly related to women’s 
employment. With significant logged odds coefficients of 0.4, 1.1, and 2.6 for primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education (compared to no education), this is one of the main factors 
influencing women’s employment. The two highest levels of education are especially important. 
As Figure 6.3 shows, the probability of employment rises most steeply between having 
completed secondary education and having at least some tertiary education: from 21% to 53% – 
at least, for the average woman living in the average district of the average country.70 However, 
it should not be forgotten that few women (<7%) have enjoyed higher education.
 The second resource focussed on is the socio-economic status of the social network a 
woman has access to, in terms of her spouse’s job. It seems that women whose spouse has a 
lower white-collar job, a blue-collar job, or whose spouse is unemployed, all have roughly the 
same employment opportunities. The main differences are found for women with a partner in 
agriculture (even after control for living in a city) and with a husband who has an upper white-
collar job. The former have a considerably lower likelihood of employment, the latter a somewhat 
higher one. These results are roughly in line with expectations. However, the effect is only 
modest: the increase in odds on employment is about 13% to 19% for women with an upper 
white-collar spouse, compared to the women with a partner with a lower (non-agricultural) 
occupational status.
 Both education and partner’s occupation as indicators of household resources have been 
shown to be influencing women’s employment positively, but it is clear that education is the 
more important of the two. Hypotheses 3.10 and 3.11 are thus supported. Primary education 
has a positive effect as well, while others have argued that it leads to a lower likelihood of 
employment (e.g. Aromolaran, 2004; Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud, 2009). Given the large 
number of uneducated women and the efforts to increase the basic education levels in many 
of the 28 countries, this is an important conclusion. Providing women with at least primary 
education is thus potentially likely to increase women’s employment.
In this section, the results have shown that not only is the presence of jobs important, but there 
should be a match between women and the jobs that are available for these women to become 
employed. On the demand side the presence of service sector jobs seems very important, and on 
the supply side women’s education.
6.6 tHe added vaLue of worK: SoCIetaL and InternaLISed norMS
Values were expected to form the background of other variables and to have direct effects. 
Regarding the latter, more traditional norms at the societal level (see Box 6.5) and more 
traditional values held by household member or internalised by women (Box 6.6) were 
theoretically linked to lower employment levels, and the same goes for institutionalised 
conservative values, more particularly, state institutionalisation of conservative Islam (Box 6.7).
 At the district level, both variables measuring societal norms are related to women’s 
employment in the bivariate analyses, and the direction is as expected. In Table 6.2’s Model 2 the 
relationships are still statistically significant, but somewhat more modest due to the inclusion of 
the other societal-level variables. Even when not taking into account the possible indirect effect 
through education, the positive direct effect of the public sphere being less dominated by men is 
still substantial (Table 6.4 ). Women living in a district with a score one standard deviation (0.16) 
above its mean (0.21) have odds on employment that are 159% higher than women living in a 
district scoring one standard deviation below the mean.
 The effect of traditionalism disappears almost completely after including education 
(Table 6.4). It might be that norms regarding traditional care roles do mainly prevent women 
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71 In the IGLS model, the effect even turns positive. This 
clearly refutes the hypothesis. In later chapters this 
results is found as well. I will pay some more attention to 
it in the concluding chapter, where I argue that filtering 
out individual level values might lead to this variables 
capturing a wealth effect. 
73 I do not mean to say here that the effect of values is larger 
than the sum of these effects, only that the controlled 
direct effect of values in general can be expected to be 
72 Given the large number of cases, this level of significance 
is rather modest.
somewhat higher than the small separate effects.
  In addition it should be noted that the effects of 
the individual value variables does vary across estimation 
techniques (Appendix 6.1). The signs are all according 
to expectations, but for age at birth of the first child 
and a partner’s education only the MCMC model shows 
statistical significant results. For traditional household 
structures and age difference all models do. Despite these 
somewhat less robust results, it is safe to conclude that 
overall micro-level values do have the expected impact on 
women’s employment.
3.14 To the extent that other household members hold more traditional values, the smaller the probability that a woman in
✓  that household is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.15 To the extent that more traditional values are internalised, the smaller the probability that a woman is gainfully non 
✓  agriculturally employed.
Box 6.6
3.16 To the extent the institutionalisation of conservative Islam into the state increases, the smaller the probability
✓  that a woman in that country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.7
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from entering the educational system and that consequently their likelihood of employment 
decreases. It should be noted however, that the effect found for traditionalism at the district 
level is not consistently found across models using different estimation methods.71
 Based on the analyses in this section, it can be concluded that values and norms seem to 
have a direct and an indirect effect on women’s employment. If we include the possible indirect 
effects, both hypotheses (3.12 and 3.13) seem to be corroborated. The support for Hypotheses 
3.13, however, rests solely on the indirect effect through education.
 At the micro-level, four variables have been used to measure the impact of the (internalised) 
values of women and their household members: (1) the age of the woman at the birth of her first 
child, (2) the age difference with the partner, (3) the partner’s education, and (4) the presence 
of traditional household structure. The more traditional the values, the lower the expected 
employment propensity. The results are summarised in Box 6.6.
 Each of these variables appears to be related to women’s employment, but all decrease in 
strength considerably after controlling for other micro-level factors. Moreover, the age of the 
woman when she gave birth to her first child shows a small negative effect (p<0.01) where a 
positive was expected.72 Overall, it still seems that the cluster as a whole shows the expected 
results. The decrease in effects after controlling for factors such as education and having children 
suggests indirect effects as well. Over the full range, increasing age difference between spouses 
decreases the odds on employment by about 50%. Rises in the educational level of the husband 
shows a steady increase in odds on women’s employment, and the odds are 12% higher for 
women with tertiary-educated partners compared to women with uneducated partners. Lastly, 
women living in household with the least traditional structure (nuclear, not polygynous) have 
28% higher odds of employment than women in the most traditional (extended, polygynous) 
structures, 1.4% of all women included here.
 While each of these effects is limited in strength, it should be taken into account that they 
all work simultaneously, meaning that the effect of the micro-level values cluster as a whole 
is larger.73 With regard to Hypotheses 3.14 and 3.15, the four value variables I have used do 
not neatly distinguish between the two hypotheses; as they overlap it is difficult exactly to 
determine whether the behaviours used as proxies tap into a woman’s or, for instance, her 
partner’s values. Only a partner’s education seems rather safe to declare an indicator of the 
partner’s values. The other variables tap into both the value system of the household in which 
a woman was raised, her own values, and the values of the partner. Yet, since three out of four 
variables show statistically significant effects in the expected direction, I do think the evidence 
is solid enough to consider both the hypotheses supported.
 In the analyses, the institutionalisation of conservative Islam was included to test the idea 
that institutionalised values also influence women’s employment (Box 6.7). In all models and the 
bivariate analyses, this country-level variable is the only one that is consistently and strongly 
related to women’s employment. The more conservative Islam is institutionalised in a country, 
the lower the probability that a woman in that country is employed. Most countries are coded 0 
(13) or 2 (5) on this variable ranging from 0 to 6. Women in a country with a score of 2 have odds 
of employment 58% lower than women in a state in which Islam is not institutionalised at all.
Overall, in these analyses, many different value variables simultaneously, but also differently, affect 
women’s employment. This strongly supports the view that ‘values’ is not just one influencing 
factor, while different values are often treated as one in cultural explanations. Moreover, values can 
be internalised by women or by their direct environment. They can take the form of societal norms, 
and they can become institutionalised in the state. Distinguishing between these helps to think 
about what and how changes in value patterns might or might not influence women or not and how. 
Moreover, a change in the values upheld in society might change women’s position but not directly 
lead to changes in the institutionalised values. Through institutionalisation, ‘old’ values can have 
unexpected long-lasting effects. On the other hand, institutionalised values might be more easy to 
change than societal norms or internalised values. Also, results suggest that values can be grounded 
in different sources, as is evident when surveying the difference between Islam-based values to 
values more generally related to traditional gender roles.
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3.17 To the extent that traditional gendered family roles are more institutionalized in government policies, the smaller the 
?/? ✓ probability that a woman in that country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
3.18 To the extent that the size of the social safety net in a country increases, the smaller the probability that a woman in that 
?/? ✓ country is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.8
3.19 To the extent that the level of democracy in a country is higher, the greater the probability that a woman in that country
?/? ✓ is gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 6.9
theoretical factor expec-
tation
re-
sults
operationalised 
variable
expec-
tation
re-
sults
accepted
H3.1: Presence male breadwinner - ✓ Partner present - ✓
Working male is head of household - ✓
H3.2: Presence children - ✓ presence of children + ✓
H3.4: Male labour supply - ✓ Non-employed men in district - ✓
H3.6: Urbanisation + ✓ Living in a city + ✓
Degree of urbanisation in district + ?✓
H3.8: Service sector + ✓ Number of service sector jobs in district + ✓
H3.10: Human capital + ✓ Education + ✓
H3.11: Socio-economic class network + ✓ Occupation(al status) partner + ✓
H3.12: Norms public presence women (pro) + ✓ Relative presence women in education 
and labour
+ ✓
H3.14 & H3.15: Traditional values household 
members &
traditional values woman
-
-
✓
✓
Partner’s education 
Age difference with partner (partner-
women)1
Traditional family structure1
Age at birth first child1
+
-
+
-
✓
✓
✓
x
H3.16: Institutionalisation conservative Islam - ✓ Codification of Islam in constitution - ✓
accepted, but also counteracting effects found
H3.3: Economic development + ✓ Country: GDP/c + x
District: Wealth +/- ✓ Possibly in-
cludes a nega-
tive indirect 
effect
Cautiously accepted
H3.5: Light manufacturing + ?✓ Proportion skilled labour + ?✓
H3.13: Norms traditional care roles (pro) - ?✓ Prevalence of traditional households - ?✓
H3.17: Traditional gendered family role policies - ?/? ✓ Gender unequal policies and laws - ?/? ✓
H3.18: Social safety net - ?/? ✓ Family allowance - ?/? ✓
not accepted
H3.7: Foreign direct investment + x Ln (FDI three years average (% GDP)) + ? x
H3.9: Public sector size + x Government expenditures + ? x
H3.19: Democracy + x Freedom House civil liberties and politi-
cal rights
+ ? x
Notes: (1) While these value proxies are related to either the degree of traditionalism of the household member or of the women, the 
variables are expected to capture both.
Box 6.10: Overview hypotheses and results
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6.7 tHe roLe of tHe governMent: SHapIng opportunItIeS and needS
The last group of variables has drawn attention to how government policies reflect values and 
shape opportunities and needs. Reinforcing dominant gender roles was expected to influence 
employment negatively as were policies decreasing economic need (Box 6.8); on the other hand, 
giving women room to influence policies was expected to increase employment (Box 6.9).
 The bivariate models (Table 6.1) indicate that more traditional family policies are related to 
lower employment, as well as an increase in family allowances. The latter is only significant at 
the 5% level, but given the limited number of countries (28), this still seems to support the idea 
that family allowances discourage women from entering the labour market. However, for both 
variables the results do not hold when other variables are included in the model. Different groups 
of variables can account for the difference found between models. Consequently, it is unclear 
whether the bivariate results are spurious, top-down indirect, or absent because of technical 
reasons.
 Spuriousness could firstly be derived from disappearing effects after the inclusion of 
economic and labour market structure variables and societal norms. In this case, it could also 
be argued that the policies work through district-level norm variables. However, the policy 
variables focus on very specific policies, whereas the norm variables focus on general norms. 
As the measurement of the policy variables comes closer to the direct actions of women than 
to the norms, it is unlikely that these particular policies have a large influence on norms, 
without having a direct effect on women’s employment. Secondly, the traditional family 
policies might lead to a lower educational participation of women, and consequently to lower 
employment rates. The family allowance policies might shape households’ fertility decisions 
and have an indirect effect that way. However, the effect of policies on fertility can be 
expected to be fairly limited (see Olmsted, 2003: 87–90) and thus even smaller with regard to 
women’s employment. Thirdly, the relatively weak operationalisation might mean that a more 
encompassing variable such as state Islamisation more effectively taps into the overall policy 
climate. In short, policies might have indirect effects, but the expectations are not strongly 
supported (see Box 6.8).
 Lastly, democracy was expected positively to influence women’s employment, mainly 
through policy-making. The raw association with women’s employment (Table 6.1) shows that 
women in the most democratic countries in the dataset have 37% higher odds of employment 
than women in the least democratic country. However, including the state institutionalisation 
of conservative Islam takes away that effect for my sample of 28 countries, in which the two 
variables overlap substantially.74
 Overall, the results for the political variables certainly indicate that family policies and 
benefits, as well as state structures, all relate to women’s employment, and that they relate to 
women’s employment in the expected direction. However, the results from these analyses are 
too ambiguous to draw strong conclusions about the influence of state structures and policies 
measured by the variables in this thesis. More attention for these kinds of factors, using better 
operationalisations and more cases, could shed more light on the possible influences of policies 
and polities.
6.8 ConCLuSIonS: overaLL reSuLtS
6.8.1 SUMMARY
Summarising, of the nineteen hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3, eleven are rather 
unambiguously accepted in this chapter (see Box 6.10). The hypothesis on economic development 
is supported as well, but aside from the hypothesised positive effect there seems to be a 
negative effect coming from economic development. On four other hypotheses, the results do 
suggest an influence, but the results are less robust. Lastly, three hypotheses are provisionally 
rejected. For these, I found no to hardly any proof that they have a general effect on women’s 
employment in the 28 countries. This is not to say, that these factors (FDI, public sector size, and 
democracy) cannot have an effect in a certain context;75 however, based on the data used here 
no patterns are found that broadly hold.
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77 For each variable the full range on this variables was 
multiplied by the coefficient. Based on those coefficients 
it is concluded that education has the largest impact. It 
is also larger than the coefficient for the control variable 
age, for which the variable and its quadratic terms 
should be taken together. The range with the maximum 
differences is then between the ages of 15 and 39. Over 
this range the difference in logged odds is about 1.8.76 Strictly speaking coefficients at the country level cannot 
be compared, because the variables are not included 
74 In a model with all micro and district-level variables 
and only democracy at the country level, democracy 
is positively and significantly related to women’s 
employment. However, when state Islamisation is 
included the effect disappears and a model with only 
state Islamisation decreases the country level variance 
more strongly than the model with only democracy. 
It could be argued that democracy leads to less state 
Islamisation, but given the way the two variables are 
measured, this is unlikely.
75 A clear example are the cuts in the public sector, which is 
found to important in Egypt, both in Chapter 10 as well as 
the literature (Assaad, 2003; Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 
2003).
in one multivariate model. However, multiplying the 
bivariate regression coefficients by the range of the 
variables shows that the influence of state Islamisation is 
larger than any other effect (at least by a factor of 3.3). 
Furthermore, using a backward deletion method it was 
the only variable at the country level that shows a robust 
significant effect and is thus included in the final model.
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 Of the five groups of variables (1: household care and economic needs; 2: labour demand 
creating opportunities; 3: matching demand and supply; 4: societal and internalised norms; 5: 
policies shaping needs and opportunities) the only cluster for which generally little or weaker 
relationships were found, is the one on policies and political institutions. For several reasons it 
was also the one for which the weakest effects could have been expected to be found. Firstly, the 
theorised causal mechanism from policies to women’s employment is the one with the most steps 
or linkages. This causal distance weakens the overall effect. Secondly, statistically speaking, the 
limited number of countries in this study prevents that many country-level variables’ effects are 
robust and recur across models. Thirdly, of all hypotheses presented here, the ones on policies 
are the ones least systematically tested across countries and thus little comparable data on 
specific policies related to women’s employment are thus available. Other authors often fall back 
to very general concepts and data. However, I was not interested in the general status of women 
in these countries, accordingly the use of general measurements – the percentage of women 
in parliament, the Gender Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measurement, and 
CEDAW ratification – as is done in others studies (e.g. Blackburn, Jarman & Brooks, 2000; Donno 
& Russett (2004), Fish (2002), Gray, Kittilson & Sandholtz, 2006; Tzannatos & Kaur, 2003) would 
not have helped to solve the problem of measurement here. With this in mind, the presence of 
some effects for these variables can be regarded as a half-full glass situation instead of a half-
empty one, as far as I am concerned.
6.8.2 MA JOR DETERMINANTS
Regarding the second general research question of this thesis – Which micro-, meso- and macro-
level factors are the (major) determinants of women’s employment in Muslim countries, and how 
do they influence women’s employment? – I have reserved the issue of which factors are the 
‘major’ or most important ones until now.
 To answer this question, I should start by making clear what my criteria are for determining 
which factors are most important. At the core of the answer is the perspective one takes in asking 
this question. Firstly, from the explanatory perspective (which is dominant in this study), the 
most important factors are the ones with presumably the largest and most certain influence on 
women’s employment likelihood. This means that the statistical significance and (standardised) 
effect sizes are important. A second – more policy-making-oriented – perspective also takes into 
account whether an intervention is possible to manipulate the explanatory factor. For instance, 
educational attainment levels are easier to change than internalised values, or, more extremely, 
the geographical location of a country. I will discuss which factors are most important based on 
the first view, but depending on the reader’s interest, the second perspective might be kept in 
the back of one’s mind.
 At the country level the conclusion is rather simple. The only robust result was found for state 
institutionalisation of conservative Islam, and this variable also shows the largest substantial 
influence in the bivariate analyses. Moreover, the remaining country-level variance was lowest for 
this variable in the bivariate models. That this variable is most important indicates the precedence 
of policies and political institutions over economic characteristics at the country-level.76 At the 
district level, economic factors turned out to be much more important. Together with the variable 
meant to measure the norms on the public presence of women, the size of the service sector and 
the non-employment of men have the greatest influence. The impact of the other variables seems 
smaller, mixed, or less robust.
 At the micro level, it is education that seems to stand out. Based on the logged odds 
coefficients, higher education is the most important.77 Other important variables are: living 
in a city, having a spouse, having an agriculturally employed partner, and the age difference 
between partners. It could be argued, however, that the frequency of a characteristic should be 
taken into account. For instance, tertiary education increases women’s employment likelihood 
tremendously, but less than 7% of the women have reached such an educational level. Given 
the coefficients and the occurrence over the variables, education, having a spouse, and living 
in a city are candidates for being most important. The leverage of the last two is increased by 
the ‘secondary support’ of the results for, respectively, the presence of a working-age male 
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78 Sheaf variables are created by multiplying the values 
on the original variables with the coefficients for those 
variables and adding these up. Using these sheaf variables 
in a MCMC model with 5,000 iterations, indeed shows 
that the coefficients all come close to 1.000. They vary 
between 0.98 and 1.01. In an IGLS model the coefficients 
show much more deviation from 1.000.
Sheaf group Coefficient Standard deviation Standardised coefficient (Influ-
ence for one standard deviation 
on x)
Children 1 0.12 0.12
Breadwinner 1 0.39 0.39
Education 1 0.70 0.70
City vs agrarian 1 0.63 0.63
Values 1 0.08 0.08
Note: These coefficients are based on the weighted sample. 
table 6.5 Relative influence of groups of micro-level variables
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household head and the difference between women with a partner active in agriculture and 
other women, both having a negative effect.
 To further asses the leverage of the different groups of micro-level variables, I have created 
sheaf coefficients for five different groups of variables – (1) children, (2) partner and male 
working age breadwinner, (3) education, (4) living in a city and the dummies for having a partner 
with a agricultural and upper white collar occupation, (5) the value proxies – by multiplying 
the variables’ values with those variables’ coefficients and adding these up. Sheaf coefficients 
can be used to assess the relative impact of a group of variables by taking them together and 
studying the standardised regression coefficients. This is mostly used to compare the impact 
of a factor for which several dummy variables are included to other factors, but can be applied 
to the question at hand here (see e.g. Whitt, 1986). Rerunning the analyses with these newly 
created variables leads to a model in which for each of the sheaf variables the coefficient is 
about 1.000.78 The new variable with the highest standard deviation has the largest influence, 
because a change of one step on the independent variable is most easily accomplished on that 
variable. This exercise shows that education and the combination of living in a city and partner’s 
occupation are most important (see Table 6.5). Since the latter is slightly less influential and 
not only includes agricultural occupation but also the upper white-collar effect, it seems safe 
to conclude that education is indeed most important at the micro level, closely followed by the 
difference between an urban vs. rural environment.
6.9 refLeCtIon and dISCuSSIon
In this section, the broader implications of the results will be discussed. Firstly, I will analyse the 
implications for the theoretical framework and literature on women’s employment in Muslim 
countries. Secondly, I will highlight how the results lead to new questions and how they relate to 
the following chapters.
6.9.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Three aspects of the general theoretical framework (Chapter 2) have been tested in this chapter: 
the levels, their interrelatedness, and the conditions of needs, opportunities, and values.
 DISTINGUISHING FIVE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
First of all, the results have shown that characteristics of units found at different levels, are 
influential. Women’s own characteristics (e.g. human capital, values) and the characteristics 
of her household (e.g. children, income, partner’s values) are clearly related to women’s 
employment likelihood and both these theoretical levels should be taken under consideration 
when theorising on women’s employment (see also Wolf, 1990). Of the theoretical meso and 
macro levels, the sub-national district level seems to be more important with regard to economic 
and cultural factors than the other two (men’s non-employment, service sector size, norms 
on public presence). Together with the result found for urbanisation (living in a city is more 
important than living in an urbanised district), this result stresses the importance of proximity. 
Contextual effects are often strongest when the contextual level is closest to women. Focusing 
only on the country level, can easily lead to a type II error: a false negative (rejecting a hypothesis 
while it is true). Testing hypotheses at lower contextual levels, however, might correctly lead 
to accepting the hypothesis. At the national level, policies seem more relevant than economic 
characteristics such as GDP per capita, which is in line with the specific expectation regarding 
the locus of policy-making at the national level.
 Least attention was paid to the global level, and the included variables from that level solely 
showed a correlation in the bivariate analysis. Little support for an indirect top-down influence 
through labour market structures was found. A more systematic assessment of the influence of 
different forms of foreign investments in developing countries on different aspects of women’s 
economic position is needed. It seems that it is not just the amount invested that counts; what kind 
of investment is done and in which sector, might be critical as well. In addition, some processes – 
such as FDI – might have no general effect but can still impact women’s employment in a certain 
context, in specific countries. Chapter 10 pays more attention to understanding global influences.
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79 While it is not surprising that there are more household 
structures that shape economic needs, it is surprising that 
there is so little attention for this. One reason I expect to 
explain this, is that most studies start reasoning from the 
variable level and think why marriage might be important. 
In this study, I started reasoning from an overarching 
theoretical framework and then descended to the 
variable level.
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 INTERREL ATEDNESS OF LEVELS
In Chapter 2, I have discussed four ways in which district, country, and global characteristics can 
be related to women’s employment. In this chapter direct and indirect top-down effects and 
multilevel spuriousness relationships have been studied and found.
 For several variables, the results suggest the existence of multilevel spurious relationships. 
For instance, the service sector size has a direct top-down influence, but part of its effect found 
in the contextual-level-only models seems spurious. Not controlling for micro-level differences 
can thus lead to wrongly thinking that a causal relationship exists where it is in fact spurious. 
As described above, unilevel approaches can also lead to a false negative. Consequently, it is 
virtually impossible to estimate the direction of possible biases if not using multilevel models 
including the relevant micro-level factors.
 Ignoring the distinction between direct and indirect top-down influences can have rather 
important consequences for interpreting the results as well. However, the distinction between 
these two types of interrelatedness is sometimes hard to make. For instance, I have found a 
direct effect of state institutionalisation of conservative Islam, but this does not mean that its 
effect is a direct top-down influence. It only means that my models did not contain indicators 
that are part of the causal mechanism through which state Islamisation has an effect. That it is 
nonetheless helpful to distinguish between these two types of interrelatedness has been nicely 
illustrated by the results for economic development. In Chapter 3, five possible mechanisms 
were outlined describing how economic development might influence women’s employment. 
Comparing models including (different sets of) micro and/or macro-level variables supports three 
of these. Firstly, a truly district-level effect is found through the creation of jobs. Secondly, 
a indirect top-down effect through educational achievement is found. Thirdly, the ‘residual’ 
negative effect is in line with the expectations about the negative indirect top-down effect 
through the economic needs of the household. For values no indirect top-down effect was found, 
but an influence was registered through district-level norms. No evidence was found or an effect 
through fertility.
 The fourth form of relatedness – ‘embedded relatedness’: a meso- or macro-contextual 
factor shaping the micro-level relationship – was not empirically studied in this chapter. It will be 
given particular attention in Chapters 7, 8, and 10.
 NEEDS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND VALUES
While this chapter has focused on factors already discussed in the literature, it is not a simple 
repetition of existing work. On the contrary, the framework of needs, opportunities, and values 
informed the inclusion of alternative measurements of often-used factors to test the underlying 
mechanisms in more detail, and the framework developed here helps to understand results that 
are contradictory to results in the literature.
 With respect to including alternative measurements, the inclusion of marital status in this 
study is not unique (see e.g. Glick & Sahn, 1997; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & 
Afghanjanian, 1980; Khattab, 2002). However, the studies on Muslim countries that discuss why 
having a partner leads to lower employment levels, all combine different explanations such as the 
need to care for children, lower economic needs, and the partner prohibiting labour market entry 
(Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Hirschman & Afghanjanian, 1980). In this study these effects 
are disentangled (theoretically and empirically), and the results suggest that the economic 
needs argument is most important. Consequently, it will be interesting to look for other family 
structures determining this need. I therefore included the variable indicating whether or not the 
head of household was a working-age man, and this seems to support the existence of the causal 
economic needs causal mechanism.79
 Similarly, at the macro-level, studies that focus on Islam and women’s employment tend 
to include a country’s percentage of Muslims to measure the possible influence of Islam 
(see e.g. Clark, 1992; Dollar & Gatti, 1999; Haghighat, 2005). The framework applied in this 
study also includes religion, but it draws attention to religion as just one source for sets of 
values, needing a means of communication by which these values might influence women’s 
employment (institutionalisation, norms, internalisation). In that spirit, I have included a 
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80 Haghigat (2005a; 2005b) also includes both the 
percentage of Muslim and a variable on the strength of 
religiosity of the state (all religions) and finds negative 
effects of both, with a somewhat stronger effect of the 
first. The sample in that study however includes 135 
countries and the political-religious variable included 
more levels of conservatism captured under one heading. 
For instance, Norway and Germany are coded as religious 
governments because they identify with Protestantism, 
but in my reasoning they would get a low score because 
conservative religious restrictions are relatively absent 
from the state structure.
(1) table 6.2, Model 4 (1) + % Muslims
variable Coeff. Coeff. full range one s.e.
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam -0.428 *** -0.208 ** -1.24 -0.38
Percentage of people being Muslim - -0.014 *** -0.88 -0.28
Country-level variance 1.062 *** 1.059 *** - -
Note: These coefficients are based on a model of which all specifications are the same as Model 4 in Table 6.2. The only difference is 
that in the second model an additional variable is included. 
table 6.6: Coefficients of different measurement of religion in a country
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variable that measures the institutionalisation of Islam. This variable appeared to be an 
important explanatory factor and the results supported the idea of the importance of values. 
Including a population-based variable (percentage of Muslims) in the models used here also 
shows a statistically significant relationship. However, state Islamisation seems to be greater 
(see Table 6.6).80 Moreover, the theoretical argument for using the percentage of Muslims 
is still underspecified. Ideas about what these values concern fall back on humdrum, such as 
“Islam is more conservative”, and how this influence is exerted not specified beyond “through 
culture”. In addition, there are serious methodological problems with the usage of the ‘Muslim 
percentage’ variable at the country level, because the values on this variable are highly clustered 
in geographical patterns, which means that the variable might measure many other things related 
to this geographic clustering (e.g. colonial history, Arab culture, postcolonial relations, and the 
amount of sand in a country). For more discussions and tests on the influence of religion, see 
Chapter 9.
 Several of the other results in this study do not refine existing knowledge, but simply 
contradict it. Firstly, based on ideas of rational cost-benefit reasoning on the part of women and 
their families, several scholars expect primary education to have a negative effect on women’s 
employment, because the opportunity costs of employment rise more with attaining at least 
primary education than the benefits of a job do. The analyses of Aromolaran (2004) and Kuepie, 
Nordman & Roubaud (2009) tend to support these ideas for Nigeria and Sub-Saharan West 
Africa (see also Lincove, 2008). I have found a very clear positive effect of primary education 
in all 28 countries. In terms of needs, opportunities and values, the positive net result of 
primary education is to be expected. Additional education does not increase the care needs 
of the household and working can help to meet the economic needs of the household, while a 
higher education level simply creates more opportunities on the labour market. For instance, 
primary education opens the door to jobs in which literacy is required. The empirical results in 
this study seem to confirm this. Secondly, in the analyses performed here, several indications 
were found that economic development might have a negative effect on women’s employment. 
In the literature, however, it is generally accepted that economic development only has a 
positive impact on women’s (non-agricultural) employment (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Inglehart, 1997; 
Jaquette, 1982; Lenski & Nolan, 1984; Lerner, 1958; Mernissi, 1987; Moghadam, 1998, 2003, 
2007; Rukhsana, 2004). Applying the needs, opportunities and values framework logically leads 
to disentangling different processes influencing women’s employment that stem from economic 
development. One of these processes does entail a negative influence because economic 
household needs decline when a country and its households become richer. My framework and 
analyses have led to a better understanding of the mechanism behind ‘old results’, in which the 
effects of economic development are collapsed.
6.9.2 ROADS TO FOLLOW
The framework and multilevel modelling have highlighted some avenues for future work on data 
and methods beyond the scope of this present thesis, and the results logically lead to the themes 
of the four upcoming chapters. 
 QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA ENRICHMENT
For some factors, the analyses in this chapter have resulted in less robust conclusions. In most 
cases this is directly related to the measurement of the variables. At the country level, the least 
strong results were found for FDI, public sector size, and the two policies variables. These 
variables were also the ones for which the weakest measurements have been used. This is a 
problem for many cross-sectional country-comparative studies that have to make use of existing 
data. In this study, I have used several new measurements at the country level (state Islamisation 
and the allowances variable), and the results suggest that this is the start of a fruitful endeavour.
 Secondly, the less robust and less clear result at the micro level might also be traced to data 
issues. At this level, there are for example variables that were expected to tap into values, which 
show important differences between estimation techniques (Appendix 6.1). These variables are 
behaviour-based proxies for values. Obviously, there is a concept-measure inconsistency and 
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81 All results do point in the expected direction, but the size 
of coefficient differs and the statistical significance is not 
very robust across estimation techniques.
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this ‘noise’ might explain the less robust results.81 Similarly, the partner’s occupational status 
is a relatively weak operationalisation of the socio-economic network a woman has access to. 
While the DHS, PAPFam and IPUM surveys are unique in their coverage of issues and countries, 
further integration and combination of surveys is desirable. Only then is it possible to test (inter)
relationships in more detail. The results in this chapter only underscore the importance of doing 
so.
 A third issue is that this study has found important influences manifesting themselves at 
the district level. These were mainly of an economic or cultural nature. Including this level with 
383 units is rather unique, but it has its limitations. Cross-sectionally, no data whatsoever are 
available on policies or any other variable for all these districts. As Chapter 9 will show, policy- 
and culture-related factors based on external data also seem influential at the sub-national level, 
and it can be expected that sub-national differences are rather relevant in federal countries. To 
test and understand macro-level processes influencing women’s employment, much more data 
collection at different sub-national levels is needed.
Lastly, for some variables, an effect has been found, but we should be cautious with interpreting 
the results singularly in favour of the theory. This is particularly the case for the gender-role 
related variables such as having children, the size of the (light) manufacturing sector, and male 
non-employment. For instance, I found a strong impact of male non-employment on women’s 
employment, but based on the tests in this study it is impossible to tell whether non-employment 
has a (dis)similar effect on men’s employment. If the effect is similar, it is a general labour market 
effect and not so much a gendered labour market effect. Broader models including interactions 
with sex are needed to truly understand how and to what extent labour market structure 
influences are gendered.
 Each of the data-related problems addressed above can be solved in studies focusing on 
one level, one country, or one domain. I have shown, however, that taking the different levels, 
countries, and domains together is crucial in understanding what shapes women’s employment 
in Muslim countries. Thinking this completely through, means that the strength of a study is in 
the end determined by its weakest data (availability). Therefore, collecting and linking more 
comprehensive data in terms of levels and domains is crucial for on-going development of our 
knowledge about the influences on women’s employment.
 FURTHER THEMES 
Firstly, the analyses in this chapter have also informed the selection of the issues to be 
investigated in the following chapters. In this chapter, I have shown which general relationships 
seem to exist in these 28 Muslim countries, but how effects might differ by context has so far 
been ignored (Chapter 2’s embedded interrelatedness). Now it is clear that education is the most 
important micro-level factor, this will be the focus in Chapter 7 on embedded interrelatedness. 
Secondly, in Chapter 8, I will further use the framework to translate ideas about patriarchal 
systems to (new) household-level hypotheses about the influence of other household structures 
on women’s employment. Thirdly, in discussing women’s position in Muslim countries, Islam 
by definition plays an important part. I have shown how it can be treated as a source of 
institutionalised values, but that is only one way religion-based values might influence women’s 
employment. This approach stands in stark contrast with the more ‘civilisationist’ or simplistic 
approach to the influence of Islam. Chapter 9 goes into that debate, and theoretically and 
empirically compares my approach to the civilisationists’ approach. Finally, this chapter has 
found a complex system of influences for economic development (often used to measure the 
level of modernisation). At the same time, little attention has been paid to the global level 
and no effect has been found. What does this say about the influence of globalisation and the 
idea that women’s position will change for the better if we let time do its job? This complex of 
relationships – including temporal embeddedness and a stronger focus on how the international 
level plays a role, partly working through the sub-national influences – will be studied in greater 
detail in Chapter 10.
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83 In addition to Figure 5.9, this indicates that the number of 
women that are non-agriculturally and gainfully employed 
is roughly the same for each of the educational groups 
as indicated by the equally-sized rectangles: women 
without education are clearly less often employed than 
82 The probabilities are based on the ‘final’ regression 
equation in Chapter 6 (see also Figure 6.2).
�% ���%
no education
primary education
secondary education
tertiary education
figure 7.1 Employment and the percentage of women with that educational level
 Estimated probability on employment
for instance secondary or tertiary-educated women but 
there are many more women without any education. 
Again, a focus on only the higher-educated women, would 
disregard about three-quarter of the women gainfully 
active in the non-agricultural sector. The focus in this 
chapter will therefore be on all educational levels. 
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Chapter 7
theme 1: embedded interrelatedness
Variations in the effects of education in 28 
countries
7.1 IntroduCtIon
Chapter 2 has introduced the idea of embedded effects in order to draw attention to the 
questions whether and why effects on women’s employment differ between areas: contextual 
characteristics are expected to shape the influence of explanatory factors, and these contextual 
characteristics differ from area to area. In this chapter, these notions are applied to the effects of 
education on women’s employment.
 The previous chapter has shown that educational attainment is a major influence on 
women’s employment. Across the 28 Muslim countries studied in this thesis, women’s odds 
of employment increase by 53% if a woman has primary education instead of no education. 
For secondary education this is 203%, and for tertiary education 1,212%. In Figure 7.1 this is 
translated into the probability of being employed,82 whereby the relative number of women 
with a certain educational level is depicted through the width of the blocks.83 There are two 
reasons why this explanatory factor is particularly interesting to focus on in this chapter. Firstly, 
because of the large effect of education, differences in that effect can have major implications 
for a woman’s economic position. It is relevant to understand under which circumstances 
additional education pays off most. Secondly, hardly any ideas are formulated in the literature 
about how micro-level effects are embedded in the context. The literature on education is the 
most promising in this regard, because some thoughts on context specificity are found in that 
literature, which can serve as some bases for this thesis (e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1998; Acar, 2006; 
Jansen, 2006; Tansel, 2002). By reinterpreting and elaborating these ideas, using the framework 
of this thesis, concrete expectations can be formulated and tested. In turn, the results for 
education might inform theoretical ideas about the embeddedness of other micro-level factors.
 In this chapter, I will start by briefly discussing the differences in education and effects across 
countries and district (Section 7.2). After I have established that education indeed has different 
effects in different areas, a short literature review is given in Section 7.3, to explore the existing 
literature. Section 7.4 formulates expectations regarding the different effects. The results of 
interaction models are presented and discussed in Section 7.5. In the concluding part (Section 
7.6), these results are then related to the general framework and questions of this thesis.
7.2 tHe effeCt SIze of eduCatIon
Before it can be studied why the effect of education varies across areas, it has to be established 
whether and how it does. A first, very general way to look at the possible different effects of 
education is visualised in Figure 7.2. For each country the bars present the percentage of women 
that have not completed primary education and that of women that have at least some tertiary 
education. The darker parts of the bars represented the employed women within these groups. 
For example, in Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, more than 90% of the women have not finished 
primary education. However, in Guinea 28% of all women have no primary education but are still 
employed; in Chad this is true for only 15%. For tertiary education, such differences are found 
as well: in Jordan, almost 30% of all women have enjoyed at least some tertiary education, but 
the number of women that has tertiary education and is employed is lower than in Lebanon, 
Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic.
 If the effects of education were the same across countries, this would be reflected in the 
size of the darker bars relative to the total bars. The change in this ratio between education 
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85 The logged odds on employment are estimated used the 
regression equations derived from the random slopes 
models, all variables fixed (including the constant) with 
exception of the three education dummies. The logged 
odds were estimated for each country and district and the 
84 It should be taken in account that ‘no education’ is set to 
zero, which automatically leads to fanning out if there are 
different effects across contexts. 86 Although the review of Pettit & Hook focuses on 
industrialised (OECD) countries, their conclusion can 
be easily extended to women’s employment in Muslim 
countries or developing economies, a smaller and also 
fragmented literature. 
% of all women in the country
Darker parts of the bar represent the percentage of the 
women being employed, the total bar the percentage of 
women with the indicated education level: no education 
completed or tertiary education
� �� �� �� �� ���
Kyrgyz Republic - Tert.
Kyrgyz Republic - No
Kazakhstan - Tert.
Kazakhstan - No
Azerbaijan - Tert.
Azerbaijan - No
Malaysia - Tert.
Malaysia - No
Jordan - Tert.
Jordan - No
Lebanon - Tert.
Lebanon - No
Turkey - Tert.
Turkey - No
Indonesia - Tert.
Indonesia - No
Syria - Tert.
Syria - No
Algeria - Tert.
Algeria - No
Zanzibar - Tert.
Zanzibar - No
Egypt - Tert.
Egypt - No
Nigeria - Tert.
Nigeria - No
Bangladesh - Tert.
Bangladesh - No
Tunisia - Tert.
Tunisia - No
Djibouti - Tert.
Djibouti - No
Pakistan - Tert.
Pakistan - No
Morocco - Tert.
Morocco - No
Sierra Leone - Tert.
Sierra Leone - No
Eritrea - Tert.
Eritrea - No
Mauritania - Tert.
Mauritania - No
Senegal - Tert.
Senegal - No
Yemen - Tert.
Yemen - No
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Burkina Faso - No
Mali - Tert.
Mali - No
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Guinea - No
Niger - Tert.
Niger - No
Chad - Tert.
Chad - No
figure 7.2 Employed women by educational group and country
results of this are graphed. The figures are thus controlled 
for all other variables in the model (see Chapter 6).
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levels should then be similar across countries. For instance, the relative size of the darker bar 
would for instance triple when comparing uneducated and tertiary-educated women. Such a 
consistent pattern is not to be found, indicating that the effect of education at least differs 
across countries. Take Nigeria and Yemen. In Nigeria, relatively many women without education 
are employed (>40%) and for tertiary-educated women this is about two thirds, while in Yemen 
hardly any woman without education is employed, but about half of the small number of women 
with tertiary education is employed in Yemen. This indicates that the effect of education is 
relatively small in Nigeria when that country is compared to Yemen.
 These figures are based on statistics that are not controlled for other important 
characteristics the women might have, which might (partly) explain these differences, and these 
percentages only present country-level differences. One way to assess whether education 
effects differ per macro-level context (after control for other relevant factors) is to re-run the 
final model as presented in the previous chapter, but now with random slopes for education 
at the district or country level. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 7.1, and it is 
clear that all the variances are statistically significant. The effects of each level of education on 
women’s employment differ substantially between countries as well as districts. The positive 
coefficients, which become larger for each level of education, furthermore indicate that the 
effect is fanning out (see Jones, 2007): the further the educational level from the reference 
category, the larger the differences in effect between areas.84 This is also one of the conclusions 
that can be derived from Figure 7.3, which graphs the employment likelihoods (in logged odds) 
by educational level, per district and per country.85 It shows that though a few countries and 
districts show some (minor) negative effects of education, the effects are positive in almost all 
areas. The maximum difference between tertiary and no education is about 5 logged odds at the 
country level and somewhat over 6 at the district level. 
 So far, I have shown that education has a strong and positive effect on women’s employment 
in general, and that the effect is not the same everywhere. Interesting as this finding might be, it 
is plainly not informative. To transcend killjoy remarks, such as ‘the effects of education differ’, 
it is pivotal to understand why the effects of education differ, and the subsequent parts of this 
chapter therefore focus on the question: What factors might explain the variance in the slopes of 
education?
7.3 LIterature overvIew
In their 2005 review of the literature on women’s employment, Pettit & Hook aptly summarise 
the condition of the field (780): “The polarization of research on women’s employment into 
traditions emphasising either micro or macro determinants of women’s employment ignores 
the relationship between individual employment decisions and institutional conditions”.86 
Consequently, there is hardly any systematic assessment of, or theorisation on, how the effect 
of education depends on the macro-level context, something already observed by Pampel & 
Tanaka (1986: 601) in their classic study about the relationships between economic development 
and female labour force participation: “Even though empirical models have not tested for 
interactions, there are several reasons for supposing they exist”. A closer look at the studies 
discussing women’s employment in Muslim countries lays bare some of these reasons, these 
ideas about embedded effects.
 At least four authors link the effects of education to the cultural context,87 more specifically 
the strength of a woman’s role as mother and housewife, but each in a different way. More 
stringent cultural norms are related to the influence of education through employer preferences, 
through household restrictions, and what is taught at school. In what can be called the first line 
of reasoning that connects education to culture, Abu-Lughod (1998) and Shakry (1998) refer to 
the hybridisation of modernisation, which signifies that modernisation can accommodate more 
traditional ideas in different combinations. Shakry (128–9) discusses colonial Egypt specifically, 
where the education of women was seen as important to elevate their moral and material 
position. However, the domain of women was not reconstructed and women remained confined 
to the private sphere. Translated, this means that even if women’s educational level improves, 
society (including employers) may still uphold the idea that a woman’s place is in the private 
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variable Slope coefficients of education variances of slopes
B-coeff. s.e. variance s.e.
Country-level random slopes
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not 0.478 *** 0.079 0.261 *** 0.080
secondary completed, no tertiary 0.934 *** 0.135 1.161 *** 0.347
at least some tertiary 1.828 *** 0.165 2.145 *** 0.669
district-level random slopes
Education (ref = less than
primary completed, secondary not 0.639 *** 0.039 0.338 *** 0.042
secondary completed, no tertiary 1.493 *** 0.078 1.256 *** 0.129
at least some tertiary 2.925 *** 0.107 2.394 *** 0.226
Notes: (1) * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; (2) These coefficients presented here are based on models of which all specifications are 
the same as Model 4 in Table 6.2. The only difference is that for the three education dummies the slopes were allowed to vary at the 
macro-level context. The variances of these slopes for the district and country level are derived from two separate models.
table 7.1 Variance coefficients of the effects of education on women’s employment 
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figure 7.3 Effects of education on employment
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 Country level
87 These authors do not use the terms of interactions or 
embedded interrelatedness, but what they have written 
can be interpreted as such.
88 This is partly reflected in the shrinkage of the effect of 
education, comparing the bivariate and multivariate 
models in Chapter 6.
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sphere, and thus not in organisations in the public sphere, such as companies or factories (see 
also Fergany et.al., 2006: 91).
 Abu-Lughod (1998) also can be grouped with Acar (2006) along a second line of reasoning 
which expects education to change women’s internalised gender roles and desire to work. 
These are however then expected to change less if education happens in a more traditional 
environment (see also Vella, 1994). For instance, if education is provided from the perspective 
of Muslim reformers such as Thanawi (1863–1943), educated women cannot be expected to 
desire work. In the words of Abu-Lughod (19), Thanawi saw a future in which women will be 
empowered, literate and educated. These self-disciplined and proper Muslim women would 
then be able to become modern housewives (i.e. using recipes and weighing and measuring 
ingredients). Women receiving education in this context can be expected to be less inclined 
to enter the labour market. In line with this, Acar (2006: 103–4) argues that in Turkey more 
traditional education teaches different skills: “religious education … reinforces stereotypical 
gender roles and offers very little in terms of income-generating skills to women”.
 In a third line of reasoning, Jansen (2006) directs attention to the position of other household 
members in translating education to employment. In her study on Jordan, Jansen (48) notes 
that: “The rise in female education had hardly any effect on women’s economic participation … 
While most parents support their daughters’ education, far fewer allow them to use their skills in 
jobs. At times, girls are annoyed by these limits put on their ambitions, but they usually comply 
with their parents’ wishes”. In each of the three views regarding culture, the emphasis is on the 
(religious-motivated) traditional environment. These authors imply that the effect of education 
will be stronger in less traditional settings than in more traditional ones.
 The second cluster of authors focusses more on the economic context. Both Tansel’s study 
of Turkey (2002) and Pampel & Tanaka’s cross-sectional study of 70 nations (1986) – including 
sub-Sahara Africa, North Africa, Asia and the Middle East – include economic development and 
women’s labour force participation and discuss the possibility that the effect of education might 
differ according to the type of labour that is demanded during economic development. Pampel 
& Tanaka (601) argue that the pay-off of education decreases in more economically developed 
areas, because economic development will mainly increase the demand for female labour 
through home-based labour, and Tansel (11) also expects – without much further argumentation 
– that in the process of economic development the effect of education becomes smaller. These 
expectations are very general, but they do draw attention to labour market structures. Travelling 
a bit outside the literature on Muslim countries, we can for example find an India study of Rani & 
Schmid (2008) in which different effects of education on poverty are shown for different parts of 
the service and manufacturing sector. However, the theorising is again minimal on this point; it is 
expected that there is a difference between rural and urban areas, but it is not further explained 
why this should be so. 
 Overall, the information on the embedded effects of education on women’s (gainful non-
agricultural) employment is sketchy at best, even while a need for more knowledge about these 
effects was already identified over 25 years ago (Pampel & Tanaka, 1986). The focus is only 
on culture/religion and economics, not on policies, and it is not clear which types or levels of 
education are referred to. It is also not specified which aspects of the labour market structure are 
important in shaping the influence of education. To address these lacunae, I will in the following 
section formulate specific hypotheses for each of these three clusters (labour market structures, 
culture, policies) based on the logic developed in Chapter 2.
7.4 tHeorISIng tHe eMBedded effeCtS of eduCatIon
In this thesis, in line with my notion of opportunities, I perceive education as a ‘human 
capital’ resource. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that education can be expected 
to influence women’s values as well.88 As the literature overview above has made clear, 
education’s effect might differ because of its different effects on how much women want to 
find employment (Abu-Lughod, 1998; also Inglehart, 1997).Having said this, we turn to the 
expectations in the three clusters of macro-contextual factors (labour market structures, 
societal norms, and policies).
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90 As discussed in Section 4.7.2, the datasets do not contain 
variables that exactly use these types of jobs as labels, 
89 This seems in line with observations by others. For 
instance, for Zanzibar it is known that women are rather 
highly represented in construction (Eliufoo, 2007).
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heavy manufacturing
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lower service
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figure 7.4 The education of women employed in different types of jobs
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figure 7.5 Women’s employment by type of job
so the figures presented here are approximations that 
should be treated as indications of the labour market 
structure, not the exact percentages of women in these 
positions. 
Women's employment (%)
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7.4.1 L ABOUR MARKET STRUC TURES AND THE EFFEC TS OF EDUCATION
The labour market structure can be expected to be particularly important for the effects of 
education, because this structure determines the presence of suitable and desirable jobs and 
this in turn shapes the demand for women with certain educational achievements. In an area 
with many managerial jobs, the demand for tertiary education will increase. However, this does 
not automatically mean that the effect of being tertiary educated becomes larger as well. These 
effects depend on the overall balance between the labour demand and the supply of employees 
with a certain education and sex. Given working conditions and the perceived higher suitability 
of service jobs for women, I assume (ceteris paribus) that (see also Fergany et.al., 2006: 91):
1) Women prefer – if they can choose – a job in the service sector above jobs in any other sector.
2) Employers in the service sector will prefer higher-educated people as employees over lower-
educated people.
3) Employers in the manufacturing sector prefer the cheapest labour.
Consequently, I expect that most higher-educated women, if they want to be employed, will find 
a job in their preferred sector; in the service sector. The data confirm this: 94% of the employed 
women with tertiary education are employed in the service sector, 78% in a ‘professional, 
technical, managerial’ or ‘clerical’ job. For secondary-educated women, these figures are 81% 
and 36% respectively.
 Furthermore, it should be noted that in almost all of the Muslim countries, the number of 
jobs in the service sector turns out to be larger than the supply of tertiary-educated people. In 
my data, of all people (men and women, aged 25 to 97), 17.7% are active in the service sector, 
and 7.5% have tertiary education. Studying this by district shows that in all of the districts more 
people work in the service sector than there are tertiary-educated people. If only the service 
sector jobs in the categories of ‘professional, technical, managerial’ and ‘clerical’ are taken into 
account – thus excluding ‘sales and services’ – 90% of the districts have fewer tertiary-educated 
people than service sector jobs. Also excluding clerical jobs leads to a figure of 75%. In sum, 
people with tertiary education can most probably find a job in the most preferred sector in 
their own district, and employers have additionally to employ people with less than tertiary 
education.
 With regard to the manufacturing sector, it is expected that more lower-educated women 
are active in that sector, not only because of employers preferences, but also because most 
tertiary-educated women will choose the service sector, and finally because lower-educated 
women have fewer opportunities in the (upper) service sector. This combination of factors makes 
it difficult to empirically prove the third assumption made above, but the data are illustrative in 
showing higher numbers of lower-educated women in manufacturing jobs (see Figure 7.4).
 Besides the demand-supply balances discussed above, it will be relevant to know the general 
percentage of women present across the main sectors. Of all women who are gainfully employed 
outside agriculture, roughly a quarter is active in manufacturing and three quarters in the service 
sector according to my data (see Figure 7.5). Regarding the latter, 22% of women has a ‘better’ 
service sector job and 51% a ‘sales and services’ one. Overall, 93% of the employed women is 
active in the two sectors designated to be the most feminised: service and light manufacturing 
(see Chapter 3). Most (21) countries show similar figures (see Appendix 7.1). In Tunisia and Turkey, 
a large percentage (>40%) of women is active in light manufacturing (probably the clothing 
industry), and in Bangladesh, Chad, Djibouti, Yemen and Zanzibar the number of women in the 
heavy manufacturing sector is particularly large (>24%).89 Nonetheless, the overall picture 
strongly suggests that the service sector is the preferred employer, light manufacturing the 
second best option, and heavier manufacturing labour a last resort (see also Chapter 6). This is 
also in line with Figure 7.4: the women with the most assets are found in the arguably most-
preferred sectors.90
 Now that the background to the hypotheses is clear, I will be able to formulate specific and 
testable hypotheses on the four labour market structure factors in this study: (1) non-employment, 
(2) the size of the service sector, (3) the size of light manufacturing, and (4) urbanisation.
 In areas in which the non-employment of men is higher, the labour supply of preferred 
employees (men) is larger. Consequently, the demand for women is lower (see Chapter 6). 
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91 If there is a substantial number of higher educated but 
non-employed, this demand for higher-educated women 
is still expected to be low, but as said the demand for 
service sector jobs outnumbers the total number of 
higher-educated people.
7.1 To the extent that the male labour supply in a community is more depleted, the greater the effect of a woman’s education 
on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.2 To the extent that the number of jobs in the service sector in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s 
education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.3 To the extent that the number of jobs in the light manufacturing sector in a community increases, the larger the 
difference in women’s probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed between primary educated women and 
women without education, and the smaller the difference between primary educated women and women with a higher 
education. 
7.4 To the extent that the urbanisation of a woman’s living environment increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s 
education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 7.1
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However, higher-educated people are still preferred over lower-educated people (see above), 
and thus the demand for higher-educated women will stay relatively constant.91 If so, this would 
mean that in areas with higher non-employment of men, especially lower-educated women 
would have more difficulty in finding a job while higher-educated women could still find work 
relatively easily. The effect of education is thus expected to increase, when the non-employment 
of men increases.
 The size of the service sector is expected to have a negative impact on the effect of 
education. This may sound counterintuitive given the feminised nature of the service sector, 
but again the balance of labour and employer/employee preferences are crucial here. A larger 
service sector will increase the demand for female labour, particularly for higher-educated 
women. However, if all higher-educated women who want a job already have a job since there 
are enough service sector jobs for tertiary-educated people, an increase in the demand for 
labour in the service sector will lead to an additional demand for female employees with lower 
levels of education. Consequently, more lower-educated women will become employed, and the 
difference in employment between tertiary and other educational groups decreases.
 Whereas it is relatively simple to predict the pull of the service sector, the influence of the 
light-manufacturing sector is somewhat more difficult to predict, because the workforce in light 
manufacturing is educationally more diverse (see Figure 7.4). About half has primary education, a 
third has no education, and the last 20% has at least completed secondary education. Compared 
to all women or to women who are not employed, primary- and secondary-educated women are 
overrepresented in manufacturing. Based on this, we might expect that particularly primary-
educated women benefit from an increase in the size of the light-manufacturing sector. However, 
the ‘in-between’ preference for these jobs and the possible mixed preferences of employers 
(cheap labour versus educated labour) leads me to add that the underlying assumptions for this 
expectation are far more speculative than the ones discussed above.
 In line with the expectations for service sector jobs, it can also be expected that the effect 
of education is smaller in more urban areas. More jobs are available there and the chances of 
women with lower education levels thus mainly increase. Higher-educated women will generally 
have less trouble finding a job, even if there are fewer jobs. In Box 7.1, the discussion above is 
summarised in four hypotheses.
7.4.2 CULTUR AL NORMS AND THE EFFEC TS OF EDUCATION
Regarding the function of education in transferring norms, it seems useful to distinguish 
between the different forms of education. In tertiary and to some extent secondary education 
it is to be expected that people are taught to think analytically and critically, to form their own 
opinions, at least to some extent. In elementary education, the focus will much more be on basic 
skills such as reading, writing and arithmetic. Consequently, the emancipatory function of higher 
(tertiary) education is already relatively large by nature of the type of knowledge and skills 
taught there, while lower education is less about reflection and more about learning by heart, 
which includes learning the norms that are dominant in the community.
 Because of the general effect of higher education, women having enjoyed higher education 
can be expected to have a stronger desire to enter the labour market, even if the norms are 
less in favour of the public presence of women. These women have (partly) broken free from 
these norms. Moreover, employers in need of scarce higher-educated personnel might be less 
influenced by the societal norms than employers who can afford to choose men over women. 
For women with lower education the story is quite different. If the norms in society are more 
in favour of women entering the public sphere, I expect this to influence them considerably. 
These women are more influenced by the societal norms surrounding them and will more often 
act accordingly, and the same holds for employers. Consequently, the effects of education 
are expected to be smaller if the norms on the public presence of women are more in favour of 
women’s labour market entry.
 Similarly, norms regarding the role of women as caretakers can be expected to have the 
greatest impact on lower-educated women, and the least on higher-educated women. This 
would mean that the effect of education is greater in areas with more traditional norms, because 
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92 Once past this barrier, it is still expected that basically 
all tertiary-educated women can find a job. The effect of 
these policies is seen as having an impact on the first step 
in becoming employed: entering the labour market and 
not so much on becoming employed in which women’s 
skills, network and resources as well as the employers 
values and demands become more important (see  
Section 2.3).
7.5 To the extent that the presence of women in the public sphere in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a 
woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.6 To the extent that the dominance of traditional care roles in a community increases, the larger the effect of a woman’s 
education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
Box 7.2
7.7 To the extent that the economic development in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s education on 
her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community. 
Box 7.3
7.8 To the extent that traditional gendered family roles are more institutionalized in government policies, the smaller the 
effect of a woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.9 To the extent that the institutionalisation of conservative Islam into the state increases, the smaller the effect of a 
woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
Box 7.4
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figure 7.6 Illustrating similar interaction coefficients, ‘different effects’
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the lower educated have a relatively low employment level, while tertiary-educated women have 
employment levels similar to women in areas with less traditional norms. In sum, this leads me to 
formulate two further hypotheses (see Box 7.2).
 Economic development as an embedding characteristic taps into both groups of factors 
discussed above (labour market structures and cultural norms). As the framework used in this 
study points out, both district-level value patterns and labour market structures are part of the 
container ‘economic development’. This means that for economic development both embedded 
interrelatedness mechanisms are expected to apply: if economic development leads to value 
change in favour of entering the labour market, I mainly expect lower-educated women to be 
influenced positively; and if economic development leads to more jobs, this mainly increases 
the opportunities of women with less education. In both cases the effect of education decreases 
(statistically speaking) once economic development increases. These two mechanisms are 
complementary, since norm modernisation and job availability are positively associated. The 
hypothesis regarding economic development is provided in Box 7.3.
7.4.3 POLICIES AND THE EFFEC TS OF EDUCATION
The last set of expectations about the different effects of education revolves around (culturally 
informed) policies that might shape the impact of education. Especially interesting are policies 
that regulate the flow between (educated) women and the labour market where the job 
opportunities are found. The effect of restricting women’s job searches is expected to be fairly 
straightforward. The more formal restrictions in place – little access to public transport, having 
to travel with a mahram, no access to economic resources, the risk of bodily violation, stricter 
dress codes – the more women will not enter the labour market and will not become employed. 
Since most of these restrictions are applicable to all women, it can be expected that they hurt all 
who want to search for a job. Since higher-educated women are overrepresented in this group, 
they will relatively be disadvantaged the most.92 Consequently, the difference between higher- 
and less high-educated women can be expected to decrease. In turn, policies that lift restrictions 
or facilitate the job search – such as childcare provisions or quota – can be expected mostly to 
benefit the higher educated. This general mechanism can be translated to two of the policy 
variables used in this study (see Box 7.4). The first is chosen because it includes policies and laws 
that formalise gendered family roles, such as to what extent the access to resources is limited 
to men or (male) heads of household. The second is selected because the institutionalisation 
of conservative Islam also includes institutionalising ideas on the position of women, such as 
stipulated in Shari’a.
7.5 ModeLLIng dIfferent effeCtS
7.5.1 APPROACH
For the analyses, the final model from Chapter 6 (Model 4, Table 6.2) is taken as the starting 
point since it includes the necessary controls and variables, and was the strongest model 
presented there. To this model, the interaction terms with education are then added (see 
Jaccard, 2001). At first, this is done one by one, afterwards they are all included together. In the 
case of the ‘traditional family policies & law’ variable, the base term (the country-level variable) 
is added as well. The main coefficients are not very informative because they are only applicable 
to the situation in which the values on the base variables are zero. Because of this and because 
this chapter focusses on embedded interrelatedness (not on the main effect), I will only present 
the interaction coefficients here. The coefficients of the full model can be found in Appendix 7.2. 
In Appendix 7.3, the same model is presented using weighted IGLS estimation.
 The interaction coefficients are all relative to women who did not finish primary education. 
In other words, the coefficients of the education dummies are relative to the intercept corrected 
for the specific district’s or country’s position. For instance, if the employment level of 
uneducated women in Area A is higher than in Area B (see Figure 7.6a, the difference between 
the points at the left), and Area B has a higher value on the contextual embedding factor, then a 
negative interaction coefficient indicates ‘fanning out’ and the difference increases (see Figure 
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94 The exception is the non-employment of men, because 
using this range would lead to figures that are either non-
existent (below zero) or extremely large and belong to the 
outliers (>17%). Therefore a more real range is chosen of 
0.4 standard deviations around the mean: from 2% to 10% 
non-employment.
95 This additive character should not be confused with 
linearity of the interaction effects. In the latter case the 
93 Because I am only talking about dummies here, ‘fanning 
in’ is correct. In the case of two interval variables, it can 
be initially ‘fanning in’, with crossing slopes, and thus 
‘fanning out’ after the cutting point.
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figure 7.7 Women’s employment predicted, varying education and non-employment
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figure 7.8 Women’s employment predicted, varying education and the size of the service sector
difference between interaction coefficients is similar 
between education categories. For instance if interaction 
coefficient were found for embedding variable C with 
primary education of 0.42, with secondary education of 
0.84, and for tertiary education of 1.26, then the effect 
would be additive and linear. If the coefficients are 
0.42, 0.73, and 1.98, they are additive but not linear: the 
differences between the four educational groups are not 
equal to each other.
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7.6a). If the starting position differs and the employment level of uneducated women in Area A is 
lower than in Area B, a negative interaction coefficient indicates ‘fanning in’ (see Figure 7.6b).93 
However, in both cases the interaction coefficient is positive, because the effect is larger in Area 
A.
 To determine what is really going on, the main coefficients of education, the constant and its 
variance should be taken into account. Plots based on the full regression equation will be used 
to do this. In these plots, the effect of education is given for different values on the district- or 
country-level variables. Generally, I take the value one standard deviation below the average 
in the sample, and one a standard deviation above.94 The other variables use the averages as 
given in Chapter 4. Moreover, in logistic analyses the (assumed) non-linear relationship between 
probabilities on women’s employment (or any other dependent variable) and the explanatory 
factors are linearised. Because the interactions are based on the additive logged odds and not on 
the multiplicative odds ratios or the probabilities, the differences in effects (in terms of fanning 
in or out) might be somewhat different when measured in probabilities. To fully comprehend the 
differences in effects, the results presented in terms of logged odds (Table 7.2) are recalculated 
to probabilities when needed. That is why the visualisations of the interaction effects – the plots 
– will show the probabilities on employment by education, whereby the district or country-level 
variables are varied.
7.5.2 THE GENER AL PAT TERNS
Table 7.2 presents the interaction coefficients of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. 
Generally speaking, the coefficients are largest and the most significant interactions are found 
for tertiary education. In the multivariate model only the two country-level variables are the 
exceptions. Furthermore, most (five out of nine) interaction effects have an additive character: 
the interaction coefficients for a particular embedding variable show the same sign and become 
larger when the education level rises.95 The exceptions to this are economic development, 
traditional care role norms, and again the two country-level variables.
 As will be discussed below, some of these results were expected, some are surprising. 
Nonetheless, it can already be concluded that labour market structures, norms, and policies do 
at least correlate substantially with different effects of education. For each of the embedding 
factors at least one statistical difference is found, and for most factors several interaction 
coefficients are significant and show a clear pattern.
7.5.3 L ABOUR MARKET STRUC TURES
Four expectations were formulated regarding the impact of labour market structures on the 
effect of education. Of these three seem supported (the negative influence of male labour 
supply, the service sector size, and urbanisation on the influence of education), but the 
fourth (on the light-manufacturing industry) does not. Both the bivariate and the multivariate 
coefficients for the non-employment of men are positive, statistically significant (p<0.001), 
and increase by the level of education. Based on the multivariate model, we can say that the 
difference in logged odds on employment between tertiary-educated women and uneducated 
women varies with a maximum of 3.81 (5.374*0.71). If the non-employment of men in a district 
is higher, being (higher-) educated makes more of a difference. Women without education are 
most disadvantaged in a district with high unemployment. Figure 7.7 – plotting the probabilities 
for average women in an average environment – illustrates this somewhat with a small fanning-in 
effect: the difference between districts becomes smaller when the education level increases.
 The expected negative interaction between education and the size of the service sector was 
also found in the bivariate and multivariate models. The largest and only statistically significant 
difference was found for the difference between tertiary- and uneducated women. The effect 
of education in regions with a larger or smaller number of service sector jobs is largely the same 
for women without education, or for those with primary or secondary education. The difference 
between these education levels and tertiary education is however much smaller in areas with 
many service sector jobs when compared to areas with few service sector jobs. Figure 7.8 
presents the probabilities and shows that the probability for tertiary-educated women hardly 
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table 7.2 Interaction coefficients of bivariate and multivariate four-level logistic regression analyses with the logged odds of being non-
the variable with which education is interacted   primary education completed Secondary education completed at least some tertiary education
range Interaction coefficient s.e. Interaction coefficient s.e. Interaction coefficient s.e.
Bivariate models
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 0.179 * 0.076 2.115 *** 0.111 3.519 *** 0.111
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 0.850 *** 0.237 5.618 *** 0.301 9.392 *** 0.434
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 -0.009 0.103 0.159 0.152 -0.931 *** 0.169
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.493 ** 0.183 2.922 *** 0.255 6.998 *** 0.339
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 -0.054 0.066 0.282 ** 0.093 -0.081 0.092
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 -0.662 *** 0.119 -2.353 *** 0.148 -3.869 *** 0.158
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -0.957 *** 0.142 -2.478 *** 0.184 -4.504 *** 0.223
Country level
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.037 *** 0.010 0.148 *** 0.013 0.120 *** 0.016
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71 -1.654 *** 0.104 -2.226 *** 0.172 -2.561 *** 0.155
Multivariate model
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -1.076 *** 0.154 0.475 * 0.222 3.737 *** 0.343
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 2.084 *** 0.301 4.870 *** 0.382 5.374 *** 0.577
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 0.264 0.148 0.075 0.259 -1.539 *** 0.266
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.414 0.256 0.254 0.346 3.093 *** 0.369
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 -0.142 0.090 -0.726 *** 0.137 -2.125 *** 0.141
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 -0.268 * 0.125 -1.575 *** 0.163 -1.842 *** 0.175
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 -0.983 *** 0.268 -0.832 ** 0.269 1.275 *** 0.321
Country level
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.019 0.012 0.113 *** 0.017 -0.082 *** 0.022
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71 -2.152 *** 0.181 -2.509 *** 0.210 -0.801 * 0.359
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; The DIC of the multivariate model: 234,121.29
The coefficients presented are all part of a larger model which is identical to Model 4 from Table 6.2. The only difference is the 
addition of the interaction terms (and in the case of traditional family policies also this main effect). In appendix 7.1 the main 
coefficients are given. The models are based on MCMC estimation, starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-
country representativeness. Sources: see Chapter 4.
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agriculturally employed as dependent variable
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96 See Section 4.7.2, were the operationalisation of this 
variable is dicussed. A closer look at the make up of the 
light-manufacturing jobs (skilled manual labour) in the 
datasets that provide more detailed information about 
occupation (only a few do) indeed indicates that light-
manufacturing jobs are mainly in the food and textile 
industry. In Azerbaijan, for example, the larger part of 
women coded as being active in light manufacturing are 
active in ‘food processing and related trades workers’ 
and ‘textile & garment & related trades workers’. In 
Burkina Faso it are mostly ‘crafts & production of goods’ 
workers. For Nigeria almost all women in this category 
98 These figures are not to be confused with percentage 
points in which probabilities are expressed – here I give 
the percentual (relative) change in these probabilities.
97 Based on analyses of the 383 districts as units of analyses, 
the Pearson correlation of urbanisation with non-
employment is 0.136 (which is with 99.3% certainty above 
0) and with economic development it is 0.643 (with more 
than 99.9% certainty above 0).
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figure 7.9 Women’s employment predicted, varying education and the number of light manufacturing jobs
 Women's probability of employment (%)
7.1 To the extent that the male labour supply in a community is more depleted, the greater the effect of a woman’s education 
✓  on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.2 To the extent that the number of jobs in the service sector in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s 
✓  education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.3 To the extent that the number of jobs in the light manufacturing sector in a community increases, the larger the 
x  difference in women’s probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed between primary educated women and 
women without education, and the smaller the difference between primary educated women and women with a higher 
education.
7.4 To the extent that the urbanisation of a woman’s living environment increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s
✓  education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 7.5
are active in one of the following three trades: ‘spinners, 
weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers’, ‘food & 
beverage processors’, and ‘tailors, dress makers, sewers, 
upholsterers & related workers’. 
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differs. The difference in service sector size is however much more relevant for women with 
lower educational levels. They seem to be harmed most by the absence of service sector jobs.
 The results for the embedding effect of light manufacturing do not support the 
expectations. Where it was expected that the size of this sector would have a positive effect 
on the chances of women with primary education, it mainly affects higher-educated women. 
The more light manufacturing jobs, the larger the effect of education for those with tertiary 
education, especially when compared with the smaller effects enjoyed by lower education 
levels. Given the main coefficients (see Appendix 7.2), this means that the employment level is 
similar for women with no, primary or secondary education regardless of the number of light-
manufacturing jobs, but women with tertiary education have a considerably higher likelihood 
of being employed in districts with more manufacturing jobs (see Figure 7.9). This indicates that 
employers in the manufacturing industry draw from a group of tertiary-educated women who 
are not employed in the service sector. Possibly, this group consists of tertiary-educated women 
who want to work, but will not or cannot work outside the house, for instance because of the 
presence of children or restrictive values and norms. In those cases the manufacturing industry 
offers opportunities to work at home in the food and textile industry (see Section 4.7.2, were the 
operationalisation is discussed).96
 The multivariate model also shows the expected negative interaction of the degree of 
urbanisation with the effect of education. That this effect was not found in the bivariate model 
is not really surprising, because the degree of urbanisation is not only positively correlated 
to the presence of suitable jobs, but also, for example, to non-employment and economic 
development,97 which show opposite effects. In the bivariate model, these are not filtered out.
 Overall, the analyses in this section tend to support three of the hypotheses formulated 
above (see Box 7.5 for the hypotheses and outcomes). Only Hypothesis 7.3 was not supported 
by the results. It seems that the underlying assumption about preference formation has 
to be adjusted. Given social restrictions, some tertiary-educated women might choose 
a manufacturing job at home (or not at all) instead of one in the service sector, because 
manufacturing gives them the opportunity to work from home. These women might only enter 
the labour market if such possibilities exist. Simultaneously, the results for the service sector and 
urbanisation support the idea that employers in these sectors prefer higher-educated women 
over women (and men) with a lower education level. For light manufacturing this seems to hold 
as well: when tertiary-educated women want to work in manufacturing, it seems they are able 
to find a job. Generally, tertiary-educated women who want to work outside the home are 
relatively immune to changes in the non-employment of men and the presence of service sector 
jobs, as long as there is a shortage of people with tertiary education. Lower-educated people are 
affected more by changes in labour market structures. That employers prefer to employ relatively 
higher-educated people underscores the importance of receiving education in finding a job and 
gaining employment.
7.5.4 CULTUR AL NORMS
With regard to gendered public presence norms, the effect of education does indeed seem to 
be less strong in districts more favourable to women entering the labour market (Table 7.1). 
However, once translated and ‘delinearised’ to probabilities, the relationship between education 
and employment shows more similarities than differences between districts with less or more 
restrictive norms. It seems that the norms on entering the public sphere also matter for women 
with tertiary education. However, the effect is proportionally larger for women with lower 
education levels: comparing districts with a low public presence (one standard deviation below 
average: 0.05) and with a higher one (one standard deviation above average: 0.37) shows that 
women’s chances of being employed increase by more than 100% for women without education 
or with primary education, while for women with secondary and tertiary education the chance 
increases by 44% and 19% respectively.98
 The care role norm variable shows a more mixed result. Before controlling for other factors, 
the effect is opposite to what was expected, with especially the higher employment of tertiary-
educated women in more traditional areas found to be remarkable (Figure 7.10a). Once the 
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99 For Figure 7.10a the average scores are used on all 
variables but education and district-level traditionalism. 
For traditionalism two scores were chosen: the scores 
that marked the first and last decile of 383 districts. 
For Figure 7.10b, on the five micro-level variables that 
vary considerable with the degree of traditionalism in 
a district, the averages were used of the first and last 
quintile of districts on traditionalism. Quintiles are used 
since doing so takes the 76 districts surrounding the 
chosen scores on traditionalism (0.169 and 0.481), 38 
districts on either side. The five micro-level variables 
were: the number and age of children, having a partner, 
living in a city, age difference between partners, and 
traditional household structures.
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figure 7.10 Women’s employment predicted, varying education and the district-level traditionalism
 Women's probability of employment (%)     Women's probability of employment (%)
7.5 To the extent that the presence of women in the public sphere in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a
? ✓  woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.6 To the extent that the dominance of traditional care roles in a community increases, the larger the effect of a woman’s 
? ✓  education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
Box 7.6
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figure 7.11 Women's employment, varying only education and the level of economic development
 Women's probability of employment (%)
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numbers are controlled for the fact that in districts with more traditional care role norms the 
averages on other factors, such as the number of children and living in a city, differ as well (Figure 
7.10b), the effect is more in line with expectations.99 Regardless of this, the effect of tertiary 
education is smaller in less traditional districts compared to the effects of secondary and primary 
education in those districts. In less traditional areas, lower-educated women are more often 
employed, while for tertiary-educated women the traditionalism of the norms matters less in the 
education payoff. Simultaneously, in less traditional districts, the difference between primary 
and secondary-educated women on the one hand and women without education on the other is 
larger than in more traditional areas. This seems to go against the formulated expectations. An 
explanation might be that the transmission of norms takes place during (primary and secondary) 
education, which means that women without any education are less ‘affected’ by the cultural 
norms. Consequently, women without education remain in rather similar positions regardless of 
the cultural environment, while this environment makes a difference for primary- and secondary-
educated women, for whom the added value of their education differs with the norms in society.
 After further inspection, the results tend provisionally to confirm the expectations for both 
cultural norm variables (see Box 7.6). However, several more assumptions had to be made to 
come to these conclusions. Nonetheless, the results are more in favour of the hypotheses than 
that they contradict them. Overall, public norms do influence the impact of education. Tertiary-
educated women seem least influenced by these norms, the effect of tertiary education seems 
to make them almost immune to these norms, whereas lower-educated women are not. In 
other words, the additional returns of a higher educational level are lower in districts with less 
conservative norms.
 The effect of education also seems to differ with the level of economic development in 
an area, but not according to the expectations or in line with the results for the cultural norms 
variables above. The effect of primary education is smaller in richer districts, but the effects 
of secondary and tertiary education are larger there (Figure 7.11). Especially the lower levels 
of employment for the three lowest educational levels seem problematic in richer districts, 
as well as the negative interaction for the dummy comparing primary to no education. One 
explanation for this result might be found in the consideration that economic development is 
not only connected with value change and labour market structure, but also with a decreased 
economic need to become employed (see the previous chapter). Economic needs are lower in 
more economically developed districts, and thus women work less in those districts, regardless 
of their educational level. However, in a poorer district, economic needs can be expected to 
push women onto the labour market, especially those from lower economic strata (i.e. the lower 
educated). Of the lower educated, those with some education can more easily find a job. This 
explains the variation in the difference between women without education and women with 
primary education. The weak effect of tertiary education in poorly developed districts might 
then capture the general absence of jobs, as enough higher-educated men are available to fill the 
positions.
 In this reasoning, I do assume that education and wealth overlap. Yet this is not a mere 
assumption: based on household assets (car, electricity, radio, refrigerator), I created a five-
point scale running from 1 to 5 indicating the household’s wealth. Comparing these figures with 
education shows a strong correlation: women without education have an average household 
wealth score of 1.8; with primary education 2.5; secondary 3.2; tertiary 3.7.100
 In sum, the surprising effect of economic development seems to be related to the 
observation that economic development is a container concept harbouring many processes, 
including labour demand and economic needs. After controlling for some of these effects, 
economic development seems to impact the effect of education, though in a different way than 
my expectations regarding labour market structures and values suggested (Box 7.7 shows the 
hypothesis and outcome).
7.5.5 POLICIES
Of the three groups of interactions, the results are most ambiguous for the two policy 
interactions. The interactions with traditional policies show the expected negative signs, but 
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100 As said before, it is hard to include wealth levels at 
the household level: the risk of serious biases due to 
endogeneity is too large. It is possible to control for 
the interaction of economic development with having 
a spouse and the presence of a male breadwinner, but 
these cannot be expected to capture the full economic 
need effect. In an additional model, interaction terms 
between economic development and the two economic 
needs variables (partner, male age head of household) 
are included to test this reasoning. Both interaction 
terms show the expected negative interaction effect: a 
strengthening effect. The interaction for partner is highly 
significant (p<0.001), for the presence of a working-age 
male head of household it is only significant at a 10% 
criterion). In richer districts the difference between 
women with and without partner/working age male head 
of household is larger. This can be interpreted as to say 
that having a partner in a poorer district does not alleviate 
the economic need enough to keep women from entering 
the labour market. 
7.7 To the extent that the economic development in a community increases, the smaller the effect of a woman’s education on 
? x her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community. 
Box 7.7
7.8 To the extent that traditional gendered family roles are more institutionalised in government policies, the smaller the 
? effect of a woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
7.9 To the extent that the institutionalisation of conservative Islam into the state increases, the smaller the effect of a
? ✓ woman’s education on her probability of being gainfully non-agriculturally employed in that community.
Box 7.8
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figure 7.12 Women’s employment predicted, varying education and the level of State Islamisation
 Women's probability of employment (%)
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the effect weakens for tertiary-educated women, and the main coefficient for more traditional 
policies is positive. Correcting for micro-level differences between districts with more traditional 
policies and those that have less traditional policies partly corrects for this (as was the case for 
traditionalist societal norms), but not completely.
 For the institutionalisation of conservative Islam, the coefficients seemed to show mixed 
results as well. However, once the results are translated to probabilities there seems to be a 
fanning-out effect (see Figure 7.12), which is in line with the expectations. In areas with more 
restrictive policies, education pays off less. However, this can differ somewhat for women with 
non-average scores on the other explanatory variables, such as having children, a spouse, and the 
labour market structures.
 For both policy variables, the results are not clear-cut (Box 7.8). More research, including 
more and better measurements of policies at the country level might shed more light on the 
mechanisms involved. The analyses in this study preliminarily suggest that the entrance of 
higher-educated women to the labour market increases disproportionally in districts with less 
strict policies. Still, it is far too soon to be sure of such an effect.
7.6 ConCLuSIonS
Here, the results will be summarised and related to the larger theoretical framework (Section 
7.6.1), I will also reflect on the robustness of the results, including the difficulties encountered 
along the way (Section 7.6.2), and the wider implications of this chapter’s results (Section 7.6.3).
7.6.1 OVER ALL RESULTS
This chapter has exclusively focussed on the effect of education on employment: (how) does 
it differ across districts and countries? The results will contribute to the answer on the third 
general question in this thesis:
3) Do the effects of explanatory factors of women’s employment in Muslim countries differ 
in strength and presence according to time and space, and if they do, how and why do they 
differ? 
In fact, this question collapses three issues and I shall discuss these subsequently: (1) is there a 
difference in strength, (2) what patterns does this difference show, and (3) how can we explain 
this difference?
 In the first part of this chapter, I have established that the difference between lower and 
higher education in terms of its effect on employment likelihoods is, though overwhelmingly 
positive, clearly not the same across districts or countries. The interaction models subsequently 
showed that these differential effects primarily relate to economic and cultural factors, and 
probably also to policies in the different areas. With these results (five hypotheses seem 
supported, two seem rejected, and for another two the results are too inconclusive to draw real 
conclusions), the overall existence and relevance of ‘embedded interrelatedness’ (see Chapter 2) 
is clearly supported.
 Based on notions of needs (household economics, societal labour demand), opportunities 
(feminised labour markets, education), and values (societal norms), expectations were 
formulated that are largely supported by the analyses in this chapter. The main pattern found for 
different factors is that higher-educated women have higher levels of employment regardless 
of their district’s characteristics in terms of labour market structures and societal norms. The 
‘why’ behind this is found in two mechanisms that are supported by the analyses in this chapter: 
(1) higher-educated women are less influenced by labour market changes once they have 
entered the labour market. As the demand for tertiary-educated people outweighs the supply, 
tertiary-educated women who want to find a job will more easily do so; and (2) it seems that 
norms mostly make a difference for lower-educated women, because tertiary education leads 
to higher employment relatively regardless of the norms prevailing in society (public presence, 
traditionalism). Norms seem mostly to be transmitted through lower levels of education, 
whereas tertiary education is more or less emancipatory by nature, because tertiary education 
helps to ‘break free’ from societal norms.
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101 Here I make another assumption: that it is easier to have 
little contact with men in the service sector than in other 
sectors. This assumption is based on the existence of all-
women universities, hospitals, etc. However, also women 
only industrial parks exist (Van der Haak, 2005). 
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 The first mechanism was supported by the results for non-employment of men, 
urbanisation, and the presence of service sector jobs. The creation of additional jobs (or the 
loss of them) leads to relatively higher (or, in case of loss, lower) employment rates among the 
lower-educated women on the labour market. The only exception to this rule was the effect 
of light manufacturing. More jobs of this kind seemed mainly to increase higher-educated 
women’s employment rates. It seems the case that the women finding employment in more 
manufacturing-oriented areas are women that would not have entered the labour market if these 
kinds of jobs – which often involve home-based work – were not offered. These results clearly 
refute Pampel & Tanaka’s implicit argument that, because economic development is rooted in 
home-based labour, the effect of education will decrease in more economically developed areas 
(1986: 601).
 The second general mechanism is empirically suggested by the two interaction effects 
showing that in areas with norms more favourable to women’s employment the effect of 
education is smaller. In these areas, more lower-educated women will enter the labour market 
than in areas with more gender-segregated role patterns, while tertiary-educated women will 
enter the labour market more often in general. These results go against the suggestions in 
the literature (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Acar, 2006; Jansen, 2006; Shakry, 1998), which imply that 
education has the largest effect in less traditional areas. However, these authors do seem to be 
right in their claim that norms are transmitted through the educational system, only the effects 
mainly hold for lower education and they made no such distinction.
 For economic development and the policy-related variables, less clear-cut differences were 
found, but context factors seem to matter in these as well. The effect of economic development 
tends to contradict the results of the other factors, but since economic development harbours 
many characteristics and processes, the evidence of the other six (value and labour market 
structure) variables seems to outweigh the result for economic development both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. Moreover, this contradiction can be explained, once economic needs are taken 
into account, but this factor could not be fully captured in this study. The results for the policies 
variables were not in line with my expectations either, and appear somewhat erratic at first 
(and second) glance. Nevertheless, the absence of these factors in the literature does not seem 
justified. My overarching framework did draw attention to them, but both policy variables are 
measured at the country level, where only 28 cases are included, and these measurements could 
be improved, as I have discussed in previous chapters.
7.6.2 REFLEC TION
With regard to different methods of estimation and models, the general patterns in this chapter 
are rather robust and similar conclusions are reached using various estimation techniques 
(Appendix 7.3). Still, some reservations should be made regarding the theoretical assumptions 
and statistical restrictions.
 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this chapter, several (theoretical and empirical) assumptions have been made in order to 
translate the theoretical mechanisms to testable hypotheses on interaction coefficients. 
Strictly speaking, the fact that the statistical results are in line with the hypotheses does not 
prove that the – untested – assumptions are correct. In Section 7.4.1, I have presented empirical 
information that substantiates some of the assumptions about labour market structures, such 
as the shortage of higher-educated people compared to the number of (higher) service sector 
jobs. However, that material is neither conclusive nor does it directly test what women’s and 
employers’ preferences are. The literature on this (in Muslim countries) is very scarce (some 
information is found in De Regt, 2009 [Yemen]; Metcalfe, 2007 [Bahrain]; Miles, 2002 [Jordan]; 
Vidyasagar & Rea, 2004 [Saudi Arabia]), and hardly any research distinguishes between the 
preferences of women with different educational levels or their preferences for certain sectors. 
Nonetheless, studies based on open interviews in two oil countries (Metcalfe, 2007; Vidyasagar 
& Rea, 2004) suggest that (higher-educated) women ‘prefer’ to work in companies in which 
the contact with men is minimalised. This might favour working in service sector jobs.101 Miles 
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(2002) probably provides the most information: graduates (men and women) are said to ‘prefer’ 
public over private jobs because of job security and the match with education (420), and women 
seem to refrain from work in manufacturing outside the home, because of their vulnerability 
and risk of harassment. This is for instance illustrated by a high-school-educated woman from 
Wahdat, quoted by Miles (421): “My brother worked in the sewing factories and said the factory 
girls get hassled on the bus transporting workers”. By obtaining more information about these 
preferences, it is possible to formulate more exact expectations about the effects of changes in 
education (and other characteristics of women) on women’s chances to become employed in a 
certain sector instead of another.
 Furthermore, the expectations in this chapter have been formulated for a situation in which, 
for instance, more service sector jobs exist than tertiary-educated people. While the assumed 
preferences might be stable, a difference in the balance between the demand and supply of 
certain jobs and people with certain characteristics can lead to expectations in which interaction 
coefficients are exactly the opposite. To test my expectations, the relationships should also be 
tested under such circumstances, as I shall partly do in Chapter 10. 
 STATISTICAL RESTRIC TIONS
The analyses in this chapter have also encountered some statistical restrictions. First of all, it 
should be noted that models become more and more complex and harder to interpret when 
more interaction terms are included in the model (cf. Jaccard, 2001). Therefore, I have chosen 
only to include interaction terms with education, about which I had formulated theoretical 
expectations. Though the interaction effects are now controlled for interactions with the 
other included macro-level effects, an interaction term is always ‘two sided’. The found effects 
are not controlled for interaction effects with micro-level factors apart from education, but 
strongly related to education. A possible example is my reasoning on the interaction effect of 
education with economic development. There it might be the case that the education part of the 
interaction term actually taps into economic needs.
 With regard to the match between a woman’s characteristics and the labour market, the 
interaction of education with labour market structure variables can be expected to be among 
the strongest. Regarding the societal norms, the correlation between education and having 
children (especially uneducated women have more children) might have some implications for 
the results. It can be expected that for women with many children the level of traditionalism is 
less relevant, because they are restricted by their childcare responsibilities anyway. Then, the 
difference between primary and uneducated women in less traditional districts might be less 
after controlling for the number of children. In terms of Figure 7.10b, it would make the two 
lines more similar, because the low level of employment of uneducated women in less traditional 
districts does not filter out that it are the women with many children (instead of the uneducated 
women) that are less often employed in these areas.
7.6.3 IMPLICATIONS BE YOND THIS STUDY
The results of this chapter contain relevant information, both in more general scientific terms 
and for policy-making.
 UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES
The study of interaction effects in explaining women’s employment (in Muslim countries) is still 
in its infancy and, compared to the previous chapter, this chapter thus has a more exploratory 
character. However, the results in this chapter strongly suggest that the relationship between 
other micro-level factors and women’s employment is embedded in their contexts as well. 
Stressing the existence of different effects in different contexts of education and possibly other 
explanations of women’s employment might open a can of worms. As Bottero (2000: 785) argues 
more generally: “There is a danger that in the stress to emphasise diversity and heterogeneity 
any wider understanding of the general processes that generate diversity will be lost, and that 
the analysis of the ‘big picture’ will be replaced by attention to detail.” In this chapter and the 
previous one, however, I have shown that the big picture and diversity can be combined: Now 
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that I have tested the differences in education effects, I can claim with much more credibility that 
the effect of education on women’s employment is largely positive. Simultaneously, it is possible 
to argue that there are differences in these effects. By transcending the kind of general remark 
that ‘effects differ’, and by theorising and testing why effects differ, this chapter has shown that 
diversity can be systemised; diversity should not be equated with chaos. This was shown for the 
diverse impact of education in this chapter, but it can also be translated to other fields.
 The focus on diversity seems to originate in feminist critiques and gender studies, where it 
was argued that ‘careless generalisation needs to be avoided’ (Bottero, 2001: 781), but in the 
‘discursive and linguistic turn’ and shift to postmodernism, this has lead to a moral claim that 
diversity is the golden standard (Bottero, 2001; Reinharz, 1992: 252–258). This chapter can 
be regarded as an attempt to integrate the notion of diversity with that of general patterns, 
or in other words the ‘discursive and materialist accounts of gender patterns’, which helps to 
understand current social patterns in terms of differences (see Bottero, 2001; McCall, 2005; 
Spierings, 2010, 2012a; Walby, 1992, 2009). It is a way of tackling the paradox of doing research 
on generalised differences that resembles what Reinharz (1992: 252) prescribes for feminist 
researchers: “Feminism acknowledges the paradox that women are all alike in some ways and 
dissimilar in others.”
 POLIC Y FOCUS
If policies raising educational levels among women are implemented with the goal to help women 
find a (non-agricultural and gainful) job and make these women economically more independent, 
there are three concrete implications that can be derived from the results in this chapter.
 Firstly, the employment levels of women with tertiary education are the least dependent 
on the context. This implies that higher-educated women who want to find a job (and thus have 
entered the labour market) will often succeed in doing so. The group of higher-educated women 
whose employment level can be increased are then the women who did not enter the labour 
market in the first place. Their education will only pay off for them if the labour market provides 
jobs in line with what they think is acceptable for women. Creating jobs in home-based work and 
gender-segregated workplaces might help this group of relatively less-empowered women in 
obtaining an income of their own or prevent sexual harassment at work.
Secondly, investing in education is highly productive. Each level of education increases women’s 
chances on the labour market and also the step from no to primary education also generally 
increases women’s employment in the overwhelming majority of districts.
 Thirdly, programs focussing on increasing girls’ educational participation in developing 
countries often focus on primary education (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals: Achieve 
universal primary education (MDG2)). As I have explained, primary education fosters women’s 
employment, but the effects differ. The data in this chapter imply that primary education has a 
larger effect in areas with less traditional norms and more service sector jobs.
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103 It is not uncommon that ideas about the Middle East are 
generalised to the whole collection of Muslim countries 
102 There are exceptions such as Glick & Sahn (1997); 
however, they give no theoretical justification for 
including household configuration variables.
(Read, 2002: 19). This is also often the case for how 
patriarchy is used as an explanation to explain difference 
between the whole Muslim civilisation and other groups 
of countries.
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Chapter 8 
theme 2: new determinants
Patriarchy & household configurations in 28 
countries
8.1 patrIarCHy and IntroduCIng HouSeHoLd ConfIguratIonS
So far the empirical chapters have focussed mostly on factors that already feature in the 
literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries. That focus shifts considerably in this 
chapter, in which this thesis’ framework will be applied to the value system of patriarchy. This 
will draw attention to the influence of factors related to the composition of the household a 
woman lives in.
 Patriarchy is a prominent concept in the literature on women’s economic position in Muslim 
societies. Caldwell talks about the ‘patriarchal belt’ across the Middle East, North Africa and 
South Asia (1978; 1982), Moghadam analyses the ‘patriarchal gender contract’ for the MENA 
(1998), and Kandiyoti applies the terms ‘classic patriarchy’ in South and East Asia and the Middle 
East, and ‘sub-Saharan African patriarchy’ for the system in which polygyny and the relative 
autonomy of women co-exist (1988; 1991). These general concepts of patriarchy are mainly used 
to explain why ‘patriarchal countries’ have lower employment rates, but not to explain how 
differences within countries are shaped by the patriarchal system. That is where this chapter 
comes in.
 These typical Muslim-country patriarchy concepts in the literature all emphasise the 
prevalence of non-nuclear families in the form of the extended households. Indeed, the 
dominant norm or household configuration in the countries studied here is not that of two 
parents and a few children. Based on the data used in this thesis, it seems that in the 28 countries 
about 40% of women live in an extended household (and that includes polygynous ones). This 
implies a great variety in household configurations, and these micro-level differences can 
be expected to matter in explaining women’s employment. Patriarchal values about gender 
roles and the patrilineal system, in which men and elderly people have most status, both lead 
to different needs and opportunities for women. Nevertheless, existing micro-level studies 
almost exclusively focus on only two aspects of the household configuration: being married 
and having children (e.g. Al-Qudsi, 1998; Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Başlevent & Onaran, 2004; 
Dale, Fieldhouse, Shaheen & Kalra, 2002; Esmaeili Khatir, 2007; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; 
Hirschman & Aghanjanian, 1980; Khattab, 2002; Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud, 2009; Miles, 
2002; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2010).102 This is probably due to the lack of a crossover between 
the literature on the concept of patriarchy and the statistical micro-level studies.
 Below, I intend to fill this gap in two ways: firstly by formulating new hypotheses about the 
possible influences of factors such as the presence of elderly (care consumers), adult women 
(care providers), adult men (income providers), and different children (care consumers with 
different perceived needs) in the household (Section 8.2). After discussing the operationalisation 
(Section 8.3), the results for the 28 countries are subsequently interpreted in relation to the 
impact of having a partner and children (Section 8.4). Secondly, in line with the idea that micro-
level effects differ by context, I will take a closer look at the possible differences between 
groups of Muslim countries,103 formulate some exploratory expectations on how these 
might influence the micro-level relationships, and rerun the analyses separately for the four 
distinguished regions: the Greater Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast 
Asia (Section 8.5). Section 8.6 ties the results to the general questions posed in this thesis and 
more generally discusses how different literatures can benefit from new connections between 
different fields of study.
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104 As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
different labels are used to designate this type of 
patriarchy. While this one – introduced by Kandiyoti – 
might be interpreted implying a historical or geographical 
original form of patriarchy, I think it is the best (short) 
label given the literature on patriarchy. Furthermore, I 
refrain from using labels such as ‘Islamic patriarchy’ or 
‘Muslim patriarchy’ because the content of this patriarchy 
can be found in not Islamic contexts as well and the 
content might not originate in Islam. 
105 Walby (1996: 21) mentions the tendency of Moghadam to 
focus on the household level, but while I often build from 
Moghadam and focus on the household level, I still see 
patriarchal regimes as (re)constituting systems of gender 
inequality involving multiple parties, including individuals 
and households as well as collective bodies such as states 
(Moghadam 1998: 9; see also Pateman, 1988). 
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8.2 tHeorISIng patrIarCHy
To understand how patriarchy is conceptualised, I will first discuss how it is generally understood 
when it comes to Muslim countries. Next, I will use the needs and opportunities conditions 
to translate the values found at the core of the classic patriarchy concept to hypotheses on 
the impact of household configurations. In this exercise two new groups of variables are 
distinguished: one related to household roles & needs and a second related to sex hierarchy & 
lineage.
8.2.1 CL ASSIC PATRIARCHY 
Of the social institutions in Muslim countries, patriarchy might well be most frequently referred 
to as an impediment to women’s employment. It is usually described as a conservative and 
traditional structure, ideology or regime regarding families and the position of women (e.g. 
Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b; Read, 2002, 2004; Syed, 2008; 
Fergany et.al., 2006: 173–4; Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007). In this reasoning, the concept of 
patriarchy is still rather abstract and vague (Kandiyoti, 1988), and in need of further definition to 
become useful in understanding how it might influence women’s employment.
 Despite the literature’s (substantially) different usages of the concept (Walby, 1996; 2009), 
two core elements recur in each definition: ‘gender inequality’ and ‘systematicity’ (Walby, 1996: 
20). In the case of Muslim countries these two elements are further defined in the idea of ‘classic 
patriarchy’,104 which is the type of patriarchy generally referred to concerning Muslim countries. 
The two core characteristics of ideal-typical ‘classic patriarchy’ that are at the centre of this 
value system are: (1) the dominance of patriliny in households and (2) a strict division of labour 
within households. Given my focus on the household level,105 I will focus on the societal values 
in classic patriarchy that inform the possible roles and contributions of household members and 
their perceived care needs and standing in the household. Because there are many different 
(non-nuclear) household configurations, this can have ample implications for the overall balance 
in care and in economic needs as well opportunities, consequently shaping women’s employment 
likelihood.
 In patrilineal systems, the typical household is headed by the senior male; both age and 
sex thus determine one’s household position, with gender being more important than age. 
Furthermore, the transfer of status over generations is determined through the male line. 
Women live in their husband’s households, sons are preferred over daughters, and women are 
subordinate to male household members (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Kandiyoti, 1988; 
Moghadam, 2004).
 The strict division of labour is closely connected to the patrilineal system. In the words of 
Kandiyoti (1988: 279): “the patrilineage totally appropriates both women’s labour and progeny 
and renders their work and contribution to production invisible”. In classic patriarchy, the 
male breadwinner/female homemaker model is dominant and very present (Moghadam, 1998; 
Kandiyoti, 1988; see also Jansen, 2004; Miles, 2002). Income is provided by the labour of the 
(adult) men in the household. Such labour is generally performed outside the home. A woman’s 
role is restricted to that of caregiver. Women run the household, bring up the children, and care 
for other household members. All of this is seen as a collection of tasks mainly performed within 
the boundaries of the home. This way, it is assured that women can maintain “their respectable 
and protected domestic roles” in the family as the “fundamental unit in society” (Dale a.o., 2002; 
Kandiyoti, 1988: 280; Moghadam, 2004).
8.2.2 VALUES AND NEEDS & OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, the conceptualisation of patriarchy discussed above will be translated to specific 
hypotheses regarding the influence of household configurations on women’s employment. The 
framework of needs, opportunities and values helps to understand who the most relevant people 
in the households are and how their presence or absence might change the likelihood of women’s 
employment. The values are the underlying pattern that partly determines who is considered 
to be a caregiver, who a care consumer, who an income generator, and who has first drawing 
rights from the available resources. As discussed in Chapter 3, children are care consumers 
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106 The role of grandparents, grandmothers in particular, 
in patrilineal systems and how they tend to increase the 
care demand more than the care contribution or economic 
contribution is nicely discussed in a recent Dutch 
scientific newspaper article by Vlasbom (2011).
8.1 To the extent that the number of adult women in a household increases, the greater the probability of a woman in that 
household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.2 To the extent that the number of elderly people in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman in that 
household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.3 To the extent that the number of adult men in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman in that 
household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.4 If a woman is the head of household, the probability that she is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is greater than if 
she is not the head of household.
8.5 If a woman is the partner of the head of household, the probability that she is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is 
smaller than if she is not the partner of the head of household (or head of household herself).
Box 8.1
8.6 To the extent that the proportion of children that is male in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman 
in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.7 To the extent that the proportion of children who are non-biologically related to the household’s family increases, the 
greater the probability of a woman in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.8 To the extent that the number of young male relatives of a young woman in a household increases, the smaller the 
probability of a young woman in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 8.2
201
and male breadwinners (including spouses) are primarily income generators, so the presence 
of either children or a male breadwinner decreases women’s employment likelihood. The new 
household configuration variables can be divided in two groups according to the two defined 
core aspects of classic patriarchy: hypotheses on five variables concern the balance between care 
and economic needs and gendered household positions, and three concern the sex hierarchy in 
lineage.
 HOUSEHOLD POSITIONS & NEEDS
Taking the household as a unit and considering that sex, age, and household position shape the 
balance between care demand and supply as well as between economic demand and supply leads 
me to formulate the following five new expectations (see Box 8.1 for the hypotheses).
 In general, higher care demand will decrease women’s employment likelihood (and vice 
versa), while care provision supplementary to the care a woman can give will increase that 
woman’s chance of being employed (and the other way around). Given gendered household 
roles, (adult) women are the ones who mainly perform caring tasks, and therefore the total 
number of caregiving women in a household is relevant. They constitute the total care supply 
together and thus also influence the care balance. This means that in households in which more 
(adult, but not elder) women are present, the care burden for each woman can be expected to 
be lower (ceteris paribus), which is likely to increase their individual chances of employment (see 
also Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Spitze, 1988) (Hypothesis 8.1).
 Aside from the number of children, the total care demand in a household possibly also 
depends on the presence of elderly people. In the context of traditional household patriarchy, 
the nuclear family is not the norm and elderly household members – important as they are in 
terms of lineage – often live with their children. Given the honoured position of the elderly in 
this system, it can be expected that their presence increases the care burden of women in the 
household and thus decreases women’s employment chances (Hypothesis 8.2).106
 In terms of the balance of economic demand and supply, the presence of adult men can be 
expected to matter. In the patrilineal household, the head of household is male and the primary 
income provider. The core household role of generating income is however not restricted to the 
head of a household, especially not since – again – households are often extended. For other 
adult men, the typical household role is also being active on the labour market. If a household 
needs additional income, other adult men will be the first to be considered as ‘secondary income 
providers’. Consequently, the number of adult men in a household mainly determines the basic 
economic supply. If there are relatively few adult men in the household this supply might not 
meet the demand, leading the women to seek jobs as well. Therefore, I expect that women living 
in households with more adult men have lower likelihoods of being employed (Hypothesis 8.3).
 Regarding women’s household position, the wife of the head of the household can be 
considered to be the head of the household in terms of running it (see Kandiyoti, 1988: 279). She 
bears the main care responsibilities and is the primary care provider. However, if that woman 
is also the general head of the household (for whatever reason), she bears the responsibility 
of providing for material needs as well (cf. Fergany et.al., 2006). The demand for food is more 
important in terms of survival than the demand for care. Consequently, women in this position 
are expected to be employed more often. Women who are neither head of the household nor 
the household head’s spouse can be expected to have employment likelihoods between the two 
other groups. They are expected to contribute less both to the household’s care and its economic 
supply. The relative positions of these three groups of women are captured in two hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 8.4 and Hypothesis 8.5).
 SEX HIER ARCHY & LINEAGE
The second core characteristic of classic patriarchy focuses on hierarchy and status transmission. 
The underlying value system dictates that men are more important than women, and 
consequently household means (both material and immaterial) are not distributed equally among 
household members. The consequences of this for women’s employment can be summarised in 
the following three hypotheses (Box 8.2).
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107 The same reasoning can be used with regard to obtaining 
education (the specific resources that help to enter the 
educational system might be different however). Still, 
regardless of whether a woman is educated or not, this 
also applies to women finding a job: a household can have 
decided that resources are used to let a girl enter primary 
and even secondary education, but once she is living with 
her family after that, at the age of let say 16, there is still a 
decision to be made what resources are to be used to help 
her find a job if she wants one. Similarly, young women 
without education can decide that they want to work 
outside the home (17.3% of the women without education 
108 It is also possible to include ratios for these three 
variables: the number of household members of a 
specific group divided by the total number of household 
members. Rerunning the model as presented in Table 8.2 
with such ratio’s does not lead to substantially different 
conclusions. I have not chosen the ratios, since the 
current operationalisation leads to easier interpretable 
coefficients.
109 A model estimated with a weighted IGLS procedure is 
given in Appendix 8.2.
in fact does [see Figure 5.9]).
factor (Hypo) variable values3 average 
(s.e.)2
Missings1
Individual level (n=295,777)
Position in household Relationship to the head of household (1) Head of household 0.06 274
(2) Partner of head of 
household
0.60
(3) Other relationship 
to head of household
0.34
Household level (n=226,676)
Presence of adult women Number of women aged 15–60 min: 1
max: 22
1.71 (1.08) 0
Presence elderly people Number household members aged 61 and up min: 0
max: 6
0.28 (0.57) 0
Presence of adult men Number of men aged 15–60 min: 0
max: 16
1.52 (1.14) 0
Control: Household size Total number of household members min: 1
max: 69
5.94 (3.15) 0
Sex of children Proportion of children up to the age of 11 in 
the household that is male
min: 0.00
max: 1.00
0.51 (0.37) 0
(48,863)
Biological relatedness of children Proportion of children of the head of house-
hold that are not biological descendents
min: 0.00
max: 1.00
0.01 (0.07) 848
(19,147)
Young male relatives Men/women ratio among children of head of 
household
min: 0.00
max: 1.00
0.45 (0.42) 0
(115,659)
Notes: (1) ‘impossible missings’ (see Section 4.4.3) are only included between brackets; (2) in the case of nominal/categorical 
variables no standard deviation is reported and the average represents the proportion of cases falling in the designated category; (3) 
the presented minimums and maximums are the extremes as they are present in the data, not the conceptual/possible extremes.
table 8.1 Overview of household configuration variables by statistical level
203
 Firstly, in this gender system, having sons is more important than having daughters. In 
the extreme it can be argued that the survival of boys is more important than that of girls. 
Consequently, it can be expected that boys receive more attention and are in that sense more 
‘care-demanding’. If so, their presence is more restrictive to women who want or need to enter 
the labour market (Hypothesis 8.6).
 Not only the offspring’s sex is important, but also the question whether the people who 
need care are part of the family line. A focus on status transmission through the bloodline tends 
to emphasise biological descent. This means that the children who are biologically related to 
the head of the household do help the family to survive over the generations. Children not-
biologically related to the household’s family might not be considered to be fully part of the 
lineage of the family. Consciously or unconsciously, these children might be given less attention 
(see also Glick & Sahn, 1997). The balance between economic needs and care needs then tilts 
more towards entering the labour market if the same number of children is present, but fewer are 
biologically related to the household’s family (Hypothesis 8.7).
 The notion that male children are regarded as more important has implications for women’s 
opportunities in terms of household resources as well. I expect this to be reflected most in the 
distribution of household resources used to find a job.107 If a young woman has many young 
relatives, the (limited) household resources that can be employed (money, means of transport, 
contacts, etc.) have to be shared. Women with relatively more male relatives (mostly brothers or 
nephews) can be expected to be disadvantaged in this respect, because these resources will first 
be used for the men (Hypothesis 8.8).
8.3 MeaSurIng ( tHe IMpaCt of) HouSeHoLd ConfIguratIonS
The household surveys used in this thesis include the age, sex and relation to the head of 
household for each and every household member. These data were used to measure the 
household configurations discussed above. The descriptive can be found in Table 8.1.
 For the first group of hypotheses, four new factors are added to the analyses. The number of 
adult women was calculated by adding up the number of women aged 15–60 for each household. 
This ranged from 1 (the woman herself) to 22 (though in 95% of the cases it was between 1 and 3). 
For the presence of elderly people, the total number of people over the age of 60 was taken. The 
minimum of this variable is 0 and the maximum was 6. The number of adult men was measured 
by the presence of male household members aged 15 through 60, and it ranged from 0 to 16. 
For control, I also include a variable for the total number of household members.108 The fourth 
factor in this cluster is the relation of the woman to the head of household (Hypothesis 8.4 and 
Hypothesis 8.5). This was measured by creating a three-category variable out of a household 
position indicator. The three categories are: (1) head of household; (2) spouse of head of 
household; and (3) other relationship to head of household.
 The group of hypotheses involving the sex hierarchy and lineage led to the inclusion of three 
additional factors. The proportion of boys was measured by dividing the household’s number of 
boys age under 11 in a household by the total number of children in that age group in the same 
household. The scale ranges from 0 to 1. To measure the proportion of children not-biologically 
related to the household’s family, the household surveys provide information about household 
positions in terms of being a son or daughter of the head of household, as well as being an 
adopted or not-biologically related child of the household head. I divided the number of children 
not-biologically related to the head of household by the total number of children (biological sons, 
biological daughters and not-biologically related). The variable can range from 0 to 1. Lastly, 
the presence of male relatives was measured by taking the number of male household members 
aged 15 to 21 and dividing that number by the total number of household members in that age 
group. Logically, this variable also can range from 0 to 1. For each of the three variables in this 
section, some of the women have no scores because the variables are not applicable; the data are 
‘inexistent’. In those cases, the women for whom no data were available were given the average 
scores of the women of whom we have information on those variables (see Section 4.4.3).
 The type of methods, models, estimation techniques and data sources used in this chapter 
are identical to the ones described in Chapter 5 and used in Chapters 6 and 7.109 Only new 
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110 Of the other variables, traditional household structures 
and the societal norm on public presence decrease 
somewhat in size. Since these are related in the way they 
are measured, this decrease is not surprising. Moreover, 
it does not lead to substantially different conclusions. 
Also, the effect of economic development becomes less 
negative, but is still negative and significant at the 5% 
level. Moreover, the societal traditionalism variable 
shows a significant positive effect now, and the effect 
of light manufacturing has become significant. Similar 
observations were made in Chapter 6.
111 The IGLS model in Appendix 8.2 shows fewer significant 
relationships for the ‘having children’ dummies. 
Nevertheless, the trend is negative and the dummies for 
having five or more children show the largest coefficients 
and are statistically significant (p<0.05).
112 This is given a constant number of household members. 
If the man or woman is additional, then also the effect of 
113 The overlap between having no partner and being head of 
household is moderate and does certainly not cause any 
multicollinearity problems. Of the women who are head 
of household, roughly half has no partner (of the women 
with partner, only 4% is head of household though). Also 
the effect of having a partner shows only a small decline 
in coefficient after including the household position 
variables, indicating that the effects are different and 
largely independent.
range coefficients s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women  1 - 22 0.079 *** 0.011
Number of elderly 0 - 5 -0.040 * 0.017
Number of adult men  0 - 16 -0.054 *** 0.010
Control: Number of household members  1 - 69 -0.028 *** 0.005
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household Dummy 0.307 *** 0.036
Other position Dummy -0.016 0.024
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children 0.00 - 1.00 -0.061 ** 0.020
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.00 - 1.00 0.263 * 0.106
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.00 - 1.00 0.046 0.033
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.031 0.025
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.183 *** 0.041
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.466 ** 0.148
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.185 *** 0.022
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.250 *** 0.030
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.292 *** 0.045
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.788 *** 0.026
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.055 * 0.025
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 295,777; Nh = 226,676; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; The DIC of the multivariate model: 235,429.38
The coefficients presented are all part of a larger model, which is identical to Model 4 from Table 6.2. The only difference is the 
addition of the household structure variables as they are presented here. In appendix 8.1 the other coefficients are given. The models 
are based on MCMC estimation, starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness.
table 8.2 Multivariate four-level logistic regression analysis, including household configuration variables, with the logged odds of being non- 
 agriculturally employed as dependent variable
household size has to be taken into account. On the other 
hand, holding the overall household size constant, for 
each additional woman in a household another household 
member disappears. All other household members’ 
presence seems to have a negative effect on women’s 
employment. The presence of an additional men or elder 
person, comes ‘at the cost’ of a household member that 
can have either a negative effect on women’s employment 
or a positive effect. 
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variables were added to the final model presented in Chapter 6 (Table 6.2, Model 4). The results 
presented in this chapter are thus controlled for the factors discussed in Chapter 6, including a 
variable indicating whether or not the household was extended and/or polygynous. To test the 
last hypothesis I have formulated above, I also reran the full model only for women aged 15 to 21 
(55,903 women). The figures representing the effects in probabilities are based on the regression 
formula using the averages on all variables but the one of interest. 
8.4 reSuLtS
Table 8.2 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis. The coefficients of the 
other variables in that model are provided in Appendix 8.1.110 The Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC) of this model is 235,429.38, which is considerable lower than the DIC of the model 
presented in Chapter 6, and the model thus explains more of the variation. In order to interpret 
the strength of the new household configuration variables, the more classic ones (having children 
and presence of partner or male breadwinner) are also presented in Table 8.2. The effects of 
having children and being married show the same signs and the effects are basically of similar 
strength as previously found: the more children, the lower the employment likelihood;111 
and women without a partner have higher employment likelihoods. The effect of the head of 
household being a working age man decreases however substantially after the inclusion of the 
presence of adult men and the household position variables. Still, this indicates that economic 
needs are important and that women are only secondary workers. 
8.4.2 HOUSEHOLD ROLES & NEEDS
In the 28 countries studied, there is a substantial and highly significant effect of the number 
of women present in the household. The odds of women’s employment increase by 9% for 
each additional woman aged 15 through 60 in the household. Figure 8.1 shows this effect in 
probabilities for a woman in a household of six (the average household size). In the same figure, 
we find the effect for the number of adult men. This variable showed the expected sign and was 
also statistically significant (p<0.001). The odds of employment decrease by about 5% for each 
additional adult man. Overall, if the household size is kept constant, the effect of the presence of 
adult women seems somewhat larger than that of men (Figure 8.1).112
 For the number of elderly people a negative effect was expected and a moderate negative 
effect was found: a decrease of 4% in the odds on employment for each additional elderly 
person; however, this effect was only significant at a 5% level, which is rather weak given the 
number of cases in these models.
 The household position is the last factor in this cluster. The results clearly show that women 
who are the head of the household indeed have higher probabilities of being employed than the 
other two groups.113 The difference between being the head or partner of the head of household 
entails an increase of employment odds of 36%. While this is in line with the hypothesis, the 
position of women who are neither head of household nor the head’s spouse is not significantly 
or substantially different from women who are a spouse of the household head. It seems that 
economic needs weigh heaviest on women who are household heads. The other women (head nor 
spouse) – mainly own and in-law daughters and granddaughters (see Figure 8.2) – do not enter 
the labour market more often, and it seems that spouses of the head of household have no greater 
care responsibility than these women (after controlling for having children).
 Overall, the model confirms that household configurations next to the presence of children 
and being married do influence women’s employment (see Box 8.3 for the hypotheses and 
outcomes). The care load of women in the household seems to increase with the number of 
children and to some extent the presence of elderly people, but it is reduced by the number of 
adult women. Simultaneously, it is important how many other providers of economic means are 
present (partner, adult men) as these influence women’s employment propensity negatively.
8.4.3 SEX HIER ARCHY & LINEAGE
Three variables were expected to tap into the consequences of patriliny. Firstly, I did find the 
expected negative effect for proportion of children that are boys (p<0.01). In other words, 
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114 These opposite effects can be found in one household, 
meaning that the extension of a household with an elderly 
person does not change the overall balance of care or of 
economic means. It is also possible that in some cases the 
presence of elderly people mostly increases the demand, 
while in other cases it increases the supply. Statistically, 
this would lead to the same coefficient close to zero, 
because the average effect is similar. Further empirical 
research might tell what the situation is. The section 
on the different patriarchal bargains will provide a first 
indication of what in fact is the case. 
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Number of designated persons out of � (total household size)
figure 8.1 Employment probability by number of adult women and men in a household of six
 Women's probability of being employed (%)
Other
Child or grandchild
Other relative
45%
18%
34%
3%
In law
figure 8.2 Relation to head of household if not head or partner
8.1 To the extent that the number of adult women in a household increases, the greater the probability of a woman in that 
✓  household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed. 
8.2 To the extent that the number of elderly people in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman in that 
? ✓ household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed. 
8.3 To the extent that the number of adult men in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman in that 
✓  household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed. 
8.4 If a woman is the head of household, the probability that she is gainfully non agriculturally employed is greater than if she
✓  is not the head of household.
8.5 If a woman is the partner of the head of household, the probability that she is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is 
x  smaller than if she is not the partner of the head of household. 
Box 8.3
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women living in households with relatively more boys than girls are less probable to be 
employed. However, this probability is only slightly lower. In a household with three children 
under 12, all of which three are male, a woman’s odds of employment are 4% lower than if only 
one of them is a boy.
 The effect found for the proportion of children who were not-biologically related to the head 
of the household also works in the expected direction, though whether this is a true effect is less 
certain (p<0.05). For women living in households with four children, the odds of employment 
increase with 7% if a household with four descendants of the head of household is compared to 
a household with three descendants and one other child. Given the low number of households 
with children that are not-biologically related to the head of household (13,109; 4.4%), I tend to 
be lenient on the significance criterion and conclude that the presence of biologically-related 
children is more inhibiting for women to enter the labour market than that of children not part of 
the biological family line.
 The third variable, the proportion of young relatives that are male, which was expected to 
tap into the gendered division of resources, showed neither a significant effect nor a substantial 
one. The model was rerun on the 55,903 women aged 15 to 21, but no statistically significant 
effect for this variable was found in that model either.
 Overall, in these 28 countries, sexual hierarchy and lineage variables do impact women’s 
employment, but somewhat less strongly and with less certainty than the ‘household roles & 
needs’ factors. The results are summarised in Box 8.4. Primarily, it is the kind of children that are 
present in the household that seems to make a difference: boys that are part of the hereditary 
line relate to higher care loads and lower employment rates. The hypothesis on the gendered 
resource distribution is not supported.
8.4.4 PATRIARCHAL HOUSEHOLD STRUC TURES IN 28 COUNTRIES
After assessing the employment likelihoods of women through the households they live in, 
several general conclusions can be drawn for the 28 countries studied here. The overall balance 
between the care demand and supply and between the economic demand and supply seems 
highly relevant in shaping a woman’s decision to enter the labour market or not. In terms of 
both the economic and the care supply, the genderedness of household roles informs the 
influence of household configurations on women’s employment likelihood. It is not only relevant 
whether a woman is married, the presence of other men (household head, other adult men) 
and other women (adult women) also shifts the relative responsibilities of a woman, as these 
other household members contribute to alleviating the household’s economic needs or the care 
burdens in the household. The demand for economic means and care seems for a substantial part 
determined by the presence of children, but the presence of elderly people also seems to have 
some influence. The relatively weak effect might mean that elderly people (aged 61 and up) do 
not singularly increase the care demand; they might also increase the economic demand or care 
supply, both of which are expected to increase women’s employment (see for instance Ogawa 
& Ermisch, 1996).114 Finally, the results here suggest that the impact of the presence of children 
on women’s employment is to some extent determined by whether the children are male and/
or part of the hereditary line of the household. If either or both of these is the case, women 
seem more restricted in leaving the household for a job. Overall, the division of labour in the 
household and to some extent the importance of male lineage, seem to influence women’s duties 
and possibilities. Consequently, the configuration of the household a woman lives in is relevant 
in understanding her employment decisions.
8.5 dIfferent patrIarCHaL BargaInS
It is the classic patriarchal bargain or regime that is referred to when discussing women’s position 
in conjunction with Islam and patriarchy, and this type of patriarchy is derived from the practices 
and discourses in the ‘cradle of Islam’: the Middle East. However, as I have already argued in this 
thesis, it is a bit too simplistic to consider all Muslim countries to be similar. This also applies to 
the idea of the extended family and related household configurations. As shown in Figure 8.3, 
the incidence of extended families is around 40% in the Greater Middle East and Southeast Asia, 
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8.6 To the extent that the proportion of children that is male in a household increases, the smaller the probability of a woman
✓  in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.7 To the extent that the proportion of children who are non-biologically related to the household’s family increases, the 
✓  greater the probability of a woman in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
8.8 To the extent that the number of young male relatives of a young woman in a household increases, the smaller the 
x  probability of a young woman in that household to be gainfully non-agriculturally employed.
Box 8.4
� � � � � �� ��
Greater Middle East (��%)
Sub-Saharan Africa (��%)
Central Asia (��%)
Southeast Asia(��%)
Average household size with one s.d.
figure 8.3 Household size by region
 Region with precentage extended families
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35% in the Central Asian countries, and about 25% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Simultaneously, the 
average household size is about 7 members in the Greater Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa 
and 5 in Central and Southeast Asia (with much less variation). The differentiation in the regions 
mentioned here is based on a closer look at the literature on patriarchy and gender regimes, 
which shows that roughly four groups of countries can be distinguished as distinct clusters. This 
point of departure will be elucidated below and the different patriarchal bargains found in these 
regions are used as different contexts in which household configurations can have a different 
impact. In short, after the first step above, testing whether general and overall relationships 
between household configurations and women’s employment exist, I will now shift my focus 
towards the notion of the embedded interrelatedness of these relationships.
8.5.1 FOUR T YPES OF PATRIARCHY
One of the core studies on which the concept of classic patriarchy above was based is the 
Kandiyoti’s 1988 study, “Bargaining with patriarchy”, Kandiyoti herself, however, already draws 
attention to differences in patriarchal regimes between the MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and in a footnote also mentions Southeast Asia as a region with yet another patriarchal bargain 
(286–7, footnote 2; see also Hatem, 1987). Other studies also suggest that another gender 
regime is dominant in Southeast Asia (e.g. Dube, 1997; Ong 1991; Westwood, 1997), and similarly, 
Central Asian countries (the former Soviet republics) are similarly often treated as a separate 
group of countries (see Kapteijns, 1998; Moghadam, 1998; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; 
Tohidi, 1996). Based on this literature, I will try to distil the distinguishing characteristics of the 
gender systems in these regions, and figure out how these might lead to different effects of the 
factors this chapter focusses on.
 GREATER MIDDLE EAST
For the Greater Middle East, classic patriarchy is considered to be typical (see Section 8.2). 
Briefly summarised, this means that (1) there is a strict gendered division of household roles 
whereby women are supposed to take care of the household and men provide the income; and 
that (2) male lineage is very important, meaning that in a household the male heirs of the head of 
the household are considered the most important and hierarchically above the other members of 
the household.
 SUB-SAHAR AN AFRICA
The gendered division of labour in Sub-Saharan Africa appears to differ in several important 
aspects from the situation in the Middle East, and the literature hardly refers to patriliniality 
here. The latter suggests that patriliniality is absent or much weaker than in the Middle East, 
meaning that the effects of patriliny variables are expected to be weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than those found for the Greater Middle East.
 Regarding the division of labour, women have historically been active in the (agricultural) 
economy before the development of cash crops for export, and several sources mention the 
horticultural background (cultivating a diversity of crops) that contributed to giving women a 
role in the subsistence economy. Due to this economic participation of women and the access 
they have (had) to their own plot of land, working is considered more suitable for women 
compared to for instance the Greater Middle East (Bullock, 1994; Jaquette, 1982; Lenski and 
Nolan, 1984; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). Moreover, working on one’s own plot can also 
have priority over working on a man’s land, and men cannot always claim women’s labour 
(Kandiyoti, 1988), which indicates a somewhat different and less comprehensive sex hierarchy.
 Two important consequences can be derived from this. Firstly, economic needs seem to be 
prioritised slightly over care needs, at least compared to the prioritisation in classic patriarchy. 
Consequently, the presence of additional care-needy household members (children and elderly 
people) can have a less strong negative impact on women’s employment because the additional 
economic needs of feeding more mouths push women onto the labour market. Secondly, because 
women in Sub-Saharan Africa have historically been considered economic actors who contribute 
to the household income, the divide between them and male household members is less strong 
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or strict, and the difference between male and female household members accordingly smaller. 
Consequently, the sex of other household members can be expected to be less important.
 CENTR AL ASIA
In the literature on Central Asia two historical developments are often noted when it comes to 
the system of patriarchy. Firstly, that the Soviet legacy has resulted in an emphasis on public 
equality and a dominant discourse of ‘everybody works’, including women. After the collapse of 
the USSR in 1991, traditional Islamic values are said to have re-emerged and new emphasis was 
put on women’s care duties, and women now often experience a double burden (Edgar, 2006; 
Kapteijns, 1998; Tohidi, 1996; Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2005).
 This combination of egalitarian employment attitudes but still relatively strong gendered 
roles in household tasks (in particular care) can be expected to influence the effect of the 
presence of care-demanding household members. The starting point might be that it is relatively 
accepted and desired that women are employed; the (return of) strong care roles for women 
however means that they can be expected to be pulled back into the household once children are 
present. For women with children, the social pressure from traditional norms will be strongest; 
women without children can remain employed, as was customary under Soviet rule (cf. Tohidi, 
1996: 114). This would mean that the effect of having children is relatively strong in Central 
Asia as compared to the Middle East. It could be expected that this effect is also found for the 
presence of elderly people in households, but it can also be imagined that the re-emergence of 
religious norms mainly centre on motherhood, and thus I expect that the effect is much stronger 
for children.
 As was the case with Sub-Saharan Africa, the literature does not mention a strong patrilineal 
system in Central Asia. Again, I conclude that this aspect of classic patriarchy is less present in 
Central Asia and consequently factors related to patriliny can be expected to have less to no 
effects in Central Asia.
 SOUTHEAST ASIA
The literature on Southeast Asia mostly draws attention to the ways in which the sex hierarchy 
and lineage is deviant from the classic patriarchy model. The dominant system in Southeast 
Asia is one of bilateral kinship or inter-generational family perpetuation, in which women have 
some autonomous claims on income (see Dube, 1997: 2; Ong, 1991: 288; Westwood, 1997: 457). 
Because there is relatively less of a focus on male lineage, we can expect that the variables 
related to the hierarchy of the sexes and lineage have particularly weak or no effects for the 
countries in this region.
 Furthermore, it is observed that (often young) women have taken the opportunity to 
enter the labour market presented by the inflow of foreign industries (Chinese, Japanese, and 
Western). Part of the literature’s explanation for this development is that these women tried 
to better their position, which was possible because they can make claims on property and 
resources and are able to control (parts of) their income themselves. If it is the case that in 
practice women have a greater say over their own income, it becomes more profitable for them 
to enter the labour market and it can be expected that more women want to do so. This implies 
that if the care duties in the household – for which women are still responsible – are (partly) 
lifted, more women should enter the labour market than in the other regions. Consequently, the 
presence of adult women might be more important in this system, and the presence of men less, 
while the effect of having children might be stronger.
8.5.2 TESTING HOUSEHOLD STRUC TURE’S EFFEC TS IN FOUR REGIONS
The primary goal here is estimating whether and how effects of household structures on 
women’s employment differ by each region’s patriarchal bargain. Before I can discuss the results, 
some methodological remarks should be made about the statistical modelling.
 There are basically two options in modelling the different effects. Firstly, the model 
as presented in Table 8.2 can be estimated for the four groups of countries separately. The 
advantages of this are that for each of the coefficients it is clear whether explanatory variables 
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120 The coefficients for these regions are not the largest 
coefficients. However, they are most certain. Partly 
this might be explained by the far larger number of 
respondents for the Greater Middle East compared to for 
instance Central Asia where larger coefficients are found 
but the number of cases is smallest (about one tenth of 
the number of cases in the Greater Middle East model).
121 This is even stronger in the weighted IGLS model 
(Appendix 8.4).
116 With three different models it is possible to test all the 
differences between regions; however, to see whether 
the effects of the household structures are significantly 
different from zero, I need to estimate four models. 
117 In the case of the separate models for the four regions, 
although the number of district and countries decreases 
substantially, the explanatory factors at those levels are 
retained and the models will remain four-level models. 
The results of the macro variables are not discussed here 
but will be taken into account in the concluding chapter. 
  The estimations using the alternative weighted IGLS 
procedure have been estimated for the region-specific 
models. The results can be found in Appendix 8.4, and are 
referred to in the interpretation if important differences 
were found. 
118 Also the weights in the IGLS models – from which the 
MCMC estimations start – are adjusted so that the total 
number of cases per region equals the actual number of 
respondents per region.
119 Not only the coefficients in Table 8.3 are used; I also 
include the coefficients found in the interaction models 
to check robustness.
115 Also, but less relevant to this chapter, the number of 
district and country-level units decreases substantially.
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa
Algeria Egypt Burkina Faso Chad
Jordan Lebanon Djibouti Eritrea
Mauritania Morocco Guinee Mali
Pakistan Tunisia Niger Nigeria
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Box 8.5 Country classification of patriarchal region
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figure 8.4 Employment probability by the number of young children per region
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have a significant effect for that group of countries. Furthermore, the estimation is rather 
straightforward. Disadvantages are that it is less clear whether coefficients for the different 
regions differ from each other.115 The second option is to rerun the standard model and include 
interaction terms with dummies for the regions. Contrary to the other option, this shows 
whether the household structures have significantly different effects across regions. The 
disadvantage, however, is that this should be done fourfold.116 Normally, this would lead to four 
equivalent models, but the four differently estimated models are not completely the same when 
the MCMC estimation is used. Given the different constraints of the two options, I have chosen 
to use both estimation techniques.117
 The 28 countries are divided over the four groups or regions as shown in Box 8.5. This 
grouping is done in line with the literature discussed above and the generally accepted 
geographical classifications. For the figures, average values are taken on the explanatory 
variables that are not of interest to that figure (see Section 8.3), but these averages are 
calculated separately for each region.118
8.5.3 RESULTS
Table 8.3 presents the coefficients of the models estimated per patriarchal bargain. It shows 
most clearly for which region certain variables were found to be significantly related to women’s 
employment. The somewhat larger and more complex Appendix 8.3 presents the coefficients of 
the interaction models, which test the difference in coefficients. Below, I shall discuss the effects 
on women’s employment per region and how these vary.119 The results are here presented per 
variable. In the next section (8.5.4), the overall picture will be discussed per ‘patriarchal bargain’.
 Let us start with the ‘classic’ household configuration variables. Broadly speaking, a similar 
pattern was found for all regions: if the number of children goes up, the coefficients become 
more negative, indicating that the number of children negatively relates to women’s propensity 
to be employed. However, for older children these effects were only found to be significant in 
the Greater Middle East and to some extent Southeast Asia (p<0.05/p<0.01).120 The significant 
differences between the regions also indicate that the Greater Middle East most stands out 
regarding the effect of older children. Of the nine statistical significant differences (p<0.05; 
the italicised coefficients in Appendix 8.3) seven differ between the Greater Middle East and 
another region. Moreover, the results presented in Appendix 8.3 hint at a positive effect on 
women’s employment of having one or two older children (compared to having none) in Sub-
Saharan Africa.121
 The presence of younger children (compared to having none) decreases women’s 
employment likelihood in all regions, but the effects clearly differ by region. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa the effects are weaker than in the other regions (with almost all coefficient being 
significantly smaller – see Appendix 8.3). The effects in Central Asia appear to be substantially 
larger, and of the 18 tested interaction coefficients, all but one point in the same direction and 
12 of these are statistically significant (p<0.05). These differences in effects are also reflected 
in Figure 8.4, but the conversion into probabilities for ‘the average woman’ seems to weaken 
the difference. However, it should be considered that an eyeball analysis of the graph means 
mostly looking at changes in percentage points, which does not take into account that the drop 
in probabilities is relatively stronger in the Greater Middle East than in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Overall, I tend to conclude that the effect of having young children is strongest in Central Asia 
and weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the difference of the latter with the Greater Middle 
East should not be overestimated. These two patterns explain 22 out of the 23 found significant 
differences in effects.
 In each of the four regions, women with a husband present were less likely to be employed 
than women without a spouse. The difference was smallest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The figure 
with probabilities (Figure 8.5) nicely illustrates that the gap between women with and without 
partner in Sub-Saharan Africa is small compared to that in the other regions. The differences 
between the latter three are relatively small, but in terms of logged odds they are significant 
(Appendix 8.3): the effect is largest in the Greater Middle East, followed by Southeast Asia and 
then Central Asia. The presence of a male breadwinner shows no robust significant effect in any 
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table 8.3  Logistic regression results for models of gainful non-agricultural employed, women aged 15–49, neither in school nor disables, in four 
Model 0: all countries
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Southeast asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.079 *** 0.011 0.056 *** 0.015 0.042 ** 0.017 0.266 *** 0.042 0.198 *** 0.027
Number of elderly -0.040 * 0.017 -0.102 *** 0.029 -0.033 0.019 0.056 0.052 0.090 ** 0.035
Number of adult men -0.054 *** 0.010 -0.077 *** 0.017 0.003 0.011 -0.087 * 0.039 -0.021 0.026
Control: Number of household members -0.028 *** 0.005 -0.046 *** 0.008 -0.010 0.006 -0.134 *** 0.020 -0.075 *** 0.015
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.307 *** 0.036 0.349 *** 0.074 0.201 *** 0.047 0.262 * 0.108 -0.016 0.093
Other position -0.016 0.024 -0.043 0.057 -0.076 0.034 0.238 * 0.095 -0.085 0.055
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.043 0.035 -0.072 * 0.029 0.005 0.064 -0.072 0.039
Proportion children not-biologically 
related to hhh
0.263 * 0.106 0.927 ** 0.302 0.029 0.097 1.080 * 0.457 0.289 0.260
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.046 0.033 0.080 0.051 -0.091 * 0.039 0.401 *** 0.098 0.041 0.057
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 -0.031 0.025 -0.030 0.044 0.017 0.038 -0.010 0.071 -0.148 ** 0.046
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.183 *** 0.041 -0.195 ** 0.067 -0.083 0.055 0.227 0.136 -0.214 * 0.100
5 or more, older than 5 -0.466 ** 0.148 -0.496 * 0.213 -0.183 0.219 -1.889 1.395 -0.342 0.780
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.185 *** 0.022 -0.372 *** 0.049 -0.037 0.027 -0.233 ** 0.088 -0.496 *** 0.053
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.250 *** 0.030 -0.352 *** 0.057 -0.124 *** 0.034 -0.647 *** 0.149 -0.481 *** 0.073
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.292 *** 0.045 -0.238 *** 0.076 -0.225 *** 0.043 -0.846 0.557 -0.525 ** 0.160
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.788 *** 0.026 -1.387 *** 0.052 -0.203 *** 0.030 -1.094 *** 0.131 -0.992 *** 0.075
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.055 * 0.025 -0.084 0.043 -0.053 0.028 0.064 0.076 -0.110 0.057
Model statistics
Intercept -6.085 *** 0.126 -5.912 *** 0.177 -5.300 *** 0.124 -7.611 *** 0.331 -1.518 *** 0.100
Country-level variance 1.172 ** 0.364 1.395 0.834 0.285 0.188 3.207 9.997 0.142 0.950
District-level variance 0.370 *** 0.031 0.224 *** 0.031 0.489 *** 0.124 0.085 * 0.037 0.096 *** 0.025
Household-level variance 2.099 *** 0.047 2.245 *** 0.045 0.779 0.697 0.041 * 0.017 0.950 *** 0.069
N 295,777 134,514 101,648 14,332 45,283
Deviance 235,429.38 78,879.46 99,865.72 14,274.02 43,833.61
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Notes: All models are controlled for education, age, living in a city, partner’s occupation and education, 
age difference with partner, age at birth first child, living in a polygynous household and context variables (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6).
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Model 0: all countries
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Southeast asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.079 *** 0.011 0.056 *** 0.015 0.042 ** 0.017 0.266 *** 0.042 0.198 *** 0.027
Number of elderly -0.040 * 0.017 -0.102 *** 0.029 -0.033 0.019 0.056 0.052 0.090 ** 0.035
Number of adult men -0.054 *** 0.010 -0.077 *** 0.017 0.003 0.011 -0.087 * 0.039 -0.021 0.026
Control: Number of household members -0.028 *** 0.005 -0.046 *** 0.008 -0.010 0.006 -0.134 *** 0.020 -0.075 *** 0.015
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.307 *** 0.036 0.349 *** 0.074 0.201 *** 0.047 0.262 * 0.108 -0.016 0.093
Other position -0.016 0.024 -0.043 0.057 -0.076 0.034 0.238 * 0.095 -0.085 0.055
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.043 0.035 -0.072 * 0.029 0.005 0.064 -0.072 0.039
Proportion children not-biologically 
related to hhh
0.263 * 0.106 0.927 ** 0.302 0.029 0.097 1.080 * 0.457 0.289 0.260
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.046 0.033 0.080 0.051 -0.091 * 0.039 0.401 *** 0.098 0.041 0.057
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 -0.031 0.025 -0.030 0.044 0.017 0.038 -0.010 0.071 -0.148 ** 0.046
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.183 *** 0.041 -0.195 ** 0.067 -0.083 0.055 0.227 0.136 -0.214 * 0.100
5 or more, older than 5 -0.466 ** 0.148 -0.496 * 0.213 -0.183 0.219 -1.889 1.395 -0.342 0.780
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.185 *** 0.022 -0.372 *** 0.049 -0.037 0.027 -0.233 ** 0.088 -0.496 *** 0.053
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.250 *** 0.030 -0.352 *** 0.057 -0.124 *** 0.034 -0.647 *** 0.149 -0.481 *** 0.073
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.292 *** 0.045 -0.238 *** 0.076 -0.225 *** 0.043 -0.846 0.557 -0.525 ** 0.160
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.788 *** 0.026 -1.387 *** 0.052 -0.203 *** 0.030 -1.094 *** 0.131 -0.992 *** 0.075
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.055 * 0.025 -0.084 0.043 -0.053 0.028 0.064 0.076 -0.110 0.057
Model statistics
Intercept -6.085 *** 0.126 -5.912 *** 0.177 -5.300 *** 0.124 -7.611 *** 0.331 -1.518 *** 0.100
Country-level variance 1.172 ** 0.364 1.395 0.834 0.285 0.188 3.207 9.997 0.142 0.950
District-level variance 0.370 *** 0.031 0.224 *** 0.031 0.489 *** 0.124 0.085 * 0.037 0.096 *** 0.025
Household-level variance 2.099 *** 0.047 2.245 *** 0.045 0.779 0.697 0.041 * 0.017 0.950 *** 0.069
N 295,777 134,514 101,648 14,332 45,283
Deviance 235,429.38 78,879.46 99,865.72 14,274.02 43,833.61
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Notes: All models are controlled for education, age, living in a city, partner’s occupation and education, 
age difference with partner, age at birth first child, living in a polygynous household and context variables (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6).
different geographical regions among Muslim countries
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122 In Soviet Central Asia (equal) economic participation 
was the norm; in Sub-Saharan Africa women were active 
on their own land and had some economic rights; and in 
Southeast Asia women had more economic rights and 
room to enter manufacturing industries.
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figure 8.5 Employment probability by having a partner per region
 Women's probability of being employed (%)
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figure 8.6 Employment probability by number of adult women in the household per region
 Women's probability of being employed (%)
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figure 8.7 Employment probability by number of adult men in the household per region
 Women's probability of being employed (%)
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of the regions. This is pretty much in line with the overall model for all countries (Table 8.2), 
in which the effect was small and weakly significant taking into account the large number of 
observations.
 For the household roles & needs variables considerable differences as well as similarities 
were also found. The presence of other working-age women in the household seems to have a 
positive effect in all regions. Only for Sub-Saharan Africa the results are somewhat less robust 
(Appendices 8.3 and 8.4). The effects are significantly smaller in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Greater Middle East than in the other two regions (Figure 8.6). Furthermore, in Central Asia the 
influence is significantly larger than in Southeast Asia. In Central Asia, this factor seems to have 
a truly strong impact. In the region where women’s roles prohibit labour market activities the 
most (the Greater Middle East),122 the presence of other women makes the smallest difference; 
and in the region in which women have a historical place in the formal labour force (Central Asia), 
the positive effect of an additional woman is largest. If the presence of other women decreases 
the care burden this seems most beneficial in a context in which paid labour outside the home is 
accepted. Women in these environments can take advantage of the reduced responsibilities or 
newly acquired ‘spare’ time. If they are only seen as carers, an additional caregiver does not make 
much difference.
 The presence of elderly people cannot be universally reduced to additional care needs. In 
the Greater Middle East we indeed see a negative effect on women’s employment, but not in 
any of the other regions and this difference is significant as well. The results for Southeast Asia 
even hint at a positive effect (p<0.01), but this was neither found in the interaction models, nor 
did its coefficient differ significantly from Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, where no such 
effect was found. It could be that in the Greater Middle East where elderly people are held in 
reverence, they are not expected to contribute to household tasks (and will thus mainly lead to 
a care demand), while in the other regions the elderly also provide care (e.g. Ogawa & Ermisch, 
1996), leading to a care balance-neutral effect. These different results in the regions could also 
explain why the overall effect was very weak.
 For the presence of adult men, a negative effect was found for the Greater Middle East 
and Central Asia (though less robust there), and even though the effect in the Greater Middle 
East seems rather similar to the (insignificant) effect in Southeast Asia, the effects in Central 
Asia and the Greater Middle East differ significantly from the other two regions for seven of 
the eight possible interaction coefficients (Appendix 8.3). Adding up the results presented 
in the Appendix and the calculations in Figure 8.7, it seems that the effect is stronger in the 
former Soviet countries than in the Greater Middle East, certainly in terms of percentage points. 
Again this seems to indicate that in the context of a more strict gender role division the exact 
household configuration context makes less of a difference, while it can be very important in 
contexts where women are not solely seen are caregivers.
 Lastly, in this cluster of variables we find the influence of the position in the household. In 
Southeast Asia the position of a woman does not make much of a difference, but this region 
differs significantly from the three others (Appendix 8.3). In the other regions, being the head 
of the household increases the employment probability of women compared to being the 
head of the household’s spouse, though for Central Asia the results are less robust in terms of 
significance (p<0.05 & p<0.01). For the Greater Middle East it is also found that women who 
are neither head of the household nor the partner of the head have employment probabilities 
similar to partners of the head of the household. This fits the reasoning that women mainly 
have economic responsibilities if they are head of the household, and in any other position they 
occupy do not. Figure 8.8 indicates that this is different in Central Asia but similar in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The difference found for Central Asia, however, is only significant at the 5% criterion and 
the additional models do not show any effect in this direction (Appendix 8.3). On the other hand, 
the additional models for Sub-Saharan Africa tend to indicate that other household members 
have significantly lower employment likelihoods than the spouse of the head of the household. 
Overall, it is safe to conclude that for all regions, save Southeast Asia, the major difference is 
found between women as heads of household and all other women, with similar differences in 
the Greater Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia.
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123 Another reason for this strong resemblance is that the 
Greater Middle East provides 45% of the cases of the 
whole sample of the four regions and thus has the most 
influence on the overall results.
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figure 8.8 Employment probability by a woman’s household position per region
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figure 8.9 Employment probability by ‘kind of children’
 Women's probability of being employed (%)
region
Hypothesis
total gMe SSa Ca Sea
H8.1 Adult women (+) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
H8.2 Elderly (-) ? ✓ ✓ x x x
H8.3 Adult men (-) ✓ ✓ x ✓ x
H8.4 Head of Household (+) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ x
H8.5 Partner head (-) x x X x x
H8.6 Boy/girl ratio children (-) ✓ x ? x x
H8.7 Line/not line children (+) ✓ ✓ X ✓ x
H8.8 Brothers (-) x x x x x
H3.1 Partner/breadwinner (-) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
H3.2 Children (-) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
The classification in this Table is based on the overall picture derived from all models as presented in Appendix 8.2. 
Box 8.6: Hypotheses assessed per region/patriarchal bargain
219
 The last group of micro-level patriarchy variables is related to sex hierarchy & lineage. Firstly, 
the small and relatively weak effect found for the sex ratio among children overall is not robustly 
significant for any region, except Sub-Saharan Africa. However, even for that region, the effect 
is very small, not strongly significant, and it does not differ significantly from the other regions. 
It does work in the expected direction though: having relatively more boys decreases women’s 
employment likelihood. The odds of employment are 4.7% lower for a woman in a household 
with three boys and no girls (<12) compared to one living in a similar household with one boy and 
two girls.
 Secondly, the fact that the effect of the presence of children not-biologically related to the 
head of household was moderate in the overall analysis seems to be due to a strong difference 
between the four regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia no (significant) effects 
were found (the relatively flat lines in Figure 8.9), while the effect in the Greater Middle East 
is relatively strong and highly significant (p<0.01), as well as significantly different from the 
effect in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The effect in Central Asia is even stronger 
than that in the Greater Middle East, but it is less certain (p<0.05, and p<0.01 in the interaction 
model). In the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, keeping the number of children constant, 
women in households with fewer children biologically related to the household head have higher 
employment likelihoods.
 Lastly, the expectation on the ratio of male/female siblings was neither reflected in the 
overall results nor in the region-specific models. Two regions show a (weakly) significant effect in 
Table 8.3, but rerunning the analyses on the subgroup of only women aged 15 through 21 did not 
confirm these results.
8.5.4 PATRIARCHAL BARGAINS NEWLY UNDERSTOOD
Talking about an overall Islamic patriarchal bargain seems empirically unjustified. The Middle 
East can be the cradle of Islam, but not all Muslim countries have copied the patriarchal 
bargain found there. In other chapters this has been or will be shown by the contextual-level 
variation and the influence of differences in the institutionalisation of (religiously motivated) 
traditionalism. The analyses in this chapter additionally show that household configurations 
have different effects in the four ‘Muslim regions’ distinguished here. Given this difference 
and starting from a Middle Eastern ideal-typical patriarchal bargain, it is not surprising that the 
effects found overall are mostly reflected in the following results for the Greater Middle East 
(see Box 8.6).123 That the presence of more and younger children, as well as more elderly people 
decreases women’s employment likelihood and that the presence of more adult women increases 
it, indicates that women are primarily care providers. Similarly, the fact that the presence of a 
partner and more adult men decreases women’s employment likelihood, and being head of the 
household increases it indicates that men are first and foremost responsible for providing an 
income and that women only become income providers if the men in a household are not capable 
of earning a sufficient income. This strict division of household roles seems most strong in the 
Greater Middle East compared to the others. Simultaneously, the relatively weak effects found 
for the presence of children and the presence of other adult women also indicate that married 
women without children are still not expected to enter the labour market. The Greater Middle 
East also shows the most robust results regarding the patriliny variables. However, it is not the 
gender of children that seems particularly important, but whether they are part of the biological 
line of the family. If they are not, women are less inhibited to leave the household and enter the 
labour market.
 The idea that in Sub-Saharan Africa patriliny is less important seems to be confirmed by these 
analyses, but it is possible that there is a small effect of the children’s sex, with boys being more 
inhibiting. Regarding household roles and needs a somewhat more complex picture is found. 
In line with the exploratory expectations, the number of children as care demanders decreases 
women’s employment only moderately and the increased economic needs of a household seem 
to overrule a (weaker) gendered division of household tasks: only when there are three or more 
children present, including young ones, a clear negative effect of the presence of children on 
women’s employment has been found. Furthermore, the effect of additional adult women in 
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124 In Section 5.3.1, no M-curve for these countries was 
found, but since it can be the case that there is no rise 
once children become older, the absence of an M-curve 
does not contradict this conclusion.
125 Also the average foster child in my data is in its early teens 
(between 12 and 13 years of age), which seems a bit young 
to be a housemaid, especially for Central Asia, but I have 
126 Here I assume that the value variables used in this thesis 
does not fully capture the traditionalism of a household. 
I think this is a safe assumption since these variables are 
behaviour based on not exhaustive.
region Income providing roles for… Caring roles for … Care scope
Greater Middle East ♂ ♀ All household tasks
Sub-Saharan Africa ♂ ♀ ♀ Nurturing children
Central Asia ♂ ♀ ♀ Nurturing (young) children 
Southeast Asia ♂ ♀ ♀ Nurturing children
Box 8.7 Three household-role dimension of the four patriarchal bargains 
found no information about the ages of housemaids in 
these regions. In other words, this is mere guessing.
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the household was relatively weak, the effect of additional men was absent, and that of having 
a partner small. As expected, the household roles are somewhat less gendered. However, this is 
completely due to the different roles of women compared to the Greater Middle East; the men’s 
roles seems similar. Men are not considered to be care providers here, only income providers, but 
women are considered to be providers of both care and income.
 In Central Asia, especially, the effect of children was expected to be stronger than in the 
other regions because of the combination of a Soviet history (‘women work’) and the Islamic 
resurgence (‘but not if they have children’). The results show this relatively strong effect if 
young children are present. From this, and the relatively strong negative effect of having a 
partner, it might be concluded that for women in Central Asia working outside the household is 
relatively normal. However, as soon as they become a wife or mother, their care roles become 
dominant.124 This reasoning also explains the possible negative effect of the presence of 
adult men: once a woman who worked before leaves the labour market and a new economic 
necessity rises, the adult men (not she) become responsible for providing additional income. 
With regard to patriliny, a large effect was found for the biological relatedness of children, while 
the expectation was that patriliny variables were not important in Central Asia. One possible 
explanation for this contradiction is that fosterage is a way to provide for housemaids. However, 
in that case a similar effect should be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Goody, 1996), which is 
not the case.125 A more plausible, albeit tentative, explanation would be that in Central Asia 
the less traditional families are most inclined to take care of a foster child and in those families 
women are also more often active on the labour market.126 If this is true, then the found effect is 
spurious.
 Lastly, Southeast Asia also shows no effect on the patriliny variables, and this is in line with 
the expectation for this region based on the literature that argues that the lineage system in 
Southeast Asia is more one of bilateral kinship. The strong effect of the presence of additional 
adult women and the moderately strong effect of having children on household roles and needs 
indicate that there is a major difference between women with care responsibilities and women 
without. As everywhere, family and care are important to a woman’s position, so the presence of 
care needs leads to decreases in women’s employment, but, as was the case in Central Asia, the 
starting position of women is one which includes more economically productive roles, explaining 
the stronger effect of changes in the care balance.
 Assessing the results per region seems to confirm most of the expectations formulated in 
Section 8.5.1, but the differences between the regions also imply that defining the patriarchal 
bargains based on the two aspects used here as distinguishing characteristics – household roles 
and patriliny – is not optimal. The defining differences between the regions seem to centre 
around the care and economic balances of the households, the core questions being: who 
needs to be cared for, who have the care-providing roles, and of whom it is accepted to have an 
economic productive role even if there is no economic necessity? In this scheme the patriliny 
aspect, which showed relatively small effects, is integrated in the care balance aspect, since 
the gendered appropriation of household resources seems unimportant in influencing women’s 
employment. Box 8.7 summarises the result by indicating which sex has economic and care roles 
(a larger symbol indicates that this role is primarily attached to that sex) and who or what limits 
women most in terms of care needed.
 In the Greater Middle East, women take care of the household, children, and the elderly; 
men provide the income, and only when economic necessity is urgent, will women take on the 
economic role of income provider. In Sub-Saharan Africa, both women and men have economic 
roles (possibly due to generally strong economic needs), but women are still the primary care 
providers and children are the main care-demanding household members. Central Asia is also 
characterised by women and men both being active on the labour market (not only out of 
necessity) as long as women are not yet in a care-responsible position. But the care roles are 
still highly gendered and thus (only) women retreat to the household once young children 
are present. The care provider role seems to be less general and attached only to women in a 
situation were they have a position with responsibilities for others. However, it seems women 
might re-enter the labour market, especially when children grow older, possibly out of economic 
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need. This situation is largely similar to the one found in Southeast Asia, but the results suggest 
that the presence of children has a stronger or more lasting effect there, since older children 
have a larger negative effect.
8.6 ConCLuSIon
8.6.1 MAIN DETERMINANTS AND CONTEX T DEPENDENC Y
In this chapter, I have set out to find new factors that influence women’s employment 
by applying the overall theoretical framework to the uncultivated terrain of household 
configurations – given that the nuclear family is not ubiquitous in Muslim countries – 
originating from the patriarchal bargains in society (see Kandiyoti, 1988; Moghadam, 1998). 
Based on this approach, the chapter has focused on several newly formulated hypotheses 
(expected relationships between brackets): the presence of elderly people (-), the presence of 
other adult women (+), the household position (head: +) (partner: -) (other: +/-), the number 
of men among adults (-), the proportion of children being male (-), the proportion of children 
being not-biologically related to the head of household (+), and the proportion of boys among 
siblings (-).
 These hypotheses were firstly tested on the whole sample of almost 300,000 women (see 
Chapter 4), starting from the models presented in Chapter 6, but also on four subsamples 
representing four geographical regions which can be distinguished in terms of possibly different 
patriarchal bargains: the Greater Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast 
Asia. As Kandiyoti (1988: 285) says, it is important “to capture the nature of patriarchal systems 
in their cultural, class-specific, and temporal concreteness and reveal how men and women resist, 
accommodate, adapt, and conflict with each other over resources, rights, and responsibilities.” 
By exploring the differences between the regions, I have introduced a deeper understanding 
of the concept of patriarchy to quantitative work, which until now used the concept only very 
generally to designate (a) the Muslim world, (b) the patriarchal belt including the Muslim 
countries and South Asia, or (c) the Muslim civilisation. The understanding incorporated here 
draws from the conceptual qualitative literature on the concept. The results of the overall and 
region-specific analyses (see Box 8.2) help to answer parts of the second and third general 
question central to this thesis:
2) Which micro-, meso- and macro-level factors are the (major) determinants of women’s 
employment in Muslim countries, and how do they influence women’s employment?
3) Do the effects of explanatory factors of women’s employment in Muslim countries differ 
in strength and presence according to time and space, and if they do, how and why do they 
differ?
One new factor, the presence of other adult women, had a strong (p<0.001) influence on 
women’s employment in the overall analysis and showed a significant relationship in the 
expected direction in all four regions. The more adult women live in the household, the higher 
the probability of being employed. The effect was the strongest in Central Asia, then Southeast 
Asia, and the weakest in the Greater Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The presence of 
other women alleviates the care burden and this effect seems to be most powerful when it is 
more accepted that women enter the labour market, because there are fewer other obstacles 
once the care burden is alleviated.
 Being the head of the household also has a positive effect on the employment likelihood of 
women in the overall analysis and in three regions (not in Southeast Asia). Economic necessity in 
combination with being responsible for providing the household with an income seems to push 
women onto the labour market in all regions but Southeast Asia. Similarly, the ‘old variable’ of 
having no partner has this effect in all regions. The same mechanism seems to be at work here, 
but the effects are both present after controlling for each other. These results indicate that the 
care role is rather strong, but it can be overruled when there is strong economic necessity and a 
woman is in a responsible position caused by, for instance, the absence of a partner or her being 
the head of the household.
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 Regarding the presence of other household members, two factors showed a (possible) effect 
in the overall analysis, which turned out to be mainly based on the strong effects the factors 
produced in the Greater Middle East. In this region, women’s employment decreases as more 
elderly people or adult men are present in the household. In the Greater Middle East, the division 
of household roles seems most strict, meaning that other male household member are the first 
to provide an additional income if needed and the presence of elderly people weighs down 
women’s care burden – which in all regions is mostly determined by the presence of (young) 
children – because age also strongly determines the status within the household. In other 
regions, elderly people seem to increase both the care demand and the care supply (and possibly 
also the economic demand and supply).
 Three hypotheses were neither confirmed in the overall models nor for any of the 
regions. Firstly, as already mentioned, there seems to be no substantial difference in terms of 
employment between women who are spouses of the head of the household and women who 
are neither head nor spouse. Economic needs have roughly similar effects on both groups and 
possibly different care needs are caught by the variables for the presence of children and elderly. 
Secondly, the boy/girl ratio among children showed no substantial effect (though a small and 
weak significant effect was found in Sub-Saharan Africa). I would conclude that, generally 
speaking, boys are not more care demanding than girls. This does not mean per se that boys 
are not considered more important (in terms of lineage) – think of the missing girl phenomenon 
in, for instance, Pakistan. The absence of an effect can be explained by a mixture of this effect 
with the idea that girls are more fragile and get more attention or are protected more by their 
mothers. Thirdly, the boy/girl ratio among siblings for women aged 15 to 21 did not show the 
expected negative effect.
 This result seems not only at odds with the hypotheses in this study but also with 
findings in some qualitative research. For instance, Miles (2002: 422) observes that “Several 
women reported their families did not help them with their job search as much as they did 
their brothers.” And she quotes a higher-educated woman from Madaba saying: “I have two 
unemployed brothers so my family is not looking for me.” While this indicates that resources 
are first used for boys (brothers) and for women second, my statistical results tend to indicate 
that no such general effect exists in any of the four regions. This discrepancy can have at least 
three reasons. Firstly, the effect might be context specific at a lower level than the geographical 
regions I have distinguished. Further study might shed light on the circumstances under which 
this effect might exist. Secondly, boys might get more assistance or resources from the family in 
their search for a job, but this does not mean that they are more successful in finding one. If the 
contribution of this household investment to getting a job is rather small, it will hardly contribute 
to men finding a job either. Logically, then no substantial effect turns up in statistical analyses 
that take employment as dependent variable. Thirdly, the woman interviewed by Miles assumes 
that the family will help her when her brothers have found a job, but the number of male siblings 
might be irrelevant to women’s employment, because perhaps no resources will be used for girls, 
regardless of the number of young men in the household.
 The last patriliny variable (biological relatedness of children) had the expected influence 
overall, but showed mixed effects across the regions. In Central Asia and in the Greater Middle 
East, it seems that if a child is a foster child it has a less strong negative impact on women’s 
employment likelihood. I hypothesised this might be due to a (possibly subconscious) lower 
valuation of the care needs of these children because they are not part of the lineage of the 
family, and consequently women charged with caring for foster children could more easily enter 
the labour market. Part of this reasoning can also be that less is invested in these children and 
they are more often expected to do household chores and thus alleviate women’s care burden 
(cf. Huisman, 2011). Udink (2006: 199–200), for instance, describes the youth of a local driver 
(Benedict) she encountered during her stay in Pakistan. He had lived in the household of his 
father’s sister because his mother was arrested after being involved in the murder of her husband 
(the driver’s father). Benedict was considered an additional burden (“another mouth to feed”) in 
his new home and while his nephews and nieces were sent to school, he assisted his aunt in her 
work as a maid in another household. In other words, he did contribute to filling his household’s 
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127 Comparing the two regions does indeed show that the 
relative number of households with no, one, or two other 
children besides a foster child is much higher in Central 
Asia than in the Greater Middle East, where many more 
regular children are present in households with a foster 
child. The average number of total children in a ‘foster 
home’ in Central Asia is 2.2, in the Greater Middle East 
4.0.
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economic needs, but hardly increased the care demands of the household. An alternative 
explanation for the found effect (coined for the effect in Central Asia) is that in more liberal 
families, children are more often adopted and in these families women are more often employed 
as well. Different explanations for Central Asia and the Greater Middle East can be linked to 
the descriptives presented in Figure 8.3, showing that the household size and composition is 
rather different in the two regions. In the Greater Middle East, families bring in a new household 
member dictated by social norms, while in Central Asia it might start more with the idea of 
adoption and then seeking a child who needs help.127 If so, it can be expected that the effect 
found is related to lower levels of traditionalism and not so much the child not being biologically 
related to the head of household.
 As has become clear from this discussion, the question about the main determinants 
(Question 2) is hard to answer straightforwardly. Being head of the household and the presence 
of other women in the household seem to be two factors that should definitely be included in 
models explaining women’s employment, as these are household configurations factors that 
shape the balance between care needs and supply, as well as economic needs and supply in 
almost all contexts. More generally speaking, patriliny does not seem to be very important in 
shaping women’s employment. Household roles and needs are important and influence women’s 
employment considerably. This effect extends beyond the household configuration variables 
normally used in micro-level studies: having a partner and the presence of children (e.g. Al-
Qudsi, 1998; Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Aromolaran, 2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Başlevent & 
Onaran, 2004; Calvès & Schoumaker, 2004; Donahoe, 1999; Glick & Sahn, 1997; 2005; Gündüz-
Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Khattab, 2002; Miles, 2002; Pettit & Hook, 2005). All together, the model 
including the new variables also showed a substantially better fit (DIC) than the similar model 
without these variables (Model 4 in Table 6.2).
8.6.2 CROSSOVER: FROM MICRO-LEVEL STATISTICS BACK TO THE CONCEP T OF 
PATRIARCHY
For these two (children and marriage) and at least five other variables (presence of adult women, 
the presence of elderly people, the presence of adult men, being head of household, and ‘not-
biologically related’ children) the impact on women’s employment clearly differs by context. 
To understand this, I propose adjusting the two starting-point dimensions derived from the 
literature (household roles & need; sex hierarchy & lineage [see Kandiyoti’s, 1988]). The results 
here suggest that three sub-dimensions related to the household roles dimension of patriarchy 
are rather elucidating in explaining the different influences. Firstly, in line with Jenson (1997) 
we should determine ‘Who cares?’: Who are expected to provide care to other household 
members? Is it only the women or also the men? It seems that this task is still almost exclusively 
feminine. Secondly, it is important to understand who is expected to provide the household 
with an income. Are men the only ones with income-providing roles or is it also accepted that 
women work even if there is no grave economic necessity? In all cases, primarily women might 
be responsible for care, and men for an income, but to what extent these roles are fluid turns 
out to be relevant. Income-providing roles should not be seen as the opposite of care roles, 
they are not part of the same continuum (see the negation guideline in Goertz & Mazur [2008: 
25–7]). If earning an income becomes less masculine, it is not automatically true that providing 
care becomes more masculine (see Habib, Nuwayhid & Yeretzian, 2006: 326). Women have more 
diverse roles across regions, but the men’s role is far more restricted to the economic private 
sphere (see also Box 8.3). Thirdly, it should be taken into account what is considered to be part 
of the care chores: managing the household generally and constantly, or taking care of the 
children? Does this include the elderly as well, and which children are considered to be most in 
need of care?
 The general theoretical framework of this thesis brought together two separate literatures 
on women’s economic position in Muslim countries: the conceptual and more qualitative 
literature on patriarchy as a societal gender regime (e.g. Edgar, 2006; Kandiyoti, 1988; 
Moghadam, 1996; 1998; Westwood, 1997), and the quantitative literature explaining women’s 
employment at the micro level (e.g. Al-Qudsi, 1998; Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004; Aromolaran, 
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2004; Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Başlevent & Onaran, 2004; Calvès & Schoumaker, 2004; Donahoe, 
1999; Glick & Sahn, 1997; 2005; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Khattab, 2002; Miles, 2002; 
Pettit & Hook, 2005). The concept derived from the first literature was translated to the 
micro-level and the newly derived hypotheses on household configurations were studied, and 
turned out to be rather relevant in countries where a significant proportion of the households 
is extended. Secondly, the results from these analyses were used to reflect upon the concept 
of patriarchy, building and refining it. To come full circle, these understandings could be used 
to inform scholars in constructing indices and measurements of the different dimensions of 
patriarchy. Such data are crucial to test further which contextual circumstances shape the 
effects of household configurations on women’s employment, and, for instance, how policies 
(public patriarchy) might reinforce or contest economic inequalities in the household (private 
patriarchy).
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Chapter 9
theme 3: refuting simplicity
Islam as a multivocal influence in Indonesia and 
Nigeria
9.1 ISL aM: oBvIouS But unSatISfaCtory
The obvious answer to the question 'Why do Muslim countries have low employment levels 
for women?' is suggested by the question itself: because they are Muslim. Islamic religion 
is supposed to lead to low employment levels. As quoted in the introductory chapter, Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler (1991: 59–60), for instance, state that: “Islam, with its strong emphasis on 
separate spheres for men and women [has] blocked women from acknowledged entry into the 
paid work force.” Even if we ignore the descriptives given in Chapter 5 and accept the general 
empirical fact that Muslim countries have (on average) lower female employment rates than 
other countries, conclusions such as the one quoted above have not been sufficiently proven, and 
they lack a thorough theoretical argument.
 These often-heard conclusions pinpoint Islam as the cause of women’s low employment 
level or their ‘backward’ position in general. At the core of the arguments behind these 
conclusions are general statements about Islam’s supposedly inherent conservatism or 
misogyny. These supposed aspects of the religion in themselves are supposed to be sufficient 
to prevent women from entering the labour market. I cannot but conclude that the causal path 
in this reasoning is heavily underspecified. Consequently, the empirical tests are limited to 
a crude focus on religious denomination and aggregate population measures to explain low 
employment.
 In this chapter, I apply the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapters to this 
matter in the hope of gaining a better understanding of how religion might influence women’s 
employment and providing a (better) answer to the questions whether and how Islam impacts on 
women’s employment in Muslim countries. In Section 9.2, I first reflect on existing knowledge 
to show the major gaps. Subsequently, I explain how my more holistic framework enables me 
to distinguish between different types of Islam and different manifestations of its influence. I 
argue that Islam can have multiple (reinforcing or contradictory) effects at the same time, for 
instance through societal norms, through policies and politics, and through personal beliefs. 
The effects of these different manifestations depend on the particular strand of Islam that is 
transmitted. In the third section of this chapter I will examine the cases of Indonesia and Nigeria, 
which will be studied to ascertain how different types of Islam influence women’s employment. 
The high employment levels and religiously fragmented population in both countries makes that 
studying these cases is in favour of the simplistic ‘Muslim population’ thesis described above. 
Section 9.4 will provide some information about the (additional) data that were used and the 
applied methods. Descriptive and causal analyses of the two countries, about 70 districts, and 
about 60,000 women are discussed in the fifth section. Afterwards, I shall connect the results on 
Indonesia and Nigeria with other countries for which some data on religious denomination are 
available in the DDW (Section 9.6). These analyses will be used to assess the generalisability of 
the results. A discussion of the general conclusions, limitations and implications will bring this 
chapter to a close.
9.2 LInKIng ISL aM to woMen’S eMpLoyMent
Before focusing on the framework that conceptualises how Islam influences women’s employment 
and then deriving specific hypothesis from that framework, I will firstly discuss the two dominant 
arguments in the literature on Islam and women’s employment in Muslim countries.
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figure 9.1 The state of the art of the ‘Civilisationist approach’
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9.2.1 TO INFLUENCE OR NOT TO INFLUENCE?
In discussing issues like gender equality, many scholars tend to think in terms of civilisations, 
particularly contrasting the ‘Western’ and the ‘Islamic’ civilisations (e.g. Clark, Ramsbey & 
Adler, 1991; Fish, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b; Lincove, 2008; Norris & Inglehart, 
2004; Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007). In their argument it is both the absolute and the relative 
backwardness in terms of gender equality that restricts women in ‘Islamic civilisation’ from 
entering the labour market. In absolute terms, Islam is assigned certain qualities: a propagation 
of separate spheres for women’s and men’s lives, confining women to the household; strict 
(re)productive roles wherein women are seen as carers and the men as breadwinners (see the 
previous chapter); and an emphasis on the family as the primary unit in society (e.g. Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Yuchtman-Yaar & 
Alkalay, 2007). Relatively speaking, the characteristics mentioned above are not said to be unique 
to Islam, but it is argued that they are more pronounced in Islam than in any other religion (see 
Droeber, 2003). This strong difference between homogeneously presented cultural blocks is 
presented as the reason why fewer women are employed in Muslim countries than in other 
countries (particularly Western ones). There are two major problems with this argument, one 
theoretical, the other empirical (see Figure 9.1).
 Theoretically, this can hardly be called a convincing argument for at least two reasons. First 
of all, it ignores that ‘Islam’ harbours many different strands, ideologies, and practices. Islam in 
Mali is not the same as Islam in Pakistan or in Indonesia. The same can be said for the Christian 
culture in the West. The ‘civilisationist’ concept of a religious culture is thus very crude and 
neither considers how different culturalisations of Islam affect the position of women, nor how 
multiple interpretations of Islam can simultaneously influence women’s employment. Secondly, 
the argument only discusses the content of the cultural influence, but hardly reveals how it 
influences women’s decisions; it seems that an invisible hand directs women to refrain from 
seeking employment. This argument is mainly applied to blocks of countries (civilisations), but 
it is not explained why the reasoning is restricted to the country level. In fact, I would say, the 
predicted differences can expected to be found at any level. In other words: women in Muslim 
countries have lower employment levels than in non-Muslim countries; within these countries, 
in Muslim villages or provinces women can be expected to work less often than in non-Muslim 
villages or provinces; and in these villages or provinces, Muslim women can be expected to have 
lower employment likelihoods than non-Muslim women.
 Empirically, the civilisation argument would seem to be widely supported in existing 
studies, but this support is rather thin because it is limited in two ways. Firstly, the most 
prominent tests are based on comparisons of country-level averages, asking: are there fewer 
women in parliament in Muslim countries than Western countries; is women’s employment 
on average lower in the Muslim civilisation than the West; are the views of people in Muslim 
countries less favourable of gender equality than in Western countries (e.g. Clark, Ramsbey & 
Adler, 1991; Inglehart & Norris, 2003b; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Ross, 2008; Yuchtman-Yaar & 
Alkalay, 2007)? Variation within this Muslim civilisation is not taken into account and people 
with different religions within Muslim countries are hardly compared to each other. Without 
such additional analyses it is hard to judge how much the civilisation explanation contributes to 
understanding women’s position. Secondly, defining civilisations in terms of Muslim population 
or historical religious dominance (see Chapter 4, Section 3) leads to a geographical area being 
designated as the Muslim civilisation (see Figure 4.1). Many other factors cluster by geographical 
area: from ecological circumstances such as climate, oil, and desert, to social histories such 
as colonisation, regional conflicts, and economic dependency. Therefore, very general cross-
comparative studies can never control for all alternative explanations. Testing the claims about 
differences between Islam and other religions at other levels might provide additional support or 
refutation for the civilisationist argument, because other factors can be held constant.
 The criticism formulated here may suggest that I expect that the role of Islam is highly 
overstated or does in fact not exist. Indeed, several studies suggest more or other explanations 
for the differences found, such as economic development, colonial history, conflicts in general 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, oil, urbanisation, educational attainment, and socio-
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128 There is some literature on Islam and women’s 
employment in the West as well. See, for instance, Read 
(2003).
 • Women who adhere to a more conservative Islamic tradition or women who live in areas in which a more conservative 
Islamic tradition is dominant have an employment likelihood that is lower than that of women who do not; 
 • For each religion the same argument can be formulated: it is the degree of conservatism that influences women’s 
employment, not the religious denomination;
 • Women’s employment in the Islamic denomination is not consistently lower than that in the other religions’ 
denominations, in other words, some Islamic groups have higher employment rates than for instance some Christian 
groups and others have lower employment rates than Christian groups;
 • Islam influences women’s employment likelihood through different channels at different levels (e.g. individual, 
community) and these different channels and level can lead to Islam having contradictory effects with respect to the 
likelihood that a woman is employed.
Box 9.1
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economic class (e.g. Droeber, 2003; Khattab, 2002; Moghadam, 2003; Spierings, 2007; see 
also Kaya, 2010). While I do indeed argue that the negative influence of ‘Islam’ is probably 
overstated, I also believe that religion can be a major driving force of people’s behaviour. It 
would be simplistic to dismiss Islam as an explanation for women’s position. The question 
whether Islam has an influence can however only provide answers of little scientific value. The 
more relevant question is the following:
How and what influence do various types of Islam have on the position of women, and more 
particularly women’s employment?
9.2.2 HOW ISL AM MANIFESTS ITSELF
As discussed in previous chapters, different value patterns and the different forms these take 
have to be distinguished in order to understand how values influence women’s employment. In 
this study, religion is considered as a source of values, but Islamic values can differ by region, 
time, and source. Moreover, these different values can manifest themselves through various 
routes. One might say that to understand the influence of religion, we need to think in terms 
of messages and messengers, whereby the plurality of messengers refers to the multitude of 
ways that Islam is expected to influence women’s employment (see also Badran, 2001; Spierings, 
2007).
 The view that a religion harbours a multitude of strands (or messages, or sets of values) 
is not new. The relatively rich literature on the influence of Protestantism on (wo)men’s 
employment in Western countries, in particularly for the U.S., the importance of the differences 
between Protestant denominations and their various degrees of conservativeness is established 
(Ammons & Edgell, 2007; Chadwick & Garrett, 1995; Civettini & Glass, 2008; Feldmann, 2007; 
Glass & Nath, 2006; Sherkat, 2000).128 For my goals here, it is thus important to distinguish 
different types of Islam with respect to their views on women’s position in society. For instance, 
Wahhabist Islam starts from values such as hierarchy, modesty, and complementarity, whereas 
the Hannafi legal school takes a more liberal view on women’s rights (see Geaves, 2006; Ruthven, 
1997). When we speak of the influence of Islam, we should not treat Islam as one singular entity, 
and it should be made clear which specific Islamic ‘message’ we refer to. Contrasting Islam 
as a whole to another – generalised – religion is misleading and conceals or veils important 
differences in values within each religion.
 Differentiating the messages, however, is only the first step. In order to exert influence in 
the first place, a worldview (based in an Islamic school of thought) needs a medium or mechanism 
(besides the indirect effect on women’s employment through shaping needs and opportunities). 
In Chapter 2, I have distinguished three other ways in which values can have a direct effect: (1) 
internalised values, (2) the value-based norms imposed by society or others in the household, 
and (3) the institutionalisation of values in policies and politics. Because there are multiple Islams 
and multiple ways for values to have an effect, it is possible that different combinations of these 
value effects are at work at a single place and time, each with a unique effect. The challenge is 
now to understand which specific manifestations there are and how these can influence women’s 
employment. This general discussion about the differences in messages and messengers above is 
translated into four explicit general expectations, as given in Box 9.1.
 WOMEN AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS
If we start at the lowest level that I distinguish in this thesis (the women themselves) only 
internalisation seems relevant. At the core of the mechanism are the values a woman believes 
in. If a woman strongly favours traditional family roles and believes in a sexual hierarchy, she 
prefers reproductive labour in the household above being employed outside the home. These 
stronger traditional values can be inspired by (more conservative strands of) religion. In that 
sense, I would thus expect that women adhering to more conservative denominations of any 
religion have lower employment likelihoods compared to women adhering to more progressive 
religious denominations (on Protestant women, see Feldman, 2007; Sherkat, 2000; on Arab-
American women, Read, 2002). More traditional women will not only be less motivated to enter 
the labour market, but characteristics that can negatively influence their employment likelihood 
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129 While I stress the importance of recognising the 
individual and the household level as theoretically 
distinct, in this case it should be noted that religious 
intermarriage seems rather rare and religious views are 
often a selection criterion for marriage. In other words, 
I assume that the differences in values systems within a 
household – particularly a marriage – are relatively small.
130 Based on the theoretical discussion, more and more 
refined hypotheses could have been formulated. 
9.1 If a woman is Muslim, the probability a woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if she is not.Box 9.2
9.2 If a woman lives in an area predominantly inhabited by Muslim people, the probability that that woman is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area predominantly inhabited by people with another religious 
denomination.
9.3 If a woman lives in an area predominantly inhabited by people adhering to a more conservative type of Islam, the 
probability that that woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area predominantly 
inhabited by people adhering to a less conservative type of Islam.
Box 9.3
However, despite a unique collection of data, the 
data used in this thesis do not allow me to test these. 
Therefore I have chosen to formulate the hypotheses here 
in a way that both reflects the core theoretical issues and 
can be tested. In those tests, the intervening effects or 
causal mechanisms are of course considered.
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also depend on these views. For instance, women with more conservative ideas can be expected 
to be more likely to be married, have more children and to have lower educational participation 
rates (see Glass & Nath, 2006). All these factors resonate with a belief system in which a woman 
is – in the strictest sense – subordinate to men, secluded in the home, and responsible mainly for 
reproduction and raising children.
 Theoretically and conceptually distinct, but empirically hard to distinguish from the former 
mechanism is the influence of the household context. Since I expect that the opinion of other 
household members (especially partner and parents) matters in employment decisions, their 
value system is highly relevant as well. Here the same reasoning holds and it can be expected that 
when a household holds more conservative religious views, this will have a negative effect on 
women’s employment likelihood.129
 Both of the mechanisms discussed above focus on the micro level and the differences 
between women within a country or another geographical area. If Islam were more conservative 
than other religions, Muslim women would have to have lower employment likelihoods than 
women with other religious beliefs. Moreover, this should have an effect through the level 
of traditionalism of women and their household, as religion is a personal practice. If it is not 
Islam as a whole that presents a more traditional worldview in these countries, then the level of 
household traditionalism can still be important, but it is does not mediate the effect of Islam. 
The discussion is summarised in the hypothesis given in Box 9.2.130
 RELIGIOUS NORMS
The importance of the world beyond the household is reflected by the possible influence of 
religious worldviews through cultural norms and political institutions. In previous chapters, 
the role of norms has already been discussed. Substantially, norms refer to values similar to 
those that are internalised or held by household members: women’s roles in the household, the 
genderedness of public space, sexual hierarchies, and modesty. Earlier in this thesis, the origins 
of these norms have been discussed in terms of modernisation (Chapter 3), political history, and 
religion (both in Chapter 8). This chapter shall focus on the dominant religion in the area women 
live in as a source of norms. Religion is thus seen as an important part of culture, but not as 
synonymous with that concept, which for Islam is often the case. Religious values have become 
part of the dominant ideas about how people should behave or not, and consequently people 
tend to adjust their behaviour to them. If these norms originate in an Islamic history or culture, 
it is not directly relevant whether the individual woman in a Muslim country is Muslim, Hindu, 
Christian or atheist. The dominant version of Islam prescribes what society should look like and 
how people should behave. This influence can take either an injunctive (the idea that certain 
behaviour is not accepted leads to not behaving that way) or prescriptive (observed behaviour 
is copied) form (see e.g. Smith & Louis, 2009). Injunctive norms also include stigmatisation, 
which might be responsible for the reluctance of women willing to work to enter the labour 
market because of perceived informal repercussions. If Islam incorporates values that are less in 
favour of women’s employment and Islam is the dominant religion in a region, it can be expected 
that Islam has a negative influence on women’s employment. However, if we expect that the 
difference between Islam and other religions does not exist in these general terms (because the 
strands of different religions overlap), this effect is not nearly as clear cut, as several areas with 
more progressive Muslim views would have better employment rates than areas dominated by 
strands of other religions. Regarding norms and considering the existence of different Islamic 
messages, it can also be expected that women’s employment will be lower if the dominant type 
of Islam in a region is more conservative than if the dominant type of Islam is less conservative or 
is progressive.
 The dominance of a religion is often linked to the modal religion: the religion that most 
people in the area adhere to. Thus, based on the above, living in a province in which mostly 
Muslims live could for instance be expected to lead to more conservative norms and thus to lower 
employment levels for women. In sum, two hypotheses can now be formulated – as given in Box 
9.3 – of which I expect the ‘Islam diversity thesis’, Hypothesis 9.3, to hold, and not Hypothesis 
9.2, which is based in the civilisationist logic.
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131 In Indonesia, provinces have a relatively high degree of 
regional autonomy, especially since the implementation 
of a new law in 2001. Moreover, five regions have a special 
status.
9.4 If a woman lives in an area in which Shari’a is part of the body of law, the probability that that woman is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area in which Shari’a is not part of the body of law.
9.5 To the extent the presence of Islamic political actors in an area increases, the probability a woman is gainfully non-
agriculturally employed in that area decreases.
Box 9.4
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 ISL AMIC POLICIES AND POLITICAL AC TORS
The last group of religious influences focusses on the institutionalisation of religion. Sets of 
values can become influential through institutionalisation in policy and state structures (see 
for instance Bahramitash, 2002; Doumato, 2003; Murphy, 2003; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 
2009; Walby, 2009). The policies can have direct material effects as well as effects, comparable 
to the injunctive effect of norms. Firstly, the material effects come from the codification of 
conservative views in formal rules. Once these worldviews are translated to policies, women can 
ultimately be forbidden to look for a job. Less extreme but still restrictive measures are found in 
laws that forbid women to travel without a mahram, to take jobs requiring hard physical labour, 
or to have property rights. In each of these cases, some jobs, or prerequisites for certain jobs 
(travelling from home to work), are simply forbidden to women. Because in most conservative 
strands of Islam these kinds of measures are propagated as originating from Shari’a, it can be 
expected that incorporating Shari’a into the law system of a country disadvantages women’s 
employment possibilities.
 More generally, it can be expected that the presence of political Islam has a negative effect 
on women’s employment. Less traditional forms of Islam often limit themselves mostly to the 
private and religious sphere, while more conservative strands have a more holistic view which 
encompasses the regulation of private and public life. Because of this association of a more 
conservative set of Islamic values with political organisation, it is to be expected that in areas in 
which Islamic political actors are stronger women’s employment is lower. These political actors 
might implement policies restricting women and their presence might press other political actors 
to do the same in order not to lose the support of their constituency. 
 The presence of political Islamic actors as well as the incorporation of Islam in the body of law 
of a country cannot only be expected to have a direct negative effect on women’s employment, 
but also indirect effects. As was the case for religious norms, the institutionalisation can also 
affect for instance the school attendance of women and the number of children they have, which 
in turn influences women’s employment likelihood. In sum, this focus on the institutionalisation of 
Islam in politics can be captured in the two hypotheses of Box 9.4.
9.3 t wo CaSeS: IndoneSIa and nIgerIa
The hypotheses discussed above will be tested for two large and diverse Muslim countries: 
Indonesia and Nigeria. Before arguing from a theoretical and methodological perspective why I 
have selected these two countries, I will first provide some descriptive background.
9.3.1 INDONESIA
Of the Muslim population worldwide, 12% live in Indonesia (195 million of about 1.6 billion 
Muslims in the whole world), making it the largest Muslim country. However, about 45 million 
Indonesians are not Muslim. Considerable numbers of Christians and Hindus live in Indonesia, 
as well as some Buddhists, Animists and people who adhere to other religions (Emmerson, 
2001; CIA, 2009). Islam in Indonesia is diverse and influenced by local traditions that have been 
incorporated into religious practice (Bahramitash, 2002; Emmerson, 2001). In Indonesia, one can 
distinguish between the more ‘Modernist’ form of Islam, which is based on orthodox theology 
and is in fact the more conservative of the two, and a ‘Traditional’ Islam in which local religious 
leaders interpret religious sources themselves. The latter, mostly found on Java (Patung, 2006c; 
UNDP Indonesia, 2009), is the least conservative, notwithstanding its misleading label.
 Islam is not only important in terms of individual religious belief, but it is also a significant 
societal force. Indonesian family law is partly based on Adat, a set of principles in line with 
traditional Islamic law (Bahramitash, 2002; Lindsey, 1999), and since 2003 some regions have 
promulgated laws based on the Shari’a (Patung, 2006a, Patung, 2006b). In the political sphere, 
Muslim and Islamic oppositional movements have existed since the Sukarno regime. At the end 
of the last century the National Awakening Party (PKB), a party that supports a role for Islam in 
government, became part of the government coalition (Emmerson, 2001; Bahramitash, 2002).
 Despite violent conflicts along religious lines in Aceh and on the Moluccas, religious 
differences do not seem to threaten the unity of Indonesia.131 This is partly due to crosscutting 
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132 PDP (People’s Democratic Party); AD (Alliance for 
Democracy)/since 2006 AC (Action Congress); ANPP (All 
Nigerian People’s Party), former APP (All People’s Party).
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cleavages of ethnicity, religion, residence and wealth (Emmerson, 2001: 391). Furthermore, 
Muslims and people with other religious beliefs do not live completely segregated from each 
other. Non-Muslims live in Muslim-dominated areas (provinces) and Muslims live in non-Muslim-
dominated areas.
 Economically speaking, compared to other Muslim countries, Indonesia went through a 
process of industrialisation quite early on (Moghadam, 2003). This early industrialisation is cited 
as one of the reasons why the labour market participation of Indonesian women is relatively 
high compared to that of many other Muslim countries. About a quarter to a third of Indonesian 
women are reported as being employed in non-agricultural paid labour (Chapter 5; see also 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009).
9.3.2 NIGERIA
With more than 130 million inhabitants, Nigeria is the largest country on the African continent, 
and it is one of the African countries with a majority of Muslim inhabitants: about half of the 
population is Muslim, 40 to 50% are Christian and most of the remaining people adhere to 
indigenous beliefs. The Muslim population is concentrated in the north, and the Christian in the 
south. Despite this, many Christians live in the northern states and vice versa.
 Ethnically speaking, Nigeria is extremely heterogeneous. However, ethnicity and religion 
broadly coincide, and most conflicts are fought along ethnoreligious cleavages. Thousands of 
people have died in these conflicts in the past two decades (globalsecurity, 2009; Olukoshi, 
2001). Yet this does not mean that Nigeria consists of two monolithic religious blocs. Many 
different Islamic sects exist, Sunni and Shiite Islam are practiced, and only part of the Muslim 
territories is part of the caliphate founded in the northwest of Nigeria in the early nineteenth 
century: the Sokoto Caliphate (e.g. Hunwick, 1992). Moreover, Christianity encompasses Roman 
Catholicism, Anglican churches, and many smaller Protestant groups or sects (globalsecurity, 
2009).
 Politically, the ethnoreligious conflicts threaten the unity of the Nigerian federal state. 
President Obasanjo’s first government (1999–2003) has sought to compromise with the Islamic 
opposition and his policies have reduced some tensions (Isaacs, 2003). As of 1999, Nigeria’s 37 
states are allowed to incorporate Shari’a law into the criminal law code (instead of only in civil 
law). Twelve states in northern Nigeria have made use of this opportunity. However, the Shari’a 
law does not apply to non-Muslims in these states (globalsecurity, 2009; Isaacs, 2003; Olukoshi, 
2001). Of the three main political parties in Nigeria,132 only the All (Nigerian) People’s Party is 
associated with Islam (Cahoon, 2009). In the 2003 presidential elections, this party’s candidate 
won about one third of the votes. That same year, it lost three governorships, leaving the ANPP 
with governors in six out of 37 states.
 Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil-industry exports. It has been suggested 
that this has had a positive effect on women’s employment rates. Different studies point at 
a third to half of the women being active in a non-agricultural job, which is much higher than 
the employment rates in other Sub-Saharan African countries (see Chapter 5). Even taking into 
account oil exports and the level of economic development, Nigeria’s women’s employment rate 
is somewhat higher than in other comparable Muslim countries (Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009).
9.3.3 C ASE SELEC TION STR ATEGY
Indonesia and Nigeria are interesting countries to study in terms of the effects of Islam on 
women’s employment for several reasons, some more practical, some more theoretical.
 Firstly, while the average Muslim country does not exist, studying Indonesia and Nigeria 
does make it possible to draw more general conclusions about the larger population. Both 
countries are roughly middle-income countries, oil plays some role in export, they have a 
colonial political history, and a certain degree of religious freedom. These are all characteristics 
they share with other (African and Central Asia) Muslim countries. In those terms, the results 
for these countries might be used to draw conclusions about other Muslim countries in these 
regions. The fact that Indonesia and Nigeria have relatively high levels of women’s employment 
compared to other Muslim countries is an advantage to this study. A relatively high score on 
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134 Other countries in the database also fulfil the criterion of 
at least 25 higher-level units: Algeria (47), Egypt (26); and 
with 24 districts Tunisia comes close. However, for none 
of these countries the religious denomination is present 
in the dataset, and the religious heterogeneity is very 
restricted in these countries.
133 It might be argued that their arguments only apply to 
almost exclusive Islamic contexts, but the practice in 
civilisationist studies suggest otherwise. For instance, 
Indonesia and Nigeria are generally included in the Islamic 
civilisation dummies (see for instance the map in Inglehart 
& Norris [2003b: 64]).
Indonesia nigeria
factor (Hypo) variable values1 average 
(s.e.)2
Missings3 variable values1 average 
(s.e.)2
Missings3
Individual level (n=32,265) (n=27,592)
religious 
denomination
self-reported 
religion
Muslim 0.801 161 Self-reported 
religion
Muslim 0.498 152
Protestant 0.109 Protestant 0.382
Catholic 0.042 Catholic 0.100
Hindu 0.040 Other 0.020
Other 0.008 -
district level (n=33) (n=37)
predominant 
religion
Religion of ma-
jority of women 
Muslim 0.82 0 Religion of ma-
jority of women 
Muslim 0.43 0
Protestant 0.09 Protestant 0.49
Catholic 0.03 Catholic 0.08
Hindu 0.03 -
conservatism 
of predominant 
Islam4
Traditionalist 
Islam (vs Mod-
ernist)
(1) Yes 
0 = no
0.21 0 Sokoto Islam (vs 
non-Sokoto)
(1) Yes 
0 = no
0.27 0
Implementation 
of Shari’a law
Shari’a is part 
of law is (sub)
district
(1) Yes 0.30 0 Shari’a is part of 
law in district
(1) Yes 
0 = no
0.32 0
Power of Islamic 
political actors
Share of 
district’s seat in 
parliament for 
Islamic party
min: 0
max: 54
23.7
(14.2)
0 Presence of a 
governor from an 
Islamic party in 
district
(1) Yes 
0 = no
0.16 0
Share of 
district’s seat in 
parliament for 
Muslim party
min: 0
max: 39
13.4
(10.9)
0 -
Control variable Gender Develop-
ment Index value
min: 47.7
max: 66.7
55.7
(4.07)
0 -
Notes: The figures in this table are based on unweighted samples; the indicated ‘n’ is the number of cases after deleting the reported 
missings; (1) the presented minimums and maximums are the extremes as they are present in the data, not the conceptual/possible 
extremes; (2) in the case of nominal/categorical variables no standard deviation is reported and the average represents the proportion 
of cases falling in the designated category; (3) These are the missings starting from the ‘cleaned’ data sets as presented in Chapter 
4 and used in Chapter 6 (and 7); (4) this is a dummy making a distinction for all district that are predominant Muslim on the district 
variable indicating the predominant religion in that district. Inclusion of the new variable in a model in which already the religion 
dummies at the district level are included (Muslim being the reference group) expands the classification of the old variable to include 
a new group and the reference group than shift to being the Muslim districts not included in the newly included dummy for either 
Traditionalist (Indonesia) or Sokoto (Nigeria) Islam.
table 9.1 Overview new variables 
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the dependent variable suggests relatively high or relatively low levels of certain explanatory 
factors (see Gerring’s [2007] discussion of ‘extreme cases’). That both countries have substantial 
Christian populations might indicate that religion is this explanatory factor. If so, we would, 
especially within these two countries, expect that Christian (or non-Muslim) districts have 
higher employment levels and the Muslim areas lower ones; or Christian (or non-Muslim) women 
to be more active on the labour market, and Muslim women less. If this is not the case, the 
tests in this chapter provide a strong refutation of the theoretical argument presented by the 
civilisationists.133
 Secondly, the diversity in these countries in terms of religion enables me to make 
comparisons, and establish whether there is any correlation or possibly causal relation. In terms 
of personal religious denomination, the dominant religion in districts, the type of Islam in 
districts, and the political institutionalisation of Islam there is considerable variation in Indonesia 
and Nigeria. Thirdly, but highly related to the previous point, both countries have more than 30 
districts, which creates enough statistical leverage to conduct quantitative testing at the district 
level (Jones & Duncan, 1998).134 Fourthly, as the women’s religious denomination is known for 
these countries, it can be aggregated to the district level. Lastly, politically, the significance of 
Indonesia and Nigeria is relatively large, since these are two of the largest Muslim countries in 
the world, with about 195 million female inhabitants of which roughly 140 million are Muslim, and 
the countries also play important political roles in their regions.
 Given that many countries lack a comparative database that includes information about 
different manifestations of Islam at the individual and sub-national levels, the sub-national and 
micro-level differences in Indonesia and Nigeria can for now be useful in understanding Islam’s 
influence on women’s employment.
9.4 data & MetHod
The datasets and operationalisations used in this chapter are similar to those discussed in 
Chapter 4, and the variables added as controls are those used in the models presented in Chapter 
6. The fully controlled models in Table 9.3 and Table 9.5 are based on the final model presented 
in that same chapter. One major difference is, however, that the country-level is now excluded, 
because I only focus on two countries. Furthermore, I have added one additional control variable 
for Indonesia, because the Indonesian UNDP report provides a Gender Development Index value 
at the district level (Mishra et.al., 2004).135
 In addition to the regular data, religion variables have been included to measure individual 
denomination, the districts’ religious dominance, and the political institutionalisation of Islam in 
the districts. More information on these variables is given in Table 9.1. Appendix 9.1 includes all 
district-level scores. At the individual level, I could distinguish between the women’s religious 
denominations. For Indonesia, I categorise the women as Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, 
or other. The last includes the small group of Buddhist women. For Nigeria, a distinction is made 
between Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and other religions. The last includes the small group of 
‘Animist’ women. At the individual level, I cannot make a distinction between different types of 
Islam, but the traditionalist values proxies are included to study the variation within religious 
groups.
 At the district level, the dominance of a religion is measured by the percentage of women 
that adheres to a certain denomination. For Indonesia this led to the easy classification of all 33 
districts (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, or Hinduism). In the case of Nigeria, classification 
was also not that difficult, though there was one district where no religion (Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism) had the majority, but the plurality of women was Protestant (48%) and a majority 
was Christian. This district (Kogi) was thus coded as predominantly Protestant. The focus on the 
predominant religion (with dummy variables) is in line with the civilisation approach (see Clark, 
Ramsbey & Adler; 1991; Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2003b; Norris 
& Inglehart, 2002; Tzannatos & Kaur, 2003) and therefore the best way to test their reasoning, 
although it is here tested within countries.
 To measure the difference between more and less conservative strands of Islam, the 
Muslim districts in Indonesia could easily be divided into two groups: the districts in which the 
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136 The provinces are divided in 5 to 38 ‘regions’ (including 
‘cities’) (Gwillim Law, 2011).
137 In a murder case, finding a person with a smoking gun 
at the crime scene of a murder is strong proof that that 
person is the murderer. However, the absence of a gun 
does not proof that the murdered is not present. The 
proof is asymmetrical. Finding a gun is almost sufficient 
proof, but it is not a necessity.
135 For the final models in this chapter (the models with all 
variables), Appendix 9.2 present the coefficient for the 
religion variables from models estimated with weighted 
IGLS procedures. Hardly any substantial differences have 
been found. Only the district-level variables for Indonesia 
become somewhat stronger statistically significant.
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more orthodox “Modernist” Islam is dominant, and the districts in which the less conservative 
“Traditionalist” Islam is dominant. The latter religion is mainly found in the Javanese provinces 
and the southern tip of Sumatra (Patung, 2006c; UNDP Indonesia, 2009). For Nigeria, such a 
clear-cut division was not available. However, an attempt can be made by following Nigeria’s 
ethnoreligious cleavages, which divide the Muslim part of the country. Here, the Hausa/Fulani 
people have a distinct Islamic history as being dominant in the Sokoto Caliphate and the Sokoto 
Sultan is still, after colonisation and decolonisation, an important religious figure in Nigeria 
(IslamToday, 2011; Nationsencyclopedia, 2009; Globalsecurity, 2009; XTimeLine, 2011). The 
districts in which the majority of women reported either a Hausa or a Fulani ethnicity where 
coded as Sokoto Islam. These nine districts also formed the geographical core of the Sokoto 
Caliphate. While these Sokoto Islamic districts can thus be distinguished from the other Islamic 
districts in Nigeria, it is somewhat more difficult to predict whether women’s employment will 
be higher or lower in the Sokoto districts than in the others. Callaway & Creevey (1994: 99) stress 
that Hausa/Fulani women did not have an active economic role in the wage sector, Hunwick 
(1992) believes them to be more traditional in religious matters because they have ties with Saudi 
Arabian Wahhabism, and Kritz & Makinwa-Adebusoye (1999) argue that the Hausa ethnoreligious 
background is expected to be less conducive to women’s public participation than Yoruba 
and Ibo people. On the other hand, Kriger (1993) argues and shows that women in the Sokoto 
Caliphate were far more active in the textile industry than is often thought, but mainly in (paid) 
home production.
 To assess the political institutionalisation of Islam, the focus is on Shari’a and political 
parties. In its legislation, Indonesia is rather centralist, but in 2003 Aceh was given special status 
and it adopted Shari’a under the special Autonomy Law. Since then, some other provinces and 
regions (subdivisions of provinces) have implemented Shari’a law as well. I coded a dummy for 
those districts (provinces) in which at least one region adopted Shari’a-based law (Patung, 2006a; 
2006b).136 For the twelve Nigerian districts (governorates) that have Shari’a law as part of their 
criminal law a dummy was created as well (Isaacs, 2003; globalsecurity, 2009; Olukoshi, 2001). 
The presence of Islamic political parties in Indonesia was measured by the strength in seat shares 
based on the province-level results of the 2004 parliamentary elections (Ananta, Nurvidya & 
Suryadinata, 2005). In calculating these shares, I distinguished between the Islamist parties and 
the other Muslim parties. The PPP, PKS, PBR and PBB are considered to be Islamist (Ananta, 
Nurvidya & Suryadinata, 2005; Indonesiamatters, 2006), and the PAN and PKB are considered 
Muslim parties. The latter officially hold Pancasila – the political state ideology formulated first 
by Sukarno – as their ideology (not Islam), but they are mainly supported by Muslims (Ananta, 
Nurvidya & Suryadinata, 2005: 21). An interval variable was created for both. In the case of 
Nigeria, I was able to include whether the governor of a district came from an Islamic party 
based on the results of the May 2007 elections. The ANPP (formerly APP) is considered to be an 
Islamic party (Cahoon, 2009). A dummy variable was created to indicate the presence of an ANPP 
governor.
 While the two cases have relatively many districts and meet the criteria for a multilevel 
analysis, the number of districts in both countries does not allow the inclusion of many variables. 
Moreover, in Nigeria the dummies on the religious dominance of Islam, Sokoto Islam and Shari’a 
are nested in each other, which demands very careful interpretation in terms of what exactly is 
measured when several dummies are included. Partly because of this, I will present different 
models with more and fewer controls at the district level – another reason for this is to probe the 
causal mechanisms. Low significance might thus be due to including too many variables. However, 
when a relationship is consistently significant and shows similar coefficients it will prove to be 
robust. In other words, this approach to the models can provide strong proof in favour of the 
expectations, but not finding a robust relationship is not enough proof to immediately discard the 
expectation; it could be seen as a ‘smoking-gun test’ (Van Evera, 1997: 31–2).137
9.5 ISL aM and eMpLoyMent
I will first discuss the different descriptives and the regression analyses for Indonesia, then for 
Nigeria, and finally compare the results for the two countries.
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9.5.1 INDONESIA
Figure 9.2 shows that 32% of all Muslim women Indonesia are employed, which is a higher 
percentage than for the other religions, with the exception of the Hindu, women almost half 
of whom is employed. At the district level, all the women living in Muslim-dominated districts 
have an employment probability of almost 30%. This percentage is considerably lower (20%) 
in the Protestant districts (North Sulawesi, Papua, and West Papua or Papua Barat), while it is 
much higher in Bali, where Hindus are the dominant religious group. These descriptive statistics 
give rise to the question whether the differences are significant and whether the district-level 
differences might be compositional.
 Table 9.2 and Table 9.3 present several regression models that provide insight into the 
(controlled) associations of religion with women’s employment. The models in Table 9.2 show 
the results after only including the religion variables. From this it can be deduced that the raw 
differences at the individual level, after taking into account variation between districts, do not 
show a particularly low employment likelihood for Muslim women. On the contrary, after filtering 
out district-level differences, Muslim women have significantly higher employment likelihoods 
than Protestant, Catholic, and Other women (at least p<0.01). Only the difference with Hindu 
women is not significant. This pattern is found consistently in Model 2 through Model 5.
 At the district level, it seems that living in a Hindu-dominated district is beneficial to 
women’s employment (compared to Muslim-dominated regions as well as Protestant and 
Catholic districts), while no other clearly significant differences were found with Muslim-
dominated districts. It seems that Shari’a law making is negatively associated with women’s 
employment (p<0.05): the odds on employment are between 29% and 35% lower in districts 
where the Shari’a is implemented (Model 3 and Model 5). The influence of the presence of Islamic 
and Muslim political parties is less robust across these two models. In one model, the presence of 
Islamic parties has a positive effect (Model 5, p<0.05) and the presence of Muslim parties has no 
effect. In the other, Muslim parties have a positive effect (Model 3, p<0.05) but Islamic parties 
have not. In the first case a seat share increase of 10 percentage points leads to an increase in 
employment odds of 15% (Model 5), in the second one of 22% (Model 3). In Model 4 and Model 
5, a distinction is made based on the type of Islam that is dominant in the district. Both show 
clearly that women’s employment is significantly higher (p<0.001; 89% increase in odds) in the 
districts where ‘Traditionalist’ Islam is dominant than in to districts where the more conservative 
‘Modernist’ Islam is dominant.
 Overall, these results suggest that at the individual level, Islam has no negative influence on 
women’s employment likelihood (on the contrary). At the societal level, the dominant religion 
does seem to have an influence, but the dividing line is not between Islam on the one hand 
and Christianity or the other religions on the other, as the Hindu-dominated province alone 
stands out positively. That Bali stands out might not be due to religious differences, but to 
the strong tourist economy on the island, a relatively feminine sector. Regarding the Muslim 
provinces, the difference between the more conservative and the less conservative version of 
Islam is larger than the difference between any of the religions. The districts in which a more 
conservative strand of Islam is dominant have an equal employment rate for women as the 
Protestant-dominated districts (after controlling for the religion of the people living there). The 
less conservative Islam dominated districts have higher employment levels than the Protestant 
ones. The religious institutionalisation variables show clear negative effects for the presence of 
Shari’a, but suggest positive effects of Muslim/Islamic political parties having political power. So 
far, these results have not been controlled for socio-economic and value variables.
 The results for the models, including these controls, are found in Table 9.3 and help to 
understand the possible causal mechanisms related to religion. In Models 1 through 3 the religion 
variables’ effects are controlled for different clusters of women’s individual-level characteristics 
that where mentioned as possible intervening variables.
 For the difference between women with different religions, if any effect is found at all, the 
lower employment likelihood of all other women compared to Muslim women only increases. 
Controlling for differences in education, having children, and having a partner widens the gap 
between Protestant and Catholic women on the one hand and Muslim women on the other 
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table 9.2: Logistic regression results for models of gainful non-agricultural employed outside, women aged 15–49, neither in school nor disabled 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.234 *** 0.063 -0.233 *** 0.064 -0.233 *** 0.061 -0.216 *** 0.058
Catholicism -0.430 *** 0.099 -0.436 *** 0.096 -0.433 *** 0.096 -0.407 *** 0.094
Hinduism -0.277 0.185 -0.277 0.161 -0.273 0.167 -0.254 0.162
Other -0.564 ** 0.193 -0.582 ** 0.202 -0.557 ** 0.188 -0.526 ** 0.180
district level
Dominant religion
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. - -
Modernist (more conservative) Ref. Ref.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.627 *** 0.156 0.651 *** 0.140
Protestantism -0.594 # 0.332 -0.586 0.305 -0.423 0.398 -0.333 0.239 -0.170 0.289
Catholicism -0.018 0.522 0.386 0.510 0.356 0.557 0.408 0.475 0.726 0.463
Hinduism 1.120 * 0.479 1.050 0.709 1.541 ** 0.500 1.470 ** 0.475 1.676 *** 0.385
Shari’a -0.340 * 0.163 -0.427 * 0.210
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.002 0.007 0.014 * 0.007
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.020 * 0.009 0.008 0.006
Model statistics
Intercept -1.111 *** 0.086 -1.085 *** 0.108 -1.352 *** 0.280 -1.281 *** 0.080 -1.553 *** 0.235
District-level variance 0.291 *** 0.080 0.247 *** 0.074 0.213 ** 0.065 0.168 ** 0.052 0.140 ** 0.046
Household-level variance 1.309 *** 0.093 1.305 *** 0.205 1.270 *** 0.167 1.209 *** 0.104 0.893 *** 0.221
Deviance 37,721.17 37,668.95 37,676.58 37,696.96 37,860.01
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.234 *** 0.063 -0.233 *** 0.064 -0.233 *** 0.061 -0.216 *** 0.058
Catholicism -0.430 *** 0.099 -0.436 *** 0.096 -0.433 *** 0.096 -0.407 *** 0.094
Hinduism -0.277 0.185 -0.277 0.161 -0.273 0.167 -0.254 0.162
Other -0.564 ** 0.193 -0.582 ** 0.202 -0.557 ** 0.188 -0.526 ** 0.180
district level
Dominant religion
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. - -
Modernist (more conservative) Ref. Ref.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.627 *** 0.156 0.651 *** 0.140
Protestantism -0.594 # 0.332 -0.586 0.305 -0.423 0.398 -0.333 0.239 -0.170 0.289
Catholicism -0.018 0.522 0.386 0.510 0.356 0.557 0.408 0.475 0.726 0.463
Hinduism 1.120 * 0.479 1.050 0.709 1.541 ** 0.500 1.470 ** 0.475 1.676 *** 0.385
Shari’a -0.340 * 0.163 -0.427 * 0.210
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.002 0.007 0.014 * 0.007
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.020 * 0.009 0.008 0.006
Model statistics
Intercept -1.111 *** 0.086 -1.085 *** 0.108 -1.352 *** 0.280 -1.281 *** 0.080 -1.553 *** 0.235
District-level variance 0.291 *** 0.080 0.247 *** 0.074 0.213 ** 0.065 0.168 ** 0.052 0.140 ** 0.046
Household-level variance 1.309 *** 0.093 1.305 *** 0.205 1.270 *** 0.167 1.209 *** 0.104 0.893 *** 0.221
Deviance 37,721.17 37,668.95 37,676.58 37,696.96 37,860.01
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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table 9.3 Logistic regression results for models of gainful non-agricultural employed outside, women aged 15–49, neither in school nor disabled 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level - religion
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.463 *** 0.059 -0.451 *** 0.062 -0.303 *** 0.062 -0.233 *** 0.060 -0.418 *** 0.059
Catholicism -0.703 *** 0.092 -0.688 *** 0.097 -0.541 *** 0.100 -0.445 *** 0.098 -0.625 *** 0.096
Hinduism -0.261 0.176 -0.264 0.156 -0.293 0.177 -0.297 0.176 -0.083 0.159
Other -0.569 ** 0.187 -0.549 ** 0.193 -0.647 *** 0.185 -0.574 ** 0.192 -0.824 *** 0.178
Individual level - controls
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 -0.048 0.041 -0.192 *** 0.045
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.121 0.095 -0.292 ** 0.098
5 or more, older than 5 -0.400 0.744 -0.439 0.738
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.607 *** 0.042 -0.569 *** 0.047
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.538 *** 0.054 -0.685 *** 0.058
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.754 *** 0.143 -0.849 *** 0.151
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.907 *** 0.061 -0.779 *** 0.066
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.126 * 0.054
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not 0.317 *** 0.039 0.295 *** 0.046
secondary completed, no tertiary 1.054 *** 0.048 0.765 *** 0.059
at least some tertiary 2.761 *** 0.084 2.315 *** 0.087
Living in a city (ref = no) 0.630 *** 0.038
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture -0.838 *** 0.048
Lower white collar 0.068 0.042
Upper white collar 0.106 0.060
Unemployed 0.390 *** 0.093
Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not 0.070 0.050
secondary completed, no tertiary 0.000 0.060
at least some tertiary -0.018 0.085
Age woman at birth first child 0.080 *** 0.004 -0.009 * 0.004
Age difference (partner – woman) -0.014 *** 0.003 -0.014 *** 0.003
Traditional household structure -0.048 0.033 -0.061 0.034
Age 0.180 *** 0.005
Age2 -0.002 *** 0.000
Continues on pages 254 – 255
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level - religion
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.463 *** 0.059 -0.451 *** 0.062 -0.303 *** 0.062 -0.233 *** 0.060 -0.418 *** 0.059
Catholicism -0.703 *** 0.092 -0.688 *** 0.097 -0.541 *** 0.100 -0.445 *** 0.098 -0.625 *** 0.096
Hinduism -0.261 0.176 -0.264 0.156 -0.293 0.177 -0.297 0.176 -0.083 0.159
Other -0.569 ** 0.187 -0.549 ** 0.193 -0.647 *** 0.185 -0.574 ** 0.192 -0.824 *** 0.178
Individual level - controls
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 -0.048 0.041 -0.192 *** 0.045
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.121 0.095 -0.292 ** 0.098
5 or more, older than 5 -0.400 0.744 -0.439 0.738
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.607 *** 0.042 -0.569 *** 0.047
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.538 *** 0.054 -0.685 *** 0.058
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.754 *** 0.143 -0.849 *** 0.151
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.907 *** 0.061 -0.779 *** 0.066
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.126 * 0.054
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not 0.317 *** 0.039 0.295 *** 0.046
secondary completed, no tertiary 1.054 *** 0.048 0.765 *** 0.059
at least some tertiary 2.761 *** 0.084 2.315 *** 0.087
Living in a city (ref = no) 0.630 *** 0.038
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture -0.838 *** 0.048
Lower white collar 0.068 0.042
Upper white collar 0.106 0.060
Unemployed 0.390 *** 0.093
Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not 0.070 0.050
secondary completed, no tertiary 0.000 0.060
at least some tertiary -0.018 0.085
Age woman at birth first child 0.080 *** 0.004 -0.009 * 0.004
Age difference (partner – woman) -0.014 *** 0.003 -0.014 *** 0.003
Traditional household structure -0.048 0.033 -0.061 0.034
Age 0.180 *** 0.005
Age2 -0.002 *** 0.000
in Indonesia
254
table 9.3 Continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
district level - religion
Dominant religion
Islam
Modernist (more conservative) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.621 *** 0.116 0.596 *** 0.166 0.615 ** 0.200 0.543 *** 0.115 0.572 *** 0.139
Protestantism -0.104 0.203 -0.101 0.271 -0.256 0.245 -0.243 0.204 -0.385 0.250
Catholicism 1.057 ** 0.369 0.903 * 0.399 0.584 # 0.306 0.651 * 0.284 0.702 * 0.295
Hinduism 1.660 *** 0.313 1.718 *** 0.394 1.665 *** 0.468 1.349 *** 0.344 1.154 ** 0.347
Shari’a -0.373 ** 0.128 -0.361 * 0.150 -0.337 * 0.135 -0.322 * 0.151 -0.217 * 0.102
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.010 * 0.004 0.011 # 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 # 0.006 0.009 # 0.005
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.007 # 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.013 * 0.006 0.002 0.006
district level - controls
Economic development: Wealth level 0.662 0.822
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.580 1.964
Labour market structure: Share white collar -1.854 *** 0.456
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 3.178 ** 1.057
Degree of urbanisation 1.577 * 0.772
Norms: Women in public sphere -1.936 1.864 -0.027 1.152
Norms: Traditional care roles -7.571 *** 1.364 -7.527 *** 0.988
GDI Value 0.014 * 0.006 0.020 *** 0.003
Model statistics
Intercept -0.977 *** 0.104 -2.067 *** 0.247 -1.352 *** 0.280 -0.533 *** 0.126 -2.632 *** 0.234
District-level variance 0.095 ** 0.031 0.102 ** 0.034 0.213 ** 0.065 0.074 ** 0.026 0.047 * 0.019
Household-level variance 0.664 *** 0.136 0.773 *** 0.162 1.270 *** 0.167 1.258 *** 0.144 0.665 *** 0.092
Deviance 34,792.79 35,445.74 37,266.17 37,673.48 33,348.76
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
district level - religion
Dominant religion
Islam
Modernist (more conservative) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.621 *** 0.116 0.596 *** 0.166 0.615 ** 0.200 0.543 *** 0.115 0.572 *** 0.139
Protestantism -0.104 0.203 -0.101 0.271 -0.256 0.245 -0.243 0.204 -0.385 0.250
Catholicism 1.057 ** 0.369 0.903 * 0.399 0.584 # 0.306 0.651 * 0.284 0.702 * 0.295
Hinduism 1.660 *** 0.313 1.718 *** 0.394 1.665 *** 0.468 1.349 *** 0.344 1.154 ** 0.347
Shari’a -0.373 ** 0.128 -0.361 * 0.150 -0.337 * 0.135 -0.322 * 0.151 -0.217 * 0.102
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.010 * 0.004 0.011 # 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 # 0.006 0.009 # 0.005
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.007 # 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.013 * 0.006 0.002 0.006
district level - controls
Economic development: Wealth level 0.662 0.822
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.580 1.964
Labour market structure: Share white collar -1.854 *** 0.456
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 3.178 ** 1.057
Degree of urbanisation 1.577 * 0.772
Norms: Women in public sphere -1.936 1.864 -0.027 1.152
Norms: Traditional care roles -7.571 *** 1.364 -7.527 *** 0.988
GDI Value 0.014 * 0.006 0.020 *** 0.003
Model statistics
Intercept -0.977 *** 0.104 -2.067 *** 0.247 -1.352 *** 0.280 -0.533 *** 0.126 -2.632 *** 0.234
District-level variance 0.095 ** 0.031 0.102 ** 0.034 0.213 ** 0.065 0.074 ** 0.026 0.047 * 0.019
Household-level variance 0.664 *** 0.136 0.773 *** 0.162 1.270 *** 0.167 1.258 *** 0.144 0.665 *** 0.092
Deviance 34,792.79 35,445.74 37,266.17 37,673.48 33,348.76
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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138 The role of Christian parties in Indonesia has been 
marginal.
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
District
Individual
OtherCatholicProtestantMuslim
figure 9.3 Women’s employment by religion in Nigeria
 Women's employment (%)
257
(Model 1 and Model 2, see also Model 5). Christian women are for instance higher educated 
than Muslim women, and if we take this into account Christian women have even more lower 
employment likelihoods than Muslim women. This might indicate that Christian beliefs 
are particularly unfavourable for women entering the labour market, not for educational 
participation.
 The inclusion of individual-level controls also influences some of the context-level results. 
Living in the Catholic-dominated district (East Nusa Tenggara) seems to lead to significantly 
higher employment likelihoods, putting it at the same level as the ‘Traditionalist’ (less 
conservative) Muslim-dominated districts (Model 1, 2, 3 and 5). The difference between the 
‘Traditionalist’ and ‘Modernist’-dominated districts seems to be related hardly to individual 
differences, but it is for a (relatively small) part captured by the district-level norm variables. 
The difference between the Hindu-dominated district and the rest also seems partly due to 
differences in district-level norms.
 The political-institutional variables show a picture similar to the one described above. 
The incorporation of Shari’a in the legislation has a negative effect on women’s employment, 
even after control for individual- and district-level controls. The effects of Shari’a seem only 
partly to work through district-level norms, and the educational and individual-level value 
variables. Furthermore, not taking into account the economic structures of a district leads to 
overestimating the effect. After controlling for these factors, employment odds are 20% lower 
in districts with Shari’a-based law than in other districts (p<0.05). The political power of Islamic/
Muslim parties shows positive significant effects in 2 out of 10 instances (Models 1 through 
5, p<0.05), and marginal significant positive effects in an additional 4 (p<0.10). Political Islam 
does not seem to influence women’s employment negatively; if political Islam has an influence 
it seems to be a positive effect, though it is not really robust. Moreover, Islamic parties do not 
seem to have a more negative (or different) effect than Muslim parties.138
9.5.2 NIGERIA
The raw employment figures for Nigeria show that 51% of all Muslim women are employed, and 
48% of tall women living in a Muslim-dominated district are employed (Figure 9.3). For both 
the individual women and the districts these figures are higher than for the other religions. 
In particular non-Christian/non-Muslim women have low employment likelihoods (20%), and 
Catholic women and districts also trail at a considerable distance behind the other religions. 
The raw difference between Catholic and Protestant women and districts seems larger than the 
difference between Protestant and Muslim women and districts.
 Table 9.4 and Table 9.5 present the multivariate models. When interpreting the district-
level results, it should be taken into account that the sample is limited to 37 districts and that 
collinearity is high because of embedded classifications: all Sokoto-Muslim districts have 
implemented the Shari’a, and all districts that implemented the Shari’a are Muslim dominated 
(though this is not the case the other way around – see Appendix 9.1). Taking this into account, 
some variables still show very robust findings at the district level and major conclusions can be 
drawn.
 Firstly, the legislative incorporation of Shari’a has a strong negative effect across all models 
(Table 9.4 as well as Table 9.5), partly working through education and district-level norms. 
The effect varies across models, but even after controlling for many district-level factors the 
presence of Shari’a remains related to a decrease in employment odds of 76%. In all other 
models, the effect of Shari’a legislation varies between 35% and 92%. For the other variable 
of political institutionalisation (a governor of the ANPP), no statistically significant results are 
found in the models. Running the models without the Shari’a variable, however, does show a 
negative and significant effect of the ANPP variable. This could mean that Shari’a is implemented 
in the districts where the ANPP is more powerful, but given that Shari’a is implemented 
in more northern provinces than just those where the ANPP is dominant, it seems that the 
Shari’a influence is simply more influential on women’s employment. The durable and stable 
institutionalisation of certain value systems seems more important than the institutionalisation 
through changing political power relations in terms of leaders.
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table 9.4 Logistic regression results for models of gainful non-agricultural employed outside, women aged 15–49, neither in school nor disabled 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Logg odds s.e.
Individual level
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.299 *** 0.064 -0.298 *** 0.060 -0.303 *** 0.068 -0.322 *** 0.062
Catholicism -0.346 *** 0.097 -0.345 *** 0.092 -0.359 *** 0.100 -0.372 *** 0.090
Other -1.856 *** 0.174 -1.792 *** 0.201 -1.851 *** 0.186 -1.848 *** 0.197
district level
Dominant religion
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. - -
Other Islam Ref. Ref.
Sokoto-Islam -0.558 # 0.325 0.770 0.443
Protestantism -0.480 * 0.223 -0.439 * 0.177 -0.624 * 0.306 -0.625 * 0.273 -0.188 0.186
Catholicism -0.968 * 0.477 -1.427 ** 0.575 -1.458 ** 0.563 -2.034 * 0.801 -1.014 * 0.411
Shari’a -0.807 ** 0.292 -1.212 *** 0.235
Political Islam: Governor from ANPP -0.482 0.346 -0.162 0.506
Model statistics
Intercept 0.162 0.179 0.201 0.142 0.581 ** 0.202 0.375 0.244 0.181 0.163
District-level variance 1.221 *** 0.363 1.346 *** 0.336 1.077 *** 0.326 1.362 *** 0.364 1.223 *** 0.339
Household-level variance 2.262 ** 0.819 2.835 *** 0.225 2.394 ** 0.759 2.803 *** 0.399 2.662 *** 0.578
Deviance 33,272.48 32,514.86 33,029.16 32,580.45 32,717.26
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 27,592; Nd=37; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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table 9.5 Logistic regression results for models of gainful non-agricultural employed outside, women aged 15–49, neither in school nor disabled 
Continues on pages 262–263
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level - religion
Religious denomination
Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestantism -0.284 *** 0.070 -0.676 *** 0.070 -0.336 *** 0.065 -0.313 *** 0.064 -0.770 *** 0.073
Catholicism -0.339 *** 0.101 -0.739 *** 0.095 -0.379 *** 0.093 -0.370 *** 0.095 -0.863 *** 0.105
Other -2.026 *** 0.179 -1.664 *** 0.174 -1.765 *** 0.218 -1.858 *** 0.178 -1.771 *** 0.189
Individual level - controls
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 0.774 *** 0.081 0.178 0.087
3 or 4, older than 5 0.695 *** 0.119 0.058 0.121
5 or more, older than 5 0.411 0.530 -0.120 0.515
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 0.119 0.061 0.133 * 0.062
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 0.487 *** 0.061 0.119 0.070
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 0.696 *** 0.083 0.142 0.094
Partner present (ref = no partner) 0.438 *** 0.071 0.406 *** 0.066
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.224 *** 0.060
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not 0.784 *** 0.057 0.664 *** 0.061
secondary completed, no tertiary 1.013 *** 0.068 1.019 *** 0.075
at least some tertiary 1.956 *** 0.104 1.591 *** 0.104
Living in a city (ref = no) 0.456 *** 0.054
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture -1.441 *** 0.090
Lower white collar -0.025 0.081
Upper white collar -0.188 0.103
Unemployed n.a.
Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not 0.131 0.071
secondary completed, no tertiary 0.055 0.077
at least some tertiary 0.024 0.101
Age woman at birth first child 0.036 *** 0.005 -0.016 * 0.007
Age difference (partner – woman) -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003
Traditional household structure -0.081 * 0.036 -0.020 0.040
Age 0.259 *** 0.013
Age2 -0.003 *** 0.000
district level - religion
Dominant religion
Islam
Other Islam Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Sokoto-Islam 0.668 0.508 0.239 0.411 0.321 0.418 0.581 * 0.292 0.276 0.245
Protestantism -1.529 *** 0.388 -0.772 * 0.300 -0.950 * 0.415 -0.791 ** 0.249 -1.335 *** 0.236
Catholicism -2.462 *** 0.530 -1.399 # 0.767 -1.888 * 0.851 -1.850 *** 0.444 -1.909 *** 0.447
Shari’a -2.511 *** 0.655 -0.808 * 0.356 -1.327 *** 0.277 -0.437 ** 0.206 -1.429 * 0.576
Political Islam: Governor from ANPP -0.090 0.364 -0.295 0.495 -0.082 0.565 -0.232 0.374 0.077 0.361
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table 9.5 Continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
district level - controls
Male labour supply: Male non-employment n.a.
Labour market structure: Share white collar 3.031 *** 0.709
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 3.867 ** 1.463
Degree of urbanisation -0.890 0.565
Norms: Women in public sphere 6.466 *** 0.685  3.855 *** 0.964
Norms: Traditional care roles -3.562 *** 0.303 2.555 ** 0.823
Model statistics
Intercept 0.849 *** 0.249 0.112 0.355 0.189 0.346 -0.347 0.301 -8.394 *** 0.408
District-level variance 1.306 *** 0.334 0.894 *** 0.259 0.991 ** 0.305 0.707 *** 0.196 0.472 *** 0.140
Household-level variance 3.488 *** 0.231 2.097 *** 0.356 2.205 ** 0.785 2.786 *** 0.281 3.217 *** 0.251
Deviance 31,775.87 32,344.17 33,095.76 32,563.52 29,508.78
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 27,592; Nd=37; Models are based on MCMC 
estimation (5,000 iterations), starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: see 
Chapter 4 and above.
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139 That the effects run in different directions possibly has 
to do with the role of religion in education. For instance, 
in the case of Jordan, Jansen (2006: 46) speaks of the 
Islamisation of education which might lead to higher 
education levels, but not directly to higher employment. 
The results found for Nigeria would then suggest a 
Christianisation of education, but a stronger, second 
argument would still be needed to explain to labour 
market difference.
140 p<0.05 is a rather lenient criterion for models containing 
this many respondents.
141 The unexpected positive effect for the traditionalism 
variable at the district level is less ‘worrisome’ because 
of the number of district-level variables. However, this 
effect is found in other chapters as well and will be 
addressed in the concluding chapter.
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 With regard to the dominant religion in a district, the difference between Catholicism 
and Protestantism on the one hand and Islam on the other seems rather robust as well in the 
multivariate analyses. In all models, the employment likelihood of women is lower in Protestant 
districts than in Muslim districts, and lowest in Catholic districts. These differences are neither 
simply due to the composition of the population in terms of religious denomination (compare 
e.g. Model 1 and Model 2 from Table 9.4), nor do they seem to be caused by differences in 
economic development or labour market structures (compare Model 4 and Model 5 from Table 
9.5). Given that Shari’a is implemented only in Muslim districts, the differences found in Table 
9.4, Model 2) might provide better estimates of the cultural differences than the differences 
found in the models including the Shari’a variable. A dominant Muslim culture might be 
considered a precondition for the implementation of Islamic law. If so, the models including 
the Islamic-law variable might artificially filter this effect of Muslim culture out. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the Christian-dominated districts have lower employment rates, which cannot 
be attributed to the factors that have been controlled for (e.g. individual level differences in 
education and economic circumstances in the district).
 Regarding the differences between various strands of Islam, the results are less clear. The 
Sokoto and non-Sokoto Muslim-dominated districts seem to differ somewhat, but in Model 
4 of Table 9.4 this effect is marginally significant and the employment in the latter is higher, 
while the difference takes the inverse form in the models including the Shari’a variable, though 
it only becomes significant in Model 4 of Table 9.5. Overall, the support for an effect is very 
weak. The marginally significant negative effect in Table 9.4 might however indicate that the 
Sokoto background is fertile soil for implementing Islamic law. Moreover, if I would include 
the proportion of people being Muslim, Protestant or Catholic – instead of dummies for the 
dominant religion – then the Sokoto background of districts makes no statistical difference. 
Summarising, I tend to conclude that there is no strong or robust effect of the cultural dominance 
in terms of Sokoto and non-Sokoto Islam.
 At the individual level, the differences between religious groups differ across models, but 
the relative position of the groups is rather stable. Muslim women have the highest employment 
likelihood, then the Christian women (Protestant and Catholic women have about equal 
likelihoods), and the other women have relatively very low employment likelihoods. Models 1 
through 3 (Table 9.5) show that education in particular seems related to women’s employment 
and religious denomination: after controlling for education, the difference between Christian 
and Muslim women increases. In other words, Muslim women appear to be lower educated and 
taking out this difference shows an even stronger difference between the two denominations. 
Again this begs for an explanation why being Christian compared to being Muslim has a positive 
effect on educational participation but a negative effect on labour participation.139
 Regarding the individual level differences, it should also be noted that some of the micro-
level factors show a different effect than generally expected. For the number of children, 
having a partner with an upper white-collar job or primary education, and the age of a woman 
at the birth of her first child, the results are not or only very weakly significant (Model 5, Table 
9.5).140 More noteworthy is the positive effect of having a partner.141 This might indicate a 
strong additional economic responsibility for women who are married with children. More 
than half of the women without a partner is a child or grandchild of the head of the household, 
which often means that they are less responsible for earning an income (see Chapter 8). 
However, this is speculation. More generally, the results for Nigeria suggest that some 
contextual Nigerian characteristics are particularly important in shaping these micro-level 
effects.
9.5.3 RELIGION AND EMPLOYMENT
The analyses for Indonesia and Nigeria show some (surprisingly) similar patterns regarding the 
influence of religion, Islam in particular, on women’s employment. In the first place, the analyses 
show that within these two countries, women’s employment is not consequently lower for 
Muslim women or in Muslim-dominated districts. In terms of individual denominations, Muslim 
women even have higher employment likelihoods than Christian women (Protestant or Catholic) 
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142 A possible explanation is the availability of types of jobs. 
However, I assume, and the results from Chapter 7 seem 
to confirm this, that employers prefer higher-educated 
women.
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in all models – though they are less educated.142 Secondly, at the district level, the models for 
both Nigeria and Indonesia show that the difference between strands of one religion (Islam or 
Christianity) is often just as big as the difference between Muslim and Christian or non-Muslim 
districts. Thirdly, of the political institutionalisation variables, the implementation of Shari’a 
has a clear relationship with women’s employment. In the Indonesian and Nigerian districts with 
Shari’a law, women’s employment is considerably lower. The other political institutionalisation 
variables did not show consistent effects.
9.6 reLIgIon By eMpLoyMent In otHer CountrIeS
As discussed in the section on the case selection, analyses with this degree of detail and the 
variation in the variables could only be executed for these two countries. Nevertheless, the 
religion of the surveyed women is also known for several other countries. In order to assess the 
generalisability of the results presented above – apart from the methodological discussion of their 
place in the larger population of countries (Section 9.3) – we can look at the employment levels of 
the less religiously diverse countries and the countries with fewer districts.
9.6.1 EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONAL RELIGION
Figure 9.4 presents the employment levels of women in fifteen other countries than Indonesia 
and Nigeria. These figures suggest that the result found for Indonesia and Nigeria cannot be 
translated directly to other (Muslim) countries, because in ten of the fourteen other countries 
for which data on Muslim and Christian women are available, the Christian women have higher 
employment rates (and often considerably higher ones at that). Simultaneously, next to 
Indonesia and Nigeria, Muslim women in three other countries (Guinea, Niger and Zanzibar) have 
higher employment likelihoods than Christian ones. Overall, the soundest conclusion regarding 
the difference between Christian and Muslim women’s employment seems that there is no 
universal difference.
 Besides the differences between Christian and Muslim women, Figure 9.4 also highlights 
some other differences that can provide insight into the role of religion. In the three countries 
that included substantial numbers of Hindu women (Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia), 
Hindu women have higher employment rates than either Christian or Muslim women. This might 
mean that Hinduism includes values regarding women’s economic role or gender equality that 
are beneficial to women’s employment. It should however be remembered that the numbers 
presented in this figure are not controlled for other socio-economic factors and can hardly be 
causally interpreted. The second noteworthy pattern is that in most cases the ‘Other’ group 
scores relatively low on women’s employment: in ten out of fourteen cases scoring lowest of 
all groups. Given that these include different religions ranging from Buddhism to Judaism to 
Animism, these results suggest that it is not the religion itself, but the size of a religion (a small 
minority) that plays a role. This draws attention to the context in which one adheres to a certain 
religion.
9.6.2 EMPLOYMENT AND DOMINANT RELIGION
In five of the countries discussed above, Islam is not the dominant religion in all districts. Figure 
9.5 depicts the districts’ average employment of women by dominant religion for these five 
countries. In four of the seven countries for which I have this kind of data, women’s employment 
is highest in districts where Muslim women outnumber Christian women instead of the other way 
around. Most interestingly, Muslim women in Burkina Faso have lower employment likelihoods 
than Christian women, but Muslim-dominated districts have higher employment rates than the 
Christian-dominated districts. However there are only two Christian-dominated districts and 
Ouagadougou (with an employment rate of 65%) is barely Muslim dominated (54% Muslims, 
46% Christian), so this result should be interpreted cautiously. Nonetheless, the overall picture 
is that at the district level it cannot be concluded that Muslim districts always have lower 
employment levels. The results for Indonesia and Nigeria – that women’s employment is higher 
in Muslim districts than in others (with the exception of Hindu-dominated district) – cannot be 
simply generalised either.
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143 The two views might be reconciled by distinguishing 
different types of labour: Kriger (1993) mainly talks 
about informal handicraft labour. It might be that this has 
translated to a relative strong role of women in unpaid 
and agricultural labour, not in the type of employment 
that I focus on, which is more influenced by the general 
level of conservativeness in Sokoto-Islam.
9.1 If a woman is Muslim, the probability a woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if
X she is not.
9.2 If a woman lives in an area predominantly inhabited by Muslim people, the probability that that woman is gainfully non-
X  agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area predominantly inhabited by people with another religious 
denomination.
9.3 If a woman lives in an area predominantly inhabited by people adhering to a more conservative type of Islam, the
✓  probability that that woman is gainfully non-agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area predominantly 
inhabited by people adhering to a less conservative type of Islam.
9.4 If a woman lives in an area in which Shari’a is part of the body of law, the probability that that woman is gainfully non 
✓  agriculturally employed is smaller than if she lives in an area in which Shari’a is not part of the body of law.
9.5 To the extent the presence of Islamic political actors in an area increases, the probability a woman is gainfully non 
X  agriculturally employed in that area decreases.
Box 9.5
269
9.7 ConCLuSIonS
9.7.1 OVER ALL RESULTS & HYPOTHESES
Based on district- and micro-level analyses of differences in religion and employment in 
Indonesia and Nigeria, and a rough comparison with data on some other countries, this chapter 
has tried to shed more light on the influence of religion, more particularly Islam, on women’s 
employment, answering the question: How and what influence do various types of Islam have on the 
position of women and more particularly on their employment?
 The results provide important evidence with regard to several of the hypotheses formulated 
in this chapter (see Box 9.5 for outcomes). Firstly, the analyses of the individual level differences 
in women’s employment likelihood according to their religious denomination shows mixed 
results. For Indonesia and Nigeria, it can be concluded that Muslim women have higher 
employment likelihoods, also after controlling for other micro-level characteristics. Still, the 
results show that Muslim women are lower educated than Christian women, and these results 
might be specific for the two countries studied here. In a substantial number of the other 
countries on which some information regarding religious denomination is present, Muslim 
women indeed have lower employment likelihoods. Overall, the results falsify Hypothesis 9.1. 
Muslim women do not have consistently lower employment ratios because they are Muslim.
 Secondly, regarding the dominant religion in an area, the analyses for Indonesia and Nigeria, 
in combination with the overview for five other countries have shown that Muslim-dominated 
districts do not have consistently lower employment levels than other districts (not even after 
controlling for socio-economic characteristics), refuting Hypothesis 9.2. However, it should 
again be noted that in some cases Muslim districts did have lower employment rates. More study 
of sub-national differences could shed light on the relevance of the religious-cultural context, 
and country-comparative research taking into account different institutional contexts seems 
worthwhile.
 Thirdly, the differences within a major religion (Hypothesis 9.3) can be as important as 
the differences between religions. For instance, the difference between ‘Modernist’ and 
‘Traditionalist’ Muslim districts in Indonesia is as large as the difference between Muslim 
and Christian districts. In Indonesia, the order of religions from low to high employment is: 
Protestant Christian, Modernist Muslim, Traditionalist Muslim, Catholic Christian, Hindu. For 
Nigeria, the difference between Sokoto and non-Sokoto Islam was hardly significant and not 
robust. This might reflect the disagreement in the literature about Sokoto Islam’s relative degree 
of conservatism. However, if any viewpoint is supported, it seems to be that Sokoto-Islam limits 
women’s employment and works partly or mainly through the incorporation of conservative 
Islam in political and legal institutions. This is more in line with Callaway & Creevey’s (1994), 
Hunwick’s (1992) and Kritz & Makinwa-Adebusoye’s (1999) point of view that Sokoto-Islam is 
relatively conservative, than with Kriger’s (1993) which proposes that women historically have 
had an economic role in it.143 Overall, these results resonate with literature on Protestantism and 
gender in Western countries, and on the realisation that conservativeness is a better explanatory 
factor than denomination (Ammons & Edgell, 2007; Chadwick & Garrett, 1995; Civettini & Glass, 
2008; Sherkat, 2000). Overall, the results for these two countries support the idea that the kind 
of Islam – in terms of conservativeness, not denomination – in the district is more relevant for 
women’s employment.
 Fourthly and most clearly, the legislative codification of orthodox (Shari’a) seems to harm 
women’s employment (Hypothesis 9.4). This result supports the earlier conclusion in Chapter 
6, in which the codification of conservative Islam in the constitution was found to be the most 
important country-level variable.
 Lastly, I studied the presence of political parties, and from the results for Indonesia and 
Nigeria it can be concluded that the influence of Islamic political parties is not unequivocal 
and the effects are uncertain. In Nigeria, consistent negative effects are found, but they are 
hardly statistically significant. For Indonesia the effects are consistently positive and the overall 
number of (marginally) significant relationships suggests at least a possible positive effect of the 
presence of Muslim and Islamic parties on women’s employment. Political Islam has not only a 
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negative influence on women’s position so it seems. A logical explanation for this can be found in 
the broader profile of political Islam. For instance, Pepinsky (2009) notes for Indonesia that: 
Of course, not all Indonesian progressives are so deeply concerned about the rise of PKS or of 
political Islam more broadly. Some are more concerned with empowering the poor, … fighting for 
civil rights and gender equality... For many of these causes, PKS and other Islamic parties can be 
allies rather than competitors.
In other words, Islamic values also incorporate ideas about socio-economic relationships and 
inequality, which benefit the poor. These are the values that might drive political actors and 
through that way help to create economic opportunities (see also Kotarumalos, 2009). More 
generally, in many countries political Islam is fuelled by economic inequalities. Islamic parties 
are often people’s parties and the Islamic concepts of egalitarianism and social justice can be 
translated into socio-economic policies (see Esposito & Voll, 1996; Owen, 2004). The Islamic and 
Muslim parties’ focus on the poor might thus explain the observed results as well as why no clear 
difference was found between the Islamic and Muslim parties in Indonesia.
9.7.2 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
To study the possible influences of Islam cross-sectionally, many studies have fallen back to 
measuring the denominations of individuals, the denominations that are dominant in an area, 
or the percentage of people that adheres to a certain religious denomination. Other data on 
specific religiously motivated values and religious institutionalisation are hardly available or 
show too little variation to be of use. Limitations in data have also restricted the analyses in 
this chapter, in particularly with regard to (1) measuring societal religious norms, individual 
religious values, and the difference between strands of one religion, and consequently (2) the 
selection of cases. Regarding the case selection, the two country studies performed here are still 
an important step forward, because they enabled me to test existing ideas about the general 
influence of culture as synonymous with religious denomination within a country, and because 
they provided a good basis for testing the importance of the political institutionalisation of 
religion. Although the results cannot be automatically generalised to other countries, the 
evidence presented here is sufficient to disprove the applicability of some general theories, 
at least at the sub-national level, and in that sense they do have broader implications. For the 
civilisationist theories, Indonesia and Nigeria were among the cases most likely (see Gerring, 
2007: 120–1) to confirm civilisationist theories because they showed high employment and 
relatively small Muslim populations. Yet they did not, because the Muslim women were the ones 
that caused the high employment figures. This can be seen as smoking-gun evidence against 
these theories (Van Evera, 1997).
 Of course, the internal validity should also be taken into consideration when it comes to 
the variation within countries at the district levels, especially for the dominant religion in a 
district, as some religions were only represented by one or a few districts. The results for those 
districts might be partly explained by idiosyncrasies. For instance, Bali – the only Hindu district 
in Indonesia – has an economy that is strongly fuelled by tourism: it is one of Indonesia’s main 
attractions. The job opportunities in the tourist sector and economic growth caused by tourism 
might explain the relatively high level of women’s employment in this region. I have controlled 
for this by including economic factors and labour market structures in the models, but the effect 
found for being a Hindu-dominated district should still be treated cautiously – the information 
on other countries, however, tends to support the conclusions drawn from the Bali case. 
Similarly, the high employment in East Nusa Tenggara can be due to a factor not controlled for, 
and not be related to the province being predominantly Catholic. However, this risk of ignored 
idiosyncrasies is only particularly high for the denomination variables at the district level and 
then mostly for the Hindu and Catholic districts in Indonesia. For the difference between Muslim 
and Protestant districts it is hardly problematic.
 The measurement of values and norms was not optimal in this chapter. However, the 
general usage of denominations makes the results of this chapter comparable to studies that 
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144 The analyses in Chapter 6 have also shown that the 
institutionalisation of (conservative) Islam is more 
important.
✓ Women who adhere to a more conservative Islamic tradition or women who live in areas in which a more conservative 
Islamic tradition is dominant have an employment likelihood that is lower than that of women who do not; 
? For each religion the same argument can be formulated: it is the degree of conservatism that influences women’s 
employment, not the religious denomination [not tested];
✓ Women’s employment in the Islamic denomination is not consistently lower than that in the other religions’ 
denominations, in other words, some Islamic groups have higher employment rates than for instance some Christian 
groups, and others have lower employment rates than Christian groups;
✓ Islam influences women’s employment likelihood through different channels at different levels (e.g. individual, 
community) and these different channels and level can lead to Islam having contradictory effects with respect to the 
likelihood that a woman is employed.
Box 9.6
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compare the Muslim world with the West. Consequently, the results here cannot be dismissed as 
originating from another way of measuring religion. Because of a lack of data, the district-level 
measurements were limited. In this chapter, I have followed the general guidelines by including 
at least 25 higher-level units (see Jones & Duncan, 1998), but the statistical power still remains 
limited to 33 and 37 units, respectively and the number of variables that can be included is fairly 
restricted. I would argue that more data collection about political and cultural differences at the 
district level should be an important goal for this kind of research, as the variation at that level 
seems important in both explaining intra-country differences and in testing macro-level theories. 
The access to cross-country comparative district-level data would tremendously benefit such 
research.
 With these limitations in mind, at least three major broader conclusions can be drawn for 
the study of the role of religion in establishing gender equality (see Box 9.6). These refer back 
to the general expectations formulated in Section 9.2.2. Firstly, there is no empirical proof for 
there being ‘one Islam’, and thus it is also impossible (or highly unlikely) that Islam has a single 
(negative) effect on women’s employment or position. Measuring only the presence of Islam is 
not only not the best way to establish whether conservative Islam is influential,144 it also ignores 
the differences within a religion, which seem more important than the religion itself. The focus 
should be on the particular message that materialises in a specific form, time and place, and new 
comparative datasets are needed to do so.
 The simplistic way in which religion is often measured can partly be traced back to the 
underspecification of theories in this field, which brings me to my second conclusion. The 
civilisation approach (see Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Fish, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 
2003b; Norris & Inglehart, 2002; Lincove, 2008, Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007), which still 
holds a rather dominant position in the literature that compares ‘Muslim’ with ‘Western’ or 
‘Christian’, either implicitly or explicitly, is hardly empirically supported. Indonesia and Nigeria 
are two cases with relatively high employment figures for Muslim women (controlled for 
economic development and structures), and both have relatively many non-Muslims citizens. The 
presence of the many Christian (and some Hindu) women should have been the ideal situation for 
civilisationists to explain the relatively high employment figures of women in these countries, 
because according to this logic the Christian women should be employed more. The empirical 
data, however, show otherwise: in both countries the Muslims and the women in Muslim areas 
are more often employed than people of other denominations. These results refute the country-
level interpretation of the civilisation logic (see Figure 9.1), but it could still be argued that these 
two countries’ overall culture is less Muslim because of the many Christians. However, the results 
from comparing countries do not translate to the sub-national and individual level. This means 
the civilisation logic is restricted to the country level at best, but even that conclusion is doubtful 
given the empirical proof in this chapter and the problematic methodological aspects of how 
the theory has been tested (and confirmed) so far. Due to the geographical clustering of Muslim 
countries, alternative explanations deserve more attention. Amongst those are the abundance 
of oil (cf. Ross, 2008), colonial history (cf. Spierings, 2007), or the economic world system (cf. 
Moghadam, 2003).
 In reaction to this literature and building on the framework presented in this thesis, I have 
formulated an alternative and more promising way to understand the influence of religion. By 
distinguishing multiple levels in explaining women’s position it immediately becomes clear that 
religion (Islam) can manifest itself in various ways simultaneously. Logically, this means that it 
can also take on different forms and substances. Substance here refers to value patterns, while 
form includes, for instance, norms and policies that are reflected in women’s opportunities. Form 
can also include needs that are value-based assessments of, for instance, the care demand and 
supply in a household. This chapter has shown that multiple and contradictory effects indeed 
seem to exist. The institutionalisation of conservative Islam in law has a strong and negative 
effect, but Islamic-motivated political actors might have positive effects; a dominance of Islam 
in a region is associated with more employment compared to a Catholic dominance, but the 
dominance of conservative Islam is less beneficial than that of a less conservative Islamic value 
pattern; Muslim women seem lower educated and consequently less employed, but Muslim 
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women are overall more often employed than non-Muslim women. To denote this idea of a 
multivocal influence of Islam, I have used the metaphor of the message and the messenger 
in Section 9.2. To truly understand how religion influences women’s position, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that each religion contains multiple messages, and that each message can be 
articulated by different messengers, as it is said in the Quran: “Apostles come to you (…), who 
convey my messages” (Surah 7:35).
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145 For marital status and the partner’s non-agricultural 
occupation the figures show a somewhat more mixed 
picture; but in the case of Egypt only ever-married women 
are included in the sample. No data on the other women 
are available in the surveys. Only living in a city shows 
a counteracting trend. Given the coefficients found in 
Chapter 6, this development would not lead to an overall 
decline, because the other effects outweigh its relative 
strength. 
1992 1995 2000 2005
Women’s employment 13.4 15.2 12.8 15.9
explanatory variables
Education
less than primary completed 69.5 63.0 56.6 46.1
primary completed, secondary not 11.1 12.9 13.0 14.0
secondary completed, no tertiary 14.9 17.7 22.8 29.8
at least some tertiary 4.5 6.4 7.6 10.1
Living in a city
urban 46.4 45.5 42.8 41.4
rural 53.6 54.5 57.2 58.6
Marital status
married 92.7 92.1 92.5 93.3
widowed or divorced 7.3 7.9 7.5 6.7
Age difference 7.41 7.35 7.16 6.89
Traditional Household (0–2) 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.30
Number of children 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.8
Partner’s education (0–5) 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.6
Age first birth 20.4 20.5 20.8 21.2
Partner’s occupation 
agriculture 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.16
blue collar 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.35
lower white collar 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.15
upper white collar 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.29
Notes: weighted averages; Sources: DHS Egypt 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 women’s and household survey, retrieved from the DDW.
table 10.1 Micro-level developments in Egypt 1992–2005
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figure 10.1 Women’s employment trends in five countries
 Women's employment (%)
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Chapter 10
theme 4: a longitudinal perspective
Egypt: globalisation, violence and shifting 
influences
10.1 It taKeS tIMe
Contrary to the cross-sectional perspective of the previous empirical chapters, this chapter 
takes up a more longitudinal perspective. At first this might seem to uncover a discrepancy 
between empirical reality and developments over time vis-à-vis the results from the cross-
sectional chapters and the expectations formulated in Chapter 3. However, a closer look at the 
developments in Egypt will show how the theoretical building blocks of the NOV framework 
(Chapter 2) help to understand the dynamics between the explanatory forces at work on the 
individual, household, sub-national, national and global levels, thus helping us structure the 
multitude of influences on women’s employment.
 The seeming discrepancy is clearest in the literature that expects women’s employment 
to have risen constantly over the last decades. This literature can be divided into two camps: 
the literature on micro-level effects and the macro-level literature on globalisation. As the first 
kind of literature shows us, important micro-level factors, such as education and the number 
children, have developed in favour of more employment. For instance, the number of educated 
women in Egypt has risen considerably between 1992 and 2005 (see Table 10.1). Less than 20% 
of the women had completed secondary education in 1992, and 40% had done so in 2005. The 
average age difference between partners, the proportion of women living in a household with a 
traditional structure, and the proportion of partners working in agriculture all declined during 
this period, while the average age of a woman at the birth of her first child steadily increased and 
the average number of children changed from 3.4 to 2.8.145
 The second kind of literature formulates a similar prediction regarding the higher-context 
levels (district, national, and global). We know that norms of public participation and the 
creation of light-manufacturing and service-sector jobs both influence women’s employment 
positively (see Chapter 6). Then, if the on-going process of globalisation is seen as a driving 
force for economic reform and the diffusion of gender equality norms leading to economic 
development and (post-) industrialisation, steadily growing employment figures for women 
could indeed be expected (see Black & Rainerd, 2004; Gray, Kittilson & Sandholtz, 2006; Meyer, 
2003; Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007; cf. Cheng, 1999; Osman & Ali, 2001: 95–8; 
Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Scholte, 2001).
 Instead of giving an accurate picture of reality, these perspectives appear to be part of what 
Hakim (1995: 430) calls “the myth of rising female employment” (see also Assaad, 2004). For 
the five countries of which the DDW provides four surveys between the early 1990s and the late 
2000s, clearly no unambiguous rising employment figures have been found. In Figure 10.1, only 
Nigeria shows a constant upward trend. Three of the five other countries (Egypt, Indonesia, and 
Jordan) show drops in employment around the second half of the nineties, and in Bangladesh 
declining employment figures are found between 2004 and 2007. But if the ‘positive forces’ were 
on the rise, why then did women’s employment not increase? Taking into account the dynamics 
between factors at different levels might help answer this puzzling question.
 I hope to further our understanding of the dynamics between macro- and micro-level factors 
influencing women’s employment by applying my framework and zooming in on the discrepancy 
in the case of Egypt. The backbone of the analyses is made up of datasets at four points in time 
(1992, 1995, 2000, 2005), complemented with other macro-level data and background information 
on the social, economic, and political context. The choice for Egypt will be further motivated in 
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146 I do think that most if not all aspects of causal complexity 
can also be modelled statistically, but before that 
modelling takes place it should be known what the shape 
of the causal complexity is expected to be. 
147 These are only the standard DHS collected and processed 
in the DDW. This excludes the DHS of 1988 (in which, by 
the way, not all necessary variables might be present). It 
also excludes the interim DHS of 2003, and at the time of 
this research the DHS 2008 was not yet available.
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Section 10.2, where the developments in women’s employment between 1992 and 2005 are also 
discussed in greater detail. To solve the puzzle, I will first study the globalisation argument, using 
the concept of globalisation set out in Section 10.3, and discuss its potential multifacetedness in 
influencing women’s employment. Subsequently, Section 10.4 will discuss the developments in 
the factors derived from that approach and their relevance to the case of Egypt, as well as their 
interrelatedness and connection to the development of women’s employment. ‘Cultural’ violence 
and government retrenchment in particular seem to explain the declining employment in several 
districts. From Section 10.5 onward, the focus shifts towards micro-level factors. I will start out 
with a brief diagnosis of the literature, studying how the framework applied here predicts that 
effect change over time. In Section 10.6, I will then explain how the effects are modelled, and 
discuss the strongest patterns; those found for education and for the presence of young children 
and male breadwinners. The conclusion (Section 10.7) compares the summarised results with those 
in the previous chapters, and I will reflect on the generalisability of my findings.
10.2 egypt
10.2.1 A CASE STUDY
This chapter starts from a longitudinal perspective that stresses the interrelatedness between 
levels of explanation. This means that I want to track developments in women’s employment 
over time, and that I want to be able to distinguish between individual, household, district, 
and national/global-level developments. Given this goal, the data sets used in this study are 
very useful, but once the bar is set at measuring women’s employment on at least four points in 
time, only five countries (see Figure 10.1) remain. Both the low number of measurements over 
the years and the nature of this chapter, which leans more towards generating hypotheses, 
thus argue for an in-depth study. This way the variation within a country can counteract the 
problem of too many variables (global-level factors) and too few cases (only four country-level 
measurements) (Gerring, 2007; see also King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Furthermore, a case 
study allows tbetter laying bare different aspects of causal complexity.146 In order to provide 
the necessary depth, I have chosen to focus on only one country in this chapter, and combine 
solid descriptions, multiple data sources (including those that could not be used in Chapter 6’s 
cross-sectional comparisons), as well as within-case variation, for instance at the district level.
 Of the countries mentioned in the introduction, not all countries’ older surveys contain the 
information needed to operationalise the necessary variables, which is important in ensuring that 
comparisons over time are fruitful. With regard to my definition of the population (working-age 
women who are neither in school nor disabled), it is also important that the operationalisation 
over the different years is similar. Furthermore, and thus the overall leverage – statistically at 
least 25 districts are also preferred (Paterson & Goldstein, 1991). Lastly, it is desirable to have 
some variation in the different clusters of factors related to globalisation, just as the availability 
of secondary data matters. These criteria have led to the selection of Egypt. The DDW contains 
data for four years (1992, 1995, 2000, and 2005).147 In all cases but one, 26 districts are included 
(in 1992 the five desert Frontier Governorates were not sampled). After deleting respondents 
with missing data, 55,149 (ever-married) women remained: 9,482 for 1992; 13,490 for 1995; 13,000 
for 2000; and 19,177 for 2005. All variables are operationalised as discussed in Chapter 4. The 
models applied to these data are five-level cross-classified models: the women are nested in the 
household, the household in the year-district and the year-district in both the district and the 
year. The other specifications are similar to what has been discussed in Chapter 4.
 Overall, it should be taken into account that the outcomes of the analyses in this chapter 
cannot be directly applied to other Muslim countries. To what extent and in what way outcomes 
do say something about the larger population is discussed in greater detail in the concluding 
section of this chapter.
10.2.2 EMPLOYMENT TRENDS
In this section, the employment figures presented for Egypt in Figure 10.1 will be broken down 
along two lines: the differences between districts, and the differences by age, the latter to 
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148 A second explanation would be that these are not global 
or national processes, but that there is a survey effect. 
This seems unlikely: firstly, the samples are weighted, 
and thus representative. Secondly, the patterns found for 
most other variables, such as educational participation 
and fertility, do show the expected developments very 
clearly. Thirdly, neither the measurement of being 
gainfully employed, nor the questions and codings used 
by DHS substantially changed between these surveys. 
151 The actual years should be treated somewhat cautiously 
because only four years are included. For instance, the 
decline period can as easily have taken place from 1999 to 
2006, or 2001 to 2004.
150 The coefficients for the time dummies with 1992 as their 
reference group are: for 1995, 0.077 (s.e. 0.090); for 2000, 
– 0.407 (s.e. 0.096); and for 2005, – 0.473 (s.e. 0.106).
149 In MLwiN the ‘predictions’ are used to estimate the 
outcomes based on coefficients derived from the model 
given in the main text; the intercept coefficients and 
time dummy coefficients of this model are included in 
the prediction function. A similar estimation could have 
been made with a fixed-effects model including dummies 
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figure 10.2 Women’s employment trends in 26 Egyptian districts
 Women's employment (%)
for every district-time point. However, in such a model 
district-level explanatory variables could not be included 
later on.
152 Such a pattern might have been related to a trend of 
women marrying later in life, because many women stop 
working once they get married (see Amin & Al–Bassusi, 
2004). However, that cannot be the case here, because 
the sample only includes ever-married women.
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uncover cohort effects. Figure 10.2 presents the development per district. Overall, women’s 
employment was about 2.5 percentage points higher in 2005 than in 1992, but after a rise in the 
early 1990s, women’s employment dropped, until it rose again at the start of the new millennium. 
This general pattern is also found in 17 out of 26 Egyptian governorates. Nonetheless, some 
other patterns do turn up. For instance in the three large desert governorates (Matroh, New 
Valley, and Red Sea) women’s employment constantly declined over these 14 years, and in 
four Middle-Egypt Nile governorates (Assuit, Fayoum, Menya, and Souhag) irregularities are 
found compared to the overall pattern. That the overall pattern is found in a clear majority of all 
districts, however, indicates that some processes at the national or global level play an important 
role in influencing women’s employment.148
 While micro-level changes in educational levels, fertility, and other fields might not fully 
explain the longitudinal developments in women’s employment, differences in these characteristics 
might still be partly responsible for changes in women’s employment in the 26 Egyptian 
governorates. Moreover, micro-level factors might have developed differently in the various 
governorates. A prime advantage of multilevel analyses is that micro-level effects can be filtered 
out, leaving a net macro-level development. By using a multilevel model with the explanatory 
factors at the micro-level, using dummies for the different years with random coefficients, and 
including a random intercept at the district level, a graph can be extracted that shows the macro-
level employment developments while also taking into account increasing levels of education, 
decreasing fertility, and so on.149 Figure 10.3 shows these developments for each district.
 The general trend found in the model presented below is also found in most of the districts: 
after control for micro-level factors, women’s employment stays rather stable between 1992 and 
1995, and between 2000 and 2005, but a substantial decline is found between 1995 and 2000.150 
151 It seems that some (combination of) processes at the country and global levels considerably 
damaged women’s employment chances at the start of the new millennium, while at the same 
time few processes clearly furthered women’s employment (or were annulled by other, negative 
processes).
 A second way to zoom in on the figures found for Egypt is to look at different effects for 
different cohorts of women. Because I use representative samples, the women aged 15 in 1992 
can be treated as the same group as those that are 18 years of age in 1995, 23 in 2000, and 28 in 
2005. Thus, employment figures can be plotted for each ‘year group’ or cohort that was aged 
15 through 36 in 1992, as is done in Figure 10.4. A closer inspection of the somewhat differing 
patterns reveals a rather strong picture in which women’s employment is relatively stable or 
rising in the periods 1992–1995 and 2000–2005 in all districts, but between 1995 and 2000 
three distinctly different patterns can be distinguished. The women born between 1970 and 
1977 (aged 15 to 22 in 1992) show a consistently strong increase in employment between 1995 
and 2000. Employment figures decline for women born between 1956 and 1962 (aged 30 to 36 
in 1992) – only for women aged 32 or 34 in 1992 the lines are approximately flat. For the other 
women (born between 1963 and 1969), the developments are between those two extremes, but 
more mixed: employment shows a steep increase (1963, 1966, 1967), a moderate increase (1965, 
1968, 1969), or a decrease (1964). The declining trend found for the eldest group (born between 
1956–1962) might even be stronger than the figures suggest; the eldest women in 1992 were 
not included because I have no information on these women for all years up to 2005. However, 
when for instance the women aged 41 in 1992 (and thus 44 in 1995 and 49 in 2000) are studied, 
this declining trend is also found, and it indeed seems to be even stronger. Of the women aged 
40–44 in 1995 17.7% was employed, which decreased to 9.0% for the women aged 45–49 in 
2000. Overall, the decline in women’s employment between 1995 and 2000 seems to be mainly 
attributable to women in their 30s and 40s quitting or being fired.152
 The patterns presented here do not fit the general expectations that could be derived based 
on the ‘positive’ developments of the explanatory factors at either the macro or micro level, 
as was discussed in the introduction to this chapter. In Sections 10.3 and 10.4, I shall examine 
the dynamics and the influence of macro-level factors further, and apply the framework of 
this thesis to the found discrepancy, and in Section 10.5 and 10.6 the same will be done for the 
micro-level factors.
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153 These developments might come at the cost of traditional 
and agricultural labour (see Bergeron, 2001; Pfeifer & 
Posusney, 2003; Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Walby, 1996).
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figure 10.3 Women's employment in 26 districts after filtering out changes in micro-level effects
 Women's employment in relative terms
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10.3 gLoBaLISatIon and woMen’S eMpLoyMent
Taking a longitudinal perspective, one of the strongest processes described in the literature 
is that of continuing globalisation, which is generally depicted as creating opportunities 
and circumstances that foster women’s employment either directly or on the mid-long term 
(generally operationalised in time-lags of 5 to 9 years [Black & Rainerd, 2004; Gray, Kittilson 
& Sandholtz, 2006; Meyer, 2003]), and globalisation is surely connected to many macro-level 
processes. However, as shown above, such a clear continuous rise in employment has not been 
found for Egypt between 1992 and 2005. While globalisation might have been present and the 
context has become more globalised, the approach taken in this thesis suggests that the overall 
ideas about women and globalisation need to be disentangled in order be able to see which 
mid- to long-term developments might also harm women’s employment (see also Bergeron, 2001; 
Moghadam, 2007; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003).
 Particularly in the fields of economics – the neoclassical, neoliberal, and the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ schools – and sociology – the modernisation school – scholars tend to argue that 
globalisation betters women’s position and increases women’s employment (see Elson, 2009; 
Harrison, 2005; Jaquette, 1982; Posusney & Doumato, 2003; Serra, Spiegel & Stiglitz, 2008). 
Underlying this process are developments such as economic liberalisation, the creation of jobs, 
economic development, political liberalisation, and a shift towards secular and gender equality 
values, all of which stimulate women to become part of the labour force (e.g. Black & Rainerd, 
2004; Gray, Kittilson & Sandholtz, 2006; Inglehart, 1997; Lerner, 1958; Meyer, 2003; Norris 
& Inglehart, 2002; Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007). However, the multitude 
of aspects already listed here shows that globalisation is a multidimensional process (see also 
Bergeron, 2001; Moghadam, 2007; Osman & Ali, 2001; Pyle & Ward, 2003).
 I perceive globalisation as a process in which the costs of communication decrease, distances 
become relatively shorter (or easier to cover), and thus as Scholte (2001: 14) says “territorial 
places, territorial distances and territorial borders lose some of their previously overriding 
influence” (see also Nye, 2000: 198; Walby, 2009: 43). This overall process of globalisation does 
indeed seem to be a trend of ever decreasing distances and costs, but its consequences can 
influence women’s employment along different lines. The effects discussed in the literature 
can be grouped under three headings, which will serve as starting points for the analyses in this 
chapter: global economic politics, political liberalisation and value diffusion, and international 
conflict.
10.3.1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC POLITICS
In many developing and Muslim countries the global economic regime enforced economic 
reforms through WorldBank and International Monetary Fund policies. The IMF mainly provides 
loans to countries that have problems paying their international debt, while WorldBank loans are 
generally intended to develop economic infrastructure. In return for these loans the receiving 
countries have to implement policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation because it 
is believed that this is beneficial to the economic stability and long-term development of the 
countries (see Çağatay & Özler, 1995; Greenaway & Morrissey, 1993; Moon, 2001).
 These economic restructuring policies are also linked to women’s (non-agricultural) 
employment, as has been discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. In short, the argument can be 
dissected into two parts. Firstly, liberalisation is expected to lead to more employment in low-
wage countries and to feminise the labour force, because women are cheap, flexible, and docile 
(Black & Rainerd, 2004; Çağatay & Özler, 1995; Clark, 1992; Meyer, 2003; Richards & Gelleny, 
2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007 – see also Sections 3.3 and 3.4).153 However, depending on the 
competitiveness of the local labour market, economic liberalisation might also lead to a (short-
term) loss of jobs if an industry is not competitive. Secondly, privatisation leads to shrinkage of 
public sector employment, which is a relatively feminised sector: privatisation hurts women’s 
employment (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; 
Posusney & Doumato, 2003; see also Richards & Gelleny, 2007). The economic dimension of 
globalisation can thus have contradictory effects that should manifest themselves at the district-
level labour market characteristics.
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10.3.2 VALUE DIFFUSION AND POLITICAL LIBER ALISATION
While the causal relationship between globalisation and democracy is still debated, it has been 
observed that globalisation and democratisation go hand-in-hand (some contributions to the 
discussion are: Doces, 2006; Eichengreen & Leblang, 2006; Li & Reuveny, 2003; Rudra, 2005; 
Zimmerling, 2003). Important here is that part of the proposed causal mechanism linking the 
two entails citizens becoming more critical, a spill-over effect of economic to political liberalism, 
and the spread of egalitarian values because people can observe freedoms of people in other 
countries.
 Consequently, this process can be linked to what has been discussed in Sections 3.5 and 
3.6 regarding the influence of the political system and value patterns. A more open political 
system gives room to equality policies in order to satisfy large parts of the constituency (see 
Fergany et.al., 2003, Posusney & Doumato 2003; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Yousef, 2004), 
and the diffusion of equality values fosters both democracy and women entering the public 
sphere (see Dorius & Firebaugh, 2010; Gray, Kittilson & Sandholtz, 2006). Overall, the political 
dimension of globalisation singularly seems to work to women’s advantage, and is thus expected 
to work through the shifts in people’s attitudes and through changing macro-level opportunity 
structures and values captured in societal norms.
10.3.3 INTERNATIONAL CONFLIC T
As globalisation seems both negatively and positively linked to conflict, the relation between the 
two has got considerable scientific attention (e.g. Barbieri & Schneider, 1999; Huntington, 1993, 
1996; Kahler & Walter, 2006; Nye, 2000; Schneider, Barbieri & Gleditsch, 2003), and cross-border 
conflicts have also been related to the inflow of women into the labour market (see e.g. Chafe, 
1972; Fernandez, Fogli & Olivetti, 2004; Goldin, 1991).
 Basically, when men are being called to the front and are absent from the household, 
women are pulled into the labour market to fill the (manufacturing) positions of men or provide 
the household with an income. Once women are on the labour market, their and societies’ 
stereotypes and values might shift towards a more divers economic role of women. Bahramitish 
(2003), for instance, argues that the economic necessity at the household and societal level 
positively influenced women’s economic participation in Iran during the Iraq-Iran war (1980–
1988), and that women’s involvement in the revolution and the war gave them political leverage 
afterwards to bring about policy changes. International conflict can thus influence women’s 
employment during and after a war through shifts in the male labour supply, and indirectly 
through economic needs and value changes at the micro level. Internal conflicts might have 
similar effects.
10.4 gLoBaL and Country-LeveL deveLopMentS
In this section I will assess whether globalisation processes can explain the two patterns I have 
presented earlier: employment declining mainly between 1995 and 2000 (after control for 
micro-level changes), and the fact that mainly older women left the labour market. Firstly, I 
will sketch the major developments regarding the above-mentioned disentangled dimensions 
of globalisation in Egypt. Secondly, statistical models including district-level variables will be 
presented and then interpreted using the knowledge from the first section.
10.4.1 THE CASE OF EGYPT: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM
The period from 1992 to 2005 completely falls within Hosni Mubarak’s reign (president from 
1981 to 2011). He came to power as the third president of Egypt. Up to then, the country had a 
controlled economy, although there have been some periods of relative liberalisation (Assaad & 
Arntz, 2005; Mitchell, 2001; Owen, 2004), and government employment was high, in particular 
for women (Moghadam, 1998). Politically, Egypt was formally a multiparty system (Esposito & 
Voll, 1996; Owen, 2004; Yousef, 2004). The Arab-Israeli conflict dominated the international 
politics when Mubarak became president in 1981. Two wars have been fought with Israel (The Six 
Days War in 1967, the [4th] Arab-Israeli War or Yom Kippur War in 1973), but there also have been 
some border conflicts with Libya (1977).
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155 In Radwan (2002), 46.5% of the labour demand is ascribed 
to Industry & Petroleum and 19.4% to Tourism and Hotels. 
154 These percentages are based on date concerning men 
included as the partners of the women in the surveys.
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figure 10.5 Economic and political developments in Egypt 1992–2005
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 STRUC TUR AL ADJUSTMENTS AND OIL PRICES
In the early 1980s, the oil boom in the region stimulated Egypt’s economy and supported 
government expenditures (Yousef, 2004). Many men, especially those working in agriculture, 
went to work abroad (Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia), and many women filled the 
vacancies in Egypt (Nassar, 2003; Pfeifer & Posusney, 2003). At the end of the 1980s, the 
economic situation deteriorated, as oil prices collapsed and the international economic 
environment became more competitive (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Moghadam, 1998; Yousef, 2004). 
Unemployment and poverty increased (Assaad, 2003; Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 2003) and loans 
were needed to refinance previous commitments. Since 1987, structural reforms, demanded 
by the IMF in return for loans, were implemented. New shocks led to more reforms (Structural 
Adjustment Programmes, or SAPs), this time enforced by the WorldBank in 1991 and 1996: from 
a state-led to a privatised market with a more outward-oriented economy (Assaad, 2003, Assaad 
& Arntz, 2005; Kienle, 1998; Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 2003; Pfeiffer & Posusney, 2003; Seddon, 
1990; Yousef, 2004), the 1991 SAP being said to be the most ambitious one (Assaad, 2004; Henry 
& Springborg, 2001). However, the actual degree of privatisation is in doubt. 
 Volatile oil prices, incomplete reforms, cuts in the government budget, and rapid labour 
force growth all put severe strain on the economy and prevented it from taking off in the first 
half of the 1990s (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Kienle, 1998; Mitchell, 2001; Owen, 2004; Radwan, 
2002; Yousef, 2004). Still, even in these years the GDP per capita rose (albeit very slowly). 
Similarly, my data show that men’s non-agricultural employment consistently rose from 71% in 
1992 to 79% in 2005 – a pattern highly similar to that of the development in GDP per capita (see 
Figure 10.5).154 However, the creation of new jobs hardly benefited women. The public sector 
defeminised in the 1990s, while other, male-dominated sectors did not feminise. The newly-
created public sector positions were filled by men (Assaad, 2004). This defeminisation might 
be related to two processes. Firstly, the social security system in Egypt allowed civil servants 
to retire early without loss of pension from the age of 50, or even earlier with some pension 
reduction (El-Hamidi, 2010), making it easier for women to leave the labour market without much 
loss of income. Secondly, there was a stream of returning migrants who had worked abroad in 
oil-producing countries. These countries replaced the foreign labourers with nationals during the 
oil crisis, while about 10 to 15% of Egypt’s work force was made up of migrant workers (Radwan, 
2002).
 Another drop in oil prices in 1998 was a new blow to the economy (Handoussa, El Sherif, 
Tawila, Sholkamy & Zaalouk, 2005), but rising numbers of tourists, increasing exports (partly due 
to tariff cuts in 2003/2004), and growing FDI helped the economy substantially to grow again 
as of 2003 (Assaad, 2004; Handoussa et.al., 2005), with the GDP per capita then recovering as 
well (Figure 10.5). It seems that Egypt’s economy is becoming to rely more and more on their 
oil industry and tourism, which account for two thirds of all the new labour demand (Radwan, 
2002).155
 OPPRESSION AND VIOLENCE
As clearly illustrated by the bottom right panel in Figure 10.5, the Egyptian political situation 
between 1992 and 2005 was one of political authoritarianism, with some minor fluctuations 
and shifts. In the early 1990s, Mubarak encouraged the opposition to participate in the political 
process – as a way to secure popular support for Mubarak’s economic reforms (Owen, 2004; 
Yousef, 2004). Simultaneously, he tried to isolate and suppress the radicalised offshoots of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Deeb, 2011; Owen, 2004). While all remaining barriers to independent 
candidates were removed, the government could still constrain electoral campaign activities, 
and the Muslim Brotherhood was prohibited from running as a party. In these years, tensions 
rose and this cumulated in political violence, such as the 1992 attacks on tourist sites – symbols 
of Egypt’s corruption by the West (Mitchell, 2001: 237; see also Aziz, 1995: 93). Consequently, 
tourism sector revenues decreased (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Moghadam, 1998; Yousef, 2004). Here 
we see that international norms do not always travel in a positive way; some groups in society 
might for instance feel threatened by ‘Westernisation’ (Huntington, 1993: 29; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif 
& Meyer, 2007).
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156 Freedom House bases its scores on expert opinions, 
and Kienle’s can also be considered one such expert 
opinion, so this does not speak in favour of one of the two 
assessments. Anyhow, both sources suggest that there 
were no major changes on the democratisation front.
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 After the increase in political violence, Mubarak started a general attack on all religious 
organisations he regarded to be ‘terrorists’ (Kienle, 1998; Owen, 2004). Kienle (1998) speaks of 
political deliberalisation in the second half of the 1990s (which seems contradictory to the half-
point increase in 1999 found in Figure 10.3),156 when religio-cultural struggles also intensified 
(Owen, 2004). Political violence continued and peaked with the ‘Luxor Massacre’ in which 60 
tourists were killed in 1997 (Handoussa et.al., 2005; Kienle, 1998; Mitchell, 2001). In the run up to 
the 1999 elections the political situation hardly improved (Owen, 2004). It can be argued that the 
situation has become even worse since (9/11) 2001, and Islamic movements could until recently 
not operate freely (Jamal, 2006). In 2004 and 2005 new terrorist attacks took place in Egypt 
(Fergany et.al., 2006).
 Recently, the authoritarian system has been challenged successfully during the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in which the people, with support of the military, ousted Mubarak. While many foreign 
and local people fear that the party of the Muslim Brotherhood might hijack the process of 
democratisation, the Egyptian people have shown a demand for more say in politics and more 
political freedoms (see Spierings, 2011). This is also in line with the empirical literature showing 
a widely spread support for a democratic system in Arab countries, including Egypt (Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003a; Jamal, 2006; Yousef, 2004).
 THE AR AB-ISR AELI CONFLIC T AND THE GULF WAR
The Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be ignored for the period under study. While Egypt has 
a peace treaty with Israel, the arms purchases during the 1973 war were a heavy financial 
burden to Egypt, and loans were needed to refinance obligations that partly stemmed from 
these purchases (Mitchell, 2001). This need partly contributed to the economic reforms and 
dependency on the IMF and WorldBank.
 During the Iran-Iraq war and the Palestinian Intifada, the Arab states were increasingly 
united in their aid to Iraq and support for the Palestinians. A major change came with the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait (Mitchell, 2001; Owen, 2004). In the Gulf War, Egypt was the fourth largest 
supplier of troops against Iraq, and after Saudi Arabia the second of the Arab countries to do 
so. The Egyptians’ involvement obviously damaged Egyptian-Iraqi relations and many Egyptian 
migrant workers (men) returned from Iraq.
10.4.2 EXPL AINING LONGITUDINAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT
Above I have sketched the developments in the three theoretically distinguished ‘globalisation 
factors’ clusters. Now I can analyse if and how these are reflected in the women’s employment 
developments in my statistical data.
 The description of Egypt’s recent history above shows no strong changes in international 
conflict, democratisation, and value transmittance. Consequently, they offer little explanation 
for the changes in Egyptian women’s employment. They might however still be influential and 
responsible for the relative stability in women’s employment. Furthermore, values do seem 
important: the perceived ‘threat’ of Western values to the Egyptian culture did turn up as a 
motivation or excuse for violence and domestic terrorist attacks, to which I will return below, 
where I discuss which processes might explain the changes in women’s employment.
 The models in Table 10.2 show the differences in the year dummies – the longitudinal trend, 
in other words – after controlling for the micro-level variables and the different combinations 
of the district-level variables used in this thesis that are also part of theoretical mechanism of 
restructuring policies, foreign investments, and norm change through value transmittance. 
Overall, the results for the district variables should be treated carefully because of the limited 
number of cases. They nonetheless seem to confirm that a larger service sector creates job 
opportunities for women (Models 2, 4 and 5), and that wealth at the district level is associated 
with lower employment levels after control for the micro-level factors (see Chapter 6).157 With 
respect to changes over time, the results are roughly similar to the ones after control for the 
individual factors (Model 1): women’s employment opportunities seem to decrease, with the 
major drop found between 1995 and 2000.158 Below, these results are linked to the economic, 
political and cultural developments described above.
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157 In a model without the micro-level factors, no effect was 
found for the district-level wealth factor (0.072 with a 
s.e. of 0.192). This is in line with the results in Chapter 6 
that suggest a welfare effect: taking an increased labour 
demand, value change and educational opportunities into 
account, women in wealthier areas might have less need 
to enter the labour market.
158 In Appendix 10.1 (first and second model) the coefficients 
of the year dummies are given for models similar to 
those in Table 10.2, Models 1 and 5, but then estimated 
using weighted IGLS procedures. These basically show 
the same patterns as described in this section, but the 
coefficient are generally somewhat smaller.
159 It should be noted, however, that it is possible that the 
returning men were not captured in the male labour 
supply variable. If these men found jobs (for instance 
by pushing women out of the labour market), they do 
not count towards a higher surplus in labour, which is 
measured here. Moreover, men who diverted to the 
agricultural sector are not considered male labour supply 
in this variable either. 
160 In other years, such as 1986 and 1993, tourist 
establishments were also victim of violence (see Aziz, 
1995), but as the 1997 event was so extreme and enjoyed 
such major media coverage it can thus be considered to 
have had a far larger impact.
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figure 10.6 Tourist governorates
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 Zooming in on the political (de)liberalisation processes and the international conflicts Egypt 
was involved in directs attention to the possible influence of internal and external political 
violence on the demand for, and supply of, women’s labour; not because of the theoretically 
expected replacement of men going to the front, but because of the effects on the tourism 
sector. Regarding the former, the Gulf War (1990–1991) led to the return of migrant workers, 
which can be expected to have harmed women’s employment. The negative effect found by the 
time dummies could indeed be the lagged effect of returning migrant workers, who constituted 
10% to 15% of the labour force. On the other hand, a time lag of about 5 years for a labour supply 
shock seems unlikely. Furthermore, in Model 3 (Table 10.2) this labour supply effect is not found: 
no negative coefficient of the male labour supply variable was found and the gap between the 
year dummies did not decrease in strength after its inclusion.159
 Regarding internal violence, it is said to have mainly affected the tourism industry (an 
important employer for women – see also Section 9.7.2). As the Luxor massacre took place in 
1997, the main blow can be expected to be found in the data between 1995 and 2000.160 This 
also seems to be in line with the statistical results. First of all, Table 10.2 shows the service-
sector district variable to be one of the few statistically significant explanatory variables for the 
Egyptian districts. Indeed, in districts with more service sector jobs, more women are employed 
and including this variable does partly explain the drop in 2000: the coefficient decreases by 24%. 
However, this decrease is not significant, so not too much explanatory significance should be 
attached to this finding, also because this variable measures all white-collar jobs, not just tourism. 
Another indication that the drop in tourism affected women is provided by the descriptives of the 
service sector variables used here. In 1992, 44% of the people had a white-collar job, in 1995 this 
was 53%, but in 2000 and 2005 this dropped to 49–50%; but as I have just said, it is questionable 
whether this variable taps into the tourism sector well enough to translate these results directly. 
However, tourism figures from the World Development Indicators that are available from 1995 
through 2005 (and beyond) seem to support this reasoning. The number of inbound tourists as 
well as revenues from tourism show a general upward trend, but between 1997 and 1998 both 
figures decreased substantially: 12% in number of tourists (and from 1996 to 1997 the number 
hardly rose either) and 27% in revenues (WDI). A closer look at Figure 10.6 is also helpful. Here, 
the touristic governorates show a relatively steep decline in women’s employment over the period 
1995–2000 (e.g. Aziz, 1995). In Figure 10.6, these governorates are indicated by the thicker lines: 
Alexandria, Aswan, Cairo, Giza, New Valley, Qena (including Luxor – Qena was officially split into 
two governorates in 2009), Red Sea (incl. Hurghada), and South Sinai (incl. Sharm el Sheikh). These 
governorates account for 8 of the 11 areas with a relatively strong employment decline between 
1995 and 2000. In sum, internal violence seems to have hurt women’s employment, mainly 
because it reduced tourism, which is a relatively important sector for women’s employment.
 The return of workers due to the Gulf War has already been discarded as being a major 
influence in Egypt, but this does not cancel out a possible influence of the return of a specific 
group of migrant workers: the men active in the petrol industry. As oil-producing countries 
switched from migrant workers to nationals, this should have led to a larger labour supply on the 
Egyptian home labour market. The oil price mainly dropped between 1998 and 1999. If migrants 
returned home then this is most likely to be reflected in either the difference between 1995 and 
2000 or between 2000 and 2005. The drop in oil prices thus partly coincides with the crisis in 
tourism and the effects are hard to disentangle. However, tourism can still be expected to be 
the most important of the two, because it is a sector more important for women’s employment. 
Compared to touristic sectors all over the world, the Egyptian one might not be the most 
feminised (Assaad, 2004), but after public service it is the largest non-agricultural employment 
sector for Egyptian women, accounting for about 15% of all non-agricultural employment 
in urban areas and 30% in rural areas (WorldBank, 2010: 12). The migrants returning from oil 
countries would mainly have been blue-collar labourers, people working in the masculine petrol 
industry (Ross, 2008). It is thus far more unlikely that these returning migrants pushed women 
out of the labour market in large numbers.
 Generally, these results suggest that changes or shocks to the labour market can be 
important for women’s employment, but only if it concerns parts of the labour market that have 
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table 10.2 Temporal trends in women’s employment in Egypt 1992–2005 controlled for micro and district-level characteristics
Model 1
Micro-level only
Model 2
(1) + service sector
Model 3
(1) + male labour supply
Model 4
(1) + all economic factors
Model 5
(1) + all district factors
year dummies
1992 ref ref ref ref ref
1995 0.026 0.171 0.154 0.262 0.050 0.19 0.020 0.249 -0.213 0.239
2000 -0.432 ** 0.165 -0.327 0.207 -0.505 0.261 -0.494 0.400 -0.653 ** 0.234
2005 -0.517 ** 0.166 -0.499 * 0.248 -0.611 ** 0.230 -0.344 0.254 -0.683 * 0.278
district-level factors
Economic development: Wealth level -1.884 * 0.816 -1.055 0.361
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 1.082 1.886 -1.835 4.140 0.127 1.964
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.547 ** 0.195 2.063 ** 0.673 0.890 ** 0.315
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.227 0.839 0.596 0.493
Degree of urbanisation -0.401 * 0.188 -0.363 0.254
Norms: Women in public sphere -0.767 0.914
Norms: Traditional care roles -0.324 0.945
Model statistics
Intercept -10.388 *** 0.388 -10.524 *** 0.142 -10.403 *** 0.372 -10.179 *** 0.399 -9.689 *** 0.415
Household-level variance 0.121 *** 0.012 0.064 *** 0.013 0.045 *** 0.012 0.092 *** 0.012 0.146 *** 0.015
District/Time-level variance 0.008 0.004 0.085 ** 0.033 0.009 0.005 0.049 0.036 0.012 0.007
District-level variance 0.110 ** 0.038 0.020 0.026 0.109 0.036 0.041 0.038 0.093 ** 0.034
Time-level variance 0.029 0.072 0.051 0.149 0.047 0.106 0.067 0.221 0.077 0.211
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 55,419; Nh = 47,957; Ndt = 99; Nd =26; Nt = 4; Notes: all models are controlled for the micro-level 
factors given in Table 10.1 and the overall control variable age and its quadratic term. Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting 
from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness. Sources: DHS Egypt 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 women’s and household 
survey, retrieved from the DDW.
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Model 1
Micro-level only
Model 2
(1) + service sector
Model 3
(1) + male labour supply
Model 4
(1) + all economic factors
Model 5
(1) + all district factors
year dummies
1992 ref ref ref ref ref
1995 0.026 0.171 0.154 0.262 0.050 0.19 0.020 0.249 -0.213 0.239
2000 -0.432 ** 0.165 -0.327 0.207 -0.505 0.261 -0.494 0.400 -0.653 ** 0.234
2005 -0.517 ** 0.166 -0.499 * 0.248 -0.611 ** 0.230 -0.344 0.254 -0.683 * 0.278
district-level factors
Economic development: Wealth level -1.884 * 0.816 -1.055 0.361
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 1.082 1.886 -1.835 4.140 0.127 1.964
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.547 ** 0.195 2.063 ** 0.673 0.890 ** 0.315
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.227 0.839 0.596 0.493
Degree of urbanisation -0.401 * 0.188 -0.363 0.254
Norms: Women in public sphere -0.767 0.914
Norms: Traditional care roles -0.324 0.945
Model statistics
Intercept -10.388 *** 0.388 -10.524 *** 0.142 -10.403 *** 0.372 -10.179 *** 0.399 -9.689 *** 0.415
Household-level variance 0.121 *** 0.012 0.064 *** 0.013 0.045 *** 0.012 0.092 *** 0.012 0.146 *** 0.015
District/Time-level variance 0.008 0.004 0.085 ** 0.033 0.009 0.005 0.049 0.036 0.012 0.007
District-level variance 0.110 ** 0.038 0.020 0.026 0.109 0.036 0.041 0.038 0.093 ** 0.034
Time-level variance 0.029 0.072 0.051 0.149 0.047 0.106 0.067 0.221 0.077 0.211
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 55,419; Nh = 47,957; Ndt = 99; Nd =26; Nt = 4; Notes: all models are controlled for the micro-level 
factors given in Table 10.1 and the overall control variable age and its quadratic term. Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting 
from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness. Sources: DHS Egypt 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 women’s and household 
survey, retrieved from the DDW.
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161 The touristic governorates Alexandria and Cairo also 
have relatively masculine public sectors, compared to the 
other ‘urban governorates’ and the same goes for Red Sea 
and South Sinai of the ‘frontier governorates’. Only two 
governorates have less feminised public sectors within 
their larger region and show no ‘rapid decline’.
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the potential to offer women opportunities to find gainful non-agricultural employment, not if it 
are the male-dominated (or almost exclusively male) sectors. The more general steady rise of the 
country’s GDP per capita was also hardly reflected in a steady increase in women’s employment 
figures (though it was reflected in men’s employment). It is possible, however, that there is 
a kind of 4 to 5–year lag effect. Then the economical development at the end of the 90s only 
translated to more jobs for women (or a weaker decrease) in the early 2000s. Similarly, the slower 
economic growth in the early 90s might account for the employment malaise in the late 1990s. 
However, this seems unlikely when the data for 1988–1990 are also studied.
 Foreign investment, as shown in Figure 10.3, also hardly seems to relate to women’s 
employment, and this resonates with the observations of, for instance, Assaad (2004), who 
claimed that newly created jobs (here I assume that FDI creates jobs) mainly benefited men 
because of labour market defeminisation (see also Radwan, 2002: 8). The more general declining 
trend after control for economic and norm factors (Model 5, Table 10.2) might be attributed 
to the constant economic reforms in Egypt. If the liberalisation discourse, of which FDI is an 
important part, has had little observable effect, this mainly leaves the SAPs’ privatisation track.
 SAPs are said to be specifically harmful for women because they decrease women’s job 
opportunities. The restructuring process was constantly going on in the period under research, 
and after control for the individual factors we see a continuous downward trend in women’s 
employment. This is a first indication of this relationship, but not the only one. With the most 
ambitious plan starting in 1991, it is not surprising that the effects are strongest a few years 
after the start of its policy implementation: between 1995 and 2000. Part of this effect is 
probably captured by the service-sector or white-collar variable in Table 10.2 (which shows 
the expected positive effect and partly explains the negative trend). However, public sector 
employment in itself is not included. At the national level, using the labour force surveys of 1988 
and 1998 of Egypt, both Assaad (2004) and Radwan (2004) show that the labour market share of 
employment in state-owned companies decreased (while government employment increased 
but defeminised). The latter author also shows this to be an absolute decrease, from 13.5 million 
people in 1988 to 10.4 million in 1998 (Radwan, 2002); and the public sector is the single-most 
important non-agricultural employer of women (WDI). Moreover, the cohort analysis (shown 
in Figure 10.4) may also provide some additional support to this explanation. When the public 
sector is downsized and women are fired, it would not be surprising that this mainly affects the 
older women because they are most expensive. Next to that, the early retirement scheme in the 
government sector also stimulates older women to leave the labour market. El-Hamidi (2010: 98) 
concludes that, in particular, higher-educated women have high early-retirement probabilities, 
and higher-educated women are exactly the ones the government employs. The scheme was 
most interesting for women of 50 or older in the early 2000s, but given the possibility to opt 
out even earlier, women who were in their 30s in 1992, could have been up to 47 years old in 
2000, and might also have chosen to leave the labour market between 1995 and 2000. At the 
district level, the three non-touristic governorates with strong declines are all governorates 
with relatively masculine public sectors compared to the other governorates in the larger region 
(Lower Egypt: Behera & Menoufia; Upper Egypt: Fayoum) (Vigilante & Allam, 2003).161 This 
seems rather surprising, because fewer women can be fired there. On the other hand, it might 
also indicate a more complex dynamic, whereby a sector that is relatively masculine still employs 
many women, so that downsizing hurts women relatively more there than in ‘double feminised 
sectors’. However, this is rather speculative: while the idea springs from the results of my study, 
it does not fully support it. Nevertheless, it seems rather safe to conclude that the SAPs did 
indeed harm women’s employment. 
10.4.3 GLOBALISATION AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT DECLINE 
Based on the framework applied in this thesis, I have disentangled different processes related 
to globalisation, and studied what the dynamics are between these processes and the sub-
national and micro-level differences. Doing so helps to explain why women’s employment did not 
consistently rise between 1992 and 2005, and it shows which important aspects of globalisation 
have negative effects on women’s employment, at least in the medium term, and how these 
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162 Of the entire collection of globalisation factors, others, 
such as FDI and the degree of democracy, were not found 
to be influential. This is in line with the results from 
Chapter 6.
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manifest themselves. In that respect, differences in employment developments between the 
governorates are explained. Particularly (a) internal violence – partly framed as a response to 
Westernisation (e.g. Aziz, 1995) – affecting the tourism sector and (b) international economic 
politics (in the form of privatisation resulting in a smaller government sector) help to understand 
the pattern in women’s employment found in Egypt. The privatisation result echoes other studies 
on Egypt (Moghadam, 1998; Nassar, 2003; Pyle & Ward, 2003; Posusney & Doumato, 2003), but 
in this study I have been able to filter out all kinds of micro- and district-level effects.162
10.5 tHeorISIng CHangIng MICro-LeveL effeCtS over tIMe
As discussed in Chapter 2, not only is women’s employment embedded in women’s contexts, of 
which the global context is one, but the relationships between influencing factors and women’s 
employment are also embedded in this context. As this context changes over time, effects might 
thus change over time. This is the second explanation this thesis offers for the discrepancy 
between the literature’s and previous chapters’ expected increase in women’s employment and 
the registered decline found at the start of this chapter.
10.5.1 STATE OF THE ART
That the effect of micro-level factors might change over time seems intuitively correct and 
it logically follows this thesis’ framework; however, a review of the literature on micro-level 
studies of women’s employment in Muslim countries suggests otherwise. The dominant way 
of presenting statistical results involves reporting exact figures, and by doing so the implicit 
message is that effects are constant or stable. For example, Winckler talks about a “substantial 
growth in the female labour force participation rates, due mainly to the sharp improvement 
in [Arab] women’s educational level” (2002: 621). From this it is easy to conclude that if we 
make sure all Arab women are educated, they will all enter the labour market. More explicitly, 
Aromolaran in his study of Nigeria, states: “Specifically, an additional year of postsecondary 
education increases labour market participation probability by 15.2% in the wage sector” (2004: 
37). No restriction is made, and this number is presented unconditionally, as if it is a universal and 
timeless effect. More promising is the work of Başlevent & Onaran (2004), who statistically test 
for different effects of age, education and having children in Turkey in 1988 and 1994; however, 
they do not discuss the differences they found between the two data sets. These are just some 
examples, but assessing the literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries as a whole, 
I have to conclude that systematic studies of how (not even why) effects might change over time 
are almost completely lacking.
10.5.2 HYPOTHESISING CHANGING EFFEC TS
Because contextual factors change over time and micro-level relationships are embedded in 
these contexts, it is logical that micro-level effects are also subject to change over time. This 
might partly explain why women’s employment has not risen despite the positive micro-level 
developments, such as rising education levels, discussed at the start of the chapter. Based on 
the theory and results discussed in the previous chapters, several specific expectations can be 
formulated.
 With regard to the traditional values held by women and other household members, it may 
be expected that these become less important when a country as a whole is slowly modernising 
in terms of cultural values. However, I believe this to be highly unlikely; I expect that even 
though the more modern families as well as the moderate households become somewhat more 
modern, the most traditional will stay rather traditional. The values become less important for 
some groups but not for all. Consequently, the gap between traditional and modern households 
can be expected to widen and the effect of the value variables to increase. Moreover, we can 
learn from Chapter 8 that if women’s roles loosen a bit, this mainly affects women who do not 
live in a household with high care needs. Consequently, the gap between women in households 
with higher and lower care needs can be expected to widen, and for instance the effect of 
heaving children to increase. Simultaneously, the role of economic needs can become more 
influential because women are also slowly becoming associated with some economic role, and 
300
163 These numbers are based on the total sample for Egypt 
1992–2005 and are thus calculated for the same group of 
people.
164 The final interaction model is also estimated using 
weighted IGLS. The results for education and the 
presence of a male breadwinner show similar trends. 
The trend for having young children also points in the 
same direction but somewhat weaker than in the MCMC 
model.
301
if there is an economic need women now have more room to act on it. This results in stronger 
effects of economic needs variables, because more women with economic needs will enter the 
labour market.
 Regarding education, the strongest effect found in Chapter 7 is that education’s effect 
decreases when more jobs are created for women, but this only happens in a context where there 
are fewer educated people than service sector jobs. For the specific case of Egypt and its high 
education levels, this context is completely different. In 2005, Egypt’s supply of people who at 
least completed secondary education (about 43%) greatly outnumbered the number of service 
sector jobs (30%).163 In this case, the creation of jobs might lead to a particular advantage for 
secondary-educated women. Higher-educated women already have jobs and the lower-educated 
ones will not be hired since there is still a supply of secondary-educated women. In other words, 
if the job opportunities in the public sector decrease this might lead to a diminishing effect of 
women’s (secondary) education, because fewer people with secondary education will be able to 
find jobs.
 These specific expectations derived from Chapters 7 and 8 can also be captured in two 
more general expectations. I expect that (a) important factors that have a positive influence on 
women’s employment and become more present decrease in strength, and (b) factors that have a 
negative effect and are in retreat increase in strength. Thus, if the positively influencing factors 
are in decline the effect of that factor increases in strength, and if the negatively influencing 
effect is on the rise the strength of the effect decreases.
10.6 ModeLLIng CHangIng effeCtS 
In this Section, I will first explain how I have tested for changing effects over time, and 
subsequently discuss the results and their implications.
10.6.1 FINDING TRENDS
When estimating multilevel models it is relatively easy to include variables in the random part 
of the model in order to test whether coefficients differ by higher-level unit. In this chapter the 
year of the survey serves as that higher-level unit. I re-estimated the model from Table 10.2 with 
all micro and district-level variables and the time dummies (Model 5), but now with interaction 
terms for all micro-level factors with three year dummies (1995, 2000, and 2005). Since in this 
chapter, I am interested in the question whether effects really change over time, I do not want to 
rely on one ‘hiccup’ (with the risk of type 1 errors – false positives). Relying on just one difference 
between four years would make it relatively easy to corroborate the general claim that effects 
differ, but such a finding might be mere coincidence instead of a pattern and tells us little in 
substantial terms. In that light, and for reasons of comprehensibility, I have only included the 
interactions terms for the micro-level variables that showed a relatively clear indication of an 
upward or downward trend in the coefficient, including some statistically significant differences 
in the coefficients.164
10.6.2 STABILIT Y AND CHANGE
Table 10.3 shows which effects have clearly changed over time and might explain the unexpected 
decline in employment. If the interactions with the year dummies have been retained in the 
model, the coefficients for each of the four years are presented separately in the four columns 
at the right. There it is also indicated whether and how coefficients significantly differ from 
each other (p<0.05). Of the eleven micro-level variables, three did show a (possible) trend 
of weakening or strengthening effects between 1992 and 2005, including the single most 
influential factor, education. Most notable is that for none of the four value-related variables 
(partner’s education, traditional household structure, age difference, age at birth of first child) 
an effect was found, despite the possible mechanisms suggested above. Effects were found for 
the presence of children and male breadwinners, and for education. The paragraphs below will 
address these effects in greater detail.
 Firstly, over the years, having young children turns out to influence women’s employment 
negatively in Egypt.165 Additionally, the effect seems to increase over time: the negative 
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Main coefficients Interaction-based coefficients1
variable Log odds s.e. 1992 
(#)
1995 
($)
2000 
(&)
2005 
(+)
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 -0.036 0.047
3 or 4, older than 5 0.007 0.063
5 or more, older than 5 -0.247 0.352
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.294 ** + -0.129 &+ -0.382 $ -0.504 #$
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.065 + -0.116 + -0.315 -0.491 #$
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.057 -0.204 -0.390 -0.178
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.724 *** 0.054
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.594 *** $+ -0.336 # -0.416 -0.078 #$&
Education (ref = less than primary 
completed)
primary completed, secondary not 0.205 *** 0.061
secondary completed, no tertiary 2.925 *** &+ 2.893 &+ 2.479 #$+ 1.773 #$&
at least some tertiary 3.247 *** + 3.458 + 3.419 + 2.924 #$&
Living in a city (ref = no) 0.164 *** 0.038
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture -0.589 *** 0.069
Lower white collar 0.076 0.054
Upper white collar 0.390 *** 0.044
Unemployed 0.341 ** 0.106
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 0.053 *** 0.005
Values b: Age difference (partner – 
woman)
-0.020 *** 0.003
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less 
than primary)
primary completed, secondary not -0.085 0.060
secondary completed, no tertiary -0.028 0.060
at least some tertiary -0.137 0.075
Values d: Traditional household structure -0.312 *** 0.038
Age 0.380 *** 0.005
Age2 -0.005 *** 0.000
district level
Economic development: Wealth level -0.509 0.572
Male labour supply: Male non-employ-
ment
-0.264 2.532
Labour market structure: Share white 
collar 
0.522 0.589
Labour market structure: Share skilled 
labour
0.468 0.506
Degree of urbanisation -0.140 0.404
Norms: Women in public sphere -0.024 1.100
Norms: Traditional care roles 1.497 0.808
year dummies
1992 ref
1995 -0.328 0.340
2000 -1.330 ** 0.460
2005 -0.747 0.540
table 10.3 Different effects on women’s employment of micro-level factors in four years in Egypt variable
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Main coefficients Interaction-based coefficients1
variable Log odds s.e. 1992 
(#)
1995 
($)
2000 
(&)
2005 
(+)
Model statistics
Intercept -9.908 *** 0.367
Household-level variance 0.098 *** 0.015
District/Time-level variance 0.011 0.007
District-level variance 0.122 * 0.053
Time-level variance 0.618 1.534
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 55,419; Nh = 47,957; Ndt = 99; Nd =26; Nt = 4; Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting 
from IGLS models weighted for in-country representativeness (see Chapter 4); Sources: DHS Egypt 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 women’s 
and household survey, retrieved from the DDW. Notes: (1) In these columns the coefficients are presented for the variables that 
showed some indications of a trend. Based on the interaction terms the coefficient for each was calculated. Whether it significantly 
differs (p<0.05) from the coefficients in other years is designated as follows: # differs from 1992; $ differs from 1995; & differs from 
2000; + differs from 2005; for the year 1992 it is also indicated whether the effect differs significantly from 0.
table 10.3 Continued
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165 The somewhat anomalous results for having 5 or more 
young children can be attributed to the low number of 
women that fall within this category.
166 At the beginning of the chapter it was shown that all four 
indicators of women’s and household members’ values 
show a trend away from traditionalism.
167 The data on Egypt only include women who were still or 
once married. Therefore the partner dummy measures 
the difference between currently married women and 
compares them to widows and divorced women.
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coefficients of having 1 to 4 children grow steadily between 1992/1995 on the one hand and 
2005 on the other, and this increase in strength seems statistically significant overall. No such 
effect was found for the number and presence of older children. This strengthening effect of 
having younger children supports the reasoning that slightly loosening care roles might mainly 
benefit women with fewer care responsibilities. The care responsibilities can be expected to be 
particularly high for women with young children, and consequently a shift towards somewhat 
less traditional care roles would lead to a larger gap between women with younger children and 
other women.166
 Secondly, the results for the presence of a male breadwinner suggest a declining influence 
of this factor in Egypt. In 1995 and 2000 the effect is somewhat weaker than in 1992 (for 1995 
the difference is statistically significant) and for 2005 it is weaker than in all other years and 
has almost disappeared. Thus while having a (living) partner remains an important inhibiting 
influence on employment167 (probably due to the lack of an economic need for women to enter 
the labour market), it has become less relevant whether the household head is a working-age 
man. It seems that with the shift away from the extended-family model (as indicated in Table 
10.1), economic needs are no longer as much determined by adult male members of the extended 
family who are not the woman’s partner.
 The third and last factor for which a possible trend was found in Egypt is higher education. 
For secondary education a clearly declining trend is found: its effect weakens over the years 
and the results are significant. For tertiary education, 2005 mainly stands out. So there is a 
weakening effect of tertiary education over the years but it is not linear. The results seem to 
resonate with the expectations formulated in Section 10.5.2. Because the number of service 
sector jobs is higher than the number of tertiary-educated people, but not higher than the 
number of secondary-educated people, the decline and/or defeminisation of the public sector 
can be expected especially to harm secondary-educated women because they are the least 
preferred of the people needed to fill these vacancies (for which secondary- and tertiary-
educated men and women are mainly hired). As Radwan (2002: 4) signals, the labour demand 
for people with intermediate (secondary) education has especially become rather low compared 
to the supply. That also the effect of tertiary education drops in 2005 might indicate that the 
effect is spreading towards that group, assuming that the public sector hardly hires secondary-
educated women any longer, and now it is tertiary-educated women’s turn. These results are also 
in line with the ‘qualification inflation’-effect found in Western countries, whereby an increase 
in the number of degrees leads to a declining value of the degree and thus to lower returns (e.g. 
Dolton & Silles, 2008; Green, McIntosh & Vignoles, 1999).
 Of the three trends found, two are clearly in line with the general expectations formulated 
at the end of the previous section; the results for male breadwinners is less clear because the 
number of households with a male breadwinner was rather stable over these years. It seems that 
positive influences have diminishing returns when the influence itself becomes more prevalent. 
Also, factors that have a negative influence and are in decline show an increasing influence, 
indicating that the gap between the most obstructed groups and the others increase: large parts 
of society move ahead, but some groups remain were they are.
10.7 ConCLuSIonS
Based on scientific and commonly held beliefs and on rising education levels, decreasing 
fertility, and ever-increasing globalisation, we would not have expected a decline in women’s 
employment in Egypt in the period from 1992 to 2005. The framework used in this thesis points 
towards multilevel complexity and interrelatedness to understand this discrepancy between 
expectations and empirical reality. These mechanisms have been substantiated in this chapter by 
focussing on globalisation and changing micro-level effects, and the dynamics between different 
factors helps to understand why women’s employment did not rise constantly.
10.7.1 GLOBAL INFLUENCES
Two international developments or incidents did help to explain the decline in women’s 
employment. The perceived threat of ‘Western norms’ contributed to political violence directed 
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at tourists, and – regardless of the source of the tourist attacks – this violence did damage 
women’s employment by a decreasing stream of international tourists. This was most visible in 
the tourism governorates home to the resorts Hurghada and Sharm el Sheikh, the ancient city 
Aswan, the Sphinx, the Valley of Kings and the Valley of Queens, the Great Pyramid of Giza, and 
the major spas. Similarly, internationally prescribed economic reforms that resulted in a shrinking 
or defeminising public sector have hurt women’s employment over the years. Both these effects 
support one overall idea: whether and how international or global processes influence women’s 
employment depends on the structure of the local labour market, in particular with respect to 
the vertical gender segregation.
 Regarding labour market structures, it can have several reasons why no effect was found 
of the public sector size in Chapter 6. The most plausible is the measurement used there: 
government expenditures. An additional possibility, suggested by the analyses in this chapter, 
is that the effect of the public sector size differs considerably by district, depending on the 
extent to which certain sectors are feminised in that district (e.g. tourism, public sector, light 
manufacturing). The value pattern underlying the opportunities can be more context specific 
than often assumed. For instance, manufacturing jobs might not be considered suitable 
everywhere (cf. Moghadam, 2003: 49). Consequently, the effects of IMF and WorldBank 
programs or economic shocks (oil, war) depend on which sectors they influence and how the 
labour market is segregated.
 For several global and international processes no clear effect was found here, and these 
results seem to complement the analyses in Chapter 6. FDI and general economic development 
do not seem to create an overall demand for labour nor more opportunities for women. Related 
to this, the return of oil migrants does not seem to have hurt women’s employment much. A 
positive effect of gender equality norms was not found either, but the cultural invasion by the 
West (of which gender equality is often a token issue) did seem to play its part in legitimising 
or provoking the internal violence and tourism. The influence of war could not be tested, but 
did seem to be one of the causes of the needs for loans and thus restructuring. Lastly, finding 
no effect of democratisation might indicate that is not very important for women’s absolute 
employment (the focus of this thesis), but more for women’s relative employment as argued by 
Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2009).
 Overall, globalisation is clearly a multidimensional, complex phenomenon with multiple 
and contradictory dynamics (Bergeron, 2001; Moghadam, 2007; Pyle & ward, 2003; see also the 
Egypt Human Development Report, 2000/2001). Especially when global-level processes interact 
with local labour markets does it seem likely that global factors affect women’s employment; 
and while these might be considered side effects of other processes, their impact can be strongly 
negative. This means that it is not only harder for women to find jobs, but women seem to lose 
their jobs as well. Even though the long-term effects of a process such as globalisation might 
benefit women (not tested here), the medium-term dynamics can be detrimental to certain 
groups of women and their families – from their perspective the short or medium term might 
cover their entire life.
10.7.2 CHANGING RETURNS
After the multifaceted influence of globalisation, the second explanation for the discrepancy 
diagnosed at the start of this chapter is made up of the changing effects of education, 
having young children, and the presence of a working-age male household head. This further 
substantiates conclusions drawn in Chapters 7 and 8 about the context dependency of micro-
level factors.
 From a longitudinal perspective, especially the declining effect of education helps to 
understand that women’s employment did not rise unambiguously. With both the relative 
number of secondary- and tertiary-educated women doubling in 13 years, it could have 
been expected that women’s employment would rise as well. In 1992, 60% of the tertiary-
educated women were employed and 43% of the secondary-educated women. Based on these 
probabilities, the employment rate of women – assuming stable returns – should have been more 
than 22%, not the found 16%.
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168 This effect seems to agree with the effects for the 
presence of adult male household members found in 
Chapter 8, which were stronger in the Greater Middle 
East than in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, 
the extended-family model being strongest in the first. 
However, it does not seem to correspond with the result 
for Central Asia in that chapter.
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 The analysis in this chapter has drawn explicit attention to the fact that effects do change 
over time, and the results seem to support the expectation that positive influences that become 
more prevalent (e.g. education) lose strength, whereas negative influences that lose ground (e.g. 
having many children) become stronger in effect. In other words, this means that the effects of 
factors such as education and fertility decline are no panacea for women’s employment, because 
the positive effect on women’s employment will decrease. To put it more strongly, there seems 
to be a backfiring dynamic whereby stimulating the micro-level factors that increase employment 
in the end minimise the power of these factors; the law of diminishing returns.
 Furthermore, the effects found resonate with previous results. The declining positive effect 
of education seems to be in line with the reasoning that the effect of education depends on the 
balance between (public) service-sector jobs and the number of higher-educated people (women 
and men) available. The over-education of the Egyptian people leads to a lower value of the 
education, which has also been found for labour markets in developed economies (see Dolton & 
Silles, 2008; Green, McIntosch & Vignoles, 1999). The growing difference between women with 
and without young children, and the changing values as noted at the start of this chapter both fit 
the reasoning that moving away from traditionalism mainly benefits women without strong care 
duties. Lastly, the disappearing negative effect of the presence of a working-age male household 
head might be ascribed to a waning importance of the extended household, in which case only 
the presence of a male partner is important, and not so much that of other adult men.168
 In this chapter, the emphasis has been on testing from a longitudinal perspective, whether 
there are changing effects. However, as Beck nicely phrased it methodologically: “Time is not a 
theoretical variable.” (2010: 293). The next step would therefore be to study why effects have 
changed in more detail.
10.7.3 GENER ALISATION
To pick up where the last section ended, the general conclusion seems to be that the 
developments in women’s employment are not part of a simple linear process but of a more 
complex system of non-linearity (see Walby, 2009). Earlier, when no strong increase in 
women’s employment was found for the MENA, it was often attributed to traditional norms 
that prevent women’s participation in paid work outside the home (see Assaad, 2004). The 
case of Egypt has shown that while reality is indeed more complex, it can nevertheless be 
understood. Moreover, these results seem to be generalisable, at least partly. If the “myth 
of rising female employment in Muslim countries” (cf. Hakim, 1995; Assaad, 2004) refers to 
deterministically formulated expectations, the case of Egypt – and the numbers presented in 
Figure 10.1 – would contradict such ideas about globalisation or rising education. Interesting 
in Figure 10.1 is that three of the five countries show a downward trend in the second half of 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Of the five, these three are also the most touristic countries: they 
rank 19th (Jordan), 51st (Egypt), and 80th (Indonesia) on the tourism revenues as part of the 
GDP, while Bangladesh and Nigeria rank 154th and 153rd respectively (Nationmaster, 2011); 
and violent attacks on tourists took place also in Jordan and Indonesia: the Millennium attack 
plots in 2000 that targeted U.S. and Israeli tourists in Jordan, and the 2002 Bali bombings 
which killed 202 people and were seen as retaliation against the U.S. war on terror. Both these 
events fall within the period of decline given in Figure 10.1 and seem to be reactions to either 
Westernisation or neo-colonialism.
 Regarding the generalisability of the more specific results found for Egypt in this chapter, 
it can definitely be argued that Egypt is an extreme case (Gerring, 2007: 101–5) with regard to 
the role of the public or government sector. Public sector employment was high and graduates 
(secondary and tertiary) had a public job guarantee (Assaad, 2003: 120, 140 fn 1). Because this 
sector was so large (and feminised) it is not surprising that privatisation has had a large impact 
in this country. In countries where this sector is smaller or less feminised it can be expected that 
economic restructuring programs have less of a detrimental impact on women’s employment. 
Still, the effect can be expected to be present in other countries as well. For instance, Miles 
(2002) discusses a similar effect in Jordan at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, and also in 
Algeria the public sector is an important employer of women (Assaad, 2003).
310
311
 The limitations to the generalisability of the impact of SAPs and internationally-motivated 
internal violence simultaneously direct us towards more general conclusions that can be drawn 
from these results. Opportunities in terms of labour market structures are clearly important 
to women, and the presence of feminised sectors advances women’s employment. Global and 
global-related national events and developments that hurt these feminised sectors may thus 
damage women’s employment. Which sectors are most feminised, and thus which factors at the 
global level should be focussed on depends on the local context, and on the gendered labour 
market system in the particular country, region, or area. The indirect effect of global events thus 
works through the local level.
 Regarding micro-level factors’ context-dependent effects, the longitudinal analyses support 
previous conclusions and the general framework. For instance, the declining effect of higher 
education at first glance seems at odds with the result from Chapter 7 that education’s effect 
declined when more jobs were present. However, zooming in on the Egyptian context shows that 
the balance between the supply and demand for higher-educated people is different there and 
this brings the results in line again. If there are not enough jobs available for all higher-educated 
people, additional education is no longer a guarantee for finding a job. Educating women 
increase the chances of the newly-educated women, but it also increases the competition of the 
already educated women. It changes the overall balance in an area and thus influences not just 
the newly educated women.
 Overall, this chapter’s longitudinal perspective and its combination of multilevel statistical 
analyses that are interpreted taking Egypt’s economic and political context into account have 
helped to gain a better understanding of why women’s employment is not a matter of ever-
increasing numbers. While many processes can be advantageous, international events and 
politics have gendered effects on women’s labour market opportunities, and expectations of 
rising education and declining fertility based on prior results might by misleading. In both cases 
it seems that the interrelatedness of factors and processes at different levels have been ignored, 
leading to unrealistic expectations. Applying the NOV framework and zooming in on a particular 
case has proven to create a better understanding of the dynamics between the factors and of 
how the results from previous chapter should be interpreted.
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1) What is the degree of women’s employment in Muslim countries and how does it differ among and within countries and 
over time?
2) Which micro, meso and macro-level factors are the (major) determinants of women’s employment in Muslim countries, 
and how do they influence women’s employment?
3) Do the effects of explanatory factors of women’s employment in Muslim countries differ in strength and presence 
according to time and space, and if they do, how and why do they differ? 
Box 11.1
Box 11.2 Countries studied
Algeria Eritrea Malaysia Senegal
Azerbaijan Guinea Mali Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Indonesia Mauritania Syria
Burkina Faso Jordan Morocco Tunisia
Chad Kazakhstan Niger Turkey
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Nigeria Yemen
Egypt Lebanon Pakistan Zanzibar
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
Khadija’s legacy
11.1 KHadIja: StILL tHe fIrSt -eConoMIC Independent- MuSLIM
After discussing many women in Muslim countries, and whether and why they were active on 
the labour market, Khadija’s story – with which this thesis opened – is still an important one. 
This woman, who was Muhammad’s first wife and the first Muslim in history, was economically 
very active and independent. After fourteen hundred years, her legacy illustrates, amongst 
others things, two main points of this thesis. Firstly, simply linking Islam to economically 
deprived women and gender inequality is short sighted. Secondly, logically related to the 
previous point, the story shows that Khadija’s position was shaped by multiple forces, such as 
her class background, her marital status, her ideological attitude, societal norms, and economic 
opportunities. But how? The current literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries 
already points to a reasonable array of influential factors, but an overarching understanding 
of how these influences are interrelated, what the dynamics between factors are, and which 
factors might be absent is missing. That is why this thesis sets out to understand the patterns 
of influences on women’s economic position – more specifically women’s paid employment 
in the non-agricultural sector – and increase our knowledge of the interrelatedness of these 
explanatory factors.
 This goal was captured in three central questions (see Box 11.1), and the conclusions can 
be summarised in three central answers. Firstly, the empirical diversity conclusion: the variety 
in women’s employment among countries, districts and women has shown to be so extensive 
that presenting one general figure on women’s employment in the Muslim civilisation (by 
itself or vis-à-vis other groups of countries) is uninformative at best, and misleading in most 
cases, because it veils the diversity in employment. Secondly, the structured multiplicity 
conclusion: the differences in women’s employment depend on the needs of women and 
societies, the opportunities women have, as well as women’s values and those dominant in 
their environments. All influences on a woman’s employment can be understood in these 
terms, but the way they translate to specific factors might differ. Thirdly, the generalised 
context-dependency conclusion: the effects on employment of a woman’s and her household’s 
characteristics also depend on the economic, cultural and policy environment. The effects’ 
direction might be universal, but the exact relationship and strength thereof varies. In other 
words, sometimes universal claims seem to hold, but not for all factors, and it is always possible 
and necessary to qualify general claims.
 These general conclusions might sound rather commonsensical, but are they? As shown 
across this thesis, many studies simplistically compare Muslim countries to others without 
acknowledging the differences between and within Muslim countries, thus reconstituting the 
belief that the lives of all women in Muslim countries are the same. If studies try to explain 
differences between or within countries, they often choose one specific focus or country 
and it is unclear how the study’s explanations relate to other influences or whether they 
are generalisable. Regarding contextually different effects, studies either seem to assume 
universality or state that the effects are specific to the context. With respect to all these three 
conclusions, it is also the case that so far – to my knowledge – no extensive comparative study 
exists that has studied these ideas empirically. By transcending differences between theoretical, 
methodological and discipline-bound perspectives, developing a new theoretical framework, 
and using data on almost 300,000 women from 383 district in 28 Muslim countries (Box 11.2), 
I hope to have provided theoretical and empirical insights in the diversity, complexity, and 
dynamics between influences on women’s employment in Muslim countries. Having made these 
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figure 11.2 The distribution of women’s gainful non-agricultural employment in 383 districts
 Women's employment (%)
figure 11.3 Muslim countries in 2009
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general concepts – diversity, complexity, dynamics – become tangible might be considered the 
most important contribution of this thesis.
 As argued in Chapter 4, understanding both differences and similarities among Muslim 
countries was a major reason to focus exclusively on Muslim countries, and thus my starting 
point has been the literature on Muslim countries. Consequently, factors more dominant in the 
literature on the West, such as welfare state regimes and policies (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 
2002; Pettit & Hook, 2005), are less prominent here. Another reason fort that is data scarcity 
(see Section 11.4). Nevertheless, the framework presented here can be used better to understand 
the influence of policymaking, as will be shown throughout this chapter and more specifically 
in Section 11.6 (see also Spierings, 2012b). Only incidentally will I refer to the literature on 
women’s employment in welfare states, but I will address the underlying issue of cross-cultural 
comparisons more elaborately in Section 11.4.1.
 In the next section, I will unfold the general conclusions by summarising the results of the 
previous chapters and answering the three overall questions in greater detail (Section 11.2). 
Subsequently, I will reflect on the general theoretical framework used in this thesis (Section 
11.3), as well as on some methodological choices and issues (Section 11.4). This latter section 
shows that quantitative techniques can model complexity as long as data are available and we are 
willing to cross the borders between methodological traditions. Subsequently, I will substantiate 
all these insights by discussing the broader implications for the contemporary debates 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis (Section 11.5). I will finish with the most important 
implications of this thesis’ insights in diversity and complexity for policy-making (Section 11.6), 
and with two short concluding notes (Section 11.7).
11.2 SuMMarISed reSuLtS: unfoLdIng dIverSIt y and CoMpLexIt y
Below, the three mains answers will be made more tangible by summarising the results of the 
previous chapters. These results are based on multilevel analyses on women aged 15 through 49, 
who are neither disabled, nor in school, and the dependent variable was whether or not a woman 
was gainfully employed outside agriculture.
11.2.1 THE EMPLOYMENT R ATES – QUESTION 1
The variety in women’s employment among countries, districts and women has shown to be so 
extensive, that presenting one general figure on women’s employment in the Muslim civilisation 
(by itself or vis-à-vis other groups of countries) is uninformative at best, and misleading in most 
cases because it veils the diversity in employment.
As shown in Chapter 5, of all the women in my samples about 1 in 4 earns money with a job 
outside agriculture. This shows that many women are gainfully employed outside agriculture, 
but also that even more women are active in agriculture, working unpaid, or fulltime housewives. 
However, the figures differ tremendously across and within countries. In 5 countries, at least 
40% of the women is employed; in three countries it is less than 10% (see Figure 11.1 – a reprint 
of Figure 5.2a). Within the countries major differences were found between districts as well. In 
a large majority of countries, the difference between the districts with the highest and lowest 
employment figures is at least 20 percentage points. In 90 districts from 13 countries women’s 
employment falls below 10%; in 28 districts from 12 countries it is above 50%, and in 2 above 
75% (see Figure 11.2 – a reprint of Figure 5.4). The descriptives of five countries in Chapter 10 
have also shown that women’s employment is not steadily rising across countries – which seems 
the general expectation – but that it fluctuates.
 Disregarding this diversity, ‘Muslim civilisation’ (Figure 11.3 – a reprint of Figure 4.1) is 
often seen or depicted as a collection of ‘homogeneous and undifferentiated social entities’ 
(Hatem, 1987; Syed, 2008), and ideas about the Middle East are easily generalised to all Muslim 
countries (Read 2002: 19).169 Gender inequality and Islam are always at the centre of this 
practice (Moghadam, 1996: 248). Emblematic is Hirsi Ali’s (2006: 124) choice in ‘Submission: 
Part 1’ to introduce the fictitious Muslim-majority, Shari’a-ruled ideal-type country ‘Islamistan’ 
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172 The results from Chapter 8 indicate that a traditional 
household structure is not just a proxy for values, but that 
in the extended household the presence of certain non-
nuclear household members influences the economic and 
care balance to women’s disadvantage. After inclusion 
of those variables, the effect of the general variable 
disappeared.
171 In the case of contradictory outcomes, most leverage 
is generally given to the more detailed studies for the 
particular relationship.
170 Following Scharff (2011), this sketching of a stereotypical 
image of Muslim countries might originate from a desire 
169 Examples of this practice of homogenisation are abundant 
on issues such as gender equality and democracy and can 
be found in leading journals as well as others (e.g. Anker, 
1998; Clark, 1992; Clark, Ramsbey & Adler, 1991; Donno 
& Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002; Forsythe, Korzeniewicz 
& Durrant, 2000; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Inglehart 
& Norris, 2003a, 2003b; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; 
Lincove, 2008; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Paxton, Hughes 
& Green, 2006; Ross, 2008; Tzannatos & Kaur, 2003; 
Yuchtman–Yaar & Alkalay, 2007).
to construct a strong Western identity of gender equality, 
for which a clear ‘other’ is needed.
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(see Jusová, 2008). This thesis’ results are very clear: Islamistan does not exist. I do not claim 
that there are no gender inequalities in Muslim countries, and we should be aware of the 
anthropological pitfall of creating a too positive picture to correct negative stereotypes (Jusová, 
2008). Nevertheless, speaking in such a general way about Muslim countries hides so much 
diversity that reality is done a serious injustice.170 
11.2.2 THE (MA JOR) DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT – QUESTION 2
The differences in women’s employment depend on the needs of women and societies, the 
opportunities women have, as well as women’s values and those dominant in their environments. 
All influences on a woman’s employment can be understood in these terms, but how they translate 
to specific factors might differ.
Chapter 5 has shown that it are women like Khadija (educated, widowed, between the ages of 30 
and 45, no young children, living in a city) who have rather high employment rates. However, in 
Chapters 6 through 10 I have shown that more factors at different levels play a role, and that they 
are interrelated. The results of these analyses are summarised in Boxes 11.3 and 11.4, including 
the outcomes per chapter. Below, I present the overall conclusions.171
 INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS
Box 11.3 presents an overview of all individual- and household-level factors studied. Broad 
support has been found for the idea that economic needs have a positive effect on women’s 
employment across the board (Hypothesis H-I in Chapter 2). Women without a partner have 
higher employment rates in particular. Being head of the household has also been associated 
with higher employment rates, except in Southeast Asia. In the Greater Middle East and Central 
Asia, women in a household with fewer adult men have higher employment likelihoods.
 The inhibiting effect of care needs in the household has been broadly supported by the 
negative association of employment with having children (Hypothesis H-II). Very broad support 
has also been found for the idea that the presence of more adult women in the household 
alleviates the care burden. For the Greater Middle East, the presence of elderly in the household 
increase the care burden and limit labour market participation, while the presence of children not 
part of the hereditary blood line seems less inhibiting than that of children who are.
 Regarding women’s skills, each increase in a woman’s educational level increases the likelihood 
that she finds employment (H-IV), and it is the single most important micro-level explanation. This 
effect differs between countries and districts, but it is overwhelmingly positive and consistent 
across time and the different countries. In particular, secondary and tertiary education stimulate 
women’s employment. Nevertheless, most employed women still have lower education levels. 
A strong positive effect has also been found for the resources women have at their disposal in 
terms of the socio-economic position of the partner (H-V). The analyses do not support a possible 
gendered division of job-finding resources among the young household members.
 The last group of micro-level variables I have looked at are indicators for internalised 
traditionalism (H-VI). These seem to be important inhibiting factors and of all the value 
proxies, these seem best captured by the age difference between spouses and by the spouse’s 
educational level (see Box 11.3).172 As the results from Chapter 9 have shown, Muslim women did 
not have consistently lower employment chances than non-Muslim women. The age of a woman 
at the birth of her first child showed no effect or a negative association. This indicates that it is 
no good indicator of having less traditional values. It may be the case that women mainly start 
working once the children are older, which means that giving birth at a later age delays entering 
the labour market.
 DISTRIC TS, COUNTRIES, AND THE GLOBE
An overview of macro-level outcomes is given in Box 11.4. While at the country/global level, 
no effect is found for economic development and foreign direct investments, the district-level 
demand for labour is certainly important (H-III). The district-level depletion of the male labour 
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Box 11.3 Results of factors derived from the framework presented in Chapter 2 — Micro level: Individual and household
general hypotheses (see Chapter 2) Specific hypotheses (Chapters 3, 8 and 9) operationalisation of the specific hypotheses
Hypo-
thesis
Condition expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
Specific 
hypo-
thesis
theoretical factor expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
variables Level of observation Chapter empirical 
result
expectation corroborated 
or falsified
HI Material needs + ✓ H3.1 Breadwinner present - ✓ Partner present Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA
-
+
✓
Head of household is working age male Household 6; 7; 9; 10
8
-
x
x
H8.3 Adult men - ✓ 
partly
Number of adult men (15–60) Household 8 GME, CA
8 SSA, SEA
-
x
✓ partly
H8.4 Head of household + ✓ 
partly
Household position Individual 8 GME, SSA, CA
8 SEA
+
x
✓ partly
HII Care needs - ✓ H3.2 Children - ✓ Number of (young) children Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA 
-
x
✓
H8.1 Adult women + ✓ Number of adult women (15–60) Household 8 + ✓
H8.2 Elder people - ✓ 
partly
Number of people age>60 Household 8 GME
8 SSA, CA
8 SEA
-
x
+?
✓ partly
H8.5 Partner of head of household - x Household position Individual 8 x x
H8.6 Children are male - x Proportion of children Household 8 GME, CA, SEA
8 SSA
x
-?
x
H8.7 Children are not-biological 
related to head of household
+ ✓ 
partly
Proportion of children Household 8 GME
8 CA
8 SSA, SEA
+
+?
x
✓ partly
HIv Woman’s skills + ✓ H3.10 Human capital + ✓ Educational attainment Individual 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 + ✓
Hv Resources + ✓ H3.11 Socio-economic network + ✓ Partner’s occupation Individual 6; 7; 8 GME,CA, SEA; 9 
IDN; 10
9 NGA
8 SSA
+
x
-
✓
H8.8 Male young relatives - x Proportion among young (15–21) hh 
members
Household 8 x x
HvII Seclusion & segregation values - ✓ H3.14 
H3.15
Traditional household members
&
Internalised traditionalism
- ✓ Partner’s education Individual 6; 7; 8
9; 10
+
x
✓ partly
Age difference Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA
-
x
✓
Traditional family structure Household 6; 7; 8 SEA; 10
8 GME, SSA, CA; 9 
-
x
?
Age at birth first child Individual 6; 7; 8 GME, SSA, SEA; 
9
8 CA
10
-(?)
+?
+
x
H9.11 Muslim denomination - x Muslim vs Christian and other Individual 9 x / + x
Notes: (1) While this hypothesis was formulated in Chapter 9, it is not part of the theoretical expectations derived from the frame-
work presented in this thesis. It is an expectation formulated in the existing literature which is in contrast with the expectations 
derived from my framework.
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general hypotheses (see Chapter 2) Specific hypotheses (Chapters 3, 8 and 9) operationalisation of the specific hypotheses
Hypo-
thesis
Condition expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
Specific 
hypo-
thesis
theoretical factor expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
variables Level of observation Chapter empirical 
result
expectation corroborated 
or falsified
HI Material needs + ✓ H3.1 Breadwinner present - ✓ Partner present Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA
-
+
✓
Head of household is working age male Household 6; 7; 9; 10
8
-
x
x
H8.3 Adult men - ✓ 
partly
Number of adult men (15–60) Household 8 GME, CA
8 SSA, SEA
-
x
✓ partly
H8.4 Head of household + ✓ 
partly
Household position Individual 8 GME, SSA, CA
8 SEA
+
x
✓ partly
HII Care needs - ✓ H3.2 Children - ✓ Number of (young) children Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA 
-
x
✓
H8.1 Adult women + ✓ Number of adult women (15–60) Household 8 + ✓
H8.2 Elder people - ✓ 
partly
Number of people age>60 Household 8 GME
8 SSA, CA
8 SEA
-
x
+?
✓ partly
H8.5 Partner of head of household - x Household position Individual 8 x x
H8.6 Children are male - x Proportion of children Household 8 GME, CA, SEA
8 SSA
x
-?
x
H8.7 Children are not-biological 
related to head of household
+ ✓ 
partly
Proportion of children Household 8 GME
8 CA
8 SSA, SEA
+
+?
x
✓ partly
HIv Woman’s skills + ✓ H3.10 Human capital + ✓ Educational attainment Individual 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 + ✓
Hv Resources + ✓ H3.11 Socio-economic network + ✓ Partner’s occupation Individual 6; 7; 8 GME,CA, SEA; 9 
IDN; 10
9 NGA
8 SSA
+
x
-
✓
H8.8 Male young relatives - x Proportion among young (15–21) hh 
members
Household 8 x x
HvII Seclusion & segregation values - ✓ H3.14 
H3.15
Traditional household members
&
Internalised traditionalism
- ✓ Partner’s education Individual 6; 7; 8
9; 10
+
x
✓ partly
Age difference Individual 6; 7; 8; 9 IDN; 10
9 NGA
-
x
✓
Traditional family structure Household 6; 7; 8 SEA; 10
8 GME, SSA, CA; 9 
-
x
?
Age at birth first child Individual 6; 7; 8 GME, SSA, SEA; 
9
8 CA
10
-(?)
+?
+
x
H9.11 Muslim denomination - x Muslim vs Christian and other Individual 9 x / + x
Notes: (1) While this hypothesis was formulated in Chapter 9, it is not part of the theoretical expectations derived from the frame-
work presented in this thesis. It is an expectation formulated in the existing literature which is in contrast with the expectations 
derived from my framework.
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Box 11.4 Results of factors derived from the framework presented in Chapter 2 — Macro and meso level: Globe, Country, and District2
general hypotheses (see Chapter 2) Specific hypotheses (Chapters 3, 8 and 9) operationalisation of the specific hypotheses
Hypo-
thesis
Condition expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
Specific 
hypo-
thesis
theoretical factor expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
variables Level of observation Chapter empirical 
result
expectation corroborated 
or falsified
HI Material needs + ?/? ✓ H3.18 Social safety net - ?/? ✓ Family allowance Country 6 +? ?/? ✓
HIII Labour demand + ✓ H3.3 Economic development + ✓ also GDP/c Country 6; 10 x x
Wealth District 6
6 (8 Total, GME, SEA)
(8 SSA, CA; 9; 10)
+ 
- 
(x)
✓ also
H3.4 Depletion male labour supply + ✓ Non-employed men District 6 (8 Total, GME, SSA, SEA;
(8 CA; 9; 10)
-
(x)
✓
H3.5 Light manufacturing jobs + ✓ Proportion skilled labour District 6 
(8 Total, GME, SSA, SEA; 9)
(8 CA)
(10)
+?
(+)
(-)
(x)
✓
H3.6 Urbanisation + ✓ Living in a city Household 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 + ✓
Urbanisation District 6 
(8, 9 NGA, 10)
(9 IDN) 
+?
(x)
(-)
x
H3.7 FDI + x Inflow foreign investment Country 6, 10 x x
HvI Suitable jobs + ✓ H3.8 Service sector + ✓ White collar jobs District 6 (8 Total, CA, SEA; 9 NGA; 10)
(8 GME, SSA)
(9 IDN)
+
(x)
(-)
✓
Tourism inflow Country 10 + ✓
H3.9 Public sector + ? Government expenditures Country 6 + ?x
Government employment Country + district 10 + ✓
HvII Seclusion & segregation values - ✓ H3.12 Presence public sphere + ✓ Relative presence women District 6 (8 Total, GME, 9 NGA)
(8 SSA, CA, SEA; 9 IDN; 10)
+
(x)
✓
H3.13 Traditional care roles - ? Prevalence traditional household District 6 (9 IDN)
(8 SEA; 10)
(8 GME, CA)
(8 Total, SSA; 9 NGA)
-?
(-)
(x)
(+)
?
H9.3 Conservative Islam is dominant - ✓ IDN: Modernist vs Traditionalist Islam
NGA: non-Sokoto vs Sokoto Islam
District 9 -
-?
✓
? /?✓
H9.21 Islam is dominant - x Muslim vs Christian or other District 9 x / +2 x
n.a.3 Government’s role H3.16/
H9.4
Institutionalisation conservative 
Islam
- ✓ State Islamisation Country 6 (8) - ✓
Shari’a implemented 9 - ✓
H3.17 Policies are traditional family-role 
based
- ? /?✓ Gender unequal policies and laws Country 6 -? ? /?✓
H3.19 Democracy + x Political rights & civil liberties Country 6; 10 x x
H9.5 Islamic political actors - x IDN: Political parties
NGA: Governors
District 9 IDN
9 NGA
+?
x
x
For district-level variables the results in brackets are those of the models presented in chapters which in the focus was not on these 
factors. Because for these factors it is important to focus on the paths and changes after the inclusion of other factors –as shown in 
Chapter 6– , these models do not provide as much information as the results of the factors focused on in Chapters 6, 9, and 10. In sum, 
the results in brackets should be treated with much caution. The results from Chapter 7 are excluded in total, because the models in 
that Chapter include interaction effects with the district-level variables. Notes: (1) While this hypothesis was formulated in Chapter 9, 
it is not part of the theoretical expectations derived from the framework presented in this thesis. It is an expectation formulated in the existing 
literature which is in contrast with the expectations derived from my framework; (2) One negative effect was found: In Indonesia the Hindu 
province has a higher employment rate than the Muslim ones; (3) Some government-related factors could be directly linked to one of the seven 
main hypotheses, but the factors mentioned here might have multifinal effects and are thus related to more than one of the seven hypotheses.
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general hypotheses (see Chapter 2) Specific hypotheses (Chapters 3, 8 and 9) operationalisation of the specific hypotheses
Hypo-
thesis
Condition expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
Specific 
hypo-
thesis
theoretical factor expec-
tation
expecta-
tion cor-
roborated 
or falsified
variables Level of observation Chapter empirical 
result
expectation corroborated 
or falsified
HI Material needs + ?/? ✓ H3.18 Social safety net - ?/? ✓ Family allowance Country 6 +? ?/? ✓
HIII Labour demand + ✓ H3.3 Economic development + ✓ also GDP/c Country 6; 10 x x
Wealth District 6
6 (8 Total, GME, SEA)
(8 SSA, CA; 9; 10)
+ 
- 
(x)
✓ also
H3.4 Depletion male labour supply + ✓ Non-employed men District 6 (8 Total, GME, SSA, SEA;
(8 CA; 9; 10)
-
(x)
✓
H3.5 Light manufacturing jobs + ✓ Proportion skilled labour District 6 
(8 Total, GME, SSA, SEA; 9)
(8 CA)
(10)
+?
(+)
(-)
(x)
✓
H3.6 Urbanisation + ✓ Living in a city Household 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 + ✓
Urbanisation District 6 
(8, 9 NGA, 10)
(9 IDN) 
+?
(x)
(-)
x
H3.7 FDI + x Inflow foreign investment Country 6, 10 x x
HvI Suitable jobs + ✓ H3.8 Service sector + ✓ White collar jobs District 6 (8 Total, CA, SEA; 9 NGA; 10)
(8 GME, SSA)
(9 IDN)
+
(x)
(-)
✓
Tourism inflow Country 10 + ✓
H3.9 Public sector + ? Government expenditures Country 6 + ?x
Government employment Country + district 10 + ✓
HvII Seclusion & segregation values - ✓ H3.12 Presence public sphere + ✓ Relative presence women District 6 (8 Total, GME, 9 NGA)
(8 SSA, CA, SEA; 9 IDN; 10)
+
(x)
✓
H3.13 Traditional care roles - ? Prevalence traditional household District 6 (9 IDN)
(8 SEA; 10)
(8 GME, CA)
(8 Total, SSA; 9 NGA)
-?
(-)
(x)
(+)
?
H9.3 Conservative Islam is dominant - ✓ IDN: Modernist vs Traditionalist Islam
NGA: non-Sokoto vs Sokoto Islam
District 9 -
-?
✓
? /?✓
H9.21 Islam is dominant - x Muslim vs Christian or other District 9 x / +2 x
n.a.3 Government’s role H3.16/
H9.4
Institutionalisation conservative 
Islam
- ✓ State Islamisation Country 6 (8) - ✓
Shari’a implemented 9 - ✓
H3.17 Policies are traditional family-role 
based
- ? /?✓ Gender unequal policies and laws Country 6 -? ? /?✓
H3.19 Democracy + x Political rights & civil liberties Country 6; 10 x x
H9.5 Islamic political actors - x IDN: Political parties
NGA: Governors
District 9 IDN
9 NGA
+?
x
x
For district-level variables the results in brackets are those of the models presented in chapters which in the focus was not on these 
factors. Because for these factors it is important to focus on the paths and changes after the inclusion of other factors –as shown in 
Chapter 6– , these models do not provide as much information as the results of the factors focused on in Chapters 6, 9, and 10. In sum, 
the results in brackets should be treated with much caution. The results from Chapter 7 are excluded in total, because the models in 
that Chapter include interaction effects with the district-level variables. Notes: (1) While this hypothesis was formulated in Chapter 9, 
it is not part of the theoretical expectations derived from the framework presented in this thesis. It is an expectation formulated in the existing 
literature which is in contrast with the expectations derived from my framework; (2) One negative effect was found: In Indonesia the Hindu 
province has a higher employment rate than the Muslim ones; (3) Some government-related factors could be directly linked to one of the seven 
main hypotheses, but the factors mentioned here might have multifinal effects and are thus related to more than one of the seven hypotheses.
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173 The public sector did not turn up in Chapter 6, but the 
operationalisation was far from optimal there. The 
more detailed analyses in Chapter 10 provided rather 
strong indications that the government sector is indeed 
important for women.
174 In Chapter 7 this theoretical argument helps to explain 
the at first glance surprising interaction effect between 
education and light manufacturing. 
175 The district-level wealth and traditionalism variable 
indeed correlate negatively (–0.765; p<0.001; n=383). 
If, the district-level traditionalism variable taps into the 
economic deprivation in districts, it might have become 
part of an U-curve effect of economic development 
together with the district-level wealth variable. 
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force has a rather strong general positive effect, indicating that it is crucial whether there are 
still non-employed men. Also living in a city is unambiguously positively related to women’s 
employment, and sub-national wealth seems to have a positive influence through the labour 
market structure (and education and gender norms). But indications of an additional negative 
effect were also found: in richer areas the economic incentives to enter the labour market are 
smaller for women.
 Refining the idea of demand, the kind of jobs that are available has turned out to be 
highly relevant (H-VI), and the labour market structure in the vicinity of women is particularly 
vital. Local gender norms determine which (sub)sectors provide the most opportunities and 
the greatest demand. White-collar jobs, including the tourist and government sector,173 are 
generally positively associated with higher employment levels for women. The presence of a 
larger light-manufacturing sector (including the food and textile industry) also seems to benefit 
women, and not just the lower educated ones.174 Several global processes have proven to be 
important in this respect, but only through the local labour markets. The international economic 
policies of the WorldBank and the IMF, and the interrelation between international tourism 
and anti-Western violence against tourists have been shown to damage women’s employment 
opportunities in certain Egyptian districts.
 Despite some difficulties in measuring them, differences in norms and value systems turned 
out to be rather influential (H-VII). The presence of women in the public sphere seem to serve as 
a positive example and increases women’s employment, but no strong or robust effect has been 
found for the traditional care role norm. This factor, measured by the prevalence of traditional 
household behaviour, even showed some positive effects. Because the effects were controlled 
for micro-level values, the variable might have tapped into the economic situation: in the more 
traditional – poorer – areas there is a higher need to enter the labour market.175 Regarding 
religion, in areas where a more conservative Islam is dominant women have employment rates 
lower than those in areas with a more progressive Islam. No consistently lower employment 
levels are found in Muslim districts compared to non-Muslim (mainly Christian) districts.
 Lastly, of the political factors the overall political system did not show to have a clear effect. 
It can be that democracy offers opportunities both to feminist movements as to organisations 
lobbying against women’s empowerment. The institutionalisation of conservative Islamic law 
and practices, such as Shari’a, has a strong, negative effect on women’s employment, both at 
the country or district level. Simultaneously, the presence of Islamic political actors showed 
indications of a positive effect in Indonesia, where Islamic and Muslim parties are also the parties 
that want to promote employment of the lower social classes. The more general country-level 
policy variable and the presence of a social safety net variable did not show any effect, which 
might be related to the absence of strong welfare states and data limitations (see Section 11.4). 
Still, possible indirect effects of welfare policies, for instance through education and economic 
need, as well as the results of the variables here suggest that policymaking is highly relevant, but 
that better indicators are needed to further understand the effects.
11.2.3 THE DIFFERENT EFFEC TS OF MICRO-LEVEL INFLUENCES – QUESTION 3
The effects on employment of a woman’s and her household’s characteristics also depend on the 
economic, cultural and policy environment. The effects’ direction might be universal, but the 
exact relationship and strength thereof varies.
To claim context-dependency is one thing; to understand it is another. Context-dependency was 
analysed for education in 28 countries and 383 districts, household configurations in 4 regions, 
and for all micro-level factors in Egypt over time. The overall patterns are discussed below. 
Further details can be found in Chapters 7, 8 and 10.
EDUCATION
The effect of education is almost exclusively positive, though it varies quite a bit between 
countries and districts, and over time. The balance between the demand (few non-employed 
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176 This idea explains these results for the Greater Middle 
East.
178 At least, this can explain the results for Central Asia 
regarding having children, and Southeast Asia regarding 
having children and the presence of other women.
179 Also some additional analyses in Chapter 7 support this 
idea: the effect of having a partner is smaller in less 
economically developed areas.
180 The average district-level wealth was lower in 2000 than 
in 1995 and 1992, but higher in 2005 than 2000, and 
non-employment of men was highest in 2005. This is no 
unambiguous pattern of increasing economic hardship 
however.
177 This was how I have explained the effects found for Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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figure 11.4 A holistic-level framework for explaining women’s employment in Muslim countries
327
males, urbanisation, and service sector jobs) and the supply of higher-educated labour 
determines the effect of educational levels. If the number of higher-educated people is smaller 
than the demand for tertiary-educated people, all higher-educated women who want a job can 
find one, and it will also be easier for secondary- (and lower-) educated women to find a job if the 
number of jobs increases. Similarly, if the context is that the supply of higher-educated people 
outnumbers the demand, additional jobs will mainly benefit higher-educated women, which 
will increase the gap between lower- and higher-educated women in terms of the returns of 
education.
 A different pattern was found for the presence of light manufacturing jobs. As already 
mentioned in the previous section, the results I have observed suggest that this sector offers 
additional opportunities for women who want to work, but seem to prefer working at home. 
An increase in the number of these jobs pulls a new group of higher-educated women onto the 
labour market, leading to a larger difference between lower- and higher-educated women and 
thus to a stronger effect of education.
 Regarding a prohibiting effect of norms, most support was found for the idea that in 
particularly the effect of lower education is shaped by the strength of the norms; tertiary-
educated women tend to break free from societal norms and have similar employment levels 
across districts, lower-educated women are more restricted in a traditional environment than in a 
less traditional district.
 HOUSEHOLD STRUC TURES
In Chapter 8, I have shown that the effect of household configurations varies across the four 
regions I have distinguished: the Greater Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and 
Southeast Asia. Firstly, it appears that, if the gendered division of household roles is strict 
and focussed on the general household management, the care demand (presence of children) 
has less of an influence because women are already restricted.176 Secondly, in the context of 
economic hardship the care supply and demand balance (presence of children and other adult 
women) seems less influential as well.177 Thirdly, if it is somewhat more normal for women who 
are not leading the household management to have an economic role, the effect of shifts in a 
household’s care balance seem to influence these women with fewer care duties to a greater 
degree.178 For instance, the women without children are the ones that mainly benefit from a 
loosening of norms.
 Economic needs and the importance of patriliny also depended on the context. A weaker 
impact of having higher economic needs (the absence of a partner and other adult men in the 
household) seems to be related to a context of general economic hardship, as in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.179 However, it is not clear whether this also explains the weakening effect of having a 
partner that I have found for Egypt.180 Differentiating between the type of children (biologically 
related to the head of household or not) seems to be most relevant in a context of stricter 
patriliny, because in such a context being part of the bloodline is related to a child’s higher 
perceived care needs, thus making the environment more restrictive. 
 VALUES AND RESOURCES
I have not paid specific attention to differing effects for the other micro-level factors. However, 
the differences in results across the chapters suggest that further study and theorisation of the 
contextual effects of different resources (H-V) and values (H-VII) should take place. For instance, 
as shown in Box 11.3, partners’ education and occupation has a positive effect in most contexts, 
but not in all, see Egypt, Nigeria, or Sub-Saharan Africa.
11.3 tHe MuLtILeveL needS-opportunItIeS-vaLueS fraMeworK
Now that we have a gained better understanding of which factors influence women’s 
employment, I will go back to the framework from which this thesis started (see Figure 11.4). 
It was built on four premises (see Chapter 2), and below I will reflect on these, show that 
their claims have been warranted, and discuss how the framework can be further refined and 
developed.
328
181 Also Villarreal & Yu (2007) find that (foreign) employers’ 
have preferences for women, and these cannot be solely 
explained in economic terms, values seem to play a role 
there.
182 Assaad & Arntz (2005) is an exception to the rule. They 
include the governorate level in a comparative (statistical) 
analysis.
183 Based on the partitioning of the variation in Chapter 
6, the variation at the district level seems moderate 
compared to the variation between countries, but the 
184 See the discussion in Teachman & Crouder (2002). 
Regarding the constituencies, the database on 
constituency-level data, which is being built by Garcia 
(2011), is noteworthy. For instance, Indonesia, Niger, and 
Turkey are part of it.
statistical and substantial significance of many variables 
at this level as well as the variation found in Chapter 5 
make me concludes that this level is indeed important to 
women’s employment.
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 The first premise was that both structure and agency are important, women are neither 
“passive recipients”, nor fully autonomous (see also Hakim, 1991; Rathgeber, 1990; Razavi & 
Miller, 1995; Walby, 2009: 72). Moreover, women are not the only agents; other agents are 
present within the context as well. Nevertheless, the literature often equates structure with 
context, and given the focus on contextual forces when it comes to women’s employment in 
Muslim countries, this easily leads to neglecting the importance of agency, and consequently, 
the diversity within countries. The results in this thesis draw attention to the role of agents, 
particularly these agents’ preferences, at the different levels, without losing sight of general 
patterns. Firstly, at the level of the women themselves, the desire to work seems strongest 
among higher-educated women, but the results simultaneously suggest that the circumstances 
under which women want to work differ, and it looks as if a considerable group of women might 
only prefer home-based jobs. Not taking this into account creates false expectations about 
structural changes such as the creation of more service-sector jobs. Secondly, the influence 
of the household-level values variables indicates that other household members’ preferences 
are important. While the focus on the household as one actor was already problematised over 
twenty years ago (e.g. Wolf, 1990), there is still little attention for the different agents in the 
household or the way in which cultural norms (such as particular patriarchal bargains) interact 
with the presence of these agents. That this is relevant is suggested strongly by the different 
effects of the presence of, for example, elderly household members and other adult women. 
Thirdly, there should be more attention for agents at the macro-level, such as employers (and 
politicians). While it is often mentioned that women more easily find jobs in the service sector, 
the concrete preferences of employers are hardly studied. My results however suggest that 
employers prefer higher- over lower-educated women (also in low-wage jobs) – and occasionally 
women over men, if women are higher educated and men not181 – which has major consequences 
for the employment gap between higher- and lower-educated women. Measuring employer’ 
preferences directly can be an important next step in understanding these dynamics.
 The second premise – multilevelness – has helped to understand and structure the 
multiplicity of influences: based on existing studies I distinguished five theoretical levels 
where influences can be found: the individual, household, district, country, and global level. 
It hardly seems surprising that each level proved to have influences that turned out to be 
important, but one of the five levels is largely ignored in the literature: the sub-national level.182 
Data availability reasons might have led to this, but theoretically and empirically my results 
strongly argue in favour of including the sub-national level. Norms, labour market structures, 
institutionalised religion, and, possibly, political actors all influence women’s employment at the 
sub-national level. Furthermore, country- and international-level developments such as political 
violence and global economic politics affect women’s employment through the sub-national 
level.183 The direct and indirect roles of the sub-national level support the idea that proximity 
is important. A next step is to test whether contexts closer by than the district are even more 
important, and if the geographical focus needs to be reconsidered by highlighting, for instance, 
social environments and political districts or constituencies. The questions here are: are norms 
less tied up with geography than with the social environment (see Teachman & Crouder 2002), 
and are political influences not more closely related to constituencies?184
 Thirdly, I have claimed that the factors at different levels should be studied in combination. 
I distinguished four ways in which this could work, including two that are hardly ever studied 
comparatively: context-dependent effects and multilevel spuriousness. Together with the 
direct and indirect influences, these forms of relatedness seem crucial in interpreting the 
empirical results. The importance of multilevel spuriousness was illustrated by the labour market 
structure’s effect. For instance, the size of the effect of the service sector will be overestimated 
by more than 50% when not controlling for the educational level of the women in the area. The 
higher employment in those ‘service sector’ areas is partly caused by higher education levels 
in the area. This is not picked up in macro-level only studies. The embedded relationship has 
been discussed elaborately above in answering Question 3 (Section 11.2.3). For this type of 
relationship it seems that the lack of sufficient data and techniques have halted the development 
of theoretical arguments that go beyond the ‘it’s-context-specific’ argument (see Pampel & 
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185 Similarly, Moghadam (2003) sees the gender system as 
an underlying mediating structure, but I perceive this 
underlying system more broadly, and Moghadam grounds 
the gender system in the capitalist economic system.
186 Marriage is preferred over living together (unmarried), 
couples are considered better in raising children than 
187 The examples here are not exhaustive, nor did I pay 
special attention to all aspects of Walby’s complexity 
theory, as my framework is not a direct translation of it.
single parents, and it is thought that if children are born 
people should marry.
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Tanaka, 1986; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). My results and approach show that cross-cultural 
differences in effects exist and can be theorised, modelled, and generalised, though it has not 
been done enough.
 Fourthly and in conclusion, inspired by Hijab (1988; 2001) my research has been premised 
on the notion that the influence of the interrelated characteristics of the agents and structures 
can be understood in terms of three basic conditions: needs, opportunities, and values. 
This approach has shown itself to be particularly useful in understanding the multiplicity of 
influences, as well as their context dependency. First, in the light of multiplicity, I identified 
several household configurations as explanatory factors by applying the framework to 
the concept of patriarchy. This framework then helped to understand surprising results 
by disentangling effects. A prime example of this was interpreting the effect of economic 
development as a combination of creating opportunities and labour demand, changing value 
patterns, but also decreasing economic needs. Lastly, and shifting toward context-dependency, 
the importance of the underlying value system in societies was demonstrated. This system 
shapes what are believed to be the population’s opportunities and needs.185 This implies that 
much more attention needs to be directed at understanding the different dimensions along 
which value systems vary. While I have paid attention to distinguishing public seclusion and 
traditionalism, other studies on women’s employment mention dimensions such as Machista 
attitudes in Chile – focussing more on coupledom (Contreras & Plaza, 2010)186 – or on gender 
traditionalism attitudes versus egalitarianism in the United States (Maume, 2006). The question 
now is along which dimensions different value systems truly differ from each other, and how 
this is reflected in women’s employment. Fourthly, the NOV framework helps to understand the 
context-dependency of effects in different contexts, as discussed elaborately by now. Future 
research might pay more attention to the embedding effects of policies that, for instance, 
dampen or increase the influence of care needs in the household.
 As can be derived from the discussion above, the four premises of my theoretical framework 
are fundamentally related to the three main conclusions – empirical diversity, structured 
multiplicity, and generalised context-dependency – because the framework allows for them to 
be traced and because it facilitates substantiation and interpretation. Complex interrelatedness 
has not only been a mere assumption in this work, it has been revealed to be at work in the 
world; and for the case women’s employment I have fleshed out the general idea of complex 
interrelatedness. In that sense, this work can also be considered as an example of how very 
general theories can be translated into large-scale comparative empirical research.
 In that light, the framework I have used is grounded in several existing approaches of which 
Walby’s complexity theory (2007, 2009) is the most encompassing one. While I did not take 
that theory as my sole starting point, this thesis can be considered as a practical application 
of Walby’s work. A translation that might seem daunting, but is thus possible. Walby argues 
for the existence of several institutional domains and inequality regimes that are in a constant 
process of change, mutually shaping each other and at the same time irreducible to one 
another (Walby, 2009: 58–70). Using my conditions framework to identify factors based on 
the mechanisms at work have led to the inclusion of explanatory factors related to Walby’s 
four domains (economy, polity, violence, and civil society), as well as different regimes of 
inequality (e.g. gender, class, religion). This runs counter to the very most common practice 
of reasoning from the primacy of one of the domains, often economy, culture, or politics. For 
instance, Marxist (or Marxist-inspired) feminist theory retraces everything to the economic 
system (cf. Fazeli, 2002; Hatem, 1987; Jaquette, 1982; Moghadam, 1998, 2003). Also, my 
analyses substantiate Walby’s claim that an inequality (in this case based on gender) has a basis 
in all levels of abstraction: micro, meso, and macro (Walby, 2009: 65). My focus on contextual 
embeddedness then is one way to conceptualise the differences in trajectories of development 
and non-linearity, for instance in terms of the catalysts, dampeners and, feed-back loops Walby 
speaks of (Walby, 2009: 59).187
 In sum, the multilevel NOV can show how basic complexity mechanisms are applicable to 
specific issues (such as women’s employment), and can be modelled in statistical research. I 
would argue that my framework can also be used as a bridge from general ideas about complexity 
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188 One can think of non-agricultural labour and informal 
labour, but also aspects of economic participation such 
as number of hours, segregation, and economic activity 
status (see Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). 
189 Examples of in-depth studies on this topic regarding 
women’s reasoning and preferences that I have used 
are De Regt (2009) on Yemen, Jansen (2004) on Algeria, 
Metcalfe (2007) on Bahrain, Miles (2002) on Jordan, and 
Vidyasagar & Rea (2004) on Saudi Arabia.
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to other forms of labour market participation than women’s gainful, non-agricultural (self-)
employment.188 Moreover, using multinomial models, we can distinguish effects on blue-collar 
labour, lower white-collar labour, and upper white-collar labour. For instance, it is my expectation 
that care needs have rather similar effects across these types of labour, but economic needs 
mostly push women in blue-collar and lower white-collar jobs, while opportunities are far more 
important for getting an upper white-collar job. Similar translations can be thought of for other 
forms of participation; studying educational, societal, and political participation by applying the 
multilevel NOV framework could prove fruitful (see Spierings, 2012b).
11.4 ConneCtIng MetHodS and data 
Large-scale comparative datasets are pivotal to the study of empirical diversity, structured 
multiplicity, and generalised context-dependency, and for this approach to women’s 
employment I also had to bring together different methodological perspectives. Here, I will 
reflect on the merits and drawbacks of this approach, as well as how further scientific progress 
can be made and what kind of data would be beneficial to that.
11.4.1 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Studying complexity on the one hand and doing large-scale statistical analyses on the other 
might on some points be at odds with each other, and combining them might come at the cost 
of the depth of analyses and data (compared to their width). Along these lines – internal and 
external validity – I shall discuss the challenges faced in this thesis and the ways its framework 
could be developed and tested further.
 To get a better grasp on the internal validity of my results, I have included intervening 
variables in the models, but the focus in this kind of statistical research remains on external 
validity. Therefore, I have complemented and compared my results with insights from studies 
focussing on people’s motivations, such as fieldwork-based research.189 More of such in-depth 
studies could help to explain discrepancies and test whether the associations found are causal 
instead of spurious. It might also help to test my ideas about why household configurations have 
different effects across the countries.
 The internal validity of this study might in some cases also have been compromised because 
of limitations in data availability and quality. The scarcity of good data is particularly severe for 
specific policies (see Section 6.8) and cultural norms (see Chapter 9), as well as sub-national-level 
factors. Due to suboptimal measurements, fewer relationships will turn out to be statistically 
significant, which is why I have been cautious about fully rejecting hypotheses. Moreover, 
variables might tap into something different from what I envisioned, and theoretical mechanisms 
sometimes are hard to distinguish empirically. The former explains some surprising results such 
as the negative effects of district-level traditionalism or the age of a woman at birth of her first 
child. The latter applies to the individual-level variables measuring values. They hardly allowed 
me to differentiate between values of the women and other household members.
 A last reflection on the internal validity concerns reversed causality. While this might be 
present in some relationships, I expect that it is only partly reversed. In-depth studies support 
this, as well as studies explicitly testing endogeneity. For instance, discussing the relationship 
for which this issue is most salient (between children and employment), Kotsadam (2011) used six 
recent studies (2004 onwards) that investigated potential endogeneity, all using panel data or 
instrumental variables. He concludes there is no strong case for fully reversed causation and that 
the biases due to endogeneity are limited (Kotsadam, 2011: 137–9). Contreras & Plaza (2010) also 
found that cross-sectional methods deliver estimates close to these ‘better’ methods. It thus 
seems warranted to argue that the household division of labour in particularly withholds women 
with children from entering the labour market.
 Overall, to increase and assess the internal validity, I have made use of data at different 
levels, compared models, used other studies applying different approaches, and created new 
data. Nevertheless, further assessments are needed and for that I would advise combining 
statistical and observatory or in-depth interview approaches, and the creation of better 
comparative data.
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193 Here I echo Adely’s (2009: 113) words when she discusses 
the focus on patriarchy for women in Arab countries: “It 
is obvious that patriarchal notions of a proper division of 
labor do exist and are at play in framing people’s choices 
and desires – both men and women – but that does not 
preclude other explanations or an attempt at a more 
complex analysis of factors in such important economic, 
political, and personal decisions.” 
190 The number of 24 is based on the population figures from 
the year 2009 as presented in Chapter 4. Based on the 
year of measurement and the exact source of the figures, 
the total number of countries in the population might 
vary a bit. Roughly, about 50 countries can be defined as 
being a Muslim country.
191 Previous studies found contradictory results (e.g. 
Moghadam, 1998, 2003; Ross, 2008; Spierings, Smits 
& Verloo, 2009). My framework would predict hardly 
any (positive) short-term labour-opportunities effect, a 
long-term positive effect through the development of 
the service sector, a possible negative wealth effect, and 
a negative effect through the perpetuation of traditional 
norms. The results in Chapter 10 suggest that there is 
indeed no short term-effect.
192 Fairly recent examples from both industrialised and 
developing countries include Contreras & Plaza (2010), 
Drobnic, Blossfeld & Rohwer (1999), Kotsadam (2011), Van 
der Lippe & Van Dijk (2002), and Vijverberg (1993).
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 With respect to external validity, the representativeness of the cases at the macro and 
micro-level determine the generalisability of my results. As far as I know, no other combined 
macro/micro study on Muslim countries has included 28 countries or more. However, regarding 
the macro-level, 24 countries of the population were still left out.190 A possible bias is mainly 
found in the absence of the oil economies. The influence of oil on women’s employment has 
thus not really been studied.191 Furthermore, the micro-level effects might differ in strength 
in such a context. My results on labour market structures and norms can be extrapolated to 
those countries, but whether this is legitimate remains an empirical question in need of more 
comparable micro-level datasets (see also Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). Regarding the 
generalisability over individuals, the samples in this study have been restricted to women aged 
15 through 49. However, I have no direct reason to believe that the general effects presented 
here do not generally hold for older women. They might differ somewhat in strength, but the 
theoretical framework foresees such effects. This thesis is unique in its empirical scope, but does 
not include a fully representative sample of the theoretical population. Again, the collection of 
more and better data across and within countries is crucial.
 Related both to the internal and external validity is the issue of cross-cultural comparisons 
or ‘establishing equivalence’ (e.g. Landman, 2008). I would argue that the approach taken in this 
thesis transcends the issue by taking a position that is both universalist and relativist: embedded 
interrelatedness in combination with a meta-level framework. In this light, one may wonder 
about cross-cultural comparisons beyond the borders of ‘the Muslim world’. For instance, the 
effects for education, having children and marriage show similar patterns across the world.192 But 
a universal pattern does not equal finding the same effect everywhere. So far, hardly any study 
has focussed on systemising and testing the extent of and grounds for differences in effects; it 
often remains a matter of assumptions. Comparisons along this line might also show whether 
it is tenable that the different geographical literatures tend to focus on other factors. Of the 
macro-level variables, (childcare) policies are stressed relatively often in the literature on welfare 
states (e.g. Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002; Pettit & Hook, 2005), while for Muslim countries 
economic and cultural contexts are highlighted (see Hijab, 1988; Moghadam, 1996, 1998, 2003), 
and the concept of the extended family is mainly associated with Muslim countries. These 
particular focuses are hardly justified. In Muslim countries, as I have shown, there is a multiplicity 
of economical, political, and cultural factors that influences women’s employment,193 and I see 
no reason why this would be different in other countries. Much is assumed about cross-cultural 
comparisons, but fairly little is truly tested comparatively. Whether or not effects differ across 
countries and concepts have different meanings can be tested by focussing simultaneously on the 
various contexts. To do this, large micro/macro-level combined databases need to be built, and at 
the same time the walls between scientific fields need to be broken down.
11.4.2 MERGING CULTURES
Too often have I come across statements about quantitative and qualitative research that 
describe them as two essentially different paradigms, using phrases such as ‘A Tale of Two 
Cultures’ (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006) or terms like ‘war’ (see King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 3). 
As someone who is trained in both qualitative and quantitative techniques, and who moves 
between the fields of sociology, political science, gender studies, economics, and anthropology, 
I have seen many differences between the applications of methods, and found there to be 
strong bulkheads between disciplines. This thesis might seem a classic example of quantitative, 
large-scale data-driven research, but the theoretical and empirical analyses here have greatly 
benefitted throughout the process from non-quantitative, critical studies and approaches. 
I have used large-dataset research to study general patterns and have tried to draw general 
conclusions, but at the same time I thankfully made used of knowledge from other studies to 
inform my concepts and validate my expectations of why certain relationships exist. These same 
other studies have also led me to include and model diversity and complexity.
 In this respect, the virtues and vices of quantitative research strategies in feminist and 
gender studies have been heavily discussed since the 1970s,194 and, with McCall (2005) and 
others, I have argued before (see Spierings, 2010, 2012a) that a great degree of diversity can be 
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194 The discussion was wide spread and not just found in the 
humanities, where the postmodern turn was strongest. 
Focussing mainly on the social sciences some of the most 
important and other interesting contributions to the 
debate include Bernard (1975), Bottero (2000), Harding 
(1986, 1997), Jayaratne (1983), Maynard (1994), Mazur & 
Goertz (2008), McCall (2005), Millman & Kanter (1975), 
Oakley & Oakley (1979), Ramazanoğlu & Holland (2002), 
Reinharz (1992), Spierings (2011, forthcoming).
195 DHS samples clusters in all districts and about 20 
households in each cluster. Kravdal (2006) argues that 
the micro-level data can also be aggregated to the cluster 
196 See also the discussion of the closely related anti-
categorical approach, as it is labeled by McCall (2005).
level. See also Huisman (2011). More generally, also King, 
Keohane & Verba (1994) have argued to focus on subunits 
as an option for increasing the number of observations. 
They argue correctly that we should be cautions however, 
because the causal mechanism must be able to take 
place in the subunits. However, I believe it is too often 
assumed that countries are the best units, whereas the 
causal mechanism is more tied up to a subunit than the 
superunit. 
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incorporated in statistical research by using interaction effects and ‘identity’ dummies, and by 
discussing variability next to centrality. This thesis provides many examples of this. In a similar 
vein, I do think that ‘complex relationships’ can be modelled and studied statistically (cf. Walby, 
2009: 59–100). For instance, I have modelled non-linearity using dummies and interactions 
(education’s effects); critical turning points using dummies (think of the shock effect of 
attacks on tourists); catalysts and dampeners using interaction terms (norms and household 
configurations); and path dependency can be captured by time lags, dummies, and time series 
analyses (cf. Walby, 2007: 465). To further model this complex interrelatedness and understand 
women’s economic position, the development of large cross-disciplinary multilevel databases 
– including sub-national-level data195 – is crucial. In addition, studies of these data should be 
accompanied by in-depth research, such as anthropological studies and case study designs. I 
believe this thesis illustrates that the different methods and approaches need each other in 
order to obtain a greater internal and external validity, and that a field of research that wants to 
develop itself needs to open up to insights from other traditions.
11.5 ConteMporary deBateS: ISL aM, ModernISatIon, eduCatIon, 
gLoBaLISatIon, and patrIarCHy
The main empirical, theoretical, and methodological results have been discussed and reflected 
upon, and the resulting insights have been captured in the words ‘empirical diversity’, ‘structured 
multiplicity’, and ‘generalised context-dependency’. Here, I will show how these insights inform 
contemporary debates on issues such as those highlighted in the introductory chapter: Islam, 
modernisation, education, globalisation, and patriarchy.
11.5.1 ISL AM
Regarding the link between Islam and gender equality, roughly two approaches can be 
distinguished in the literature. Firstly, there is the civilisationist approach, which I have often 
criticised in this thesis. It treats Muslim countries as one homogenous bloc with Islam and 
gender inequality as identity markers, the former leading to the latter (e.g. Clark, Ramsbey 
& Adler, 1991; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Ross, 2008; Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2007). My 
conclusion of empirical diversity clearly counters this idea, and some authors did to some 
extent incorporate diversity among Muslim countries in later work (e.g Norris, 2009), perhaps 
due to earlier critiques (e.g. Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009). Furthermore, the results in this 
thesis have shown that religious denomination is no good general explanation for a woman’s 
employment.
 In terms of the NOV framework, Islam is clearly linked to the condition of values; however, 
Islam constitutes both less and more than a single value system. Less than such a value system 
because Islam is only one of the sources that shape the needs, opportunities, and values 
influencing women’s employment, as indicated by the chapter on household structures. On the 
other hand, it is more than one value system: as I have shown, the message of Islam is diffuse and 
contains multiple dimensions. It can for instance focus on gender equality or on socio-economic 
justice, and different positions can be taken on each of these dimensions. In this light, even a 
focus on religiosity instead of religious denomination is still rather crude (cf. Read, 2004). The 
messenger can also take different shapes, and in this study alone it already entailed cultural 
norms, internalised values, institutionalisations of specific religious values in policy, and violence 
motivated by religion.
 Deconstructing the influence of religion this way brings me to the second approach in the 
literature on gender and Islam. The more anthropological and postmodern studies focus on 
how local culture and religion are intertwined; how women are subject to religious practices, 
but also how they use Islam to their own advantage; what the performative aspect of Muslim 
women’s behaviour is (e.g. Jansen, 2004; Johnsdotter, 2003; Freedman, 2004; Ghorashi, 1996; 
Gruenbaum, 2001; Ketner, Buitelaar & Bosman, 2004; Mojab, 2001; Moors, 2004). This literature 
offers important insights that have informed the framework and theories used in thesis, but 
it tends to overstress differences, and ignore or exclude general patterns.196 The notion of 
generalised context-dependency implies a less extreme position on diversity (see Spierings, 
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197 Let me again list some studies on Muslim countries 
supporting this: Aromolaran (2004), Assaad & Arntz 
(2005), Calvès & Schoumaker (2004), Glick & Sahn (1997, 
2005), Gündüz–Hoşgör & Smits (2008), Hirschman & 
Aghajanian (1980), Khattab (2002), Kuepie, Nordman & 
Roubaud (2009), Moghadam (1998, 2003), and Pettit & 
Hook (2005).
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2012), and I have shown how certain effects might differ – for instance, by the (partly religiously 
informed) patriarchal bargain – but at the same time are roughly similar.
 In short, the NOV framework walks a middle ground and usefully conceptualises Islam, or 
religion more generally, as one of the sources of a value system that manifests itself at different 
levels and in different guises. The framework thus enables us to study general influences without 
simplifying Islam to a stereotype.
11.5.2 MODERNISATION
Regarding modernisation, the general conclusion in the extensive literature was that it has a 
positive influence on women’s employment. After criticism from the Women-In-Development 
approach (see Boserup, 1970; Elson, 1991; Jaquette, 1982; Rathgeber, 1990), this conclusion 
was modified to only hold for non-agricultural labour (e.g. Inglehart & Norris, 2002; Pampel & 
Tanaka, 1986; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009).
 The broad mechanism that links modernisation to women’s employment is generally 
formulated in terms of economic and values change, including economic development, 
urbanisation, increased education, decreased fertility, and a value shift towards gender equality. 
These are said to lead to an increase in the demand and supply of labour, which is supported 
by my results as well. However, economic development – which is often at the start of the 
modernisation process – is only conducive to employment when it is not based on petrol exports. 
The labour demand coming from the petrol industry does not fit the role assigned to women 
(Inglehart, 1997; see also Ross, 2001, 2008). In line with this, the disentanglement of labour 
markets here shows that in the first phase of modernisation (‘industralisation’ [Inglehart, 1997]) 
light manufacturing (e.g. food and clothing) fosters women’s employment, not heavy industry, 
and in the second phase (‘postmodernisation’ [Inglehart, 1997]) it is the growth of the service 
sector that increases women’s chances on the labour market. The sectors have to fit the role 
of women in the light of societal norms. In addition, I have found that modernisation can have 
negative effects by decreasing the economic needs of households, in which case modernisation 
then prevents women from entering the labour market, because incentives are absent. Still, the 
overall effect of modernisation might be positive.
 The conclusion about structured multiplicity not only serves to disentangle and refine 
the mechanisms within the process of modernisation, it also draws attention to the matter 
that modernisation should not be seen in isolation. This relates to the discussion about the 
trajectories of modernisation: are they similar everywhere (Inglehart, 1997; Lerner, 1958), do 
they run parallel to each other depending on the cultural context (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2002), or are there many different modernisation processes with their 
own trajectories (Azzam, Abu Nasr & Lorfing, 1985; Huntington, 1996; Lenski & Nolan, 1984; 
Moghadam, 2003)? The strong evidence for structured multiplicity and generalisable context-
dependency suggests that modernisation is indeed a process with universal tendencies, but 
that the trajectories are not completely fixed and shaped in interaction with the context. There 
is a strong pattern in which economic development leads to an increased demand for (female) 
labour through the (light) industry and service sector, and the supply of labour is increased by 
higher levels of education and norms shifting towards gender equality. At the same time, these 
developments differ considerably. For instance, governmental policies might dampen the effect 
of labour market demand; cultural norms shape the strength of the educational effect; political 
violence can disturb the demand for labour; shifting norms might not affect the most traditional 
women; the importance of having children seems related to the economic needs of a household; 
and norms do not always shift towards gender equality. The challenge lies in understanding and 
generalising these divergences from the universal pattern.
11.5.3 EDUCATION
Both my results and a broad literature197 find the following statement to hold true: education 
fosters women’s employment. There is no doubt about it, is there? Assessing education as one of 
multiple influences embedded in its context sheds light on the effect of education, which seem 
less straightforward after a second reading of the literature.
340
198 The costs of hiring someone to perform household tasks 
may still be considered in the decision-making processes, 
and the additional income might be dependent on 
possible additional costs (e.g. public transport, clothes), 
or that the cost of leaving the household are measured in 
terms of the expected hourly wage. Human capital theory 
as applied by Aromolaran (2004) and Kuepie, Nordman & 
Roubaud (2009) seems to say, assume, or imply otherwise.
200 It has to be noted that most of these studies clearly 
describe or define which aspect of globalisation they 
study empirically, but in the overall presentation it is 
often suggested that results hold for globalisation as a 
whole.199 The concept of time-poverty and the finding – for Guinea 
– that women are considerably more ‘time poor’ support 
this idea (Bardasi & Wodon, 2010). The time spent on the 
household and activities on the labour market are not a 
zero sum game; additional activities such as employment 
come at the cost of time for rest and leisure.
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 There are different ideas about how education fosters employment, but most of these agree 
that the effect of education is not linear. While my results also support this non-linearity – the 
positive effect of education grows disproportional to the level of education – , they do not 
support non-linearity’s major proponent: human capital theory. Aromolaran (2004) and Kuepie, 
Nordman & Roubaud (2009) applied human capital theory to respectively Nigeria and West 
African capital cities, and argued that primary education leads to lower employment, because 
the skills developed during primary education benefit women’s household role more than labour 
market duties (see also Lincove, 2008). Consequently, the opportunities costs of entering the 
labour market outweigh the additional income. Based on the dominantly positive effects of 
primary education in this thesis, I have to disagree with this reasoning. In the NOV framework, 
the effect of education is rather straightforwardly seen as increasing women’s human capital, 
which opens more doors on the labour market. No highly rationalised (opportunity) cost-benefit 
analysis is made,198 and household tasks can be given to other women in the household or be 
given less importance or time, or women can simply face a double burden.199
 While the results suggest that the influence of education works mainly through increased 
opportunities, to a lesser extent the effect seems to have an impact through having children 
(decreased care needs) and through value patterns. This supports arguments from Azam, Abu 
Nasr & Lorfing (1985), Hirschman & Aghajanian (1980), Lincove (2008), and Olmsted (2003), all 
of whom do not (solely) focus on the direct opportunities effect. However, to my knowledge, 
no study on Muslim countries has empirically tried to break down the total effect of education. 
My study suggests that by far the largest part of the effect runs through opportunities, though I 
have not been able to optimally filter out values.
 A last debate in the literature is which kind of employment is fostered by education (Calvès 
& Schoumaker, 2004; Hirschman & Aghajanian, 1980; Kuepie, Nordman & Roubaud, 2009), 
and this suggests that educated people may not have the same payoffs everywhere. While 
some references to this are found in the literature (see Abu Lughod, 1998; Acar, 2006; Jansen, 
2006; Miles, 2002; Pampel & Tanaka, 1986; Rani & Schmid, 2008; Tansel, 2002), hardly any 
comparative work on it exists. In theorising and testing this context-dependency, I have shown 
the impact of local norms and of the demand and supply balance on the payoff of education 
(see Section 11.2.3). For instance, a scarcity of higher-educated people makes the difference 
between secondary and primary education salient, decreasing the gap between tertiary- and 
secondary-educated women. Also, primary education is less beneficial in more traditional areas, 
because there primary-educated women are held back most by traditional norms. Nevertheless, 
my contextual analyses of education’s effects are inconclusive and the results ask for more 
theoretical and empirical work.
 Generally speaking, the pivotal role of education implies the significance of understanding 
women’s educational participation. Applying the multilevel NOV approach to primary, 
secondary, and tertiary educational participation might be helpful here (cf. Huisman, 2011; 
Huisman & Smits, 2009).
11.5.4 GLOBALISATION
The literature on globalisation and women’s employment can be roughly divided in two groups: 
first we have the ‘optimists’, who basically suggest that economic and cultural globalisation has 
a largely positive effect on women’s employment (e.g. Black & Rainerd, 2004; Gray, Kittilson 
& Sandholtz, 2006; Meyer, 2003; Richards & Gelleny, 2007; Villarreal & Yu, 2007).200 It will be 
clear that the multiplicity of influences as discussed and shown in the previous chapters does 
problematise such a conclusion. Regarding the more economically oriented arguments, the 
negative effects of privatisation are the most striking example of this. In addition, no general 
effect of FDI was found, and my results even suggest that effects found in other studies might be 
spurious, due to ignoring the cultural dimension: companies invest in countries where women’s 
position is already relatively good and not in the more Islamist states. Moreover, when the 
cultural dimension is studied, it is regularly thought of as a positive force of Westernisation (for 
instance through tourism), but some people in developing countries rather see it as threatening, 
which sometimes results in major backlash effects, either through reifying the cultural self in 
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gender-unequal terms or through violence against ‘tokens of the West’, such as tourism. In the 
long term, the economic development and changing cultural norms might have positive effects, 
but important and large groups of women see their chances on employment being diminished in 
the short term. These ‘losers of globalisation’ should not be ignored (as the revolutions in Egypt 
and Tunisia also suggest).
 Whereas the first group of studies mainly draws from (cross-sectional) statistical analyses, 
the second is more oriented towards the in-depth case study of particular countries. These can 
be labelled ‘critical studies’, because they focus on laying bare the contradictory tendencies 
and trends within the overall process of globalisation (e.g. Assaad, 2003; Doumato & Posusney, 
2003; Moghadam, 1998, 2003, 2007; Nassar, 2003; Murphy, 2003). My theoretical approach 
falls mostly in line with this literature and supports the need for unpacking the influences of 
globalisation. However, my comparative statistical approach is positioned more in-between the 
two approaches. In combination with the multilevel NOV approach this has drawn attention 
to sub-national differences, which are mostly ignored in the case studies. The studies are 
often based on solid analyses with a holistic take on globalisation – thus including its cultural, 
economic, and political dimensions – and an aggregate country-level focus. By including the 
district-level, I have been able to study the dynamics behind the impact of globalisation and 
show that the political-economic and political-cultural effects of economic globalisation are 
translated through the local labour market structure and thus depend on the latter. Therefore, 
we should first know which jobs are considered suitable for women in a certain context before 
we can assess globalisation’s influence, and again this means that globalisation transforms (in)
equalities among women within a country.
11.5.5 PATRIARCHY
Patriarchy and similar concepts are often used to describe the gender relationships in Muslim 
countries, or more particularly the Middle East and North Africa. In most cases a prefix is used to 
designate that it only applies to that group of countries: ‘Muslim patriarchy’ (see Hatem, 1987; 
Mernissi, 1975), ‘classic patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti, 1988), ‘Islamic gender regime’ (Metcalfe, 2011), 
or ‘traditional gender contract’ (Moghadam, 1998). Overall, this creates the image that there is 
an overarching Islamic system of patriarchy, which is the pure form of patriarchy (‘traditional’, 
‘classic’), based on male breadwinner/female homemaker roles and the patrilocally extended 
household (Kandiyoti, 1988; Moghadam, 1998). It seems a contextual constant. However, my 
results suggest that household structures, the conception of care, and women’s economic roles 
differ considerably across Muslim countries, as was illustrated by the strongly different effects 
of household configurations. For instance, the presence of elderly people only influenced 
women’s employment negatively in the Greater Middle East, and the positive effect of the 
number of adult women in a household was much stronger in Central and Southeast Asia than in 
the Greater Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.
 A better look at the literature shows that this diversity and context-dependency are to 
some extent found in the discussion of patriarchy as well. Moghadam’s notion of a gender 
contract is “subject to modification and renegotiation” (Moghadam, 1998: 9), Kandiyoti says 
that “patriarchal bargains are not timeless or immutable entities” (Kandiyoti, 1988: 275), and 
Walby explicitly focuses on the dynamics and changes of patriarchy or gender regimes (Walby, 
1996, 2009). Different regimes among Muslim countries are also identified. Kandiyoti (1988), 
for instance, does this on a geographical basis, and Syed (2008) on a theoretical-religious one. 
Simultaneously, these studies make use of ideal types – Kandiyoti uses this term herself (1988: 
275), but it also applies to Moghadam (1998) and Syed (2008). These ideal types tend to have 
a life of their own and become ‘empirical realities’. Thus the concept might not be inherently 
essentialist – a critique on the concept of patriarchy (Walby, 1996; 2009) – but there is a 
considerable risk that the use of these concepts nonetheless leads to essentialism.
 While I started from a kind of geographical ideal-type approach as well, the analyses 
of context-dependency have led me to start thinking about different underlying axes that 
differentiate the gender relations in different societies. By not talking about a specific contract, 
but about these axes, it becomes far easier to see patriarchy as a fluid reality that is constantly 
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201 This echoes a remark Waite already made in 1978 on the 
topic women in the United States, but it hardly applied to 
micro-level research on women’s employment in Muslim 
countries: “These attitudes only influence the market 
choices of married woman and perhaps only those of 
married women with children at home. Clearly the work 
decisions of a woman who feels that mothers should not 
work will not be influenced by her beliefs if she has no 
children.” (314).
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renegotiated. Based on the literature and my empirical research I have distinguished at least 
three axes: the role of women (in terms of care and income provision), who and what is part of 
the household care tasks (e.g. only people related by bloodline, regular cleaning tasks),201 and 
whether the role of men is confined to economic tasks (see also Habib, Nuwayhid & Yeretzian, 
2006). The position of a society along these axes identifies a value system that underlies 
institutionalised norms and that, for instance, informs which household configurations have an 
impact. Such a conceptualisation of the patriarchy variable helps to explain both differences 
between and within societies. To further develop and test ideas such as those presented in this 
thesis, the major challenge now is to collect comparative data for different countries and regions 
on the separate dimensions of patriarchy.
11.6 poLICy IMpLICatIonS
This study is not the first to point at creating jobs, increasing education, and changing norms 
as ways to increase women’s employment. However, the messages of multiplicity and context-
dependency refine these policy recommendations and one of the most important contributions 
of this thesis is, arguably, to warn about adverse (side-) effects of policymaking. With that in 
mind, I will discuss three characteristic examples that illustrate why complex interrelatedness 
should be on policymakers’ minds.
 Firstly, it is clear that having (young) children prevents women from entering the labour 
market. One obvious way of reducing women’s care burden then lies in providing childcare 
facilities or arrangements. However, it should be considered who will benefit from such facilities, 
and whether these women are the ones the policymaker was targeting. For women in an 
environment where the care-role norm does not primarily focus on caring for children, but also on 
general household management – cleaning, cooking and so on and so forth-, childcare facilities 
hardly relieve the care burden of women. This means that the women in the most restricted 
situation will benefit least from additional facilities. Women with children living in an area where 
care roles have a smaller scope, on the other hand, might benefit from childcare arrangements. 
For women who also have to take care of elderly people (which affects employment negatively in 
the Middle East), the same reasoning can be applied on elder care facilities.
 Secondly, the presence of labour demand is of course important in creating opportunities for 
women. In line with other research it was shown that effectively to create jobs, these jobs have 
to fit the idea of what kind of labour is suitable for women, and simultaneously match women’s 
‘preferences’. The service sector might be feminised, as well as parts of the manufacturing 
industry, but it seems that what particular parts are deemed suitable depends on the local 
context. Also, circumstances such as how to get to work and working with or without male 
colleagues might play a role in women choosing home-based labour or not being employed at all. 
These preferences, which are not directly related to being employed, determine which group is 
(not) reached by creating a labour demand.
 Thirdly, furthering education seems an important way to empower women in finding a job. 
It even seems that higher-educated women are sometimes preferred over lower-educated men, 
and being educated thus does not only increase the chances of a woman vis-à-vis other women, 
but also against men. Moreover, it turns out to be important in what context which educational 
level is obtained. Investing in women’s tertiary education is most effective in a place where there 
are not enough men with tertiary education to fill all the vacancies. There women can better 
compete with (lower-educated) men. Primary education seems to pay off mainly in areas with 
less traditional norms. Investing in primary education facilities in more traditional areas should 
be followed up by good secondary and tertiary educational facilities in order to have effect on 
women’s employment.
 Each of these examples points to a larger mechanism that is often not taken into account in 
regularly thought-of policy recommendations. Because of the interrelatedness of each factor to 
its environment, different groups of women are affected differently by one and the same change. 
Often this means that the gap in employment between the women who already are the worst off 
and the others widens. Furthermore, the interrelatedness also suggests that policies not directly 
related to women’s employment (e.g. elder care, socio-economic safety nets, public transport) 
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can have all kinds of negative (or positive) side-effects on employment. So the main message 
here is that policy plans have to be thought through from a holistic perspective considering 
complex interrelatedness and inequalities, as can be done through, for instance, gender impact 
assessments (e.g. Verloo, Van der Vleuten, Jansen & Acar, 2006).
11.7 CLoSIng noteS
The focus in this thesis has been on Muslim countries. Using this focus and label might be 
considered a discursive practice that brings into existence exactly what it decries: the existence 
or idea of a separate block or culture. At the same time, I have shown that the internal diversity 
is enormous, that some (macro- and micro-level) influences on women’s employment seem to be 
important across the world, while others highly differ within the region. By taking this collection 
of countries and deconstructing the unity in which it is often portrayed, without letting go of 
the scientific goal of finding general patterns, I believe the overall balance of this study to lean 
toward gaining a better understanding of women’s position in Muslim countries, and to breaking 
down stereotypes and simplifications more than reinforcing them.
 Khadija the Pure (amongst others) showed that Muslim women can fulfil prominent economic 
roles and have a high degree of empowerment. While her legacy might serve as an example for 
many women in Muslim countries, showing that women can have their own income and play an 
active role on the labour market, it does not mean that we know which, why, and when women 
obtain such a position. The research I have done for this thesis hopefully contributes to a better 
understanding of the underlying processes and thus may help women to follow Khadija’s lead 
and empower themselves.
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Level Civilisation Macro Micro
predominant unit of comparison Groups of countries sharing a 
culture of religion
Countries and sometimes adminis-
trative units within a country
Individuals, sometimes placed 
within household context
explained phenomenon “the low employment figures of 
women in the Muslim civilisation”
Levels of and developments in 
women’s employment 
Which women are employed and 
which women are not
Main explanatory factor(s) Islam (culture) Economic, political and cultural Education, having children and a 
range of other factors
Major contribution(s) –Drawing attention to women’s 
employment in the MENA and 
other Muslim countries as an 
unexplored field of study.
– Important knowledge of specific 
countries
– Provides macro-level hypotheses
– Insight in the differences within 
a country
– Identifies important household 
and individual influences
theoretical shortcoming(s) – A clear causal mechanism is lack-
ing: what is the ideology/value 
and through what process does it 
influence employment. 
– It is unclear whether macro-level 
factors work through micro-level 
effects, next to them, or in stead 
of them.
– Ideas about how effects differ by 
context are lacking. 
empirical shortcoming(s) – Hypergeneralisation veils inter-
nal dynamics and plurality
– Few systemic tests of macro-
level hypotheses exist.
– It is unclear which factors have 
the most impact.
– It is unclear how factors inter-
relate, e.g. which factors are most 
important
– It is not tested whether effects 
differ by country/context. 
appendix. 2.1 A systematic overview of the literature on women’s employment in Muslim countries by level of analysis
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Country year number of 
districts
number of 
women1
response rate 
household survey
response rate 
women’s survey
Survey Source population size2 female 
population 15–64
Algeria 2002 47 33,796 93.5 97.4 PAPFam 32,277,942 9,950,315
Azerbaijan 2006 9 8,444 97.8 97.6 DHS 7,961,619 2,706,275
Bangladesh3 2007 6 10,996 95.5 98.4 DHS 150,448,339 46,712,687
Burkina Faso 2003 14 12,477 99.4 96.3 DHS 13,228,460 3,455,817
Chad 2004 9 6,085 99.4 97.2 DHS 9,538,544 2,459,796
Djibouti3 2002 5 6,689 n.a. n.a. PAPFam 472,810 122,209
Egypt3 2005 26 19,474 98.9 99.4 DHS 77,505,756 23,972,216
Eritrea 2002 6 8,754 98.7 96.2 DHS 4,465,651 1,213,313
Guinea 2005 8 7,954 99.2 97.2 DHS 9,467,866 2,486,300
Indonesia3 2007 33 32,895 99.0 98.3 DHS 234,693,997 76,731,481
Jordan3 2007 12 10,876 99.0 97.6 DHS 6,053,193 1,777,361
Kazakhstan 1999 6 4,800 98.5 96.7 DHS 16,824,825 5,580,271
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 7 3,848 95.0 95.0 DHS 4,512,809 1,321,774
Lebanon 2004 6 6,556 n.a. n.a. PAPFam 3,777,218 1,305,339
Malaysia 2000 15 10,500 n.a. n.a. IPUM 21,793,293 6,642073
Mali 2006 9 14,583 98.8 96.6 DHS 11,716,829 2,910,097
Mauritania 2001 13 7,728 98.7 96.5 DHS 2,747,312 718,883
Morocco 2004 15 16,798 98.8 96.3 PAPFam/DHS 32,209,101 10,112,060
Niger 2006 8 9,223 98.7 96.4 DHS 12,525,094 3,083,522
Nigeria 2008 37 33,385 98.6 95.4 DHS 135,031,164 36,277,038
Pakistan3 2007 4 10,023 97.7 94.5 DHS 164,741,924 47,327,161
Senegal 2005 11 14,602 98.5 93.7 DHS 11,126,832 3,122,854
Sierra Leone 2008 4 7,374 93.3 94.0 DHS 6,294,774 1,708,840
Syria 2001 14 12,455 95.0 98.9 PAPFam 16,728,808 4,644,870
Tunisia 2001 24 8,829 90.5 92.3 PAPFam 9,705,102 3,161,596
Turkey3 2003 12 8,075 92.9 95.6 DHS5 68,109,469 22,243,477
Yemen 2003 20 20,180 n.a. n.a. PAPFam 19,349,881 4,778,034
Zanzibar 2004 3 1,365 98.8
4
97.3
4
DHS 1,089,540
6
292,869
7
Total 383 348,764 1,084,398,152 326,818,528
Notes: (1) These numbers refer to the total number of women in the surveys between 15 and 49 years of age; (2) Source: CIA WFB respective 
years; (3) only ever married women; (4) These response rates refer to the entire survey for Tanzania; (5) DHS was not fully involved in this survey, 
but provided limited technical assistance on the review and formatting of the final report; (6) http://www.tanzania.go.tz/smz/ocgs/documents/
Economic%20Survey/Economic%20Survey%20table%20.doc; (7) percentage of women 15–64 based on cia wfb percentage for whole of Tanzania.
appendix 4.1 Countries and surveys
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Item factor loading
Electricity 0.941
TV 0.883
Refrigerator 0.941
Car 0.487
Telephone 0.741
Running water 0.766
Eigenvalue 4.198
% of Variance 70.0
KMO 0.709
Bartlett’s (sig) 0.000
Source: DDW – district-level aggregates; N=322; Note: Factor loadings with a weight less than 0.35 are not included in the table. Principal Axis 
Factoring with oblique rotation was used (since only one factor was derived from the data, the rotation method becomes irrelevant).
Item factor loading
Age of woman at birth first child 0.726
Intracouple age difference 0.867
Household size 0.351
Polygynous household 0.718
Eigenvalue 2.347
% of Variance 58.7
KMO 0.738
Bartlett’s (sig) 0.000
Source: DDW – district-level aggregates; N=322; Note: Factor loadings with a weight less than 0.35 are not included in the table. Principal Axis 
Factoring with oblique rotation was used (since only one factor was derived from the data, the rotation method becomes irrelevant).
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rank Country district employment %
1 Nigeria Osun 86.4
2 Nigeria Oyo 75.8
3 Nigeria Lagos 73.2
4 Kyrgyz republic Bishkek 70.0
5 Nigeria Akwa Ibom 65.5
6 Nigeria Ekiti 65.4
7 Burkina Faso Ouagadougou 64.6
8 Nigeria Kano 63.9
9 Kazakhstan Almaty city 63.5
10 Nigeria Ogun 61.3
11 Guinea Conakry 59.1
12 Nigeria Sokoto 59.0
13 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 
Federal Territory
58.9
14 Mali Bamako 58.7
15 Malaysia Pulau Pinang 57.1
16 Nigeria Bauchi 56.5
17 Nigeria Abuja 54.9
18 Malaysia Selangor 54.6
19 Nigeria Edo 53.3
20 Nigeria Kogi 53.1
21 Kazakhstan East region 53.0
22 Tunisia Monastir 52.9
23 Indonesia DI Yogyakarta 52.2
24 Kazakhstan Central region 51.6
25 Senegal Dakar 51.5
26 Malaysia Melaka 50.9
27 Zanzibar Town west 50.6
28 Chad N Djam,na 50.5
29 Nigeria Kwara 49.9
30 Nigeria Abia 49.1
31 Indonesia Bali 48.7
32 Nigeria Imo 48.5
33 Nigeria Jigawa 48.5
34 Malaysia Johor 48.2
35 Nigeria Niger 48.2
36 Malaysia Labuan Federal 
Territory
48.0
37 Nigeria Delta 47.0
38 Nigeria Katsina 46.6
39 Indonesia DKI Jakarta 46.4
40 Kyrgyz republic Chuiskaya 45.7
41 Tunisia Ariana 45.3
42 Tunisia Tunis 45.2
43 Kazakhstan North region 44.9
44 Kazakhstan West region 42.9
45 Tunisia Sousse 42.8
46 Indonesia Central Java 41.9
47 Nigeria Kebbi 41.7
48 Mauritania Nouakchott 41.7
49 Malaysia Kedah 41.5
rank Country district employment %
50 Malaysia Perak 41.2
51 Kyrgyz republic Narynskaya 40.8
52 Nigeria Zamfara 40.4
53 Malaysia Perlis 40.3
54 Kyrgyz republic Issyk-Kulskaya 39.8
55 Kyrgyz republic Oshskaya 39.8
56 Kazakhstan South region 39.4
57 Senegal Thies 39.1
58 Lebanon Beirut 38.3
59 Nigeria Anambra 37.8
60 Nigeria Rivers 37.8
61 Tunisia Ben Arous 37.6
62 Nigeria Adamawa 37.1
63 Zanzibar South 36.8
64 Nigeria Yobe 36.7
65 Mali Tombouctou 36.2
66 Malaysia Negeri Sembilan 36.2
67 Guinea Kindia 36.1
68 Senegal Ziguinchor 36.0
69 Sierra Leone Western region 35.9
70 Niger Niamey 35.6
71 Egypt North Sinai 35.5
72 Guinea Kankan 35.3
73 Mali Segou 34.8
74 Morocco Grand-Casablanca 34.7
75 Niger Agadez 34.5
76 Senegal Diourbel 34.4
77 Niger Ebonyi 34.2
78 Nigeria Enugu 34.1
79 Indonesia East Java 34.1
80 Eritrea Maekel 34.0
81 Malaysia Sarawak 33.5
82 Tunisia Zaghouan 33.5
83 Guinea Boké 33.1
84 Indonesia South Kalimantan 33.1
85 Kyrgyz Republic Dzhelal-Abadskaya 33.0
86 Indonesia East Kalimantan 33.0
87 Tunisia Nabeul 32.8
88 Niger Dosso 32.6
89 Mali Mopti 32.4
90 Kyrgyz republic Talasskaya 32.2
91 Indonesia Kep Bangka 
Belitung
32.2
92 Guinea Faranah 31.7
93 Indonesia West Sumatra 31.4
94 Lebanon Mount Lebanon 31.2
95 Nigeria Taraba 30.8
96 Turkey Istanbul 30.7
97 Nigeria Kaduna 30.5
98 Indonesia Maluka Utara 30.1
99 Nigeria Gombe 29.9
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rank Country district employment %
100 Nigeria Bayelsa 29.8
101 Morocco Rabat-Sale-Zem-
mour-Zaer
29.7
102 Azerbaijan Baku 29.4
103 Malaysia Terengganu 29.3
104 Egypt Port Said 29.3
105 Tunisia Manouba 29.2
106 Syria Al-Latakia 29.2
107 Malaysia Kelantan 29.1
108 Malaysia Pahang 28.9
109 Indonesia North Sumatra 28.9
110 Indonesia West Nusa Tenggara 28.7
111 Senegal Saint Louis 28.7
112 Indonesia Banten 28.6
113 Indonesia East Nusa Tenggara 27.9
114 Indonesia Lampung 27.9
115 Indonesia Maluku 27.6
116 Chad Moyen Chari 27.3
117 Guinea N Zérékoré 27.1
118 Indonesia North Sulawesi 26.9
119 Indonesia Central Kalimantan 26.8
120 Niger Maradi 26.7
121 Indonesia Riau 26.4
122 Mauritania Hodh Charghi 26.4
123 Indonesia West Java 26.2
124 Mauritania Nouadhibou 25.9
125 Malaysia Sabah 25.7
126 Senegal Fatick 25.6
127 Burkina Faso Hauts Bassins 25.5
128 Syria Al-Swida 25.4
129 Indonesia South Sumatra 25.2
130 Turkey Aegean 25.2
131 Zanzibar North 25.2
132 Azerbaijan Absheron 25.0
133 Mali Koulikoro 24.8
134 Egypt Cairo 24.6
135 Egypt Suez 24.5
136 Indonesia Sulawesi Barat 24.4
137 Indonesia Bengkulu 24.0
138 Nigeria Ondo 23.9
139 Eritrea Debubawi Keih 
Bahri
23.7
140 Indonesia Bangka Belitung 23.7
141 Indonesia Central Sulawesi 23.2
142 Tunisia Sfax 23.2
143 Azerbaijan Shaki Zaqatala 23.2
144 Nigeria Borno 22.9
145 Tunisia Bizerte 22.9
146 Senegal Kaolack 22.8
147 Nigeria Cross River 22.8
148 Egypt Menoufia 22.7
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149 Turkey East Marmara 22.4
150 Mali Sikasso 22.4
151 Indonesia Gorontalo 22.3
152 Burkina Faso Sahel 22.1
153 Burkina Faso Centre (sans Ouaga-
dougou)
22.0
154 Morocco Fes-Boulemane 22.0
155 Indonesia Southeast Sulawesi 21.9
156 Indonesia DI Aceh 21.9
157 Algeria Alger 21.7
158 Nigeria Nasarawa 21.3
159 Tunisia Gabes 21.2
160 Jordan Karak 21.1
161 Indonesia South Sulawesi 21.1
162 Burkina Faso Sud-Ouest 21.1
163 Azerbaijan Yukhari Karabakh 20.9
164 Egypt Damietta 20.8
165 Chad Centre Est 20.7
166 Senegal Louga 20.7
167 Egypt New Valley 20.7
168 Lebanon South 20.6
169 Niger Tahoua 20.5
170 Mauritania Gorgol 20.5
171 Burkina Faso Cascades 20.4
172 Lebanon Nabatieh 20.4
173 Niger Zinder & Diffa 20.1
174 Egypt Ismailia 20.0
175 Burkina Faso Centre-Ouest 20.0
176 Niger Diffa 19.9
177 Egypt Kalyubia 19.8
178 Senegal Tambacounda 19.8
179 Senegal Kolda 19.7
180 Lebanon North 19.7
181 Egypt South Sinai 19.7
182 Egypt Gharbia 19.6
183 Tunisia Tozeur 19.5
184 Tunisia Mahdia 19.5
185 Syria Damascus 19.5
186 Syria Tartous 19.5
187 Turkey West Marmara 19.5
188 Turkey West Anatolia 19.3
189 Egypt Alexandria 19.1
190 Indonesia Papua Barat 18.9
191 Indonesia Jambi 18.8
192 Pakistan Sindh 18.6
193 Burkina Faso Centre-Est 18.6
194 Azerbaijan Ganja Gazakh 18.5
195 Egypt Dakahlia 18.3
196 Djibouti Ali Sabieh 18.3
197 Yemen Aden 18.3
198 Jordan Madaba 18.2
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rank Country district employment %
199 Chad Logone Occidental 18.2
200 Niger Tillaberi (without 
Niamey)
18.1
201 Lebanon Bekaa 17.6
202 Senegal Matam 17.4
203 Mauritania Inchiri 17.3
204 Tunisia Kairouan 17.1
205 Turkey Mediterranean 17.1
206 Pakistan Balochistan 17.0
207 Nigeria Plateau 16.8
208 Morocco Tanger-Tetouan 16.7
209 Guinea Mamou 16.7
210 Egypt Red Sea 16.7
211 Tunisia Balqa 16.5
212 Algeria Annaba 16.5
213 Guinea Labé 16.4
214 Mali Gao 16.1
215 Jordan Ma an 16.1
216 Mauritania Tiris-Zemmour 15.8
217 Azerbaijan Dakhlik Shirvan 15.8
218 Mauritania Adrar 15.7
219 Indonesia West Kalimantan 15.7
220 Tunisia Kebili 15.7
221 Tunisia Gafsa 15.5
222 Egypt Sharkia 15.5
223 Nigeria Benue 15.5
224 Burkina Faso Egypt - Giza 15.4
225 Tunisia Kasserine 15.1
226 Mauritania Assaba 15.1
227 Jordan Ajlun 14.9
228 Tunisia Beja 14.9
229 Mali Kayes 14.8
230 Tunisia Sidi Bouzid 14.8
231 Indonesia Papua 14.7
232 Algeria Constantine 14.7
233 Mauritania Guidimagha 14.7
234 Jordan Tafiela 14.5
235 Algeria Blida 14.4
236 Morocco Doukkala-Abda 14.4
237 Turkey West Black Sea 14.3
238 Pakistan Punjab 14.2
239 Tunisia Medinine 14.2
240 Syria Homs 14.1
241 Azerbaijan Aran 14.0
242 Chad B.E.T. 14.0
243 Syria rural Damascus 14.0
244 Bangladesh Khulna 14.0
245 Turkey Central Anatolia 14.0
246 Burkina Faso Centre-Sud 13.8
247 Sierra Leone southern region 13.4
248 Egypt Beni Suef 13.4
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249 Banladesh Dhaka - Upper 
Bangladesh
13.4
250 Bangladesh Rajshahi 13.3
251 Algeria Béchar 13.3
252 Mauritania Trarza 13.3
253 Chad Mayo Kebbi 13.3
254 Morocco Marrakech-Tensift-
Al Haouz
13.1
255 Algeria Oran 13.1
256 Egypt Kafr El-Sheikh 12.9
257 Burkina Faso Plateau Central 12.8
258 Morocco Gharb-Chrarda-Bni 
Hssen
12.7
259 Morocco Souss-Massa-Draa 12.4
260 Algeria El Bayadh 12.3
261 Algeria Tlemcen 12.1
262 Tunisia Siliana 12.1
263 Jordan Amman 12.0
264 Eritrea Debub 12.0
265 Turkey East Black Sea 11.7
266 Syria Hamaa 11.6
267 Burkina Faso Boucle de Mouhoun 11.5
268 Jordan Mafraq 11.5
269 Tunisia Tatouine 11.4
270 Mauritania Tagant 11.4
271 Jordan Irbid 11.3
272 Syria Del El Zour 11.3
273 Egypt Fayoum 11.3
274 Algeria Aïn Témouchent 11.2
275 Egypt Behera 11.2
276 Algeria Tamanghasset 11.1
277 Morocco Laayoune-Boujdou-
sakia Al Hamra
11.0
278 Burkina Faso Centre-Nord 11.0
279 Algeria Sidi Bel Abbès 10.9
280 Egypt Aswan 10.9
281 Morocco Chaouia-Ouardigha 10.9
282 Morocco Oriental 10.9
283 Morocco Meknes-Tafilalet 10.9
284 Algeria Illizi 10.8
285 Jordan Aqaba 10.8
286 Algeria Guelma 10.6
287 Azerbaijan Guba Khachmaz 10.5
288 Jordan Jarash 10.4
289 Algeria Boumerdès 10.3
290 Tunisia Kef 10.2
291 Egypt Menya 10.1
292 Algeria Ouargla 10.0
293 Syria Halab 10.0
294 Algeria Saïda 9.9
295 Turkey Northeast Anatolia 9.9
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296 Chad Chari Barguirmi 9.8
297 Eritrea Gash-Barka 9.7
298 Mauritania Hodh Gharbi 9.7
299 Syria Edlab 9.4
300 Algeria El Tarf 9.2
301 Egypt Qena 9.2
302 Tunisia Jendouba 9.1
303 Yemen Al-Amana 9.0
304 Bangladesh Barisal 9.0
305 Algeria Tiaret 9.0
306 Algeria Tipaza 8.9
307 Algeria Ghardaïa 8.9
308 Bangladesh Chittagong 8.9
309 Djibouti Djibouti 8.9
310 Algeria Batna 8.8
311 Bangladesh Sylhet 8.7
312 Sierra Leone Northern region 8.4
313 Eritrea Semenawi Keih 
Bahri
8.3
314 Algeria Jijel 8.2
315 Sierra Leone Eastern region 8.2
316 Syria Al-Qunitara 8.0
317 Turkey Central East 
Anatolia
7.9
318 Algeria Chlef 7.9
319 Algeria Tizi Ouzou 7.7
320 Syria Al-Hasaka 7.7
321 Jordan Zarqa 7.7
322 Algeria Skikda 7.7
323 Morocco Guelmim-Es-smara 7.7
324 Syria Daraa 7.4
325 Pakistan NWFP (North West 
Frontier Province
7.3
326 Algeria Biskra 7.3
327 Chad Ouaddai Est 7.1
328 Algeria Khenchela 7.0
329 Algeria Naama 7.0
330 Egypt Souhag 7.0
331 Turkey Southeast Anatolia 6.6
332 Egypt Assuit 6.5
333 Algeria - Laghouat 6.4
334 Azerbaijan Lankaran 6.4
335 Yemen Al-Hodeidha 6.4
336 Algeria Mascara 6.3
337 Eritrea Anseba 6.1
338 Mauritania Brakna 6.0
339 Yemen Marib 6.0
340 Algeria Oum el Bouaghi 5.9
341 Djibouti Dikhil 5.8
342 Algeria Souk Ahras 5.7
343 Morocco Tadla-Azilal 5.7
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344 Morocco Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate
5.6
345 Syria Al-Raka 5.5
346 Yemen Yemen - Hadramout 5.5
347 Yemen Yemen - Abyan 5.4
348 Algeria Sétif 5.3
349 Algeria Béjaïa 5.2
350 Algeria Relizane 5.1
351 Algeria Médéa 5.1
352 Algeria Msila 5.1
353 Algeria Djelfa 5.1
354 Algeria Mostaganem 5.0
355 Algeria Tébessa 4.9
356 Mali Kidal 4.7
357 Algeria Bouira 4.7
358 Algeria Adrar 4.6
359 Egypt Matroh 4.4
360 Algeria El Oued 4.3
361 Burkina Faso Nord 4.2
362 Algeria Mila 4.1
363 Yemen Lahej 3.9
364 Chad Bar Azoum 3.8
365 Algeria Aïn Defla 3.5
366 Yemen Al-Jawf 3.1
367 Yemen Al-Dhalih 3.0
368 Burkina Faso Est 3.0
369 Yemen Taiz 2.7
360 Djibouti Milieu Nomade 2.7
371 Yemen Shebwa 2.3
372 Yemen Sa adah 2.2
373 Yemen Ibb 1.9
374 Algeria Tissemsilt 1.8
375 Yemen Al-Mahweet 1.7
376 Yemen Omran 1.6
377 Djibouti Tadjourah & Obock 1.6
378 Yemen Al-Beidha 1.6
379 Yemen Sana a 1.2
380 Algeria Bordj Bou Arréridj 1.2
381 Yemen Dhamar 1.1
382 Yemen Hajjah 0.9
383 Yemen Al-Maharah 0.0
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MCMC (started from 
weighted IgLS)
IgLS
(weighted)
fixed effects model 
(weighted)
variable range Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.026 0.024 -0.024 0.021 -0.014 0.015
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.214 *** 0.039 -0.143 *** 0.036 -0.133 *** 0.028
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.542 *** 0.148 -0.399 ** 0.148 -0.481 *** 0.115
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.180 *** 0.021 -0.155 *** 0.020 -0.205 *** 0.015
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.281 *** 0.027 -0.232 *** 0.024 -0.269 *** 0.018
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.375 *** 0.037 -0.241 *** 0.036 -0.253 *** 0.028
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.833 *** 0.024 -0.509 *** 0.022 -0.622 *** 0.017
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.203 *** 0.018 -0.119 *** 0.019 -0.114 *** 0.027
Education (ref = less than primary com-
pleted)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.426 *** 0.020 0.200 *** 0.019 0.138 *** 0.014
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 1.108 *** 0.027 0.549 *** 0.025 0.463 *** 0.018
at least some tertiary Dummy 2.574 *** 0.036 1.387 *** 0.031 1.428 *** 0.023
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 0.813 *** 0.019 0.481 *** 0.017 0.508 *** 0.012
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture Dummy -0.861 *** 0.025 -0.608 *** 0.022 -0.715 *** 0.016
Lower white collar Dummy 0.047 0.024 0.005 0.020 -0.008 0.014
Upper white collar Dummy 0.173 *** 0.026 0.121 *** 0.025 0.129 *** 0.019
Unemployed Dummy 0.045 0.046 0.082 0.045 0.231 *** 0.034
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 -0.005 ** 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69- -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.001
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than 
primary)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.042 0.024 0.050 * 0.021 0.024 0.016
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 0.093 ** 0.028 0.042 0.025 0.010 0.019
at least some tertiary Dummy 0.110 *** 0.034 0.006 0.031 -0.057 * 0.023
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.125 *** 0.014 -0.077 *** 0.014 -0.079 *** 0.010
Age 15 - 49 0.235 *** 0.011 0.175 *** 0.006 0.191 *** 0.005
Age2 225 - 2401 -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.003 *** 0.000
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -1.308 ** 0.409 -0.534 0.369
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -2.063 ** 0.716 -2.107 ** 0.725
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 1.312 *** 0.209 1.345 *** 0.303
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.628 0.358 1.519 *** 0.425
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 0.050 0.182 0.023 0.168
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 2.971 *** 0.308 2.170 *** 0.423
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 0.214 0.327 1.396 ** 0.430
Country level
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5
State institutionalisation of conservative 
Islam
0 - 6 -0.428 *** 0.052 -0.210 ** 0.069
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy
appendix 6.1 Coefficients of Multivariate four-level logistic regression analyses with the logged odds of being non-agriculturally employed 
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MCMC (started from 
weighted IgLS)
IgLS
(weighted)
fixed effects model 
(weighted)
variable range Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Model statistics
Household-level variance  2.126 *** 0.067 2.337 *** 0.024 The model includes 
382 dummies, one 
for each district 
minus one. These 
coefficients are not 
reported.
District-level variance 0.375 *** 0.032 0.174 *** 0.016
Country-level variance 1.062 *** 0.323 0.383 *** 0.110
Intercept -5.571 *** 0.115 -5.134 *** 0.333 -5.923 *** 0.565
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 96,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28
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full interaction model
variable range Log odds s.e.
Micro level
Children (ref = no children)
1or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.033 0.026
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.213 *** 0.041
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.520 *** 0.150
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.204 *** 0.025
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.311 *** 0.033
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.390 *** 0.043
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.842 *** 0.022
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.207 *** 0.017
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy -0.118 0.239
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy -0.156 0.169
at least some tertiary Dummy 1.092 ** 0.279
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 0.806 *** 0.017
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture Dummy -0.912 *** 0.025
Lower white collar Dummy 0.036 0.022
Upper white collar Dummy 0.108 *** 0.027
Unemployed Dummy 0.141 ** 0.046
Values a: Age woman at birth first child  7 - 49 -0.006 *** 0.002
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69- -0.007 *** 0.001
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.055 * 0.023
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 0.088 ** 0.028
at least some tertiary Dummy 0.169 *** 0.035
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.126 *** 0.014
Age 15 - 49 0.248 *** 0.018
Age2 225 - 2401 -0.003 *** 0.000
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -1.120 *** 0.216
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -4.558 *** 0.0797
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 1.436 *** 0.293
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 0.074 0.578
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 0.532 *** 0.135
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 2.989 *** 0.521
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 0.504 0.450
Country level
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 – 8.16
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.367 *** 0.042
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71 3.772 *** 0.781
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy
appendix 7.1 Coefficients of the main effects of the multivariate four-level logistic regression analyses with the logged odds of being non- 
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full interaction model
variable range Log odds s.e.
Model statistics
Household-level variance 2.064 *** 0.047
District-level variance 0.337 *** 0.028
Country-level variance 0.905 ** 0.280
Intercept -4.046 *** 0.216
DIC Diagnostic 234,121.29
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 296,460; Nh = 227,477; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; The coefficients of the variables that are included in the interaction 
terms (education, all district-level variables, state institutionalisation of conservative Islam, and traditional family policies and laws), represent the 
influence of that factor in the case that the other have of the interaction terms is zero (either being education of the macro-context variable). In 
other words, these coefficients should not be interpreted as the general effects of education or the district/country-level factor. Models are based 
on MCMC estimation, starting from IGLS models weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness. Sources: see Chapter 4.
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variable range Log odds s.e.
Micro level
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.401 *** 0.020
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 1.094 *** 0.028
at least some tertiary Dummy 2.558 *** 0.036
Living in a city (ref = no) Dummy 0.807 *** 0.018
Partner’s occupation (ref = blue collar)
Agriculture Dummy -0.852 *** 0.024
Lower white collar Dummy 0.043 0.022
Upper white collar Dummy 0.167 *** 0.027
Unemployed Dummy 0.058 0.046
Values a: Age woman at birth first child 7 - 49 -0.005 * 0.002
Values b: Age difference (partner – woman) -35 - 69- -0.005 *** 0.001
Values c: Partner’s education (ref = less than primary)
primary completed, secondary not Dummy 0.043 0.022
secondary completed, no tertiary Dummy 0.097 *** 0.027
at least some tertiary Dummy 0.111 *** 0.032
Values d: Traditional household structure 0 - 2 -0.029 0.017
Age 15 - 49 0.238 *** 0.009
Age2 225 - 2401 -0.003 *** 0.000
district level
Economic development: Wealth level 0.01 - 0.87 -0.337 * 0.167
Male labour supply: Male non-employment 0.00 - 0.71 -1.924 *** 0.565
Labour market structure: Share white collar 0.03 - 0.81 0.454 * 0.224
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.01 - 0.48 1.178 *** 0.327
Degree of urbanisation 0.00 - 1.00 0.060 0.101
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.00 - 0.79 3.244 *** 0.348
Norms: Traditional care roles 0.03 - 0.76 0.681 *** 0.131
Country level
Economic development: GDP/c (*1000) 0.49 – 8.16
FDI (ln three years average (% GDP)) -1.11 - 3.50
Democracy (Freedom House) 1 - 5
State institutionalisation of conservative Islam 0 - 6 -0.355 *** 0.062
Traditional family policies & laws 0.06 - 0.71
Public sector: Gov. expenditures (prop. GDP) 0.05 - 0.41
Social Safety: Family Allowance policies Dummy
Model statistics
Household-level variance 2.099 *** 0.047
District-level variance 0.370 *** 0.031
Country-level variance 1.172 ** 0.364
Intercept -6.085 **** 0.126
DIC Diagnostic 235,429.38
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 295,777; Nh = 226,676; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; Models are based on MCMC estimation, starting from IGLS models 
weighted for in-country and between-country representativeness. Sources: see Chapter 4.
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MCMC weighted IgLS
variable range Coefficients s.e. Coefficients s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women  1 - 22 0.079 *** 0.011 0.062 *** 0.016
Number of elderly 0 - 5 -0.040 * 0.017 -0.045 * 0.020
Number of adult men  0 - 16 -0.054 *** 0.010 -0.052 *** 0.015
Control: Number of household members  1 - 69 -0.028 *** 0.005 -0.021 * 0.009
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household Dummy 0.307 *** 0.036 0.172 * 0.076
Other position Dummy -0.016 0.024 0.019 0.071
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children 0.00 - 1.00 -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.042 * 0.020
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.00 - 1.00 0.263 * 0.106 0.329 * 0.144
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.00 - 1.00 0.046 0.033 0.050 0.027
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 Dummy -0.031 0.025 -0.017 0.047
3 or 4, older than 5 Dummy -0.183 *** 0.041 -0.109 0.058
5 or more, older than 5 Dummy -0.466 ** 0.148 -0.318 *** 0.076
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.185 *** 0.022 -0.148 0.109
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.250 *** 0.030 -0.196 0.112
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 Dummy -0.292 *** 0.045 -0.168 0.093
Partner present (ref = no partner) Dummy -0.788 *** 0.026 -0.465 ** 0.188
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) Dummy -0.055 * 0.025 -0.021 0.032
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 295,777; Nh = 226,676; Nd = 383; Nc = 28; The coefficients presented are all part of a larger model, which is 
identical to Model 4 from Table 6.2. The only difference is the addition of the household structure variables as they are presented here. In appendix 
8.1 the other coefficients are given for the MCMC model. Sources: see Chapter 4.
appendix 8.2 Multivariate four-level logistic regression analysis, including household configuration variables, with the logged odds of being 
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Model 0: all countries
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Central asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.079 *** 0.011 0.056
0.058
0.065
0.046
0.063
***
**
0.015
0.020
0.042
0.039
0.034
0.045
0.036
** 0.017
0.019
0.266
0.349
0.319
0.293
0.353
***
***
0.042
0.045
0.198
0.172
0.181
0.171
0.182
***
***
0.027
0.015
Number of elderly -0.040 * 0.017 -0.102
-0.098
-0.092
-0.095
-0.054
***
***
0.029
0.026
-0.033
-0.022
-0.020
-0.021
-0.018
0.019
0.024
0.056
0.121
0.096
0.102
0.124
0.052
0.053
0.090
0.020
0.025
0.019
0.016
** 0.035
0.040
Number of adult men -0.054 *** 0.010 -0.077
-0.112
-0.098
-0.101
-0.074
***
***
0.017
0.014
0.003
0.010
0.009
0.010
0.006
0.011
0.014
-0.087
-0.189
-0.195
-0.305
-0.188
*
***
0.039
0.034
-0.021
-0.044
-0.034
-0.038
-0.031
0.026
0.023
Control: Number of household members -0.028 *** 0.005 -0.046
-0.049
-0.058
-0.052
-0.056
***
***
0.008
0.009
-0.010
-0.004
-0.003
-0.005
-0.002
0.006
0.007
-0.134
-0.142
-0.131
-0.099
-0.145
***
***
0.020
0.009
-0.075
-0.083
-0.091
-0.083
-0.092
***
***
0.015
0.009
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.307 *** 0.036 0.349
0.314
0.299
0.288
0.318
***
***
0.074
0.074
0.201
0.227
0.243
0.242
0.232
***
***
0.047
0.049
0.262
0.302
0.256
0.368
0.267
*
**
0.108
0.109
-0.016
-0.055
-0.049
-0.044
-0.094
0.093
0.103
Other position -0.016 0.024 -0.043
0.016
0.008
0.000
0.019
0.057
0.042
-0.076
-0.147
-0.144
-0.135
-0.149
***
0.034
0.037
0.238
0.001
-0.018
0.046
-0.024
* 0.095
0.079
-0.085
0.017
0.018
0.023
0.017
0.055
0.048
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.043
-0.043
-0.041
-0.039
-0.038
0.035
0.033
-0.072
-0.088
-0.095
-0.090
-0.093
*
**
0.029
0.034
0.005
0.013
0.008
0.003
0.016
0.064
0.009
-0.072
-0.087
-0.088
-0.091
-0.091 *
0.039
0.041
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.263 * 0.106 0.927
0.902
0.808
0.779
0.787
**
**
0.302
0.279
0.029
0.026
0.029
0.044
0.031
0.097
0.127
1.080
1.472
1.484
1.368
1.468
*
**
0.457
0.450
0.289
0.435
0.459
0.434
0.534
0.260
0.323
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.046 0.033 0.080
0.152
0.147
0.137
0.151
0.051
0.050
-0.091
-0.130
-0.125
-0.120
-0.119
*
**
0.039
0.045
0.401
0.773
0.727
0.879
0.769
***
***
0.098
0.111
0.041
-0.020
-0.021
-0.037
-0.032
0.057
0.055
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Model 0: all countries
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Central asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.079 *** 0.011 0.056
0.058
0.065
0.046
0.063
***
**
0.015
0.020
0.042
0.039
0.034
0.045
0.036
** 0.017
0.019
0.266
0.349
0.319
0.293
0.353
***
***
0.042
0.045
0.198
0.172
0.181
0.171
0.182
***
***
0.027
0.015
Number of elderly -0.040 * 0.017 -0.102
-0.098
-0.092
-0.095
-0.054
***
***
0.029
0.026
-0.033
-0.022
-0.020
-0.021
-0.018
0.019
0.024
0.056
0.121
0.096
0.102
0.124
0.052
0.053
0.090
0.020
0.025
0.019
0.016
** 0.035
0.040
Number of adult men -0.054 *** 0.010 -0.077
-0.112
-0.098
-0.101
-0.074
***
***
0.017
0.014
0.003
0.010
0.009
0.010
0.006
0.011
0.014
-0.087
-0.189
-0.195
-0.305
-0.188
*
***
0.039
0.034
-0.021
-0.044
-0.034
-0.038
-0.031
0.026
0.023
Control: Number of household members -0.028 *** 0.005 -0.046
-0.049
-0.058
-0.052
-0.056
***
***
0.008
0.009
-0.010
-0.004
-0.003
-0.005
-0.002
0.006
0.007
-0.134
-0.142
-0.131
-0.099
-0.145
***
***
0.020
0.009
-0.075
-0.083
-0.091
-0.083
-0.092
***
***
0.015
0.009
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.307 *** 0.036 0.349
0.314
0.299
0.288
0.318
***
***
0.074
0.074
0.201
0.227
0.243
0.242
0.232
***
***
0.047
0.049
0.262
0.302
0.256
0.368
0.267
*
**
0.108
0.109
-0.016
-0.055
-0.049
-0.044
-0.094
0.093
0.103
Other position -0.016 0.024 -0.043
0.016
0.008
0.000
0.019
0.057
0.042
-0.076
-0.147
-0.144
-0.135
-0.149
***
0.034
0.037
0.238
0.001
-0.018
0.046
-0.024
* 0.095
0.079
-0.085
0.017
0.018
0.023
0.017
0.055
0.048
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.043
-0.043
-0.041
-0.039
-0.038
0.035
0.033
-0.072
-0.088
-0.095
-0.090
-0.093
*
**
0.029
0.034
0.005
0.013
0.008
0.003
0.016
0.064
0.009
-0.072
-0.087
-0.088
-0.091
-0.091 *
0.039
0.041
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.263 * 0.106 0.927
0.902
0.808
0.779
0.787
**
**
0.302
0.279
0.029
0.026
0.029
0.044
0.031
0.097
0.127
1.080
1.472
1.484
1.368
1.468
*
**
0.457
0.450
0.289
0.435
0.459
0.434
0.534
0.260
0.323
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.046 0.033 0.080
0.152
0.147
0.137
0.151
0.051
0.050
-0.091
-0.130
-0.125
-0.120
-0.119
*
**
0.039
0.045
0.401
0.773
0.727
0.879
0.769
***
***
0.098
0.111
0.041
-0.020
-0.021
-0.037
-0.032
0.057
0.055
disables, in four different geographical regions among Muslim countries
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Model 0: all countries 
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Central asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.062 *** 0.016 0.047 * 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.209 *** 0.033 0.149 *** 0.034
Number of elderly -0.045 * 0.020 -0.068 * 0.030 -0.056 *** 0.014 -0.002 0.053 0.028 0.033
Number of adult men -0.052 *** 0.015 -0.056 ** 0.019 -0.011 0.019 -0.145 ** 0.053 -0.047 0.055
Control: Number of household members -0.021 * 0.009 -0.028 ** 0.010  0.003 0.007 -0.095 *** 0.009 -0.064 *** 0.018
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.172 * 0.076 0.165 * 0.081 0.139 ** 0.044 0.170 0.097 -0.199 0.150
Other position 0.019 0.071 -0.106 * 0.052 -0.123 0.093 0.196 *** 0.055 0.040 0.084
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.042 * 0.020 -0.009 0.042 -0.095 *** 0.012 -0.002 0.062 -0.063 *** 0.015
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.329 * 0.144 0.971 ** 0.360 0.114 0.144 0.793 *** 0.094 0.197 0.137
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.050 0.027 0.034 0.060 -0.085 *** 0.019 0.377 *** 0.041 0.069 * 0.030
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 -0.017 0.047 0.002 0.045 0.096 *** 0.020 0.018 0.083 -0.146 *** 0.034
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.109 0.058 -0.066 0.067 -0.004 0.036 -0.034 0.078 -0.273 *** 0.054
5 or more, older than 5 -0.318 *** 0.076 -0.329 0.199 0.008 0.157 -0.891 *** 0.107 -1.285 *** 0.162
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.148 0.109 -0.208 *** 0.045 0.005 0.020 -0.265 *** 0.034 -0.400 *** 0.096
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.196 0.112 -0.285 *** 0.055 -0.029 0.031 -0.613 *** 0.026 -0.409 ** 0.146
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.168 0.093 -0.210 *** 0.079 -0.056 0.039 -1.250 *** 0.027 -0.554 *** 0.145
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.465 ** 0.188 -0.982 *** 0.053 -0.034 0.104 -0.785 *** 0.108 -0.936 *** 0.280
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.021 0.032 -0.030 0.050 -0.046 0.025 -0.002 0.035 -0.137 ** 0.042
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Notes: The models only show the coefficients of the variables of theoretical interest. All models are controlled for 
education, age, living in a city, partner’s occupation and education, age difference with partner, age at birth first child, living in a polygynous 
household and context variables (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). The region-specific models are based on the subsamples (not on the models with 
interaction terms [see Section 8.5.2]).
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Model 0: all countries 
(see table 1)
greater Middle east Sub-Saharan africa Central asia Southeast asia
Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Household roles & needs
Number of adult women 0.062 *** 0.016 0.047 * 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.209 *** 0.033 0.149 *** 0.034
Number of elderly -0.045 * 0.020 -0.068 * 0.030 -0.056 *** 0.014 -0.002 0.053 0.028 0.033
Number of adult men -0.052 *** 0.015 -0.056 ** 0.019 -0.011 0.019 -0.145 ** 0.053 -0.047 0.055
Control: Number of household members -0.021 * 0.009 -0.028 ** 0.010  0.003 0.007 -0.095 *** 0.009 -0.064 *** 0.018
Household position (ref = partner of hhh)
Head of household 0.172 * 0.076 0.165 * 0.081 0.139 ** 0.044 0.170 0.097 -0.199 0.150
Other position 0.019 0.071 -0.106 * 0.052 -0.123 0.093 0.196 *** 0.055 0.040 0.084
Sex hierarchy & lineage
Proportion male children -0.042 * 0.020 -0.009 0.042 -0.095 *** 0.012 -0.002 0.062 -0.063 *** 0.015
Proportion children not-biologically related to hhh 0.329 * 0.144 0.971 ** 0.360 0.114 0.144 0.793 *** 0.094 0.197 0.137
Proportion male among 15 -21 age group 0.050 0.027 0.034 0.060 -0.085 *** 0.019 0.377 *** 0.041 0.069 * 0.030
Children and household head
Children (ref = no children)
1 or 2, older than 5 -0.017 0.047 0.002 0.045 0.096 *** 0.020 0.018 0.083 -0.146 *** 0.034
3 or 4, older than 5 -0.109 0.058 -0.066 0.067 -0.004 0.036 -0.034 0.078 -0.273 *** 0.054
5 or more, older than 5 -0.318 *** 0.076 -0.329 0.199 0.008 0.157 -0.891 *** 0.107 -1.285 *** 0.162
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.148 0.109 -0.208 *** 0.045 0.005 0.020 -0.265 *** 0.034 -0.400 *** 0.096
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.196 0.112 -0.285 *** 0.055 -0.029 0.031 -0.613 *** 0.026 -0.409 ** 0.146
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.168 0.093 -0.210 *** 0.079 -0.056 0.039 -1.250 *** 0.027 -0.554 *** 0.145
Partner present (ref = no partner) -0.465 ** 0.188 -0.982 *** 0.053 -0.034 0.104 -0.785 *** 0.108 -0.936 *** 0.280
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.021 0.032 -0.030 0.050 -0.046 0.025 -0.002 0.035 -0.137 ** 0.042
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Notes: The models only show the coefficients of the variables of theoretical interest. All models are controlled for 
education, age, living in a city, partner’s occupation and education, age difference with partner, age at birth first child, living in a polygynous 
household and context variables (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). The region-specific models are based on the subsamples (not on the models with 
interaction terms [see Section 8.5.2]).
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district women’s 
employment
predominant religion type of 
Islam
Institutionalisation of Islam
Indonesia
province % Muslim protestant Catholic Hindu tradition-
alist1 
Shari’a Islamic 
party (%)
Muslim 
party (%)
DI Aceh 22.0 1 0 0 0  0 1  54  15
North Sumatra 28.9 1 0 0 0  0 1  28  10
West Sumatra 31.5 1 0 0 0  0 1  50  14
Riau 26.6 1 0 0 0  0 1  36  19
Jambi 19.0 1 0 0 0  0 0  29  14
South Sumatra 25.3 1 0 0 0  0 1  31  19
Bengkulu 24.0 1 0 0 0  0 0  25  25
Lampung 27.9 1 0 0 0  1 0  18  17
Bangka Belitung 23.6 1 0 0 0  0 0  33 0
DKI Jakarta 46.4 1 0 0 0  1 0  33  10
West Java 26.2 1 0 0 0  1 1  30  12
Central Java 41.9 1 0 0 0  1 0  15  27
DI Yogyakarta 52.3 1 0 0 0  1 0  13  37
East Java 34.1 1 0 0 0  1 1  12  39
Banten 28.9 1 0 0 0  1 1  32  18
Bali 48.9 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0
West Nusa Tenggara 28.7 1 0 0 0  0 0  40  10
East Nusa Tenggara 28.6 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 0
West Kalimantan 15.7 1 0 0 0  0 0  20  10
Central Kalimantan 27.3 1 0 0 0  0 0  17  16
South Kalimantan 33.1 1 0 0 0  0 0  45  19
East Kalimantan 33.2 1 0 0 0  0 0  29  14
North Sulawesi 26.7 0 1 0 0  0 0  17 0
Central Sulawesi 23.2 1 0 0 0  0 0  17  16
South Sulawesi 21.1 1 0 0 0  0 1  29 9
Southeast Sulawesi 21.8 1 0 0 0  0 0  20  20
Gorontalo 22.3 1 0 0 0  0 1  33 0
Maluku 27.6 1 0 0 0  0 0  25 0
Kep Bangka Belitung 31.6 1 0 0 0  0 0 0  33
Sulawesi Barat 24.6 1 0 0 0  0 0  17 0
Maluka Utara 30.1 1 0 0 0  0 0  33 0
Papua Barat 19.2 0 1 0 0  0 0 0 0
Papua 14.9 0 1 0 0  0 0 0  20
appendix 9.1 District scores
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district women’s
 employment
predominant religion type of 
Islam
Institutionalisation of Islam
nigeria
governorate % Mulim protestant Catholic Sokoto2 Shari’a anpp 
governor
Akwa Ibom 65.3 0 1 0 0 0 0
Anambra 37.6 0 0 1 0 0 1
Bauchi 57.2 1 0 0 1 1 1
Edo 54.6 0 1 0 0 0 0
Benue 15.2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Borno 23.8 1 0 0 0 1 1
Cross River 22.9 0 1 0 0 0 0
Adamawa 37.8 1 0 0 0 0 0
Imo 48.4 0 1 0 0 0 0
Kaduna 29.9 1 0 0 1 1 0
Kano 63.8 1 0 0 1 1 1
Katsina 47.7 1 0 0 1 1 0
Kwara 49.6 1 0 0 0 0 0
Lagos 73.1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Niger 47.4 1 0 0 1 1 0
Ogun 62.2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ondo 24.0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Oyo 75.4 1 0 0 0 0 0
Plateau 17.0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Rivers 37.5 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sokoto 58.6 1 0 0 1 1 0
Abia 49.0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Delta 45.4 0 1 0 0 0 0
Enugu 34.2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Jigawa 48.4 1 0 0 1 1 0
Kebbi 41.9 1 0 0 1 1 0
Kogi 52.7 0 1 0 0 0 0
Osun 86.4 1 0 0 0 0 0
Taraba 29.3 0 1 0 0 0 0
Yobe 36.6 1 0 0 0 1 1
Bayelsa 29.9 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ebonyi 35.2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ekiti 65.2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Gombe 29.3 1 0 0 1 1 0
Nasarawa 21.6 0 1 0 0 0 0
Zamfara 39.4 1 0 0 1 1 1
Abuja 54.2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: for dummy variables a ‘1’ indicates the presence of the type of religion or institution as given in the column label; (1) 
Traditionalist is the less conservative form of Islam in Indonesia, compared to the ‘Modernist’ type. All other Muslim districts are 
‘Modernist’; (2) the Sokoto dummy only distinguishes between the Muslim dominated districts. The Christian districts are by definition 
not Sokoto. 
appendix 9.1 Continued
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Indonesia 
MCMC
Indonesia 
weighted IgLS
nigeria
MCMC
nigeria
weighted IgLS
Log odds s.e. Log odds  s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level - religion
Religious denomination
Islam ref ref ref ref
Protestantism -0.418 *** 0.059 -0.275 *** 0.080 -0.770 *** 0.073 -0.473 *** 0.122
Catholicism -0.625 *** 0.096 -0.435 *** 0.117 -0.863 *** 0.105 -0.533 *** 0.136
Hinduism -0.083 0.159 -0.128 0.231 n.a. n.a.
Other -0.824 *** 0.178 -0.705 ** 0.238 -1.771 *** 0.189 -1.193 *** 0.121
district level - religion
Dominant religion
Islam
Modernist (more conservative) ref ref n.a. n.a.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.572 *** 0.139 0.408 *** 0.122 n.a. n.a.
Other Islam n.a. ref ref
Sokoto-Islam n.a. 0.276 0.245 0.264 0.235
Protestantism -0.385 0.250 -0.175 0.174 -1.335 *** 0.236 -0.644 * 0.272
Catholicism 0.702 * 0.295 0.842 *** 0.252 -1.909 *** 0.447 -1.186 ** 0.399
Hinduism 1.154 ** 0.347 1.257 *** 0.310 n.a. n.a.
Shari’a -0.217 * 0.102 -0.220 *** 0.066 -1.429 * 0.576 -0.817 * 0.399
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.009 # 0.005 0.013 ** 0.004 n.a. n.a.
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.004 n.a. n.a.
Political Islam: Governor from ANPP n.a. 0.077 0.361 -0.135 0.209
district level - controls
GDI Value 0.020 *** 0.003 0.019 0.011 n.a. n.a.
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; n.a. means that for that country the variable 
or category was not used/available. Notes: all models include the standard individual- and district-level variables that are used in this thesis (see 
Chapters 4 and 6). Sources: see Chapter 4 and Section 9.4.
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Indonesia 
MCMC
Indonesia 
weighted IgLS
nigeria
MCMC
nigeria
weighted IgLS
Log odds s.e. Log odds  s.e. Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e.
Individual level - religion
Religious denomination
Islam ref ref ref ref
Protestantism -0.418 *** 0.059 -0.275 *** 0.080 -0.770 *** 0.073 -0.473 *** 0.122
Catholicism -0.625 *** 0.096 -0.435 *** 0.117 -0.863 *** 0.105 -0.533 *** 0.136
Hinduism -0.083 0.159 -0.128 0.231 n.a. n.a.
Other -0.824 *** 0.178 -0.705 ** 0.238 -1.771 *** 0.189 -1.193 *** 0.121
district level - religion
Dominant religion
Islam
Modernist (more conservative) ref ref n.a. n.a.
Traditionalist (less conservative) 0.572 *** 0.139 0.408 *** 0.122 n.a. n.a.
Other Islam n.a. ref ref
Sokoto-Islam n.a. 0.276 0.245 0.264 0.235
Protestantism -0.385 0.250 -0.175 0.174 -1.335 *** 0.236 -0.644 * 0.272
Catholicism 0.702 * 0.295 0.842 *** 0.252 -1.909 *** 0.447 -1.186 ** 0.399
Hinduism 1.154 ** 0.347 1.257 *** 0.310 n.a. n.a.
Shari’a -0.217 * 0.102 -0.220 *** 0.066 -1.429 * 0.576 -0.817 * 0.399
Presence political Islam: Islamic parties 0.009 # 0.005 0.013 ** 0.004 n.a. n.a.
Presence political Islam: Muslim parties 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.004 n.a. n.a.
Political Islam: Governor from ANPP n.a. 0.077 0.361 -0.135 0.209
district level - controls
GDI Value 0.020 *** 0.003 0.019 0.011 n.a. n.a.
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 and only for the district-level variables # p<0.10; Ni= 32,265; Nd=33; n.a. means that for that country the variable 
or category was not used/available. Notes: all models include the standard individual- and district-level variables that are used in this thesis (see 
Chapters 4 and 6). Sources: see Chapter 4 and Section 9.4.
disabled in Indonesia and Nigeria using different estimation techniques
372
Individual-level model includ-
ing year dummies1
weighted IgLS
full model, without
interactions2
weighted IgLS
Interaction model3
weighted IgLS
variable Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. 1992 1995 2000 2005
Micro level 
Children (ref = no children)
 …
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.240 *  0.011 -0.336 -0.462
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.035 -0.087 -0.281 -0.524 ***
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.072 -0.013 -0.333 0.033
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.510 *** -0.387 -0.409 -0.079 **
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
 …
Secondary completed, no tertiary 2.748 *** 2.554 2.263 *** 1.554 ***
At least some tertiary 3.057 *** 3.055 3.292 2.692 *
district-level factors
Economic development: Wealth level -1.236 ** 0.398
Male labour supply: Male non-employment -1.072 1.074
Labour market structure: Share white collar 1.461 *** 0.299
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.347 0.587
Degree of urbanisation -0.559 *** 0.057
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.233 0.619
Norms: Traditional care roles -1.550 * 0.636
1992 Ref. Ref.
1995 0.030 0.093 0.005 0.052
2000 -0.423 *** 0.094 -0.232 0.215
2005 -0.412 *** 0.091 -0.453 *** 0.079
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 55,419; Nh = 47,957; Ndt = 99; Nd =26; Nt = 4; Notes: (1) This model is similar to Model 1 in Table 10.2; (2) This 
model is similar to Model 5 in Table 10.2; (3) In these columns, the coefficient for each was calculated based on the interaction terms. The * indicates 
that the coefficient significantly differs from the coefficients in 1992; for 1992 the * indicate whether the coefficient differs significantly from zero.
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373
Individual-level model includ-
ing year dummies1
weighted IgLS
full model, without
interactions2
weighted IgLS
Interaction model3
weighted IgLS
variable Log odds s.e. Log odds s.e. 1992 1995 2000 2005
Micro level 
Children (ref = no children)
 …
1 or 2, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.240 *  0.011 -0.336 -0.462
3 or 4, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.035 -0.087 -0.281 -0.524 ***
5 or more, at least 1 younger than 6 -0.072 -0.013 -0.333 0.033
Presence male breadwinner (ref = no) -0.510 *** -0.387 -0.409 -0.079 **
Education (ref = less than primary completed)
 …
Secondary completed, no tertiary 2.748 *** 2.554 2.263 *** 1.554 ***
At least some tertiary 3.057 *** 3.055 3.292 2.692 *
district-level factors
Economic development: Wealth level -1.236 ** 0.398
Male labour supply: Male non-employment -1.072 1.074
Labour market structure: Share white collar 1.461 *** 0.299
Labour market structure: Share skilled labour 0.347 0.587
Degree of urbanisation -0.559 *** 0.057
Norms: Women in public sphere 0.233 0.619
Norms: Traditional care roles -1.550 * 0.636
1992 Ref. Ref.
1995 0.030 0.093 0.005 0.052
2000 -0.423 *** 0.094 -0.232 0.215
2005 -0.412 *** 0.091 -0.453 *** 0.079
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; Ni = 55,419; Nh = 47,957; Ndt = 99; Nd =26; Nt = 4; Notes: (1) This model is similar to Model 1 in Table 10.2; (2) This 
model is similar to Model 5 in Table 10.2; (3) In these columns, the coefficient for each was calculated based on the interaction terms. The * indicates 
that the coefficient significantly differs from the coefficients in 1992; for 1992 the * indicate whether the coefficient differs significantly from zero.


376
377
Bibliography
a Abdolah, Kader (2008). De Boodschapper: Een Vertelling. Breda: De Geus.
Abu Nasr, Julinda, Khoury, Nabil F. & Azzam, Henry T. (1985). Women, Employment and 
Development in the Arab World. Berlin: Mouton Publishers.
Abu-Lughod, Lila (Ed.) (1998). Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Acar, Feride (2006). “Gender Mainstreaming Policies in Education and Employment in Jordan, 
Morocco and Turkey; Turkey” In Verloo, Mieke, Van der Vleuten, Anna, Jansen, Willy & Acar, 
Feride (Eds.), Gender Mainstreaming in Education and Employment (pp. 79–111). Turin, Italy: 
European Training Foundation. 
Adely, Fida (2009). “Educating Women for Development: the Arab Human Development Report 
2005 and the Problem with Women’s Choices” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
41(1): 105–22.
Afshar, Haleh (Ed.) (1998). Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World. 
Basingstoke, England: MacMillan.
Ahmed, Leila (1992). Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. London: 
Yale University Press.
Allison, Paul D. (1999). Multiple Regression: A Primer. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. 
Allison, Paul D. (2001). Missing Data. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Al-Qudsi, Sulayman S. (1998). “Labour Participation of Arab Women: Estimates of the Fertility to 
Labour Supply Link” Applied Economics, 30(7): 931–41.
Amin, Sajeda & Al-Bassusi, Nagah H. (2004). “Education, Wage Work, and marriage: Perspectives 
of Egyptian Working Women” Journal of Marriage and Family, 66 (5): 1287–99.
Ammons, Samantha K. & Edgell, Penny (2007). “Religious Influences on Work-Family Trade-Offs” 
Journal of Family Issues, 28(6): 794–826.
Ananta, Aris, Arifin, Evi Nurvidya & Suryadinata, Leo (2005). Emerging Democracy in Indonesia. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Andersen, Roy R., Seibert, Robert F. & Wagner, Jon G. (2012). Politics and Change in the Middle 
East. Boston: Longman.
Anderson, Siwan & Eswaran, Mukesh (2009). “What Determines Female Autonomy? Evidence 
from Bangladesh” Journal of Development Economics, 90(2): 179–91.
Anker, Richard (1983). “Female Labor Force Participation in Developing Countries: A Critique 
of Current Definitions and Data Collection Methods” International Labour Review, 122(6): 
709–23.
Anker, Richard (1998). Gender and Jobs: Sex Segregation of Occupations in the World. Geneva: ILO. 
Archer, Margaret Scotford (1988). Culture and Agency. The Place of Culture in Social Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aromolaran, Adebayo B. (2004). “Female Schooling, Non-Market Productivity, and Labor Market 
Participation in Nigeria” Economic Growth Center, Yale University, Center Discussion Paper no. 
879.
Assaad, Ragui (1997). “The Employment Crisis in Egypt: Current Trends and Future Prospects” In: 
Pfeifer, Karen (Ed.), Research in Middle East Economics, vol. 2 (pp. 39–66). Greenwich, C T: JAI 
Press.
Assaad, Ragui (2003). “Gender and Employment: Egypt in Comparative Perspective” In: 
Posusney, Pripstein, Marsha & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and Globalization 
in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 119–41). Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Assaad, Ragui (2004). “Why Did Economic Liberalization Lead to Feminization of the Labor Force 
in Morocco and De-Feminization in Egypt?” Paper prepared for The Center of Arab Women 
Training and Research (C AW TAR), Mediterranean Development Forum (MDF).
Assaad, Ragui & Arntz, Melanie (2005). “Constrained Geographical Mobility And Gendered Labor 
Market Outcomes Under Structural Adjustment: Evidence from Egypt” World Development, 
33(3): 431–54.
378
Aziz, Heba (1995). “Understanding Attacks on Tourists in Egypt” Tourism Management, 16(2):  
91–5.
Azzam, Henry, Abu Nasr, Julinda & Lorfing, Irini (1985). “An Overview of Arab Women in 
Population, Employment and Economic Development” In: Abu Nasr, Julinda, Nabil F. Khoury 
& Henry T. Azzam (Eds.), Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World (pp. 5–37). 
Berlin: Mouton Publishers. 
B Badran, Margot (2001). “Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism” Journal of   
 Women’s History, 13(1): 47–52. 
Bahramitash, Roksana (2002). “Islamic Fundamentalism and Women’s Employment in Indonesia” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 16(2): 255–72.
Bahramitash, Roksana (2003). “Revolution, Islamization, and Women’s Employment in Iran” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, IX(2): 229–41.
Barbieri, Katherine & Schneider, Gerald (1999). “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New 
Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict” Journal of Peace Research 36(4): 387–404.
Bardasi, Elena & Wodon, Quentin (2010). “Working Long Hours and Having No Choice: Time 
Poverty in Guinea” Feminist Economics, 16(3): 45–78.
Başlevent, Cem & Onaran, Özlem (2004). “The Effect of Export-Oriented Growth on Female 
Labor Market Outcomes in Turkey” World Development, 32(8): 1375–93.
Beck, Nathaniel (2010). “Time is Not A Theoretical Variable” Political Analysis, 18(3): 293–4.
Becker, Gary S. (1965). “A Theory of the Allocation of Time” Economic Journal, 75(299): 493–517.
Becker, Gary S. (1981). The Treatise of the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Beneria, Lourdes (1981). “Conceptualizing the Labor Force: the Underestimation of Women’s 
Economic Activities” Journal of Development Studies, 17(3): 10–28.
Beneria, Lourdes (1982). “Accounting for Women’s Work”. In Beneria, Lourdes (Ed.), Women and 
Development: The Sexual Division of Labor in Rural Societies. New York: Praeger.
Benería, Lourdes & Sen, Gita (1981). “Accumulation, Reproduction, and Women’s Role in 
Economic Development: Boserup Revisited” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 
7(2): 279–98.
Bergeron, Suzanne (2001). “Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics” 
Globalization and Gender, 26(4): 983–1006.
Bernard, Jessie. (1975). Women, Wives and Mothers: Values and Options. Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing.
Black, Sandra E. & Brainerd, Elizabeth (2004). “Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization 
on Gender Discrimination” Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 57(4): 540–59.
Blackburn, Robert M., Jarman, Jennifer & Brooks, Bradley (2000). “The Puzzle of Gender 
Segregation and Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis” European Sociological Review, 16(2): 
119–35.
Boserup, Ester (1970). Women’s Role in Economic Development. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Bottero, Wendy (2000). “Gender and the Labour Market at the Turn of the Century: Complexity, 
Ambiguity and Change” Work, Employment & Society, 14(4): 781–91.
Brady, Henry E. & Collier, David (Eds.) (2004). Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Brady, Henry E. (2008). “Causation and Explanation in Social Science”. In: Box-Steffensmeier, 
Janet, Henry E. Brady & David Collier (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology 
(pp. 217–70). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Browne, Kath (2005). “Selling my Queer Soul or Queerying Quantitative Research?” Sociological 
Research Online, 3(1) [online journal: www.socresonline.org].
Bullock, Susan (1994). Women and Work. London: Zed.
Burnham, Peter, Gilland Lutz, Karin, Grant, Wyn & Layton-Henry, Zig (2008). Research Methods in 
Politics (2nd edition, Comprehensively Revised and Updated). Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
Busse, Matthias & Nunnenkamp, Peter (2009). “Gender Disparity in Education and the 
International Competition for FDI” Feminist Economics, 15(3): 61–90. 
379
C Çağatay, Nilüfer & Özler, Şule (1995). “Feminization of the Labor Force: The Effects of Long-Term
 Development and Structural Adjustment” World Development, 23(11): 1883–94.
Cahoon, Ben (2009). “Worldstatesmen. Nigeria States” Accessed on 8/31/2009 through: http://
www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria_federal_states.htm.
Cairoli, M. Laetitia (2007). “Girl but Not Woman. Garment Factory Workers in Fez, Morocco”. 
In Moghadam, Valentine M. (Ed.), From Patriarchy to Empowerment. Women’s Participation, 
Movements and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia (pp. 160–79). Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press. 
Caldwell, John C. (1978). “A Theory of Fertility: From High Plateau to Destabilization” Population 
and Development Review, 4(4): 553–77.
Callaway, Barbara & Creevey, Lucy (1994). The Heritage of Islam. Women, Religion, & Politics in 
West Africa. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Calvès, Anne-Emmanuèle & Schoumaker, Bruno (2004). “Deteriorating Economic Context 
and Changing Patterns of Youth Employment in Urban Burkina Faso: 1980–2000” World 
Development, 32(8): 1341–54.
Carapico, Sheila (1996). “Gender and Status Inequalities in Yemen: Honour, Economics, and 
Politics” In: Moghadam, Valentine M. (Ed.), Patriarchy and Economic Development. Women’s 
Positions at the End of the Twentieth Century (pp. 80–98). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chafe, William H. (1972). The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 
1920–1970. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chamie, Mary (1985). “Labour Force Participation of Lebanese Women” In: Abu Nasr, Julinda, 
Khoury, Nabil F. & Azzam, Henry T. (Eds.), Women, Employment and Development in the Arab 
World (pp. 73–102). Berlin: Mouton Publishers.
Chadwick, Bruce A. & Garrett, H. Dean (1995). “Women’s Religiosity and Employment: The LDS 
Experience” Review of Religious Research, 36(3): 277–93.
Chantala, Kim, Blanchette, Dan & C.M. Suchindran (2006). Software to Compute Sampling Weights 
for Multilevel Analysis. Carolina Population Center, UNC at Chapel Hill.
Chen, Martha, Sebstad, Jennefer & O’Connell, Lesley (1999). “Counting the Invisible Workforce: 
The Case of Homebased Workers” World Development, 27(3): 603–10.
Cheng, Lucie (1999). “Globalization and Women’s Paid Labour in Asia” International Social Science 
Journal, 51(2): 217–28.
CIA World Factbook (multiple years), “CIA World Factbooks” Accessed multiple times from 
4/16/2009 through http://library.louisville.edu/government/goodsources/factbook.html 
and http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html.
Civettini, Nicole H. & Glass, Jennifer (2008). “The Impact of Religious Conservatism on Men’s 
Work and Family Involvement” Gender & Society, 22(2): 172–93. 
Clark, Roger (1992). “Economic Dependency and Gender Differences in Labor Force Sectoral 
Change in Non-Core Nations” The Sociological Quarterly, 33(1): 83–98.
Clark, Roger, Ramsbey, Thomas W. & Adler, Emily Stier (1991). “Culture, Gender, and Labor Force 
Participation: A Cross-National Study” Gender & Society, 5(1): 47–66. 
CMM (Centre for Multilevel Modelling) (2011a). “Discrete response model FAQs” Accessed on 
17/8/2010 through: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/software/support/support-faqs/drm.
html.
CMM (Centre for Multilevel Modelling) (2011b). “Using weights” Accessed on 17/09/2010 
through: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/software/support/support-faqs/weights.html.
Contreras, Dante & Plaza, Gonzalo (2010). “Cultural Factors in Women’s Labor Force Participation 
in Chile” Feminist Economics, 16(2): 27–46.
Costello, Anna B. & Osborne, Jason W. (2005). “Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis: 
Four Recommendations for Getting the Most From Your Analysis” Practical Assessment, 
Research & Evaluation, 10(7): 1–9. 
d Dale, Angela, Fieldhouse, Edward, Shaheen, Nusrat & Kalra, Virinder (2002). “The Labour Market  
 Prospects for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women” Work, Employment & Society, 16(1): 5–25.
Davis, Nancy J. & Robinson, Robert V. (2006). “The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: 
380
Support for Islamic Law and Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations” American 
Sociological Review, 71(2): 167–90.
DDW (Database Developing World) (2009). “Database Developing World. Data Infrastructure 
for Research and Policy Analysis” Accessed on on 05/17/2010 through: http://www.
databasedevelopingworld.org/.
Deeb, Marius (2011). “Arab Republic of Egypt”. In Long, David E., Bernard Reich & Mark 
Gasiorowski, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (6th edition) (pp. 
397–421).
DHS (no date). “Measure DHS. Demographic and Health Surveys” Accessed through: http://
www.measuredhs.com/data/available-datasets.cfm.
Doces, John A. (2006). “Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis Using A 
Simultaneous Equation Approach” Paper prepared for the First Annual International 
Political Economy Conference, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Center for Globalization and Governance.
Dollar, David & Gatti, Roberta (1999). “Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times 
Good for Women?” Policy Research Report On Gender And Development, Working Paper Series, 
No. 1. The World Bank Development Research Group/Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network.
Dolton, Peter J. & Silles, Mary A. (2008). “The Effects of Over-Education on Earnings in the 
Graduate Labour Market” Economics of Education Review, 27(2): 125–39. 
Donahoe, Debra Anne (1999). “Measuring Women’s Work in Developing Countries” Population 
and Development Review, 25(3): 543–76.
Donno, Daniela & Russett, Bruce (2004). “Islam, Authoritarianism and Female Empowerment: 
What Are the Linkages?” World Politics, 56(4): 582–607.
Dorius, Shawn F. & Firebaugh, Glenn (2010). “Trends in Global Gender Inequality” Social Forces, 
88(5): 1941–68. 
Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (2003). “Education in Saudi Arabia: Gender, Jobs and the Price of 
Religion”. In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and 
Globalization in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 239–58). Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner. 
Drobnič, Sonja, Blossfeld, Hans-Peter & Rohwer, Götz (1999). “Dynamics of Women’s 
Employment Patterns over the Family Life Course: A Comparison of the United States and 
Germany” Journal of Marriage and the Family, 61: 133–46.
Droeber, Julia (2003). “”Woman to Woman”- The Significance of Religiosity for Young Women in 
Jordan” Women’s Studies International Forum, 26(5): 409–24.
Dube, Leela (1997). Women and Kinship: Perspectives on Gender in South and South-East Asia. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Dworkin, Shari L., Kambou, Sarah Degnan, Sutherland, Carla, Moalla, Khadija & Kapoor, Archana 
(2009). “Gendered Empowerment and HIV Prevention: Policy and Programmatic Pathways to 
Success in the MENA Region” JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 51(3): 
S111–8. 
e Edgar, Adrienne (2006). “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet “Emancipation” of  
 Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective” Slavic Review, 65(2): 252–72.
Eichengreen, Barry & Leblang, David (2006). “Democracy and Globalization” NBER Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper 12450. Accessed on 9/15/2011 through http://www.nber.org/
papers/w12450.
Eliufoo, Harriet K. (2007). “Gendered division of labour in construction sites in Zanzibar” Women 
in Management Review, 22(2): 112–21.
Elson, Diane (Ed.) (1991). Male Bias in the Development Process. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
Elson, Diane (2009). “Gender Equality and Economic Growth in the World Bank World 
Development Report 2006” Feminist Economics, 15(3): 35–59.
Emmerson, Donald K. (2001). “Indonesia” In Krieger (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
381
World (2nd edition) (pp. 390–2). New York: Oxford University Press.
Esposito, John L. & Voll, John O. (1996). Islam and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
f Farah, N.H. (2006). “Arab Women’s Development: How Relevant Are UNDP Measurements?”  
 Middle East Policy, 13(2): 38–47.
Fazeli, Rafat (2002). [Review without a title]. SIGNS: Journal for Women in Culture and Society, 
11(2): 569–73.
Fergany, Nader, Bennani, Farida, Elsadda, Hoda, Jadaane, Fahmi, & Kubursi, Atif (core team) 
(2003). Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a knowledge society. Amman, Jordan: 
National Press; United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.
Fergany, Nader, Jad, Islah, Abdellatif, Kamal, Al-Kitbi, Ebtisam, Farahat, Mohamed Nour, Manna, 
Haytham & Silini, Naila (core team) (2006). Arab Human Development Report 2005. Towards a 
rise of women in the Arab world. Amman, Jordan: National Press; United Nations Development 
Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.
Feldmann, Horst (2007). “Protestantism, Labor Force Participation, and Employment Across 
Countries” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(4): 795–816.
Fernandez, Raquel, Fogli, Alessandra & Olivetti, Claudia (2004). “Mothers and Sons: Preference 
Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 
1249–99.
Fish, Steven (2002). “Islam and Authoritarianism” World Politics, 55(1): 4–37.
Forsythe, Nancy, Korzeniewicz, Roberto Patricio & Durrant, Valerie (2000). “Gender Inequalities 
and Economic Growth: A Longitudinal Evaluation” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 48(3): 573–617.
Freedman, Jane (2004). “Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma” 
International Migration, 42(3): 6–27.
Freedom House (2010). “Freedom in the World. Historical country ratings” Accessed on 
21/03/2010 through: http://www.freedomhouse.org/. 
g García, Craig (2011). “Review: Constituency-Level Elections and Constituency-Level Elections  
 Archive Datasets” APSA-CP Newsletter, 22(1): 20–2.
Geaves, Ron (2006). Key Words in Islam. London: The Continuum International Publishing Group.
Gerring, John (2007). Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Ghorashi, Halleh (1996). “Iranian Islamic and Secular Feminists, Allies or Enemies? A Question 
Rethought By Participating in the NGO Forum During the Fourth International Women’s 
Conference in China” MER A Occasional papers no. 27. Amsterdam: Middle East Research 
Associates.
Glass, Jennifer & Nath, Leda E. (2006). “Religious Conservatism and Women’s Market Behavior 
Following Marriage and Childbirth” Journal of Marriage and Family, 68(3): 611–29.
Glick, Peter & Sahn, David (1997). “Gender and Education Impacts on Employment and Earning in 
West Africa: Evidence from Guinea” Development and Cultural Change, 45(4): 793–823.
Glick, Peter & Sahn, David (2005). “Intertemporal Female Labor Force Behavior in a Developing 
Country: What Can We Learn From a Limited Panel?” Labor Economics, 12(1): 23–45.
Globalsecurity (2009). “Globalsecurity. Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict” Accessed on 
8/31/2009 through: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nigeria-1.htm.
Goertz, Gary (2006). Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Goertz, Gary & Hewitt, J. Joseph (2006). “Concepts and Choosing Populations” In: Goertz, Gary 
(Ed.) Social Science Concepts. A User’s Guide (pp. 211–34). Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Goertz, Gary & Mahoney, James (2006). “Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle” In: 
Goertz, Gary (Ed.) Social Science Concepts. A User’s Guide (pp. 177–210). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Goertz, Gary & Mazur, Amy G. (2006). “Mapping Gender and Politics Concepts: Ten Guidelines” 
382
In: Goertz, Gary & Mazur, Amy G. (Eds.), Politics, Gender and Concepts: Theory and 
Methodology (pp. 14–43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldin, Claudia D. (1991). “The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women’s Employment” The 
American Economic Review, 81(4): 741–56.
Goody, Jack (1996). “Comparing Family Systems in Europe and Asia: Are There Different Sets of 
Rules?” Population and Development Review, 22(1): 1–20.
Gray, Mark M., Kittilson, Miki Caul & Sandholtz, Wayne (2006). “Women and Globalization: A 
Study of 180 Countries, 1975–2000” International Organization, 60(2): 293–333.
Green, Francis, McIntosh, Steven & Vignoles, Anna (1999). “Overeducation and Skills-Clarifying 
the Concepts” CEP Discussion Papers DP0435, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
Greenaway, David & Morrissey, Oliver (1993). “Structural Adjustment and Liberalisation in 
Developing Countries: What Lessons Have We Learned?” K YKLOS, 46(2): 241–61.
Gruenbaum, Ellen (2001). The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Gündüz-Hoşgör, Ayse & Smits, Jeroen (2008). “Variation in Labor Market Participation of 
Married Women in Turkey” Women’s Studies International Forum, 31(2): 104–17.
Gwillim Law (2011). “Statoids. Administrative Divisions of Countries” Accessed on 11/19/2011 
through: http://www.statoids.com/yid.html. 
H Habib, Rima R., Nuwayhid, Iman A. & Yeretzian, Joumana S. (2006). “Paid Work and Domestic  
 Labor in Disadvantaged Communities on the Outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon” Sex Roles, 55(5):  
 321–29.
Haddad, Lawrence, Brown, Lynn R., Richter, Andrea & Smith, Lisa (1995). “The Gender 
Dimensions of Economic Adjustment Policies: Potential Interactions and Evidence to Date” 
World Development, 23(6): 881–96.
Haghighat, Elhum (2005a). “Neopatriarchy, Islam and Female Labour Force Participation: A 
Reconsideration” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy: 25(10/11): 84–105.
Haghighat, Elhum (2005b). “A Comparative Analysis of Neopatriarchy and Female Labor Force 
Participation in Islamic Countries” Electronic Journal of Sociology, 1(1): 1–26.
Hakim, Catherine (1991). “Grateful Slaves and Self Made Women: Fact and Fantasy in Women’s 
Work Orientations” European Sociological Review, 7(2): 101–21. 
Hakim, Catherine (1995). “Five Feminist Myths about Women’s Employment” The British Journal 
of Sociology, 46(3): 429–55.
Hakim, Catherine (1996). Key Issues in Women’s Work: Female Heterogeneity and the Polarisation of 
Women’s Employment. London: Athlone Press.
Hale, Sondra (2003). “Sudanese Women in National Service, Militias and at Home” In: Posusney, 
Marsha Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and Globalization in the Arab 
Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 195–238). Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner. 
Hancock, Ange-Marie (2007). “When Multiplication Doesn’t Equal Quick Addition: Examining 
Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm” Perspectives on Politics, 5(1): 63–79.
Handoussa, Heba, El Sherif, Mahmoud, Tawila, Sahar, Sholkamy, Hania & Zaalouk, Malak 
(principal contributors) (2005). Egypt Human Development Report 2005, Choosing our Future: 
Towards a New Social Contract. Cairo: Institute of National Planning, Egypt; United Nations 
Development Programme.
Harding, Sandra (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. New York: Cornell University Press.
Harding, Sandra. (1997). “Is There a Feminist Method?” In: Kemp, Sandra & Squires, Judith (Eds.). 
Feminisms (pp. 160–170). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harrison, Graham (Ed.) (2005). Global Encounters. International Political Economy, Development and 
Globalization. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Hatem, Mervat (1987). “Class and Patriarchy as Competing Paradigms for the Study of Middle 
Eastern Women” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29(4): 811–18. 
Henry, Clement M. & Springborg, Robert (2001). Globalization and the Politics of Development in 
the Middle East. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press.
Hijab, Nadia (1988). Womanpower. The Arab Debate on Women at Work. Cambridge: Cambridge 
383
University Press.
Hijab, Nadia (2001). “Women and Work in the Arab World” In: Joseph, Suad & Susan Slyomovics 
(Eds.). Women and Power in the Middle East (pp. 41–51). Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania.
Hirschman, Charles & Aghajanian, Akbar (1980). “Women’s Labour Force Participation and 
Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–1970” Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, XI(1): 30–49.
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2006). The Caged Virgin. An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam. New 
York: Free Press.
Hoodfar, Homa (1997). Between Marriage and the Market. Intimate Politics and Survival in Cairo. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Hox, Joop (2002). Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. New York: Erlbaum.
Huber, Evelyne, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich & Stephens, John D. (1997). “The Paradoxes of 
Contemporary Democracy; Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions” Comparative 
Politics, 29(3): 323–42.
Huisman, Janine (2011). Educational Participation in Developing Countries: Multilevel Determinants 
of Going to School and Dropping Out in the Developing World. Nijmegen: unpublished PhD-
thesis.
Huisman, Janine & Smits, Jeroen (2009). “Effects of Household- and District-Level Factors on 
Primary School Enrollment in 30 Developing Countries” World Development, 37(1): 179–93.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72(3): 40.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hunwick, John (1992). “An African Case Study of Political Islam: Nigeria” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 524(1): 143–55. 
I ILO Laborsta. “Laborsta Internet” Accessed on 1/6/2011 through: http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
Inglehart, Ronald (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald & Baker, Wayne E. (2000). “Modernization, Cultural Change and the 
Persistence of Traditional Values” American Sociological Review, 65(1): 19–51.
Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa (2003a). “The True Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Policy 
Magazine, 34(2): 67–74.
Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa. (2003b). Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change 
Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPUMS (no date). “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International” Accessed through: 
https://international.ipums.org/international/.
Isaacs, Dan (2003). “BBC News. Islam in Nigeria: Simmering tensions” Accessed on 8/31/2009 
through: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk.
IslamToday (2011). “Nigerian President Meets with Sultan of Sokoto & Other Muslim Leaders 
before Elections” IslamToday, 3/28/2011. Accessed through: http://en.islamtoday.net/
artshow-233–3992.htm.
ISSA (2011). “International Social Security Association” Accessed on 06/01/2011 through: http://
www.issa.int/schema_comparison/branches?curr_node_id=&curr_object_id=&combo_
country1=72149&combo_country2=72148. 
j Jaccard, James (2001). Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression. Sage University Papers, Series on  
 Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Jamal, Amaney A. (2006). “Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World? 
Evidence from Egypt and Jordan” World Affairs, 169(2): 51–63.
Jansen, Willy (2004). “The Economy of Religious Merit: Women and Ajr in Algeria” The Journal of 
North African Studies, 9(4): 1–17.
Jansen, Willy. (2006). “Gender Mainstreaming Policies in Education and Employment in Jordan, 
Morocco and Turkey; Jordan” In: Verloo, Mieke, Van der Vleuten, Anna, Jansen, Willy & Acar, 
384
Feride (Eds.) Gender Mainstreaming in Education and Employment (pp. 45–63). Turin, Italy: 
European Training Foundation.
Jansen, Willy (2009). “De Machtskansen van Weduwen” Jaarboek voor Vrouwengeschiedenis 29: 
Zenobia, Khadîja en Dolle Amina’s: Gender en Macht in de Islamitische Geschiedenis (pp. 23–41). 
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Aksant. 
Jaquette, Jane S. (1982). “Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism” 
World Politics, 34(2): 267–84.
Jayaratne, Toby Epstein (1983). “The Value Of Quantitative Methodology for Feminist Research” 
In: Bowles, Gloria & Renate Duelli Klein (Eds.), Theories of Women’s Studies (pp. 140–61). 
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Jenson, Jane (1997). “Who Cares? Gender and Welfare Regimes” Social Politics, 4(2): 182–7.
Johnsdotter, Sara (2003). “Somali Women in Western Exile: Reassessing Female Circumcision in 
the Light of Islamic Teachings” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 23(2): 361–73.
Jones, Kelvyn (2007). Multilevel Analysis: Practical Applications. Part 2, course / training manual. 
Essex Summer School in SSDA: University of Essex.
Jones, Kelvyn & Duncan, Graig (1998). “Modelling Context and Heterogeneity: Applying 
Multilevel Models” In: Scarbrough, Elinor & Tanenbaum, Eric (Eds.), Research Strategies in the 
Social Sciences (pp. 95–123). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jusová, Iveta (2008). “Hirsi Ali and van Gogh’s Submission: Reinforcing the Islam vs. Women 
Binary” Women’s Studies International Forum, 31(2): 148–55.
Jütting, Johannes P., Morrison, Christian, Dayton-Johnson, Jeff & Drechsler, Denis (2008). 
“Measuring Gender (In)Equality: The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data 
Base” Journal of Human Development, 9(1): 65–86. 
K Kabeer, Naila. (1992). “Triple Roles, Gender Roles, Social Relations: The Political Sub-text of  
 Gender Training” Discussion Paper No. 313, Institute of Development Studies. Brighton, 1992.
Kahler, Miles & Walter, Barbara F. (Eds.) (2006). Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kandiyoti, Deniz (1988). “Bargaining with Patriarchy” Gender and Society, 2(3): 274–89.
Kandiyoti, Deniz (Ed.) (1991). Women, Islam and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Kapteijns, Lidwien (1998). “Review: New Studies of Women, Gender and Islam: Contextualizing 
and Historicizing Muslim Women’s Lives” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 32(3): 586–93.
Kaya, Yunus (2010). “Globalization and Industrialization in 64 Developing Countries, 1980–2003” 
Social Forces, 88(3): 1153–82.
Kazeem, Aramidé, Jensen, Leif & Stokes, C. Shannon (2010). “School Attendance in Nigeria: 
Understanding the Impact and Intersection of Gender, Urban‐Rural Residence, and 
Socioeconomic Status” Comparative Education Review, 54(2): 295–319. 
Kenworthy, Lane & Malami, Melissa (1999). “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A 
Worldwide Comparative Analysis” Social Forces, 78(1): 235–69.
Kerr, Clark, Harbison, Frederick H., Dunlop, John T. & Myers, Charles A. (1960). “ Industrialism 
and industrial man” International Labour Review, 71(3): 236–50.
Ketner, Susan, Marjo Buitelaar & Harke Bosma (2004). “Identity Strategies Among Adolescent 
Girls of Moroccan Descent in the Netherlands” Identity: An International Journal of Theory and 
Research, 4(2): 145–69. 
Khatir, Arezoo Esmaeili (2007). “The Effects of Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors on Married 
Women’s Employment in Shiraz” Conference Paper, Middle East Economic Association, 6th 
International Conference, 14–16th March 2007, Zayed University, Dubai.
Khattab, Nabil (2002). “Ethnicity and Female Labour Market Participation: a New Look at the 
Palestinian Enclave in Israel” Work, Employment & Society, 16(1): 91–110.
Kibria, Nazli (1990). “Power, Patriarchy, and Gender Conflict in the Vietnamese Immigrant 
Community” Gender & Society, 4(1): 9–24.
Kienle, Eberhard (1998). “More Than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of 
Egypt in the 1990s” Middle East Journal, 52(2): 219–35.
King, Gary, Robert Owen Keohane & Sidney Verba (1994). Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific 
385
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kotarumalos, Ali (2009). “Party of Indonesia’s president officially named winner in parliamentary 
polls” The Gaea Times, 5/10/2009. Accessed through: http://blog.taragana.com.
Kotsadam, Andreas (2011). “Does Informal Eldercare Impede Women’s Employment? The Case of 
European Welfare States” Feminist Economics, 17(2): 121–44.
Kravdal, Øystein (2006). “A Simulation-Based Assessment of the Bias Produced When 
Using Averages From Small DHS Clusters as Contextual Variables in Multilevel Models” 
Demographic Research, 15: article 1. Accessed through: http://www.demographic-research.
org/Volumes/Vol15/1/
Kriger, Colleen (1993). “Textile Production and Gender in the Sokoto Caliphate” Journal of African 
History, 34(3): 361–401.
Kritz, Mary M. & Makinwa-Adebusoye, Paulina (1999). “Determinants of Women’s Decision-
Making Authority in Nigeria: The Ethnic Dimension” Sociological Forum, 14(3): 399–424.
Kuepie, Mathias, Christophe J. Nordman & François Roubaud (2009). “Education and Earnings in 
Urban West Africa” Journal of Comparative Economics, 37(3): 491–515.
Kuhn, Thomas (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd edition). Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
L Landman, Todd (2008). Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (3rd edition).  
 London: Routledge.
Langstem, Ray, & Salem, Rania (2008). “Two Approaches to Measuring Women’s Work in 
Developing Countries: A Comparison of Survey Data from Egypt” Population and Development 
Review, 34(2): 283–305.
League of Arab States, Pan Arab Project for Family Health (PAPFam) & Syrian Arab Republic, 
Office of the Prime Minister, Central Bureau of Statistics (2001). The Family Health Survey in 
the Syrian Arab Republic. Principal Report, Annex 2: Survey Questionnaires. Cairo: The League 
of Arab States.
Lenski, Gerhard & Nolan, Patrick (1984). “Trajectories of Development: A Test of Ecological-
Evolutionary Theory” Social Forces, 63(1): 1–23.
Lerner, Daniel (1958). The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: 
The Free Press. 
Li, Quan & Reuveny, Rafael (2003). “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical 
Analysis” British Journal of Political Science, 33(1): 29–54.
Lieshout, Robert H. (1993). Anarchie en Hiërarchie: Een Theorie van Internationale Betrekkingen en 
Buitenlandse Politiek. Bussum: Coutinho B.V.
Lincove, Jane Arnold (2008). “Growth, Girls’ Education, and Female Labor: A Longitudinal 
Analysis” The Journal of Developing Areas, 41(2): 45–68.
Lindsey, Timothy (1999). “From Rule of Law to Law of the Rulers To Reformation?” In: Lindsey, 
Timothy (Ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society. Sydney: The Federation Press.
Little, Roderick J. A. & Rubin, Donald B. (2002). Statistical Analysis with Missing Data (2nd edition). 
New York: John Wiley.
Lorber, Judith (2006). “Shifting Paradigms and Challenging Categories” Social Problems, 53(4): 
448–53. 
M Maddison, Angus (2008). Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD.  
 Accessed on 4/23/2010 through: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm.
Mahoney, James & Goertz, Gary (2006). “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research” Political Analysis, 14(3): 227–49.
Malt, Carol (2007). “Museum Feminization? Women and Museums in Jordan”. In Moghadam, 
Valentine M. (Ed.), From Patriarchy to Empowerment. Women’s Participation, Movements, 
and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia (pp. 215–29). Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press. 
Maume, David J. (2006). “Gender Difference in Restricting Work Efforts Because of Family 
Responsibilities” Journal of Marriage and Family, 68(4): 859–69.
386
Maynard, Mary (1994). Methods, Practice and Epistemology: The Debate About Feminism and 
Research. Researching Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective. London: Taylor and Francis.
Mazur, Amy G. & Goertz, Gary (2008). “Introduction”. In: Goertz, Gary & Mazur, Amy G. (Eds.) 
Politics, Gender and Concepts: Theory and Methodology (pp. 1–13). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
McCall, Leslie (2005). “The Complexity of Intersectionality” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society, 30(3): 1771–800.
McCloskey, Donald N. (1983). “The Rhetoric of Economics” Journal of Economic Literature, 21(2): 
481–517.
McCloskey, Deirdre N. & Ziliak, Stephen T. (1996). “The Standard Error of Regressions” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 34(1): 97–114.
Measure DHS (2006). Model Questionnaire. With Commentary. Basic Documentation Number 2. 
Calverton, Maryland: ORC Macro. July 2006.
Mernissi, Fatima (1975). Beyond the Veil. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mernissi, Fatima (1978). “The Patriarch in the Moroccan Family: Myth or Reality?” In: Allman, 
James (Ed.). Women’s Status and Fertility in the Muslim World (pp. 312–32). New York: Praeger 
Publishers.
Mernissi, Fatima (1987). The Effect of Modernization on the Male-Female Dynamics in a Muslim 
Society: Morocco. Michigan: Ann Arbor.
Mernissi, Fatima (1993). The Forgotten Queens of Islam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Mernissi, Fatima (2004). Sheherazades weblog: De Internetrevolutie in het Traditionele Marokko. 
Breda: De Geus. 
Metcalfe, Beverly Dawn (2007). “Gender and Human Resource Management in the Middle East” 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18(1): 54–73.
Metcalfe, Beverly Dawn (2011). “Women, Empowerment and Development in Arab Gulf States: A 
Critical Appraisal of Governance, Culture and National Human Resource Development (HRD) 
Frameworks” Human Resource Development International, 14(2): 131–48.
Meyer, Lisa B. (2003). “Economic Globalization and Women’s Status in the Labor Market. 
A Cross-National Investigation of Occupational Sex Segregation and Inequality” The 
Sociological Quarterly, 44(3): 351–83.
Miles, Rebecca (2002). “Employment and Unemployment in Jordan: The Importance of the 
Gender System” World Development, 30(3): 413–27.
Miller, Jane E. & Van der Meulen Rodgers, Yana (2008). “Economic Importance and Statistical 
Significance: Guidelines for Communicating Empirical Research” Feminist Economics, 14(2): 
117–49.
Millman, Marcia & Moss Kanter, Rosabeth (Eds.) (1975). Another Voice. Feminist Perspectives on 
Social Life and Social Science. New York: Anchor Press. Partly reprinted in: Harding, Sandra 
(Ed.) (1987). Feminism & Methodology (pp. 160–70). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mincer, Jacob (1962). “Labor Force Participation of Married Women” In: Lewis, H. Gregg. (Ed.) 
Aspects of Labor Economics (pp. 63–106). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mincer, Jacob (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mishra, Satish C. (team leader) (2004). National Human Development Report 2004. The Economics 
of Democracy. Financing Human Development in Indonesia. Indonesia: BPS-Statistics 
Indonesia; BAPPENAS; United Nations Development Programme.
Mitchell, Timothy (2001). “Egypt” In: Krieger, Joel (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
World (2nd edition) (pp. 235–7). New York: Oxford University Press.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (1990). “Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation in the 
Middle East and North Africa. WIDER Working Papers” Helsinki: World Institute for 
Development Economics Research of the United Nations University.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (1993). Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle 
East. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (1996). Patriarchy and Economic Development. Women’s Positions at the 
End of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
387
Moghadam, Valentine M. (1998). Women, Work, and Economic Reform in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (2003). Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle East 
(2nd edition). Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (2004). “Towards Gender Equality in the Arab/Middle East Region: 
Islam, Culture, and Feminist Activism” Human development report office occasional paper, 
Background paper for HDR 2004. UNDP.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (Ed.) (2007). From Patriarchy to Empowerment. Women’s Participation, 
Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University.
Moghadam, Valentine M. & Senftova, Lucie (2005). “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: 
Participation and Rights in Civil, Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Domains” 
International Social Science Journal, 57(184): 389–412.
Mojab, Shahrzad (2001). “Theorizing the Politics of ‘Islamic Feminism’” Feminist Review, 69(1): 
124–46.
Moon, Bruce E. (2001). “Structural Adjustment Programs” In: Krieger, Joel (Ed.). The Oxford 
Companion to Politics of the World (2nd edition) (pp. 806–7). New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Moors, Annelies (2004). Muslim Cultural Politics: What’s Islam Got To Do With It? Amsterdam: 
Vossiuspers UvA. 
Murphy, Emma C. (2003). “Women in Tunisia: Between State Feminism and Economic Reform” 
In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and Globalization 
in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 169–94). Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Muscatelli, Vito Antonio, Andrew A. Stevenson & Catia Montagna (1995). “Modeling Aggregate 
Manufactured Exports for Some Asian Newly Industrialized Economies” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 77(1): 147–55.
Myntti, Cynthia (1985). “Women, Work, Population and Development in the Yemen Arab 
Republic” In: Abu Nasr, Julinda, Nabil F. Khoury & Henry T. Azzam (Eds.), Women, 
Employment and Development in the Arab World (pp. 39–58). Berlin: Mouton Publishers. 
n Nabli, Mustapha Kamel & Chamlou, Nadereh (main authors) (2004). MENA Development Report.  
 Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa. Women in the Public Sphere   
 Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Nassar, Heba (2003). “Egypt in Comparative Perspective” In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & 
Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East. Gender, 
Economy & Society (pp. 95–118). Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner. 
Nationsencyclopedia (2009). “Nationsencyclopedia. Ethnic groups – Nigeria” Accessed on 9/2/2009 
through: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Nigerai-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html.
Nationmaster (2011) “Nationmaster.com” Accessed on 4/24/2011 through: http://www.
nationmaster.com/statistics/stats&all=1.
Norris, Pippa & Inglehart, Ronald (2002). “Islam & the West: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
Thesis” Faculty Research Working Papers Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, April.
Norris, Pippa, Ronald Inglehart (2004). Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Nurudeen, Abu & Usman, Abdullahi (2010). “Government Expenditure and Economic Growth in 
Nigeria, 1970–2008: A Disaggregated Analysis” Business and Economics Journal, 2010(4): 1–11.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2000). Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and 
History (3rd edition). New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 
o Oakley, Ann & Oakley, Robin (1979). “Sexism in Official Statistics” In: Irvine, John, Ian Miles &  
 Jeff Evans (Eds.), Demystifying Social Statistics. London: Pluto.
OECD (2010). “OECD.Statextracts. Gender, Institutions and Development Database 2009” 
388
Accessed on 2/18/2010 through: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=GID2.
Ogawa, Naohiro & Ermisch, John F. (1996). “Family Structure, Home Time Demands, and the 
Employment Patterns of Japanese Married Women” Journal of Labor Economics, 14(4): 
677–702.
Olmsted, Jennifer (2003). “Reexamining the Fertility Puzzle in MENA” In: Posusney, Marsha 
Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East. 
Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 73–94). Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.
Olmsted, Jennifer (2005). “Is Paid Work the (Only) Answer? Neoliberalism, Arab Women’s Well-
Being and the Social Contract” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 1(2): 112–39.
Ong, Aihwa (1991). “The Gender and Labor Politics of Postmodernity” Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 20(1): 279–309.
Olukoshi, Adebayo (2001). “Nigeria” In: Krieger (Ed.). The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
World (2nd edition) (pp. 592–3). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Osman, Osman M. & Ali, Sultan Abou (principal contributors) (2001). Egypt Human Development 
Report 2001. Cairo: Institute of National Planning, Egypt; United Nations Development 
Programme.
Owen, Roger (2004). State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (3rd 
edition). London, New York: Routledge. 
p Pampel, Fred C. (2000). Logistic Regression: A Primer. Series: Quantitative Applications in the  
 Social Sciences, #132. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Pampel, Fred C. & Tanaka, Kazuko (1986). ”Economic Development and Female Labor Force 
Participation: A Reconsideration” Social Forces, 64(3): 599–619.
PAPFam (no date). “Pan-Arab Project of Family Health” Accessed through: http://www.papfam.
org.
Pateman, Carol (1988). The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Paterson, Lindsay & Goldstein, Harvey (1991). “New Statistical Methods for Analysing Social 
Structures: An Introduction to Multilevel Models” British Educational Research Journal, 17(4): 
387–93.
Patung (2006a). “Creeping Sharia Draws Protest” Indonesiamatters, 2/1/2006. Accessed through: 
http://www.indonesiamatters.com/87/creeping-sharia-draws-protests/.
Patung (2006b). “Eighteen Regencies Sharia Bound” Indonesiamatters, 5/4/2006. Accessed 
through: http://www.indonesiamatters.com/320/eighteen-regencies-sharia-bound/.
Patung (2006c). “Freedom of Religion Report” Indonesiamatters, 9/3/2006. Accessed through: 
http://www.indonesiamatters.com/732/freedom-of-religion-report/.
Paxton, Pamela, Melanie M. Hughes & Jennifer L. Green (2006). “The International Women’s 
Movement and Women’s Political Representation, 1893–2003” American Sociological Review, 
71(6): 898–920.
Pepinsky, Thomas B. (2009). “Dominant But Weak. Signs of Underlying Fragility in Nationalist 
Parties May Benefit Islamic Parties in Future Elections” Inside Indonesia, 2009(97). Accessed 
on 10/28/2009 through: http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1216/47/.
Pettit, Becky & Hook, Jennifer (2005). “The Structure of Women’s Employment in Comparative 
Perspective” Social Forces, 84(2): 779–801.
Pfeffermann, D., C.J. Skinner, D.J. Holmes, H. Goldstein & J. Rasbash (1998). “Weighting for 
Unequal Selection Probabilities in Multilevel Models” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
60(1): 23–40.
Pfeifer, Karen & Marsha Pripstein Posusney (2003). “Arab Economies and Globalization: An 
Overview” In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella (Eds.), Women 
and Globalization in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 25–54). Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner.
Phoenix, Ann & Pattynama, Pamela (2006). “Editorial. Intersectionality” European Journal of 
Women’s Studies, 13(3): 187–92.
Pollock, Philip H. (2009). An SPSS Companion To Political Analysis (3rd edition). Washington: CQ 
Press.
389
Popper, Karl (1982). The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism. London: Hutchinson. 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Eleanor Abdella Doumato (2003). “Introduction: The Mixed 
Blessing of Globalization” In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Doumato, Eleanor Abdella 
(Eds.), Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 1–22). 
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.
Prajogo, Daniel I., Tritos Laosirihongthong, Amrik Sohal & Sakun Boon-itt (2007). 
“Manufacturing Strategies and Innovation Performance in Newly Industrialised Countries” 
Industrial Management & Data Systems, 107(1): 52–68.
Pyle, Jean L. & Ward, Kathryn B. (2003). “Recasting Our Understanding of Gender and Work 
During Global Restructuring” International Sociology, 18(3): 461–89. 
q Quran (1993). Al-Qur’an. A Contemporary Translation by Ahmed Ali. Princeton, New Jersey:   
 Princeton University Press. 
r Radwan, Samir (2002). “Employment and Unemployment in Egypt: Conventional Problems,   
 Unconventional Remedies” ECES: The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Working Paper No.  
 70. The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies.
Ragin, Charles (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Ramazanoğlu, Caroline & Holland, Janet (2002). Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices. 
London: SAGE.
Rani, Uma & Schmid, Juan Pedro (2008). “Household Characteristics, Employment and Poverty in 
India” Working Paper. NADEL, E TH Zurich.
Rathgeber, Eva M. (1990). “WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice” The Journal of 
Developing Areas, 24(4): 489–502.
Razavi, Shahrashoub & Miller, Carol (1995). “From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the Women 
and Development Discourse” Occasional Paper 1, February 1995, United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development, United Nations Development Programme.
Read, Jen’nan Ghazal (2002). “Challenging Myths of Muslim Women: The Influence of Islam On 
Arab-American Women’s Labor Force Activity” The Muslim World, 92(1–2): 19–37.
Read, Jen’nan Ghazal (2003). “The Sources of Gender Role Attitudes among Christian and Muslim 
Arab-American Women” Sociology of Religion, 64(2): 207–22.
Read, Jen’nan Ghazal (2004). “Family, Religion, and Work Among Arab American Women” Journal 
of Marriage and Family, 66(4): 1042–50.
Regt, de, Marina (2009). “Preferences and Prejudices: Employers’ Views on Domestic Workers in 
the Republic of Yemen” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 34(3): 559–81.
Reinharz, Shulamit (1992). Feminist Methods in Social Research. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Richards, David L. & Gelleny, Ronald (2007). “Women’s Status and Economic Globalization” 
International Studies Quarterly, 51(4): 855–76.
Rihoux, Benoît & Ragin, Charles C. (Eds.) (2009). Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QC A) and Related Techniques. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Rizzo, Helen, Abdel-Latif, Abdel-Hamid & Meyer, Katherine (2007). “The Relationship Between 
Gender Equality and Democracy: A Comparison of Arab Versus Non-Arab Muslim Societies” 
Sociology, 41(6): 1151–70.
Rodríguez, Germán & Goldman, Noreen (2001). “Improved Estimation Procedures for Multilevel 
Models with Binary Response: A Case Study” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 164(2): 
339–55.
Rosenberg, Karen E. & Judith A. Howard (2008). “Finding Feminist Sociology: A Review Essay” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 33(3): 675–96.
Ross, Michael L. (2001). “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, 53(3): 325–61. 
Ross, Michael L. (2008). “Oil, Islam, and Women” American Political Science Review, 102(1): 
107–23.
Rudra, Nita (2005). “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing 
390
World” American Journal of Political Science, 49(4): 704–30.
Rukhsana, Zia (2004). Globalization, Modernization, and Education in Muslim Countries. New York: 
Nova Science Publishers.
Ruthven, Malise (1997). Islam: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
S Sanday, Peggy (1974). “Female Status in the Public Domain” In: Rosaldo, Michelle Z. & Lamphere,  
 Louise (Eds.) Women, Culture, and Society (pp. 189–206). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Scharff, Christina (2011). “Disarticulating Feminism: Individualization, Neoliberalism, and the 
Othering of ‘Muslim Women’” European Journal of Women’s Studies, 18(2): 119–34.
Schneider, Gerald, Katherine Barbieri & Nils Petter Gleditsch (Eds.) (2003). Globalization and 
Armed Conflict. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Scholte, Jan-Aart (2001). “The Globalization of World Politics” In: Baylis, John & Smith, Steve 
(Eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (2nd edition) 
(pp. 13–32). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Serra, Narcís, Shari Spiegel & Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008). “Introduction: From the Washington 
Consensus Towards a New Global Governance” In: Serra, Narcís & Joseph E. Stiglitz (Eds.) 
The Washington Consensus Reconsidered. Towards a new Global Governance (pp. 3–13). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Shakry, Omnia (1998). “Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-
Century Egypt” In: Abu-Lughod, Lila (Ed.). Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in The 
Middle East (pp. 126–170). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sherkat, Darren E. (2000). “’That They Be Keepers of the Home’: The Effect of Conservative 
Religion on Early and Late Transitions into Housewifery” Review of Religious Research, 41(3): 
344–58.
Smith, Joanne & Louis, Winnifred (2009). “Group Norms in the Attitude-Behaviour Relationship” 
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3(1): 19–35.
Smits, Jeroen (2007). “Family Background and Context Effects on Educational Participation 
in Five Arab Countries” NiCE Working Paper 07–106 November 2007. Nijmegen Center for 
Economics (NiCE) Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen.
Snijders, Tom & Bosker, Roel (1999). Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced 
Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage.
Social Security Online (2011). “Social Security Programs Throughout the World” Accessed on 
11/29/2010 through: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/.
Spierings, Niels (2007). “Boundaries and Opportunities in Women’s Economic Identity in 
Muslim Countries”. In: Beckett, Clare, Owen Heathcove & Marie Macey (Eds.). Negotiating 
Boundaries? Identities, Sexualities, Diversities (pp. 180–93). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars 
Press.
Spierings, Niels (2010). Een Nieuwe Kijk op Kwantitatieve Methoden in Feministisch Onderzoek. 
Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies, 13(3): 32–44.
Spierings, Niels (2011). “‘Arab’ or ‘Established’ Democracies? Egypt’s and Tunisia’s Post-
Revolutions Elections” Working paper. Institute for Management Research, Radboud 
University Nijmegen.
Spierings, Niels (2012a). “The Inclusion of Quantitative Techniques and Diversity in the 
Mainstream of Feminist Research” European Journal of Women’s Studies, 19(3). Forthcoming.
Spierings, Niels (2012b). “Modeling the complex dynamics shaping participation inequalities” 
Paper Paper prepared for the workshop: “Thinking Big about ‘Gender Equality’ Policy in the 
Comparative Politics of Gender”. The ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of 
Antwerp, Belgium,10th-15th April, 2012.
Spierings, Niels & Smits, Jeroen (forthcoming). “Two Myths about Temporal-Contextual Effects 
on Middle Eastern Women’s Employment: a Multilevel Analysis of Egypt and Jordan in the 
last Two Decades” In: Hassan, Aly & Nugent, Jeffrey B. (Eds.). Confronting Important Labor 
and Human Capital Issues in the Middle East. Forthcoming.
Spierings, Niels, Jeroen Smits & Mieke Verloo (2009). “On the Compatibility of Islam and Gender 
Equality. Effects of Modernization, State Islamization, and Democracy on Women’s Labor 
391
Market Participation in 45 Muslim Countries” Social Indicators Research, 90(3): 503–22. 
Spierings, Niels, Jeroen Smits & Mieke Verloo (2010). “Micro and Macrolevel Determinants of 
Women’s Employment in Six Arab Countries” Journal of Marriage and Family, 72(5):  
1391–1407.
Spitze, Glenna (1988). “Women’s Employment and Family Relations: A Review” Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 50(3): 595–618.
Stacey, Judith & Thorne, Barrie (1985). “The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology” Social 
Problems, 32(4): 301–16. 
Standing, Guy (1996). “Cumulative Disadvantage? Women Industrial Workers in Malaysia and 
the Philippines” In: Moghadam, Valentine M. (Ed.), Patriarchy and Economic Development. 
Women’s Positions at the End of the Twentieth Century (pp. 269–302). Oxford: Clarendon.
Stepan, Alfred & Robertson, Graeme B. (2003). “An “Arab” more than “Muslim” Electoral Gap” 
Journal of Democracy, 14(3): 30–44.
Syed, Jawad (2008). “A Context-Specific Perspective of Equal Employment Opportunity in Islamic 
Societies” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(1): 135–51. 
t Tansel, Aysit (2002). “Economic Development and Female Labor Force Participation in Turkey:  
 Time-Series Evidence and Cross-Province Estimates” ERC Working Papers in Economics 01/05.  
 Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
Tanzania.org (2009) “Economic Survey” Accessed on 12/18/2009 through: http://www.tanzania.
go.tz/smz/ocgs/documents/Economic%20Survey/ Economic%20Survey%20table%20.doc.
Teachman, Jay & Crowder, Kyle (2002). “Multilevel Models in Family Research: Some Conceptual 
and Methodological Issues” Journal of Marriage and Family, 64(2): 280–94.
Togunde, Oladimeji R. (1999). “Determinants of Women’s Employment in Urban Nigeria: the 
Impacts of Socio-Cultural Factors” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 34(3): 279–97.
Tohidi, Nayereh (1996). “Soviet in Public, Azeri in Private: Gender, Islam, and Nationality in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan” Women’s Studies International Forum, 19(1/2): 111–23.
Tzannatos, Zafiris & Kaur, Iqbal (2003). “Women in the MENA Labor Market: An Eclectic Survey” 
In: Posusney, Marsha Pripstein & Eleanor Abdella Doumato (Eds.), Women and Globalization 
in the Arab Middle East. Gender, Economy & Society (pp. 55–72). Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner. 
u Udink, Betsy (2006). Allah & Eva. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Augustus.
UNDP Indonesia (2009). “Indonesia Religions Map [map]” Accessed on 08/12/2009 through: 
http://www.undp.or.id/general/maps/MAP_religions.jpg. 
v Van der Haak, Bregtje (2005). Saoedische oplossingen. Deel 1. Tegenlicht documentaire 6  
 november 2005.Accessed through: http://www.hollanddoc.nl/kijk-luister/   
 documentairemakers/bregtje-van-der-haak.html?playurn=urn:vpro:media:program:86719& 
 currentPage=1.
Van der Lippe, Tanja & Van Dijk, Liset (2002). “Comparative Research on Women’s Employment” 
Annual Review of Sociology, 28(1): 221–41.
Van Evera, Stephen (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
Varea, Carlos (1993). “Marriage, Age at Last Birth and Fertility in a Traditional Moroccan 
Population” Journal of Biosocial Science, 25(1): 1–15.
Vella, Francis (1994). “Gender Roles and Human Capital Investment: The Relationship Between 
Traditional Attitudes and Female Labour Market Performance” Economica, 61(242): 191–211.
Verloo, Mieke (2006). “Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union” 
European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(3): 211–29.
Verloo, Mieke, Anna Van der Vleuten, Willy Jansen & Feride Acar (2006). Gender Mainstreaming in 
Education and Employment. Turin, Italy: European Training Foundation.
Verloo, Mieke & Van der Vleuten, Anna (2009). “The Discursive Logic of Ranking and 
Benchmarking: Understanding Gender Equality Measures in the European Union” In: 
392
Lombardo, Emanuela, Meier, Petra & Verloo, Mieke (Eds.). The Discursive Politics of Gender 
Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policymaking (pp. 166–82). London: Routledge.
Vidyasagar, Girija & Rea, David M. (2004). “Saudi Women Doctors: Gender and Careers Within 
Wahhabi Islam and a ‘Westernised’ Work Culture” Women’s Studies International Forum: 
27(3): 261–80.
Vigilante, Antonio & Allam, Saad Taha (principal contributors) (2003). Egypt Human Development 
Report 2003. Cairo: Institute of National Planning, Egypt; United Nations Development 
Programme.
Vijverberg, Wim P. M. (1993). “Educational Investments and Returns for Women and Men in Côte 
d’Ivoire” The Journal of Human Resources, 28(4): 933–74.
Villarreal, Andrés & Yu, Wei-hsin (2007). “Economic Globalization and Women’s Employment: 
the Case of Manufacturing Mexico” American Sociological Review, 72(3): 365–89.
Vlasbom, Dirk (2011). “Oma, concurrent van de kinderen” NRC Weekend, October, 15th/16th 2011: 
Wetenschap 8–9. 
w Waite, Linda J. (1980). “Working Wives and the Family Life Cycle” American Journal of Sociology,  
 86(2): 272–94.
Waite, Linda J. (1978). “Projecting Female Labor Participation from Sex-Role Attitudes” 
Social Science Research, 7(4): 299–318.
Walby, Sylvia (1992). “Woman and Nation” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 33 (1/2): 
81–100.
Walby, Sylvia (1996). “The ‘Declining Significance’ or ‘Changing Forms’ of Patriarchy?” In: 
Moghadam, Valentine M. (Ed.). Patriarchy and Development. Women’s Positions at the End of 
Twentieth Century (pp. 19–33). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Walby, Sylvia (2007). “Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social 
Inequalities” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 37(4): 449–70.
Walby, Sylvia (2009). Globalization & Inequalities. Complexities and Contested Modernities. London, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Warner, Leah R. (2008). “A Best Practices Guide To Intersectional Approaches In Psychological 
Research” Sex Roles, 59(5–6): 454–63.
WDI (no date), “World databank. World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance” 
Accessed multiple times from 2/28/2010 through: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/
home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2. 
Wejnert, Barbara & Djumabaeva, Almagul (2005). “From Patriarchy to Egalitarianism: Parenting 
Roles in Democratizing Poland and Kyrgyzstan” Marriage & Family Review, 36(3–4): 147–71.
Wekker, Gloria & Lutz, Helma (2001). “Een Hoogvlakte met Koude Winden. De Geschiedenis 
van het Gender- en Etniciteitsdenken in Nederland” In: Botman, Maaike, Jouwe, Nancy 
& Wekker, Gloria (Eds.). Caleidoscopische Visies: de Zwarte, Migranten- en Vluchtelingen 
Vrouwenbeweging in Nederland (pp. 25–50). Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
Westwood, Robert (1997). “Harmony and Patriarchy: The Cultural Basis for ‘Paternalistic 
Headship’ Among the Overseas Chinese” Organization Studies, 18(3): 445–80.
Wheeler, Raymond H. & Gunter, B.G. (1987). “Change in Spouse Age Difference at Marriage: A 
Challenge to Traditional Family and Sex Roles?” The Sociological Quarterly, 28(3): 411–21.
Whitt, Hugh P. (1986). The Sheaf Coefficient: A Simplified and Expanded Approach. Social 
Science Research, 15(2): 174–89.
Winckler, Onn (2002). “The Demographic Dilemma of the Arab World: The Employment Aspect” 
Journal of Contemporary History, 37(4): 617–36.
Wolf, Diane L. (1990). “Daughters, Decisions and Domination: An Empirical and Conceptual 
Critique of Household Strategies” Development and Change, 21(1): 43–74.
Wooten, Stephen (2003). “Women, Men, and Market Gardens: Gender Relations and Income 
Generation in Rural Mali” Human Organization, 62(2): 166–77.
WorldBank (2005). The Economic Advancement of Women in Jordan: A Country Gender 
Assessment. Accessed on 03/01/2007 through: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTMNAREGTOPGENDER/resources/JordanCGA2005.pdf.
393
WorldBank (2010). Arab Republic of Egypt. Gender Assessment 2010. Narrowing the Gap. Improving 
Labor Market Opportunities for Women in Egypt. Accessed on 10/22/2011 through: https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3003/546980ESW0p1120derRepo
rt020100Final.pdf. 
x XTimeLine (2011). “Fulani Empire or the Sokoto Caliphate” Accessed on 12/4/2011 through:   
 http://www.xtimeline.com/evt/view.aspx?id=41806. 
y Young, R.J.C. (2003). Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yount, Kathryn M. & Li, Li (2009). “Women’s ‘‘Justification’’ of Domestic Violence in Egypt” 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 71(5): 1125–40.
Yousef, Tarik, M. (2004). “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North 
Africa since 1950” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3): 91–116.
Yuchtman-Yaar, Ephraim & Alkalay, Yasmin (2007). “Religious Zones, Economic Development and 
Modern Value Orientations: Individual versus Contextual Effects” Social Science Research, 
36(2): 789–807. 
Yuval-Davis, Nira. (2006). “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics” European Journal of Women’s 
Studies, 13(3): 193–209. 
z Zaccarin, Susanna & Donati, Chiara (2008). “The Effects of Sampling Weights in Multilevel   
 Analysis of PISA  Data” Working paper n.119. Università Degli Studi di Trieste.
Zimmerling, Ruth (2003). “Globalization and Democracy: A Framework for Discussion” In: 
Zimmerling, Ruth (Ed.). Democracy and Globalization, The Tampere Club Series Volume 1 
(e-publication). Accessed 9/15/2011 through: http://www.tampereclub.org/e-publications/
tcs1.html.


396
397
Samenvatting
Khadija indachtig
De arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen in 
Moslimlanden 
Vanuit twee wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijk observaties is dit proefschrift gestart. In 
de eerste plaats zien we in de politiek, maatschappij en wetenschap zeer vaak dat er wordt 
gesproken over de abominabele positie van vrouwen in ‘de Moslimwereld’. Deze ‘Moslimwereld’ 
omvat zo’n vijftig landen en meer dan een miljard mensen. De arbeidsmarktparticipatie varieert 
echter enorm. Het aantal vrouwen dat buiten de landbouw actief is ligt onder 5% in Jemen 
en boven de 40% in Nigeria en Kazakstan. Binnen landen zijn de verschillen soms nog groter. 
In Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) is ongeveer tweederde van de vrouwen is werkzaam buiten 
de landbouw, in de Oostelijke Provincie (van Burkina Faso) is het maar 3%. Dit vraagt dus om 
andere verklaringen dan een simplistische en essentialistische focus op ‘de Islamitische cultuur’ 
als allesverklarende kracht. Dit brengt me dan ook meteen bij mijn tweede observatie: het 
(beperkte) onderzoek naar de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden is uitermate 
versnipperd. Dit betekent dat sommige onderzoekers hebben gekeken naar bijvoorbeeld de rol 
van cultuur, anderen naar de invloed van de economische situatie en een derde groep naar de rol 
van politiek en beleid. Eenzelfde versnippering zien we als het gaat om de onderzoekseenheid. 
De ene onderzoeker kijkt naar verschillenen tussen vrouwen in één land, de ander vergelijkt 
landen, en een derde zoomt in op de specifieke ontwikkelingen in een gebied. Om misverstanden 
te voorkomen: dat onderzoek is belangrijk en er zit zeer goed onderzoek tussen. Echter, door 
de versnippering is onze kennis van hoe verschillende invloeden samenhangen en wat de 
algemene patronen zijn beperkt. We weten niet welke factoren het meeste invloed hebben 
op de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen en hoe deze factoren samenhangen. Beïnvloeden ze 
bijvoorbeeld ook elkaar en zijn die invloeden afhankelijk van de context? Dit samenspel aan 
factoren kan alleen onderzocht worden door niet in te zoomen op slechts één of enkele factoren 
maar door het netwerk als geheel te bestuderen en dat is wat ik in dit proefschrift heb gedaan.
Afgeleid uit de twee bovenstaande observaties volgden drie kernvragen die ik heb proberen te 
beantwoorden:
1) Hoe hoog is de mate van arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden en hoe varieert 
dit tussen en binnen deze landen en door de tijd?
2) Welke micro-, meso- en macroniveau factoren hebben de (meeste) invloed op de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden, en hoe beïnvloeden ze deze 
arbeidsparticipatie?
3) Verschilt de invloed van deze factoren op de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in 
Moslimlanden per tijd en locatie, en als dat zo is, hoe en waarom? 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, ben ik begonnen met het formuleren van een viertal 
theoretische principes dat helpt om de veelheid aan samenhangende invloeden op de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden in kaart te brengen en te begrijpen. Hierdoor 
krijgen we niet enkel grip op de factoren die reeds in de literatuur worden genoemd, maar 
is er ook ruimte om de invloed van deze factoren opnieuw te begrijpen en nieuwe invloeden 
te detecteren. Allereerst is het startpunt van mijn analysen dat elke vrouw zelf uiteindelijk 
bepaalt of ze wel of niet de arbeidsmarkt betreedt en bepaald werk uitvoert. De keuze en het 
resultaat daarvan worden bepaald door andere individuen en structuren in de omgeving, zoals 
werkgevers, gezinsleden, beleid, maatschappelijke normen en de arbeidsmarktstructuur. 
Het tweede principe is dat de omgeving van een vrouw te zien is als een aantal concentrische 
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cirkels, waarbij de vrouw zelf geplaatst is in de context van haar huishouden, dat huishouden 
is onderdeel van een lokale gemeenschap, welke weer onderdeel is van een land, en dat land 
is onderdeel van de wereld. Op elke van deze niveaus zijn processen en factoren te vinden die 
de arbeidsbeslissingen en –posities van vrouwen beïnvloeden. Ten derde kan een kenmerk 
van de samenleving op drie verschillende wijzen van invloed zijn op de arbeidsparticipatie: 
er kan sprake zijn van directe invloed (bv. beleid dat vrouwen verbiedt in bepaalde sectoren 
te werken); er kan sprake zijn van indirecte invloed (bv. economische ontwikkeling zorgt voor 
hogere onderwijsniveaus en daardoor voor meer arbeidsparticipatie); en er kan sprake zijn 
van een conditionerend effect waarbij de context de kracht van een kenmerk van de vrouw 
of het huishouden bepaalt (bv. in meer traditionele omgevingen creëert het niet hebben van 
kinderen minder extra kansen voor vrouwen om de arbeidsmarkt te betreden). Ten slotte zijn alle 
invloeden op de arbeidsparticipatie te begrijpen in termen van een drietal condities; aspecten 
die als ze volledig aanwezig zijn als consequentie hebben dat een vrouw werkzaam is. Dat zijn: 
behoeften (needs), mogelijkheden (opportunities) en waarden (values). Behoeften verwijzen 
voornamelijk naar de economische en zorgbehoeften in een huishouden. De eerste duwen een 
vrouw de arbeidsmarkt op, de tweede houden haar in het huishouden. Ook kan gedacht worden 
aan de vraag naar arbeid als een maatschappelijke behoefte. Mogelijkheden focussen op de 
vraag of er (toegankelijk) werk is en of dit aansluit bij de vrouw haar mogelijkheden. Dit omvat 
bijvoorbeeld de bronnen waaruit een vrouw kan putten om werk te vinden, haar capaciteiten, 
en de beschikbaarheid van (bepaalde typen) banen. De derde conditie – waarden – is voor een 
deel onderliggend aan de andere twee omdat de dominante waarden bijvoorbeeld bepalen wie 
wordt gezien als zorgbehoevend en welke banen geschikt zijn voor vrouwen. Daarnaast kunnen 
waarden zich manifesteren in beleid, maatschappelijke normen en door mensen geïnternaliseerd 
zijn en zo ook meer directe invloed om arbeidsbeslissingen hebben.
 Deze vier principes zijn bruikbaar in het verklaren van allerlei vormen van participatie 
(electoraal, sociaal, economisch), waaronder verschillende aspecten van arbeidsparticipatie. 
In dit proefschrift heb ik ze echter toespitst en geconcretiseerd voor één specifiek onderdeel 
daarvan: vrouwen en betaald werk buiten de landbouw. De vertaling van de principes varieert 
namelijk voor bijvoorbeeld agrarische en niet-agrarische arbeidsparticipatie, en deze als één 
onderzoeken zou leiden tot vertekende resultaten. Daarnaast hebben verschillende vormen van 
arbeidsparticipatie andere effecten op de positie van vrouwen (bv. betaald versus onbetaald 
werk) en heb ik er voor gekozen te kiezen voor de vorm die de positie van vrouwen in potentie 
het meest kan versterken: betaalde arbeid.
Concreet leveren de vier principes tal van nieuwe inzichten en verwachtingen op. Ik benoem er 
hier slechts enkele die als voorbeeld dienen. Zo verwacht ik een sterk positief effect van het 
onderwijsniveau van vrouwen op hun kansen op de arbeidsmarkt omdat het hun mogelijkheden 
vergroot. Dit in tegenstelling tot het idee van sommige dat primair onderwijs een negatief effect 
heeft omdat de extra kennis relatief meer oplevert in het huishouden dan op de arbeidsmarkt. 
Economische ontwikkeling zie ik ook als een positieve kracht, maar dan één die werkt via 
bijvoorbeeld meer mogelijkheden door extra werkgelegenheid in feminiene sectoren en 
modernisering van maatschappelijke waardepatronen en normen. Tegelijkertijd verwacht ik 
dat economische ontwikkeling ook de economische behoefte kan verminderen, wat juist een 
negatieve invloed heeft op arbeidsparticipatie. Langs dezelfde gedachte verwacht ik ook dat 
processen als globalisering geen eenduidige invloed hebben. Bijvoorbeeld het liberaliseren van 
de arbeidsmarkt onder druk van het IMF en de Wereldbank kan juist leiden tot de afbraak van 
overheidswerkgelegenheid, een sector waar vaak relatief veel vrouwen werken. 
 Op het huishoudenniveau laat het theoretisch kader sterk zien dat de structuur van een 
huishouden erg belangrijk kan zijn. Gegeven een klassiek patriarchaal waardepatroon dienen 
mannen voor het inkomen te zorgen en vrouwen voor het huishouden. Dit zien we al terug in 
het vaak genoemde beperkende effect van het hebben van kinderen, maar vertaalt zich naar 
nog veel meer factoren. Bijvoorbeeld, de economische behoefte zal minder een rol spelen voor 
vrouwen om de arbeidsmarkt te betreden als er volwassenen mannen zijn die nog kunnen gaan 
werken. Dus in huishoudens met meer volwassen mannen verwacht ik dat de arbeidsparticipatie 
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van vrouwen lager is. Aan de andere kant, de zorgbehoefte kan juist makkelijker ingevuld 
worden als er meer volwassen vrouwen in het huishouden zijn. Van hun aanwezigheid kan 
dus verwacht worden dat het de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen bevordert. Wat betreft de 
invloed van religie, is religie een bron van waarden die zich dus op verschillende manieren 
kunnen manifesteren en dus kan religie meerdere invloeden tegelijkertijd hebben. Als een 
meer traditionele tak van een religie dominant is in een gemeenschap, dan zijn de normen 
restrictiever en kan verwacht worden dat vrouwen minder werken. Dit betekent dat de focus 
op het type religie en Islam ligt en dat ik niet verwacht dat religieuze denominatie een goede 
verklaarder is. Een tweede invloed van religie kan werken via de institutionalisering van ideeën. 
Zo verwacht ik dat gebieden waar bijvoorbeeld de Shari’a onderdeel van het rechtssysteem is, de 
arbeidsparticipatie lager is.
 De voorbeelden hierboven gaan in op directe en indirecte effecten van micro- en 
macroniveau behoeften, mogelijkheden en waarden; zoals geschetst is er ook het 
conditionerende effect. Voor het effect van onderwijsniveau verwacht ik bijvoorbeeld dat het 
relatieve effect kleiner is in gebieden waar er meer service sector banen zijn zolang er een tekort 
aan hogeropgeleide mensen is. In die situatie zullen namelijk ook minderhoogopgeleide vrouwen 
aangenomen worden omdat de pool van hogeropgeleiden reeds is uitgeput. Dit verkleint 
het gat tussen de lager en hogeropgeleiden. Vergelijkbaar, verwacht ik dat het effect van 
onderwijs groter is in meer traditionele gebieden. Hogeropgeleiden zullen zich overal redelijk 
weten te ontworstelen aan maatschappelijke normen, maar als die normen zwakker zijn is er 
ook meer ruimte voor lageropgeleide vrouwen om de arbeidsmarkt te betreden. Ik verwacht 
ook dat er sterke conditionele effecten bestaan voor de invloed van de eerdergenoemde 
huishoudstructuren, waarbij die invloed afhankelijk is van de kracht en vorm van het patriarchale 
systeem in een land of gebied. Bijvoorbeeld, de aanwezig van volwassenen mannen wordt 
verwacht minder sterk te zijn als het kostwinner–zorgdrageronderscheid minder sterk langs de 
sekselijn loopt en vrouwen bijvoorbeeld meer in beeld zijn als huishoudleden die een inkomen 
kunnen verwerven. Een andere verwachting is dat in minder traditionele gebieden vrouwen 
zonder kinderen relatief vaker betaald werk hebben dan vrouwen met kinderen, dan in meer 
traditionele gebieden. Ofwel, dat de invloed van het hebben van kinderen groter is in minder 
traditionele gebieden. De verklaring hiervoor is dat in meer traditionele gebieden het niet 
zo veel uitmaakt of je kinderen hebt of niet: als vrouw wordt niet van je verwacht dat je de 
arbeidsmarkt betreedt. Deze norm is wat losser in minder traditionele gebieden en dan voor de 
vrouwen die geen moederrol hebben in het bijzonder. 
Om al deze en andere verwachtingen over (het samenspel van) verklarende factoren te toetsen 
maak ik in dit onderzoek gebruik van enkele tientallen enquêtes die in totaal informatie 
verschaffen over ongeveer 300.000 vrouwen, uit meer dan 225.000 huishoudens. Deze 
huishoudens zijn verdeeld over 383 provincies van 28 (van de ongeveer 50) Moslimlanden 
uit verschillende hoeken van de wereld. De landen zijn: Algerije, Azerbeidjaan, Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypte, Eritrea, Guinee, Indonesië, Jemen, Jordanië, Kazakstan, Kirgizië, 
Libanon, Maleisië, Mali, Mauritanië, Marokko, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Tsjaad, Tunesië, Turkije en Zanzibar. Op basis van de huishoudenquêtes van DHS, PAPFam en 
IPUMS zijn alle vrouwen geselecteerd die niet op school zitten en geen handicap hebben. Van 
deze vrouwen en hun huishoudens zijn socio-economische, demografische en religieusculturele 
kenmerken ontgonnen van de enquêtes. De provincieniveauvariabelen zijn voornamelijk 
gebaseerd op aggregatie van de enquêtedata en daarmee meet ik economische ontwikkeling, 
arbeidsmarktstructuren en maatschappelijke normen. Voor de casestudies van Egypte, Indonesië 
en Nigeria maak ik ook gebruik van andere provinciedata, zoals die van de lokale UNDP bureaus, 
verkiezingsuitslagen en secundaire literatuur over religieuze instituties en groepen. De data over 
de landen is ook afkomstig uit externe datasets en gekoppeld aan de enquêtedata. Het betreft 
hier enkele economische en politieke variabelen. 
 Deze rijke micro- en provincieniveaudata voor een groot aantal landen en de focus op enkel 
Moslimlanden (een focus die het risico wegneemt dat er weer simplistische vergelijkingen tussen 
Moslimlanden en het Westen als twee monolithische blokken worden gemaakt) maken het in 
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het bijzonder mogelijk om te onderzoeken wat de diversiteit in arbeidsparticipatie is, en of en 
hoe de complexe samenhang van verklaringen vorm krijgt. Met deze data worden diversiteit 
en complexiteit een empirische te onderzoeken fenomeen en niet een assumptie dat dit wel 
of niet bestaat. De diversiteit is onderzocht door simpele descriptieven voor (sub)groepen in 
de steekproef te presenteren en enkele bivariate analysen uit te voeren. Om te onderzoeken 
welke factoren de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen kunnen verklaren en hoe deze samenhangen, 
is er gebruik gemaakt van logistische multiniveau-analyse (vier niveaus), met crossniveau- 
interactietermen.
Op basis van deze data en theorie zijn tal van analysen uitgevoerd. De belangrijkste resultaten 
zullen hier uitgelicht worden. Met betrekking tot de eerste vraag laten de data een sterke 
empirische diversiteit zien. De variatie in arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden 
varieert zo sterk tussen de landen, provincies en vrouwen dat het niet mogelijk is om te spreken 
van een algemeen niveau van arbeidsparticipatie in ‘de Moslimwereld’. In deze steekproef is 
ongeveer 1 op de 4 vrouwen betaald actief op de niet-agrarische arbeidsmarkt, maar percentages 
variëren van 3,6% in Jemen, 8,7% in Djibouti en 9,1% in Algerije tot 43,5% in Zanzibar, 45,8% 
in Kazakstan en 47,4% in Nigeria. Dalen we af naar het provincieniveau dan blijken zelfs 
bovengenoemde cijfers nog veel diversiteit te maskeren. In de meeste landen was het verschil 
tussen de provincie met de hoogste en laagste arbeidsparticipatie minimaal 20 procentpunten. In 
90 van de 383 provincies, uit 13 verschillende landen, lag de arbeidsparticipatie onder de 10% en 
in 28 provincies – uit 12 landen – was het meer dan 50%. In twee (Nigeriaanse) provincies lag de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen boven de 75%. Voor vijf landen (Bangladesh, Egypte, Indonesië, 
Jordanië en Nigeria) is er ook een vergelijking gemaakt tussen vier punten in de tijd, zo ongeveer 
tussen 1990 en 2008. Hieruit blijkt dat er ook geen sprake is van een duidelijk stijgende trend. 
Alleen voor Nigeria wordt een dergelijk patroon waargenomen met een arbeidsparticipatie 
van ongeveer 30% in 1990 en richting de 50% in 2008. Algemeenheden houden geen stand 
en simplistische retoriek en generalisaties, zoals het schetsen van een exemplarisch land 
“Islamistan” wat Ayaan Hirsi Ali doet in De Maagdenkooi, doen ernstig afbreuk aan de werkelijk. 
De resultaten aangaande de tweede vraag, over de (belangrijkste) invloeden op de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen, zijn te vangen in het idee van gestructureerde veelheid. Met 
andere woorden: menig factor heeft invloed, maar elke invloed kan begrepen worden in termen 
van behoeften, mogelijkheden en waarden.
 Op het niveau van het individu en huishouden manifesteert het belang van economische 
behoeften zich vooral in een negatief effect van het hebben van een partner en het 
positieve effect van huishoudhoofd zijn. In het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië is de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen tevens lager als er meer volwassen mannen in het huishouden 
wonen. Het beperkende effect van zorgbehoeften, en hoe die (voornamelijk) drukken op de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen, werd weerspiegeld in een negatieve relatie tussen het hebben 
van (in het bijzonder jonge) kinderen en arbeidsparticipatie, alsook de positieve invloed van de 
aanwezigheid van meer volwassen vrouwen. In het Midden-Oosten lijkt ook de aanwezigheid 
van oudere gezinsleden de zorgbehoefte zodanig te verhogen dat het vrouwen beperkt in het 
betreden van de arbeidsmarkt. In dezelfde regio blijken kinderen die geen onderdeel zijn van de 
bloedlijn van het huishoudenhoofd echter minder zwaar te drukken op arbeidsparticipatie van 
vrouwen dan andere kinderen. Of de kinderen jongens of meisjes zijn leek niet van belang. 
 De mogelijkheden van vrouwen, in termen van vaardigheden en bronnen, hadden ook 
duidelijk een positief effect op de arbeidsparticipatie. In het bijzonder het onderwijsniveau van 
vrouwen is van grote invloed. Van alle factoren had het onderwijsniveau het meeste invloed en 
elke stap extra onderwijs (primair, secundair, tertiair) draagt bij aan een grotere kans op een 
betaalde baan. Het effect mag verschillen per context (zie Vraag 3 verderop), maar het effect 
is overwegend positief. Het moet tegelijkertijd niet vergeten worden dan van alle vrouwen die 
een betaalde baan heeft een ongeveer even groot deel geen onderwijs heeft als dat tertiair 
onderwijs heeft gevolgd. Het beroep van de partner is gezien als het sociaal netwerk waarover 
een vrouw beschikt in het vinden van een baan, en ook dat lijkt de kansen op een baan te 
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verhogen. De aanwezigheid van meer broers leek geen algemeen beperkend effect te hebben 
op de benutting van huishoudbronnen. 
 De laatste groep variabelen was er op gericht om de (geïnternaliseerde) waardepatronen in 
een huishouden te meten. Religieuze denominatie bleek geen goede indicator te zijn en in een 
substantieel aantal landen – waaronder in meer detail bestudeerd Indonesië en Nigeria – lag 
de arbeidsparticipatie van Moslimvrouwen hoger dan die van Christelijke vrouwen. Maten voor 
meer concrete waardepatronen daarentegen zijn een betere voorspeller. Vrouwen wier partner 
beduidend ouder is en vrouwen in polygyne en niet-kerngezinnen hadden lagere arbeidsratio’s. 
Voor de leeftijd waarop een vrouw haar eerste kind baarde waren de resultaten minder 
eenduidig. Wat betreft de individuele en huishoudinvloeden laat dit onderzoek onder andere 
zien dat (1) onderwijs één van de allerbelangrijkste factoren is, en ook bij lagere onderwijsniveaus 
een positief effect heeft op vrouwen hun mogelijkheden; (2) gezien de waardepatronen, naast 
het hebben van kinderen en een partner, er ook een belangrijke rol is weggelegd voor de verdere 
samenstelling van het huishouden in het vormen van de economische en –zorgbehoeften en 
dus de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen; (3) religieuze denominatie een slechte indicator is voor 
waardepatronen en een focus op Islam vs. Christendom kortzichtig en simplistisch is; en (4) het 
effect van microniveaufactoren contextafhankelijk is (zie Vraag 3), maar tegelijkertijd algemene 
verbanden laat zien als bij onderwijs en de aanwezigheid van een partner en andere volwassen 
vrouwen.
 Voor het provincie-, land- en globale niveau zijn de resultaten in dit proefschrift evenzo 
veelduidig en geven ze veel inzicht in de processen die de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen 
beïnvloeden. De behoefte aan arbeid op het provincieniveau creëert duidelijk kansen voor 
vrouwen zolang het banen zijn die volgens de maatschappelijke normen bij vrouwen passen 
(service sector en lichte handenarbeid zoals de voedsel- en textielindustrie), en er niet te veel 
mannen werkloos zijn. Voornamelijk de hogeropgeleide vrouwen lijken te profiteren van extra 
banen. De mogelijkheden van vrouwen lijken tevens groter in stedelijke gebieden. Economische 
ontwikkeling van een gebied zorgt echter niet alleen voor extra banen, maar heeft ook een 
positief effect op de arbeidsparticipatie door veranderende waardepatronen en het creëert 
meer mogelijkheden voor vrouwen doordat hun opleidingsniveau stijgt. Tegelijkertijd lijkt 
economische ontwikkeling samen te hangen met de economische behoeften, wat verklaart dat 
er na het wegfilteren van bovenstaande effecten een negatief verband tussen economische 
ontwikkeling en arbeidsparticipatie (buiten de landbouw) bestaat. 
 Betreffende de waarden, blijkt dat de dominantie van Islam in de provincies geen goede 
predictor is van arbeidsparticipatie. Wel duiden de resultaten erop dat de incorporatie van 
conservatieve Islam in de landelijke of provinciale wetgeving (bv Shari’a) een negatief effect 
heeft op de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen, en de casestudie van Indonesië duidt er ook op dat 
in gebieden waar een meer conservatieve vorm van Islam de dominante religie is minder vrouwen 
actief zijn. Ook is het zo dat in gebieden waar vrouwen minder zichtbaar zijn in de publieke 
ruimte, de kans voor elke individuele vrouw om een baan te hebben aanzienlijk kleiner is. 
De casestudie voor Egypte gaf ook meer inzicht in de complexe invloed van land- en 
wereldniveaufactoren. Hieruit bleek dat het economisch privatiseringsbeleid vanuit het IMF 
en de Wereldbank als ook de terroristische aanslagen (deels als reactie op een gepercipieerde 
invasie van Westerse waarden en machten) een negatief effect hebben op de arbeidsparticipatie 
in de provincies waar bepaalde arbeidsmarkten groot zijn. De aanslagen lijken bijvoorbeeld 
vooral veel schade gedaan te hebben aan de arbeidsparticipatie in de toeristische provincies. 
 Voor de meso- en macro-invloeden (provincie, land, globaal) zijn enkele van de belangrijkste 
bevindingen van dit onderzoek dat (1) processen als economische ontwikkeling, globalisering 
en modernisering uiteengerafeld moeten worden om te begrijpen wat de verschillende en 
soms tegengestelde effecten van deze processen op de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen zijn; 
(2) dat de beschikbaarheid van banen cruciaal is, maar dat deze beschikbaarheid afhankelijk 
is van de lokale normen over wat geschikte banen zijn, die zowel de preferenties van vrouwen 
en werkgevers bepalen; (3) de nabijheid van banen en normen (of meer algemeen: verklarende 
factoren) van groot belang is in het begrijpen van wie door de contextvariabelen wordt 
beïnvloed, wat te zien is in het belang van de provincievariabelen boven de landvariabelen en het 
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indirecte of getrapte effect van de globale processen; en (4) religie een belangrijke rol speelt, 
maar enkel een beperkend effect heeft of de arbeidsparticipatie als conservatieve elementen 
geïnstitutionaliseerd worden in beleid of maatschappelijke normen.
De derde en laatste vraag van dit proefschrift richtte zich op of en hoe factoren in invloed kunnen 
variëren als de omstandigheden anders zijn. De kernconclusie is er een van gegeneraliseerde 
contextafhankelijkheid: de effecten van in ieder geval het onderwijsniveau en samenstelling 
van het huishouden zijn afhankelijk van economische, culturele en politieke omstandigheden. 
Daarbij is het niet zo dat dezelfde factoren sterk tegengestelden effecten laten zien, maar deze 
factoren hebben soms (het verwachte) effect en soms niet, en de kracht van het effect varieert 
per context.
 Onderwijs heeft grofweg altijd een positief effect, maar dat effect varieert geografisch en 
door de tijd, met een aantal vrij duidelijke patronen. Als het aantal hoogopgeleiden (tertiair) 
mensen kleiner is dan de vraag naar hoog (tertiair) opgeleiden, dan kunnen hogeropgeleide 
vrouwen relatief gemakkelijk een baan vinden. Als er relatief meer banen bij komen (meer 
urbanisatie, meer service sector, minder werkloze mannen), dan komt dit vooral ten gunste 
van de minderhoogopgeleide vrouwen. Het statistische effect van onderwijs is dan kleiner. 
Echter als er een overschot aan hoogopgeleide mensen is, dan vergroot het gat tussen hoog- 
en lageropgeleide vrouwen zodra er extra arbeidsmogelijkheden zijn. Dit is anders voor extra 
banen in de lichte handarbeid. Deze komen voornamelijk ten gunste van de hoogstopgeleide 
vrouwen. Een goede verklaring hiervoor lijkt te zijn dat er hoogopgeleide vrouwen zijn die wel 
willen werken, maar niet buitenshuis; dan biedt juist deze sector mogelijkheden om thuis aan de 
slag te gaan. Naast de arbeidsmarktstructuren bleken ook normen belangrijk in het vormen van 
de toegevoegde waarde van onderwijs. De resultaten ondersteunen voornamelijk het idee dat 
vrouwen met tertiair onderwijs zich sterker weten te ontworstelen aan maatschappelijke normen 
en die normen dus weinig verschil maken. Echter, de invloed van deze normen lijkt sterker voor 
vrouwen met een lager opleidingsniveau. Voor onderwijs in zijn algemeenheid lijkt het zo te zijn 
dat de hoogstopgeleide vrouwen relatief immuun zijn voor de omgeving (danwel omdat ze zelf 
meer vrijgevochten zijn, danwel omdat werkgevers hogeropgeleide vrouwen prefereren), maar 
dat voor de lageropgeleide vrouwen de omstandigheden wel vrij belangrijk zijn.
 De invloed van huishoudstructuren is vooral gekoppeld aan economische en patriarchale 
verschillen tussen de subregio’s (het groter Midden-Oosten, Central Azië, Sub-Sahara Afrika, 
Zuidoost Azië). Daaruit is bijvoorbeeld af te leiden dat als de arbeidsdeling strikter is (vrouwen 
regelen het huishouden, mannen verdienen een inkomen) en de zorgtaken breder zijn dan alleen 
de zorg voor kinderen (Midden-Oosten), dan is het effect van de zorgbehoeften (voornamelijk 
de aanwezigheid van kinderen) zwakker. Ook zagen we dat onder economisch zwaardere 
omstandigheden (Sub-Sahara Afrika) de zorgbalans (de aanwezigheid van kinderen en volwassen 
vrouwen) minder van invloed is op de arbeidsparticipatie. Het verschil in effect tussen het 
hebben van kinderen die wel of geen onderdeel zijn van de bloedlijn van het hoofd van het 
huishouden blijkt ook groter naarmate de patrilineaire normen sterker zijn (Midden-Oosten).
 Dit proefschrift maakt helder dat contextafhankelijkheid niet een excuus mag zijn voor 
een relativistische assumptie. Effecten kunnen algemene patronen laten zien en tegelijkertijd 
een variërend effect hebben. Juist die variatie in effecten kan ook weer begrepen worden 
in algemene, maar meer genuanceerde, verbanden. In dit onderzoek is dit theoretisch 
doorgeëxerceerd en empirisch onderzocht. Een aantal patronen heeft dit werk reeds 
blootgelegd, maar meer theoretische en empirische aandacht is zeker noodzakelijk om de 
complexiteit van invloeden op de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen te begrijpen. 
Al met al slaat dit proefschrift een brug tussen verschillende literaturen over de 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen in Moslimlanden en verschillende methodologische 
tradities, en zodoende biedt het een nieuw inzicht in welke factoren de arbeidsparticipatie 
van vrouwen beïnvloeden en hoe deze factoren met elkaar verweven zijn. Terwijl de focus op 
arbeidsparticipatie, vrouwen en Moslimlanden ligt, is de meer algemene benadering evenzogoed 
toepasbaar op andere vormen van participatie, andere groepen, en andere landen. Ook daarvoor 
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zou het zinvol zijn om juist de complexiteit aan invloeden beter te begrijpen en in kaart te 
brengen. 
 Het belang van deze exercitie strekt verder dan enkel meer wetenschappelijk inzicht. 
Voor het maatschappelijk-politieke debat laat dit proefschrift de grote diversiteit tussen en in 
Moslimlanden zien en daarmee wordt het helder dat er niet simpelweg gesproken kan worden 
over deze landen als één homogeen blok. Evenmin is er sprake van een eenduidig (negatief) 
effect van Islam. Het maken van dergelijke claims hebben misschien een politiek doel, maar 
brengt de werkelijkheid enorme schade toe. Dit neemt niet weg dat er voor veel van de vrouwen 
in deze landen (als in zo’n beetje elk land op deze aardbol) nog behoorlijk wat vooruitgang te 
boeken is, onder andere in termen van economische onafhankelijkheid. 
 Gericht en geïnformeerd beleid kan hier zeker aan bijdragen. Dit onderzoek is niet het eerste 
dat wijst op het belang van de creatie van banen, het verzorgen van onderwijs en het bevechten 
van patriarchale normen. Echter, de ideeën van gestructureerde veelheid en gegeneraliseerde 
contextafhankelijkheid brengen een verfijning aan in dit soort beleidsadviezen en ze helpen om 
bloot te leggen wat mogelijke (negatieve) bijeffecten zijn en welke groepen voornamelijk bereikt 
lijken te worden. Een eerste voorbeeld is dat het verzorgen van kinderopvangfaciliteiten vooral 
vrouwen in minder traditionele omgevingen zal helpen, omdat daar de zorgrol zich minder sterk 
richt op andere huishoudtaken die niet worden weggenomen door kinderopvang. Het creëren 
van banen werkt voornamelijk als rekening wordt gehouden met de preferenties van werknemers 
en de vrouwen, daarbij moeten dus de lokale gendernormen over wat toelaatbaar is, ook qua 
reizen, in acht genomen worden. De focus op onderwijs levert een derde voorbeeld: hoger 
onderwijs lijkt de kansen van vrouwen aanzienlijk te vergroten, niet alleen ten opzichte van 
lageropgeleide vrouwen, maar hogeropgeleide vrouwen lijken ook regelmatig geprefereerd over 
minderhoogopgeleide mannen. Het opleiden van vrouwen is in dat licht voornamelijk effectief in 
gebieden met relatief weinig hoogopgeleide mannen. Primair onderwijs, daarentegen, is vooral 
effectief in minder traditionele gebieden. In de meer traditionele gebieden wordt er pas meer 
effect gesorteerd als er ook vervolgopleidingen worden genoten. Elk van deze voorbeelden 
wijst ook in een meer algemeen patroon waarbij de meeste maatregelen vooral ten goede lijken 
te komen aan de vrouwen die toch al in een relatief betere situatie zitten. Daarmee kan de 
ongelijkheid onder vrouwen verder groeien.
Dit proefschrift draagt de naam van Khadija – de eerste Moslim, de eerste vrouw van 
Mohammed, een economisch onafhankelijke handelsvrouw. Zij blijkt niet alleen een legende of 
haast mythische figuur; zij is een realistisch voorbeeld voor vrouwen in Moslimlanden. Vrouwen 
van wie dit proefschrift in kaart heeft gebracht wat hun arbeidsmarktbeslissingen en – positie 
beïnvloedt.
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